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SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

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PREFACE

This paper represents an attempt to define and examine the security sector reform in post-1989 democratization countries of South East Europe. The interest for the issue grew out of my general interest on how the governance structures affect a security situation in a country. The more I thought about the subject, the more important it seemed to me. Since nobody else seemed to have examined it – at least in the way I thought it ought to be examined – I felt compelled to do so myself. I shall be disappointed if it does not lead to further research in this field, however critical of my own standpoint it may prove to be.

In the period of April-December 2002, the author conducted standardized interviews with number of governmental officials, military officers, professionals and experts in each of the following country: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro and Romania. The questions asked related to three major issues, which are also main issues of this paper: the importance of the security sector reform; reforms in the particular parts of the security sector; and factors determining the actual reform.

I am grateful to the Director of the East European Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Martin Sletzinger, who was an excellent host during my three-month fellowship at the Center, to his staff Sabina Auger and Meredith Knepp and to the Director of the Center, Lee Hamilton. I must also thank Janet Spikes and her staff at the library of the Wilson Center, who made great efforts to help me in obtaining the very wide range of books and other materials from both Center's library and the Library of Congress that were necessary to carry out my research.

All these friends, critics and associates facilitated the creative process, but in the end, of course, it remains my study and my responsibility. With all this help, the remaining errors and deficiencies must be clearly mine alone.

Finally, I dedicate this study to Nesrin, who finally saw me emerge from a stack of paper and a pile of materials and documents and still recognized me. For the life and love we share.

Islam Yusufi

Gostivar, Macedonia, February 18, 2003

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INTRODUCTION

The post-1989 transitional countries of South East Europe, namely, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia-Montenegro, from early 1990s became involved in an effort at reforming their security sector. These reforms were the beginning of the long lasting process of transforming or establishing new security institutions, including, the army, police, judiciary, border services and intelligence agencies.

The goal was to create a functioning democratic state and society in which the citizens are able to live without fear, whose human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed and whose property rights are protected. The transition process itself, the legacy of pre-1989 socialist regime and the implications of the armed conflicts that occurred in the period of 1991-2001 in the region, however, damaged the normal functioning of the security institutions and attempted efforts to reform them. As these institutions were not able to fulfill the constitutional and legal duties that were assigned to them, later they became frequent abusers of human rights and became one of the major sources of the instability and insecurity in the dominant part of societies of South East Europe.

This paper lays out the scope of the problem of the security structures in the countries of South East Europe and analyzes the security sector reform with particular attention to strengthening the governance structures in the security sector agencies.

The very idea of this research paper is to provide an extensive but not exhaustive review of the security sector reform in South East Europe in order to better understand undertaken reforms and their impact on the governance and security situation in the countries of the region. The paper will consist of five parts. The first part will give an evaluation of the concept of the security sector reform and its relevance and significance for the countries of South East Europe. The second part, in addition to the assessment of the new engagement of the international community for security sector reform in South East Europe, will include an assessment of the newly emerged domestic and regional environment within which the security reform has evolved. Assessment of the security

reform implementation practices, the reforms attempted, the obstacles encountered, successes achieved and reforms left undone, will constitute the third part. The fourth will comparatively assess the security reform experiences in South East Europe and will give evaluation of the challenges that are ahead of the countries of South East Europe in the area of security sector reform. The fifth and last part will evaluate the lessons learned from the reforms and the impact of the security sector reform on the governance and security situation of a country.

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The security sector reform (SSR) as a concept came to be used, first by the authors from the development economics school. They were concerned about the negative effects of the unreformed security sector to the development of the economies in the developing and less developed countries. The implicit assumption of the development paradigms has been the promotion of economic growth automatically enhances the peace and stability.[1] Later, there were authors who were concerned about the negative impact of an excessive or misdirected security sector for domestic governance.[2] Following them, there were writings that gave special emphasis on human rights and democratization in donor attitudes, which in turn raised the questions of the transparency and accountability in the security sector.[3] In addition to this, the debates on civil-military relations have also been a source for the discussions on SSR.[4]

Currently, in the study of SSR, there are two approaches with regard to the definition of SSR. The first is concerned with those formations authorized by the state to use force to protect the state itself and its citizens. This definition limits SSR to organizations such as the regular military, paramilitary police forces and the intelligence services. The second approach takes a wider view of SSR, defining it as those organizations and activities concerned with the provision of security.[5]

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[1] See Malcolm Chalmers, "Security sector reform in developing countries: an EU perspective," *Saferworld Conflict Prevention Research Report*, (January 2000).

[2] Nicole Ball, "Good Practices in Security Sector Reform," in *Security Sector Reform*, ed. Herbert Wulf (Bonn: BICC, 2000), 14-22.

[3] See Janet Chanaa, "Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects," *Adelphi Paper* 344, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[4] T. Edmunds, A. Forster and A. Cottey, "The Armed Forces and Society: A Framework for Analysis," *TCMR Paper* 1.13c (May 2002), http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/TCMR%20Papers/TCMR%201.13.htm.

[5] Jane Chanaa from IISS defines the security sector as encompassing those elements that have been granted a legitimate and exclusive role in the exercise of coercive power in society to deal with external and internal threats to the security of the state and its citizens. See Chanaa. For the GTZ, security sector reform embraces not only security from external threat, but also material, physical and social security as well as protection from broadly harm . . . Above all, security sector reform means guaranteeing human security. See Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), "Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries," (Eschborn, 2000), http://www.gtz.de. Timothy Edmunds considers the "security sector" as a whole, including formations for internal as well as external security. See Timothy Edmunds, "Defining Security Sector Reform," *TCMR Paper* 1.11 (April 2001),
http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/TCMR%20Papers/TCMR%201.11.htm.

In this paper we will follow the more precise operationalization of the term by the Stability Pact for South East Europe taking security sector to mean "all those organizations which have authority to use, or order to the use of, force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight. It includes: (a) military and paramilitary forces; (b) intelligence services; (c) police forces, border guards, customs services and corrections; (d) judicial and penal systems; (e) civil structures that are responsible for the management and oversight of the above."[6]

We take an issue or problem driven rather than a definition or institutional driven approach to security sector reform. With this the author accepts that there are distinct targeted components of SSR, while recognizing that there are also generic crosscutting issues inherent in SSR that have relevance to the security sector as a whole.

The army, police, intelligence agencies and other security sector agencies overstepping their constitutional and legal bounds and engaging in widespread abuses, organized crime and corruption became frequent cases in the countries of South East Europe (SEE). The entire check and balances and control system became inefficient and ineffective. The parliament, under the influence of the corrupt and organized crime syndicates functioning within the state security structures, was not able to oversight and control the actions of these agencies. The judiciary, not willing and able to act independently, predominantly became in the service only of a particular group or faction of the political elites. Expectations for higher returns, combined with the increased rates of poverty and unemployment and decreasing standards of living led to the involvement of the security agents in the smuggling and trafficking of arms, drugs and people. In short, security agencies and structures became obstacles in the strengthening of the governance structures in the government and in the improvement of the security situation, contributing to the increase of the instability and insecurity in the region.

Even today, at the beginning of the 21st century the afore-mentioned characteristics of the security sector agencies continue to plague SEE democratization countries. However, as the international community has shown signs of loss of patience and as these countries

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[6] Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, *Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Sector Reform to the Working Table III*, (November 27, 2001), 5.

have been able to enter the stability era following the armed conflicts and violence that stand as impediments for their integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, SSR has taken a new shape and urgency.

SSR is one of the most important tools for a country to enhance its security, to strengthen its governance structures, to achieve higher growth in the economy and to promote overall further democratization.

Lack of security, has remained as a major obstacle to the development of the SSR in SEE. Of the seven Stability Pact recipients of aid, five (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro) suffered armed conflicts during 1990s and early 2000s. Other Stability Pact recipients, Bulgaria and Romania, remained vulnerable to the challenges that can pose difficulties for reforming the security sector. In this context, SSR is an important element of the wider conflict prevention agenda and can act as an important regional confidence building measure.

The effective and efficient security sector structures can enable the citizens to conduct their political, economic, social and cultural activities without being under the fear of possible violence. An effective security sector is also a crucial element in the creation of the strong and viable state structures. SEE countries possess weak security governance structures and these structures are under the heavy influence of corruption and thus, under the influence of the organized crime, which has led to a reluctant judiciary, which is not able and eager to take actions against those who violate the law.

Unreformed security sector have posed difficulties for the countries of SEE to further their aims of the development of the market economy. Inefficient and ineffective security sector causes instability and unpredictability, which in turn provokes disruptions in the economic development of a country. Corruption is a likely result of the unreformed security sector, which causes inefficient allocation of the resources and undermines legitimate economic activities. Unreformed security sector is most likely to use excessive budgetary resources, which prevents the creation of the peace dividend, which can move a part of budgetary resources from the security sector to the economy.

Unreformed security sector also poses difficulties for the democratization of a country. The conflicts of 1990s in SEE have resulted in the lost of the control over the part of the territories of the respected countries and to political and economic collapse. In some parts of countries of SEE, the rule of law does not extend to all parts of their territories.

SSR has also been an important accession criterion for SEE countries wanting to join Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and EU. NATO particularly has been active in promoting SSR issues in SEE through its Partnership for Peace program and its Membership Action Plan. While future decisions on accession are likely to be decided as much by political reasons as by specific SSR successes, SSR remains an important factor in SEE countries' endeavors to join these institutions.

These factors have been of great value for the countries of the region for understanding the importance of SSR. However, it has been the combination of internal and external environment evolved in the last couple of years that has given an impetus for the reforms in this field.

II. REFLECTION ON THE NEW REFORM ENVIRONMENT

It has been the new circumstances and new regional and international environment suitable for reforms that have facilitated the reform of the security sector in the countries of SEE. Now we turn to evaluate and examine this new internal and regional as well as the international environment that have shaped security reforms.

A. Domestic and Regional Environment

Reform of the security sector is a continuous process. Domestic and regional security circumstances are inherently dynamic, and all states have to be able to adapt their security structures to the new conditions effectively. Functioning democracies adapt and reform their security sector structures in accordance with the changing circumstances.

The reform of the security sector in the countries of SEE generally has comprised a process of the accommodation of the old structures to the new realities and the creation of the new structures.[7] The political pattern and inherent instability in their political systems, has confronted them with great difficulties in proceeding with SSR. Political disruption, corruption and state institutions collapsing caused by the failures of the governance structures, have been dominant features of their political systems.

The reforms may for instance take place because of the desire of the electorate or general public by supporting the reformist politicians. The post-communist electorate of SEE countries has been active in pushing the reforms to be in the agenda, however its role has been fragile as the public opinion as oscillated between reformist and nationalist agenda.

It has been the "snowball" effects[8] of a democratization wave coming from the north that has enhanced the agenda for reforming the security sector. Domino-style influences of

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[7] Valentin Stan, "Influencing Regime Change in the Balkans," in *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans*, eds. Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 152.
[8] Geoffrey Pridham, "Democratization in the Balkan Countries: From Theory to Practice," in *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans*, eds. Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 10.

the changes in Central Europe, encouraged the countries of SEE to follow the suit and instituted democratic procedures in the security sector. Also, the increased interest of the countries of SEE to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures of NATO and EU and the readiness of the Western democracies to assist the transitional countries of SEE in democratization, has further strengthened the reform agenda.

However, the current process of SSR is proceeding when there is high politicization[9] of the reform efforts. The results of the process of SSR will depend on the outcome of the clash of nationalist and reformist/integration-oriented politicians. There is an ever-growing awareness in the region and internationally, that the role of SSR has implications for the overall democratization of the region.

In SEE countries, complex historical legacies such as ethnic divisions, totalitarian and authoritarian inheritances, play a crucial role in the reform agenda of these countries. The historical legacies do not as such prevent reforms, but they inhibit their fulfillment and depending on the circumstances, divert the process of reforms from democratic outcomes. The post-communist implications of these legacies whether in the form of weak governance and weak civil society, corruption, organized crime or inexistence of the rule of law in certain parts of the region, derail the process of SSR. All these legacies and implications may be defined in Pridham words as "confining conditions"[10] that act as constraints to the reform efforts.

Security reform eras in SEE can be divided into two periods: First, decade of 1990s that was characterized with inadequate actions for instituting real reforms in the security sector. Second, the period following the turn of the century, which has witnessed a favorable domestic and regional environment for undertaking SSR.

In 1990s, SEE countries experienced inefficiency in the functioning of security decision-making process, inadequacy of the human factor and mainly their conceptual and managerial impotency of coping with the issues of the internal social, economic and political changes, which negatively affected the attempted reforms and led to the failure in the improvement of the security sector in the region.

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[9] Stefano Bianchini, "Political Culture and Democratization in the Balkans," in *Experimenting with Democracy: Regime Change in the Balkans*, eds. Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 73.
[10] Pridham, p. 11.

With the turn of the century, however, the political and security environment within which SSR is to be performed has been transformed. The crises of former Yugoslavia are over and the security vacuum that existed in 1990s is no longer there. The countries of former Yugoslavia plus Albania have made great leap forward in stabilization and democratization. Bulgaria and Romania no longer face the dilemma in terms of their Euro-Atlantic integration strategic priorities: they have been invited to join the North Atlantic Alliance[11] and they have been offered an opportunity to finish their political, economic and security reforms that will award them an EU membership in 2007.[12] These changes, have forced SEE countries to devote immense efforts and resources to reforming their security systems.

Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania experienced rapid implementation of an extensive reform program and the enhancement of institutional stability. The emergence of a stable, reformist-governing majorities that swept into power in these states in late 1990s and early 2000s, allowed the implementation of a program of radical reform in security sector.[13] These reforms were accompanied by overall reform of the administrative system, reform of the social security system, health care, pension system and educational reforms.[14] The latter were crucial in making the first ones success. And, what is important, the public support for the undertaken reforms was sustained.

This success of Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania has not entirely replicated in other SEE countries, such as Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia-Montenegro. The legacy of 1990s' unsuccessful and painful transition, organized crime, corruption and weak governments continue to plague their efforts for reforming security sector. Their political elites were caught ill prepared to manage the new situation with which they have faced and they witnessed subsequent decline in public support for radical security reforms. Post-communist governments manipulated often reform efforts. As a result, the transition to a true democratic reform and functioning security sector in these countries proceeded at a halting pace.

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[11] NATO, *Prague Summit Declaration*, Press Release 127, (November 21, 2002), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm.

[12] Copenhagen European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, (December 12-13, 2002), 4.

[13] Donald R. Falls, "NATO Enlargement: Is Romania ready to join the Alliance," *MIT Security Studies Program Working Paper* 00-3 (May 2000), 16.

[14] IRIS, *State Democracy: Roadmap for Reforms*, Country Report, 2001,

Despite these variations, the research undertaken has proven that there is also a regional pattern that is emerging there. In all the countries of SEE (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro) there is continued inability of the political system to deliver security (public good) that leads to a heightened sense of personal insecurity and continued social and economic stratification. It is this new environment, combination of successes and failures that have shaped the reform efforts of the countries of the region. Favorable international environment and the commitment of the international community as well, have played significant role in encouraging security reforms in the region of SEE.

B. International Environment

With the turn of the century, there has been growing attention and commitment of the international community for the reform of the security sector in the countries of SEE. The international community, consisted of major bilateral donors such as UK and US and the international organizations and initiatives such as EU, NATO, OECD, OSCE, Stability Pact for South East Europe, Western European Union, and the World Bank, have played significant role to push the countries of the region for more reforms.

The Stability Pact for South East Europe (SP), with its special provisions on SSR has stimulated thinking about how to implement comprehensive reform in the security sector. SSR has become a major area in the framework of SP. It has helped to strengthen the concept of SSR and has given further option for the coordination among international organizations in the field.

With its Working Table III on security and defense, SP is working on reforming the security sector and creating a climate of confidence and security throughout the region, including by rationalization of defense planning and spending; the general demilitarization of societies within the region; reduction of personnel and military expenditures; promoting democratic control of military; training of civilian experts on security issues; contributing to the implementation of the arms control measures; addressing the problems caused by

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http://www.iris-bg.org/publications/countryreport.htm.

landmines and small arms proliferation; and promotion of transparency in defense issues and other confidence building measures.

As a result of the goals set out by SP, the work done so far includes the establishment of the Regional Center for Assistance in Mine-clearing, Training, and Testing of new Techniques and Equipment; the Bucharest Center for small arms and light weapons; Small Arms and Light Weapons Clearinghouse; Vocational Training of Unemployed Military Officers; Regional Verification Center for South East Europe; Regional Aerial Observation System; Multinational Police Training and likewise. The Task Force for Transparency on Budgeting and Security Sector Reform, Multinational Engineer Task Force and the South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group at the level of senior officials has also been established.

Despite these successes, the least developed of the three working groups of SP is that concerned with security. Of the relatively small number of security-related projects that have been identified and funded, the majority of funds are allotted for de-mining. Contrary to the expectations, SP has not become a Marshall Plan for SEE.

SP acquired a reputation for producing more words than action in many areas. With its regional table, working tables, and sub-tables – each with a Chair and Co-Chair – the Pact put plenty of "talking shop" furniture on display. Greenwood calls it "IKEA politics."[15] The new special coordinator of SP, Erhard Busek as well, recognizing the problem, has adopted: "fewer meeting, more action," approach.[16]

So far we cannot say that SP has been able to change the status quo in the region and it does not stand to do so.[17] Therefore, it is of the interest of SEE countries to transform it into an institution that will serve for the region's integration into EU[18] and to serve as a clearinghouse to promote cross-border cooperation in road construction, telecommunications and energy supplies.[19]

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[15] David Greenwood, "Transparency in Defense Budgets and Budgeting," in *Transparency in Defense Policy, Military Budgeting and Procurement*, ed. Todor Tagarev (Sofia: G.C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria, 2002), 31.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Bosnian Institute, *Stability Pact or Status Quo?*, *Bosnia Report* 17-18 (July-September 2000), http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/julsept00/quo.cfm.
[18] Wim van Meurs and Alexandros Yannis, "The European Union and the Balkans: From Stabilization Process to Southeastern Enlargement," *ELIAMEP, CAP, Bertelsman Stiftung* (September, 2002), 6.
[19] Bosnian Institute.

The *OSCE* – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – have developed a SSR tools and instruments for furthering the aims of the confidence and security building measures in Europe, including in SEE. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security of 1994[20] stipulates to the participating countries a comprehensive set of rules on political control, democracy and the use of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, as well as the information services and the police. The Code basically aims to ensure that the armed forces are placed, in terms of their use (both internal and external) under the authority of free institutions having democratic legitimacy, and abide by the principle of legality, democracy, neutrality, respect of human and civil rights and comply with international humanitarian law.

The *European Union* (EU) came to be involved in SSR in SEE was in the field of PHARE[21] assistance for the development and reform of state structures. PHARE assistance in the field of SSR have included support for English language teaching in the security forces; training programs for ministries of defense officials; and research activities covering comprehensive security and defense topics. The newly announced CARDS[22] program for the western Balkans, have also included SSR assistance programs.

Both PHARE and CARDS program are the key instruments in the EU's efforts to address SSR in SEE. Both programs among others areas, are directed to projects to improve public security, to build-up police units, fight proliferation of small arms and light weapons and encourage respect for human rights. The PHARE and CARDS assistance programs constitute a new approach, which emphasizes the targeted contribution of development assistance to security and peace building. For instance, in 2001, EU provided a package of assistance to Macedonia from the CARDS 2001 allocation, worth € 1.7 million. The purpose of the assistance was to support the reform of the police in Macedonia.[23]

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[20] OSCE, *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security of 1994*, (December 3, 1994), http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pia/epia94-2.pdf.

[21] PHARE program is one of the three pre-accession instruments financed by the European Communities to assist the applicant countries of central Europe in their preparations for joining the European Union. Originally created to assist Poland and Hungary in 1989, today it encompasses the 10 candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania helping them through a period of massive economic restructuring and political change.

[22] CARDS - Community Assistance to Reconstruction, Development and Stability in the Balkans, established in 2001 provides financial assistance to the Western Balkans.

[23] European Commission, *Support Program for Police Reform in Macedonia in 2001*, 2001, 1.

Security reform has been also the basis of the negotiations of the EU's Europe agreements with Bulgaria and Romania, and Stabilization and Association Process with Macedonia, Croatia, and Albania.[24] Both Europe Agreements and the Stabilization and Association Process stipulate respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The incentives provided by the prospect of membership in EU is seen by EU institutions and member countries as a key instrument in promoting peace, security and stability in the region as well as in reforming security sector.

Western European Union (WEU) has also had a great impact on thinking about SSR. The WEU's Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) to Albania, WEU De-mining Assistance Mission to Croatia (WEUDAM), and other initiatives, have given to SEE associate partners of WEU, some experience of western standards and approaches to operational organization, as well as the very difficult issues of mission management and budgeting. MAPE, since its establishment in May 1997, with 143 members, provided advice and training to the law enforcement agencies of Albania. It drew up a new State Police Law, which contained the foundations for building a democratic police according to the internationally accepted standards and it trained about 3000 police officers.[25]

WEUDAM was a joint action with the Croatian authorities in the field of mine clearance. WEUDAM from May 10, 1999 provided advice, technical expertise and training support to the Croatian Mine Action Center in the areas of program management, planning and project development, geographic information systems, and level II surveys.[26]

NATO has played great role in the reform process in many SEE countries. NATO's programs such as Partnership for Peace,[27] Membership Action Plan[28] and South East

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[24] European Commission, *The Stabilization and Association Process for countries of Southeastern Europe*, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sap/.

[25] The MAPE's mission terminated on May 31, 2001. See WEU, *Crisis Management Operations 1997-2001*, http://www.weu.int/History.htm#4A.

[26] WEUDAM terminated on November 30, 2001. See WEU.

[27] Partnership for Peace (PfP) is the basis for practical security cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries (19+1). Activities include defense planning and budgeting, military exercises and civil emergency operations. Launched in January 1994, PfP now has 27 members, which are all members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

[28] The Membership Action Plan was launched in April 1999 to assist those countries, which wish to join the Alliance in their preparations by providing advice, assistance and practical support on all aspects of NATO membership.

Europe Initiative[29] have advanced the pace of reform processes. NATO's Peacekeeping missions such as Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Kosovo Force, and multinational military exercises such as Medceur (medical exercises), Rescuer (rescuing exercises), Cooperative Best Effort and others, which have included the states of SEE as well, have helped to expose the regional security sectors' personnel to the norms and operating procedures of NATO countries.

The decision of the candidacy for membership in NATO has been another reason to speed up the reform of the security sector in SEE countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Romania. NATO has established preconditions and criteria for security sector reform, which have guided the reforms in those countries and which have been and continue to be key tools in both promoting and shaping relevant SSR efforts.

NATO's South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP) launched in May 2001 is the first comprehensive common document of NATO on perspectives and priorities to "build secure, stable and indivisible Euro-Atlantic area."[30] The SEECAP is intended not only to enhance political openness, but also to promote increased cooperation in defense, security sector and economic and democratic development.

Since the early 1990s, *the World Bank* has also been involved in debates on SSR. It undertook major studies that were relevant to SSR. In 1997, it set-up Post-Conflict Unit, which later was renamed to Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, dealing with post-conflict challenges, including demobilization and reintegration, good governance, judicial independence, and public administration reform.[31]

OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), through its Development Assistance Committee (DAC), has played major role in linking development to security. DAC discussions have involved demobilization and reintegration, landmine clearance, capacity building of security and justice systems and it has produced guidelines for practice in 1993. In 1997 it established a Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development

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[29] NATO's South East Europe Initiative is a series of programs and initiatives aimed at promoting regional cooperation and long-term stability in the Balkans. The Initiative was launched at the 1999 Washington Summit in order to promote regional cooperation and long-term security and stability in the region.

[30] NATO, *Declaration on the SEECAP on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities*, (May 30, 2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2001/0105-bdp/d010530b.htm.

and the same year produced a report, "Military Expenditures in Developing Countries: Security and development,"[32] which gave a OECD perspective on the issue.

Of the governmental agencies of major donor countries, *USAID* –The United States Agency for International Development- and *DFID* – UK Department for International Development- became the major development ministries to develop cooperation and assistance in security sector. USAID since mid-1990s has issued numerous reports and has launched programs supporting the reform of the police, the military and the judicial sector. In its report of April 1997, USAID calls for linking of civil-military relations to security and development.[33]

UK government has progressively become involved in SSR agenda. It has renamed and refocused the military assistance program – now known as ASSIST (Assistance to Support Stability in Service Training) – and has created a Defense Diplomacy Mission for the Ministry of Defense, which includes training and education "to help develop skills and structures needed by modern, democratically accountable forces."[34] UK government has also increasingly taken part in disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and police assistance programs. However, it was DFID that took major concrete actions in SSR.

These new developments in both domestic and international environment have had major impact on the security sector reforms undertakings of the countries of the region. Now we turn to these reforms undertaken in the security sector field and challenges faced by these countries.

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[31] World Bank/The Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, *About the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit*, http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/CPR/AboutCPRUnit.

[32] OECD Development Assistance Committee, *Military Expenditures in Developing Countries: Security and development*, 1997, http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00002000/M00002203.pdf.

[33] See USAID, *Involvement in Post-conflict Reconstruction*, (April 1997).

[34] See Nicole Ball, " Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government," *ODC* (November 1998).

III. IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES AND SECURITY REFORMS

The countries of SEE have entered the first decade of the 21st century with the successful completion of the *first generation reforms* that include the establishment of new institutions, structures, and chains of responsibility for the security sector and appropriate structures for democratic control of security sector actors. The countries laid the basis of the principles and structures for oversight of security sector issues; empowered the parliament to oversee and approve security sector budgets; and made attempts for civilianization of the security sector bureaucracies. Also, a key element of first generation security sector reforms was to provide the legal ground for reforming and professionalizing security sector formations. These entailed defining missions, tasks and structures for security sector actors in line with the priorities outlined in relevant legal documents such as constitutions, defense laws, national security concepts and military doctrines. In SEE all these first generation reforms occurred through the drafting and implementation of constitutional and legislative provisions, which clearly identified roles and responsibilities.

However, the current environment requires more than those of the first generation reforms. The present international and regional circumstances show that the first generation reforms are not enough, what is also necessary is to undertake the *second-generation reforms* that are concerned with the further consolidation of democratic control of armed forces; strengthening of the procedures of transparency and accountability; enhancing the way structures and institutions implement policy and improvements in effectiveness and efficiency in the work of the security sector; wider engagement of civil-society and creation of a strong civilian defense and security community; development of the community policing processes; enhancing the ability for effective border protection; reforming the intelligence agencies; disarmament, demilitarization and reintegration; sustaining the reforms of the judicial and legal reform; and fighting corruption and organized crime in the security sector.

It is the aim of this section to in brief explain what all these points of the second generation reforms mean for SEE countries.

A. Governance and Democratic Control of the Security Sector

Security sector despite the overall changes in the security environment of the region of SEE and decreased percentage of the security and defense budgets in the region, its presence in society has not by any means become an isolated. On the contrary, it remains very much present in the society and it continues to affect democratic building of the societies of the region. How much there is a democratic control of security and defense sector in SEE that will prevent their misbehavior in the society? Is the democratic control in the region stable and sustainable?

The countries of SEE has instituted the principle of the democratic control of security and defense forces within a legal framework that includes the constitution, laws, national security concepts and military doctrines. The countries of SEE have succeeded in creating legal structures that subordinates the security and defense sector to political and civilian rule, and at the same time have divided control over security and defense matters between the legislative and executive branches. Civilian control indicates the pre-eminence of civilian institutions, based on popular sovereignty, in the decision-making process concerning defense and security matters. The assumption is not that the civilians are per se better decision-makers than people in uniform. It is quality of civilian being a democratically elected or appointed civilian and of being representative of the democratic will expressed through due democratic processes.[35]

In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington views the issue of the civilian control of security and defense sector from subjective and objective concepts. By subjective civilian control he means the military's participation in politics and encourages the political socialization of the military so that its values mirror those of the state. With the objective civilian control he means the complete apolitical behavior from military professionals.[36] In his view, the objective civilian control of military should be the only option for containing the power of the military and sustaining democratic control of military.[37]

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[35] Rudolf Joe, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces," *ISS-Chaillot Paper* 23 (February 1996), http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai23e.html.

[36] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80-83.

[37] Ibid., 83-85.

Ulrich argues that the Huntington's view of the civilian control of the military by having a military with no political role does not reflect the reality of the dynamics that operate in a democratic state and society, least the transition of the countries from communist rules.[38] According to her, in a democratic state, all institutions compete for resources and attempt to influence policymakers who make decisions affecting their organization. There should also be differentiation between norms of military professionalism in authoritarian and democratic political systems rather than applying universally accepted norms of military professionalism to all countries, as by applying universal norms can ignore the ideological transition to democracy that transitioning militaries must make.[39]

Ulrich also argues that the security sector must serve the democratic state and remain under its control. Although civilian control of the security and defense sector is a goal for all states, its achievement in democratic states depends on the interaction between democratic and security institutions charged with defending both the state and its democratic values. The conditions of post communist states engaged in democratic transition are distinct from the conditions that characterized the security institutions in stable political systems.[40]

Looking to the situation in SEE with regard to the democratic control of security sector, the legacy of the communist era norms of behavior is influencing the course of post-socialist security institutions across the region.

SEE democracies have achieved a "liberal bargain" defined by Joseph Nye,[41] a bargain, which is supposed to define in a stable way the specific right and responsibilities for the security and defense sector and for the civilian leadership. Security and defense sector in SEE has officially recognized that it is accountable to the rule of law and has agreed formally to remain non-partisan and respect civilian authority. On the part of civilians, they also have recognized the special role that the security and defense sector plays in

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[38] Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: the Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces* (Ann Arbor: the University of Michigan Press, 1999), 6-7.
[39] Ibid., 8-9.
[40] Ibid., 6-7.
[41] Joseph Nye, "Concluding Address," in *Civil-Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy*, International Forum for Democratic Studies and George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Conference Report (June 1995), 20-21.

society and they have accepted to provide an adequate funding for the security and defense agencies.

This success in theoretic terms did not mean effective operationalization of the new way of thinking in practice. This failure resulted from, namely, the ambiguities in the legal and institutional framework; a polarized domestic politics, influencing badly the general national security situation of a country; the low level of civilian expertise in security and defense; and the inadequate balancing of the separated powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches in government.[42]

The constitutions of SEE countries form a basis for democratic control of the security and defense sector. In the constitutions of Albania,[43] Bulgaria,[44] Croatia,[45] Macedonia,[46] Romania[47] and Serbia-Montenegro there are clear hierarchy of democratic control over the army. These constitutions define the President of the country as a commander-in-chief or supreme commander.

Despite this similarity in essentiality of the democratic control, other arrangements across the countries wary widely as a result of their differing historical traditions, sociological characteristics and evolution of their domestic political and security environments. In Albania, for example, the constitution shares defense and security policy between the President and the Government. The President of Albania is commander in chief and chairs the National Security Council of Albania.[48] Through the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, he exercises the command of the armed forces. In Macedonia and Croatia, the President of the Republic is supreme commander and in difference of Albania, he/she retains some key areas within his exclusive personal decision, while the administration of the armed forces is largely left to the ministry of defense.[49]

In Romania, the President does not have exclusive powers with regard to commanding the armed forces. He shares it with other members of the Supreme Council of National

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[42] Plamen Pantev, "The New National Security Environment and Its Impact on the Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria," *ISIS-Research Study* 5, 1997,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis/Publications/Pantev_New%20National%20Security%20Environment_.htm.

[43] Articles 168-169 of the Constitution of Albania.

[44] Article 100 of the Constitution of Bulgaria.

[45] Article 100 of the Constitution of Croatia.

[46] Article 79 of the Constitution of Macedonia.

[47] Articles 117-118 of the Constitution of Romania.

[48] Article 168 of the Constitution of Albania.

[49] Article 169 of the Constitution of Macedonia and Article 100 of the Constitution of Croatia.

Defense.[50] In Bulgaria, to a certain extent, the President possesses exclusive powers, however, it has to make them in consultation with the government and with the members of the Consultative National Security Council.[51]

Macedonia is one of the countries that have made the most progress in establishing democratic control of the armed forces. However, it is not immune from the problems of gaps in the legislative framework, and an unclear division of responsibility between the President, the Government (MoD) and Chief of the General Staff. In particular, power to mobilize the armed forces during an emergency needs to be legally clarified in the future. Also, in recent years the imprecise delineation of competence has from time to time strained relations between President, MoD and the Chief of General Staff and has left substantial room for bureaucratic battles. Also, due to the short-lived governments and frequent personal switches in MoD, there have been negative consequences for establishing democratic political control.

Croatia faces its own unique challenges, particularly due to the legacy of Tudjman and the country's involvement in the Yugoslav conflicts. It has developed a legislative and institutional framework for democratic control of its security and defense sector. However, problems remain in a disproportionate balance of power between the president and parliament. A primary concern for the future is the need to enhance the role of parliament controlling the security and defense institutions, and serious efforts need to be made in order to circumscribe some of the authority of the presidency in this area. In Croatia, there is currently transition from the de facto Presidential system to that of parliamentarian one that has created certain vacuum in the democratic control of the security and defense sector in the country.

In Albania, the establishment of the civil control over the armed forces has not made it possible to keep the army off the political decision-making process and to avoid the services required by the political elites.[52] The reforms in this area often have been utilized for political purges.

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[50] Article 118 of the Constitution of Romania.
[51] Article 100 of the Constitution of Bulgaria.
[52] See Ilir Aliaj, "Armed Forces in Albania and Civil Society," Paper prepared for a Seminar "Legal framing of democratic control of armed forces and the security sector: norms and reality/ies" organized by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (May 4-5, 2001).

Of SEE countries, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Serbia-Montenegro are having the major difficulties in achieving democratic control of the security sector. BiH is hardly fulfilling the requirements for having instituted civilian control over the security and defense sector because it lacks unity in its security sector structures. Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 brought into being a complicated state security and defense structure. They legitimized the military partition of the country and their ambiguous language allowed the nationalist parties to pursue their policies of segregation.[53] Besides this, reconstruction assistance disbursed in haste tended to reinforce parallel power structures.[54] The Dayton Peace Accords recognized the existence of two separate armies: the BiH Federation Army consisted of Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats and the Republika Srpska (RS) Army, consisted of Bosnian Serbs. However, in reality there are three armies since the Federation army has not been able to bring together Bosniacs and Croats under a single command.

BiH also lacks single security policy and there is not in place a ministry of defense at the state level that will be responsible for defense matters. The high level of autonomy endowed to the two-divided and to some extent competing entities creates inefficient government institutions at the level of the state. These create difficulties in having instituted functioning civilian control over the security and defense sector. Due to these reasons BiH is unable to become a part to the Partnership for Peace program of NATO and a member of the Council of Europe.

The situation is to a certain extent similar in Serbia-Montenegro where the issue is becoming complicated as both entities have entered into a process of the creation of a new federal state. It is yet to be defined the role that each President of both entities will be playing in the control of the armed forces as well as the role that the join federal president would play. According to the agreement of March 14, 2002, there will be common army between Serbia and Montenegro, which is going to be commanded by Supreme Defense Council composed of three presidents.[55]

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[53] See Fred Tanner, "Security Sector Reform: Lessons from BiH," unpublished paper presented at IISS/DCAF conference (April 23, 2001).

[54] Marcus Cox, "State-building and Post-conflict Rehabilitation: The Lessons of Bosnia," 4th International Security Forum, (November 15-17, 2000), 8.

[55] Presidents of Serbia-Montenegro, Serbia, and Montenegro.

Currently, there is an ambiguity in Serbia-Montenegro's constitution and defense laws on who military is responsible to.[56] Pavkovic affair of June 24, 2002[57] highlighted the lack of democratic control over Serbia-Montenegro's security sector. In addition, the series of arms scandals that erupted in October 2002,[58] which uncovered that several high-ranking civilians of Serbia-Montenegro government have been aware of illicit arms exports to Iraq, but they have been unable to prevent it, are cases in point.

Parliament has a great role to play in the democratic control of armed forces. However, SEE countries parliaments' do not yet have political authority comparable to that of many analogues western institutions. Very often they lack necessary information; or appropriate financial and human resources or necessary professionals and experts. There is also general lack of knowledge among parliamentarians about security and defense issues.

In Croatia there is a special Committee on Internal Policy and National Security within Croatian Parliament (consisting of two sub-committees: Defense and Internal Policy) with defined authority and responsibilities in the area of defense. However, this body has not firmly overtaken its authorities with respect to strong parliamentarian control of defense planning and procedures. Senior MoD or MOI officials do not regularly report to the Committee. It does not issue policy directives or guidelines. There are no discussions or parliamentary investigations of certain events in defense institutions. Particularly important is that there are no procedures clearly defining how Committee's decisions and recommendations take effect. There is one working body at the level of the Croatian government – Coordination Group for Internal and Foreign Policy – that has among its authorities to discuss defense issues. However, due to its attention to other areas, it barely discusses the security and defense issues.[59]

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[56] ICG, "Fighting to Control Yugoslavia's Military," *Balkans Briefing* (July 15, 2002), 2.

[57] Dnevnik, *Kostunica go smeni Pavkovic, generalot ne saka da si odi* (June 27, 2002), 9; Radio B92, *Pavkovic ukazom smenjen, postavljen Branko Krga* (June 24, 2002); ICG, "Fighting to Control Yugoslavia's Military," *Balkans Briefing* (July 15, 2002), 1.

[58] In the evidence adopted by SFOR troops in Republika Srpska on October 12, 2002 during the raid of Vozduhoplovni Zavod-Orao in RS, it was that Serb authorities were overhauling jet engines for Iraqi Air Force MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft. The contracting party of Orao was FRY based Yugoimport-SDPR, which is partly government-owned firm. As scandal erupted, the director-general of Yugoimport, retired General Jovan Cekovic and assistant defense minister responsible for defense sales General Ivan Djokic, were sacked. See Zoran Kusovac, "Army Scandals Reveal Illicit Serb Sales," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (January 1, 2003).

[59] Tomo Radicevic, "Developing Defense Transparency in Croatia," in *Transparency in Defense Policy, Military Budgeting and Procurement*, ed. Todor Tagarev, (Sofia: G.C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria, 2002), 110-111.

In Macedonia, there is two committees entitled to control the security sector: Commission for Internal Policy and Defense and Commission for Oversight of the Department for Security and Contra intelligence and Agency for Intelligence.[60] They scrutinize the activity of security sector: army, police and intelligence services. But they do not function sufficiently, as they have happened not to receive regular reports from MOI, MoD and Agency for Intelligence and their work a lot depends on the attitude of the MPs who tend not to act as professional MPs, but rather as political deputies not wishing to criticize the MOI, MoD and Agency for Intelligence, which might be headed by somebody from the same party.

Aforementioned points illustrate that in all transitional democracies of SEE the principle democratic control of the security sector is still fragile. Particularly, there appear political disagreements on which institution is responsible for what and the precise mandate of each of the security relevant institution has in the emergency situations. This causes serious political fragmentations, which can lead to political contests or rivalries between the president, prime ministers, defense ministers, and the parliament. The civilian and military elites in SEE agree that civilian leaders should have the final say on whether to use force, but disagree on who should have the final say on operational decisions concerning how to use force.

In SEE there is also a certain political and ideological gap between the civilians and soldiers evidenced in the military treatment of the strategic goals of the respected countries, the civilian perception of the military and vice versa, the voting attitudes of the military showing great differences in their voting behavior from those of civilians and sharply different opinions for preserving the combat effectiveness of the armed forces. It should not be forgotten that the possible implication of a gap between civilians and the military are rather different from gaps with other societies. In their history since 1989, the countries of SEE have not experienced coup d'etat, however the growing gap can seed the basis for such an outcome if necessary measures are not taken to overcome the existence gap.

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[60] The Macedonian parliament can also vote to form a special commission to investigate allegations of security sector misconduct. According to Article 76 of the Macedonian constitution, such bodies may be established, "to ascertain the responsibility of holders of public office."

The issue becomes potentially dangerous having in mind the current situation in some of SEE countries that face economic decline and social instability, sometimes combined with worsening ethnic problems. Due to the weak civil society and a fragmented political system and a lack of effective government, the armed forces might be drawn into the political arena and become used as a tool in the political struggle. In spite of the disinclination of the military to become involved in coups, in some of the countries of SEE, there are extremists who manipulate with the armed forces, reinforcing their position in these institutions.

B. Transparency in Security Sector

The concept of transparency in the security sector is a state of affairs where the wider public, including the Parliament and the media, have the necessary information for the maintenance of the legitimacy of the security sector actors. Transparency is important for the civilian elite who hold the right for the control of security sector agents whether they have in their disposal necessary information to make sound security policy decisions.[61] Transparency is key for democracy. It is particularly one of the most important factors for success of SSR. Communication to the wider public is an issue that has to be an integral part of the working culture of security sector actors. Information sharing significantly affects the ability of security sector actors to establish relationships with other government agencies, with the media and with the society at large. Transparency is also crucial with regard to the procurement decisions of the government.

Transparency is a challenging concept for SEE societies with weak or even non-existent, traditions in holding security sector actors to account. That is particularly true in sensitive areas such as defense and security, where myths and culture of secrecy prevail. The security and defense policy of a given country may be considered transparent if decision makers – the elected representatives of the people – are fully aware of and society

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[61] Transparency in this paper is to be viewed from its internal or domestic dimension concerning the transparency of the government's plans and actions to its own constituency. Despite the importance of the external or international dimension of transparency, it is beyond the scope of this paper.

is informed on the policy *goals*, existing and planned *means* to achieve the goals and the *cost* of sustaining those means.[62]

All SEE countries take advantage of being part of SP, which has particular initiatives on the development of the transparency practices in defense and security sector. SP sees the transparency as a way of reducing concern and tension among the countries and among the communities and promoting stability. For this aim, SP has established Budget Transparency Initiative as of March 2001 that has endorsed two initial products: Yearbook on Southeast European Defense Spending 2000-2005 and Survey of South East European Defense Budgeting Systems.[63]

In this regard, some of SEE countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania) also take advantage from their participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program of NATO. A tailored PARP (planning and review process) was created in 1995 within the framework of PfP to promote transparency and interoperability in equipment, deployability, procedures and readiness.

Despite these initiatives and programs, the transparency is relatively new for the countries in SEE. SEE societies are aware that formulation and implementation of security and defense policy need to be transparent. Thus, political structures and legal systems of SEE countries are, more or less, well established. However, some countries, such as Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia-Montenegro, still lack doctrinal security documents such as national security strategy that would provide a solid basis for transparency in security policy and the process of security and defense planning. Therefore in many cases, the problem is not in non-accessibility but in non-existence of these strategic documents.[64]

There is a tendency in the countries of SEE a notion of transparency to be confined to relations between the Ministry of Defense and the Parliament. The national security establishments view the notion of transparency negatively, because of its potential to

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[62] Todor Tagarev, "Elaborating Policy for Transparency of Defense Procurement," in *Transparency in Defense Policy, Military Budgeting and Procurement*, ed. Todor Tagarev, (Sofia: G.C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria, 2002), 85-86.

[63] Stephan Stephanov, "Stability Pact Activity on Transparency of Military Budgeting," in *Transparency in Defense Policy, Military Budgeting and Procurement*, ed. Todor Tagarev, (Sofia: G.C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria, 2002), 41.

[64] Tagarev, 9

reveal both their weaknesses, which might tempt aggression, and their strengths, which might stimulate counter-measures.[65]

Of SEE countries that were lucky not to be involved in conflict, such as Bulgaria and Romania, they were able to establish transparency procedures more easily than the countries were affected by the conflict. The countries that were affected by the conflicts such as Albania, BiH, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro, resisted the calls for more transparency with the justification for the protection of the national interests. They first claimed necessity first to resolve national security issues, and only then to turn to enhance transparency.

Lack of transparency has created a space for creation of the non-accountable security forces under the authority of the elected ministers, prime ministers and presidents. In Macedonia, non-accountability of the security sector brought to the creation of the paramilitary forces, Lions, who were often involved in the violation of human rights. In Serbia, Prime Minister Djindjic controlled certain ministry of interior forces for its political reasons. President Kostunica as well, has used the army troops in his dealings with his political opponents. These paramilitary forces, as of writing of the paper, continue to function and flourish and become more politically and economically viable at the expense of SSR efforts.[66]

C. Weak Governance and Civilian Expertise on the Work of Security Sector

A related second-generation SSR issue concerns the capacity of security sector bureaucracies to implement policies. Capacity problems have manifested themselves in a number of ways across SEE. These include a failure to provide the security to the citizens; inexistence of the cooperation among the governmental structures of the same government; state structures unable and unwilling to implement security policy; and lack of expertise amongst civil servants in security sector bureaucracies.

The governmental institutions of the states of SEE, because of their weak economies and democracies, and the lack of the managerial cultures, do not cooperate with each other,

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[65] Chanaa, 53.
[66] Chanaa, 33.

instead they compete over spheres of competence. A fact that undermines a state's legitimacy and promotes uncontrolled conflicts.

Moreover, in most countries in the region there is an absence of effective political elite that will show an ability to establish effective and efficient governmental structures. This leads to a lack of commitment to reform at the mid-level bureaucrats who remain unconvinced of or does not understand the rationale behind the reform process.

Finally, due to the lack of experienced and well-prepared civilians that can undertake reforms, reform programs are not becoming realized. There are also certain forms of politicization in the security sector, unclear statement of national interests and goals, promotion of inadequate or unrealistic decisions and inability to form a consistent defense policy. These have all been evident in SEE governments' attempts to adopt major security and national documents and laws.

Another second-generation SSR issue concerns the development of civilian security and defense cadre and intellectuals that have the skills and experience in security and defense issues.

In SEE there has been growing civilian interest for issues over the security sector. They have recognized the need for the establishment of the strong community of the civilian security and defense, consisted of both governmental and non-governmental individuals and institutions, by launching a centers and/or faculties for security, where special education and training programs are organized for the civilians to be skilled on security and defense sector management. However, post-communist societies of SEE are still societies closed to civilians and which resist civilian interface.[67]

Development of the strong community of civilian intellectuals that will be engaged in security sector issues is of crucial importance to SSR as society is a central to the legitimization of security sector actors, particularly in a democratic context. Creation of a security community is also central for the public's support for the security sector's participation in the humanitarian and other missions that require wider public support for their successful realization and implementation. Moreover, it provides an alternative source of information on security issues for both policy makers and wider public. Furthermore, it also provides the opportunity for popular debate, discussion and criticism

of security and defense issues. In addition, it can act as an important mechanism for holding other actors in the security sector to account through exposing malpractice, forming critical judgments and so on. Experience has shown that security will be determined largely by the society itself. The onus lies on reformers to understand and engage with the society to the extent that is possible.

D. Community Policing

SEE countries' police structures, following the changes of 1989, have not been able fully to overcome the legacy of the former socialist East European model of policing, which was rather militaristic in nature since their ultimate goal was the protection and maintenance of the socialist regime.

SEE countries require internal security and police reform to be designed and implemented in a way that will deepen and strengthen democratic values, increase the community policing and overcome the confidence gap between citizens and police. In practical terms this means emphasizing both police accountability and transparency on the one hand, and on the other hand, improving police effectiveness in controlling crime.

During the transition process, the countries of SEE have undertaken efforts at reforming their police structures according to the community policing concept, which entails responsiveness to the community's needs for security and assistance.

The principle of community policing gives great importance to community relations and civil society participation in preventive police activities. Due to the police's interaction with members of the public on a daily basis and due to the fact that the police is authorized to use repressive means, the police prerogatives should be used in accordance with the law.

One of the central sources of the community policing is the organizational and functional decentralization of the police structures. Following 1989 changes, not all SEE countries adopted the common European trend of decentralizing the police and empowering the local governments with policing. In Macedonia, for example, with the

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[67] Chris Donelly, "Defense Transformation in the new democracies: a framework for tackling the problem," *NATO Review* 1 (January 1997): 17.

constitutional and legal reforms, all organizational and functional features of the police were centralized and the municipalities were not given any authority in respect to the police departments. With the law of internal affairs adopted in 1995 this centralization was de jure legalized and the police, both territorially and in the framework of task related units, was centralized with police functions concentrated within the competences of the Minister of Interior. It separated the police from the community that it was supposed to serve and increased the politicization as the Minister had authority to appoint or dismiss the heads of the local police branches. However, with the constitutional and legal changes of 2001, the authority to appoint the local police chiefs were given to the local elected municipalities.

Another source of the community policing is the adequate representation of the minority groups in the police structures of SEE countries. One of the internal deficiencies of the police in SEE has been their lack of minority and women police officers. Over the years, there has been growing number of minority and women police officers being recruited in the police, however, they still do not correspond to the composition of the minority ethnic groups and women in the overall population of a given country.

Macedonia, with the implementation of Framework Agreement (FA) of 2001, the police reform process to a great extent has also dealt with closing the gap of the representation of the minority groups in the police structures. The parties to FA committed themselves to ensure that the police services by 2004 will generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia. Under the agreement, 1,000 minority police officers are to be hired by July 2003 according to the composition and disposition of the population. The effectiveness of this project has been highlighted by the successful re-deployment of police in former crisis areas, which has already been completed. In principle, the inclusion of the minority members in the police structures was a right act for increasing the legitimacy of the police and for better police-community relationship.

In BiH, following the end of the war in 1995, there has been great progress towards the creation of the democratic and community-oriented policing structures. Measures have been taken in rooting out corruption from the police structures that has served for the increasing the accountability of the police to the civilian institutions authorized for their oversight. Professionalization of police has been another priority of the leaders of both entities by creating police training academies that teach new recruits the principle of

policing in a democratic society. Steps have also been taken in promoting multiculturalism in the policing by establishing multi-ethnic patrols around the country.

However, much work remains to be done for sustaining the undertaken reforms in BiH. The loyalty to the political parties remains dominant feature for the recruitment and promotion of the police cadets and officers. There is still gap in the percentage of participation of the ethnic minorities in police with their overall share in the total population of the entities. In RS, by mid-2002, only 4.9% of police officers were minorities. Serb officers remain drastically underrepresented in the Federation.[68] Another problem is organized crime that is plaguing the efforts of BiH leadership to reform the police. BiH has also become an important transit and destination for trafficking of women. Moreover, lack of cooperation across the entities and cantons hampers the efforts to fight organized crime syndicates.

In Bulgaria, since 1997 the governments have embarked upon extensive reform in policing. The country has witnessed extensive overhaul of legislation and practice in the area of policing. Strong action has been taken in combating the organized crime groups with "zero tolerance" campaign. However, the Bulgarian police consistently have failed to address a persistent deficit of security, which has become one of the main threats to the legitimacy of the democratic polity of the country.

Croatia, following the end of the conflict in 1995, for number of years has been unable to overcome the continuous tendency in investing the human and material resources into the defense that otherwise would have been invested to the democratization of the public administration, including police. Corruption is widespread and it has become a part of the policing.

In Montenegro, the police reforms have been more of defensive character rather than of the law enforcement nature. Tackling the problems of low morale of police officers and increasing the representation of the minorities and women in the policing are new themes of the reform agenda of Montenegro leadership. The inexistence of a police academy or a police-training center to a great extent has obstructed the intentions for development of the professionalism in policing.

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[68] UNMIBH SRSG Report, 8 June 2002, available at: www.unmibh.org.

E. Border Protection

One of the central features of a sovereign state is its ability to control its borders and protect its territorial integrity. This issue has become increasingly important for several reasons. First of all, after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Schengen co-operation is a part of the EU Justice and Home Affairs co-operation. It is also an area where lot of improvement and deeper co-operation is needed to be fulfilled by the candidate countries of SEE running for the EU membership (Bulgaria and Romania) and by those SEE countries who are part of the Stabilization and Association Process of EU (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro). Another important factor is the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, which has increased the importance of functional border security systems.

Today the border control is a matter of law enforcement, rather than national defense. Military definition of border security - which characterized the Cold War era - is not relevant any longer given the completely changed security environment.

According to the contemporary democratic and western procedures and practices, border guarding is a national mission that should be carried out by a special police force: This should not form part of the regular state police but neither should it belong to the national defense forces. For this reason it is suggested that border guarding is not a duty for conscripts though conscripts can be used for restricted tasks and in limited areas when necessary. Efficient implementation, continuous development and the need for a rapid reaction to the changing nature of cross-border crime requires the existence of one leading authority to be responsible for the national border security. This organization should operate under the auspices of either the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Justice.

The task of creating such a system now confronts the countries of SEE. Over the last 12 years, they have gradually undertaken reforms in reorganizing their structures of the border guard, changing it from a military organization with conscripted staff into a police organization with purely professional staff.

According to their current border security model, countries in SEE can be divided into three main groups: countries possessing specialized and non-military agency for border

security (Romania, Bulgaria, BiH); countries with specialized but with not non-military agency for border security (Croatia); and the countries with not-specialized and military border guard authority (Albania, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro).

F. Intelligence Services

Due to the enormous role that the intelligence services have played before 1989 and during the transition process, their transformation entails great political, security and societal difficulties. In the transitional process, the intelligence services play a far more exposed and ambiguous role than they do in consolidated democracies. They are at the center of post-communism's moral panics and conspiracy theories.[69]

The countries of SEE, as a part of the first generation reforms, in early 1990s adopted a necessary legal framework in which intelligence services operate. This framework defined the area of responsibility of the services, the limits of their competence and the mechanisms of oversight and accountability.

However, the reform of the intelligence services have been challenging especially in the area of opening of the files and their de-politicization and civilianization. Due to the possible implications of the reform of the services, the countries of SEE, have adopted gradual reform of the services, which has not included their reform from all its dimensions. Some of the countries have put off the reforms for the better times. However, it is important for the countries of the region to undertake the reforms in the intelligence services that will be on the political level, and that will include the society as a whole. The reform of the intelligence services can help to come to terms with the burden of the past. Because these agencies often wield enormous power, based on the information they gather and the clandestine operations they sponsor, it is vital to subject them to the same standards of reform as other state security institutions.

Several intelligence services in the region, for example in BiH, have for a long time remained under the control of political parties.[70] No international donor has claimed its support for intelligence services reform. In 1996, a Bosnian Federation passed the law in

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[69] Kieran Williams, "Introduction," in *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies*, eds. Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant (London: Palgrave, 2001): 1.

which they prohibited all ad hoc intelligence agencies operating on the territory of BiH. Previously in BiH these agencies were located in the police stations. UN mission in BiH made successful efforts in removing intelligence services from police facilities in the Federation, but has not yet achieved the same progress in RS. Several intelligence services have been active in BiH, believed to be under the control of political parties. BiH's services until 2002 have include security service of RS, the Bosnian-Muslim Agency for Investigation and Documentation (AID) and the Bosniac National Security Service (SNS).[71] In March 2002, a Federation Law on Intelligence Services was adopted to establish a Federation Intelligence and Security Service to replace the current ones. The service is to operate until the eventual establishment of a state intelligence service. The former intelligence services – AID and SNS – stopped operating in 2002.

In Romania, the presence of members of *Securitate* in the current security sector of Romania, have been of great concern. There are reports that the former *Securitate* personnel remain sprinkled throughout the ministries of Romania occupying of some authority and influence at the public administration and security and defense sector.[72] More troubling of all is the fact that virtually the entire military elite in Timisoara (epicenter of the Romanian revolution), which was involved in massacring civilians in 1989, has remained in place and that a large number of the officers directly involved in suppressing the uprising have since been promoted.[73] NATO asked Romania to bar some former communist secret police staff from holding sensitive positions in intelligence before it can join the military alliance.[74]

In Albania, the Democratic Party regime of Sali Berisha replaced the old security police, *Sigurimi*, with *Shik* - information service. The former security agents, deprived of a role, found work in the black market, and particularly in the running of people, drugs and arms. The magnitude of the Sigurimi's various strategies to control the population account for the tremendous effect the Sigurimi continues to have despite its formal dissolution in July 1991.

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[70] King, Dorn and Hodes, 6.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Falls, 16.
[73] See Jeremy Bransten, "Romania: the Bloody Revolution in 1989 – Historic Facts remain obscured," *RFE/RL* (December 12, 1999).
[74] Associated Press, *NATO Officials Want Romania to Exclude Some Former Communists From Intelligence Positions* (March 20, 2002).

At present, the Sigurimi files are closed. As one would expect, there is much debate among the various political factions in Albania concerning the ultimate disposition of these dossiers. In the long-term context of Albania's current and future development, the opening of these files to the public would quite likely be extremely disruptive, if not destructive, of Albanian society.

There is no dilemma in the countries of the region with regard to the necessity of the intelligence services, it is important to mention that in the region it is not solved yet the question of the inter-cooperation of the organs who participate in the taking of the actions related with the protection of the security and defense of the country and other economic, political interests. In the laws for the intelligence services of the countries of the region it is mentioned that the agency and ministries cooperate, however it is not detailed. Therefore, there is risk when there is inter-agency (and ministry) clash or conflict, they might not exchange the information.

G. Small Arms, Demobilization and Reintegration

Small arms are of great importance for the safety of the citizenry. Although SEE countries have made significant improvements to their arms export, import and production control policies and legislation in recent years, the region continues to be important source, destination and transit route for transfers of weapons and illicit shipments of arms.[75] The illicit trafficking of arms, coupled with high unemployment and mistrust between the ethnic communities remains a serious threat to the peace and stability in the region.

Currently all SEE countries are burdened with the legacy of a decade of violence in the region. The violence has led to the wide-spread illicit possession and trading of the small arms and light weapons (SALW), which in turn has led to a resurgence of gun culture in some parts of the region.[76] Arms, weapons and ammunition are still easily available on the regional markets.

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[75] Saferworld, *Strengthening Export Controls in Central and Eastern Europe*, Update 30 (Autumn 2002), 4.
[76] Ibid., 5.

In BiH, IFOR (Implementation Force of NATO) throughout 1996-1998 conducted light weapons confiscation in an ad hoc basis in BiH. In March 1998 an Operation Harvest was launched to provide amnesty to those who hand in their weapons. During the operation a sizeable number of weapons were collected despite the absence of monetary or material incentive.[77] Encouraged by the results, NATO and UN authorities operated other amnesties in 1999, 2000 and 2001.[78]

In other disarmament actions in the region, large number of SALW has been collected. In Albania 188,000 weapons have been collected; Croatia has yielded 40,000; in 2001 in Serbia-Montenegro 50,000 SALW were destroyed; in 2001 in Macedonia around 3300 SALW were collected and destroyed.

In Albania, the small arms issue has been around since the collapse of law and order in 1997, following the failure of a number of pyramid savings schemes. Around 700,000 weapons were looted following crisis at the time, from military arsenals. In September 2000, the German, Norwegian and American governments signed an agreement with Albania to establish an arms destruction program under the aegis of SP. A German MoD team began, in December, to destroy about 130,000 surplus weapons, and trained Albanians to continue the work. UNDP scheme Weapons in Exchange for Development linked arms collection with services like road repair and installation of telephones.

Bulgaria's main export items are SALW, which use simple technology and are inexpensive. Often described in the past as the "arms bazaar for rebels and rogues", Bulgaria has made some progress towards improving its arms export controls. Although there have been claim that Bulgaria's SALW does not enter to the sensitive destinations, recently there was a serious case where it was reported of the Bulgarian arms exports to Iraq as the country to have huge stocks of surplus weapons that have yet to be destroyed.[79]

Romania has the capability to develop major weaponry and produces a range of small arms and ammunition. The precarious nature of the economy has created big incentives to

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[77] Throughout March-April 1998, 1,724 small arms, 26,076 hand grenades, and 2,206 antipersonnel mines were collected.
[78] As of July 2002, the Operation had yielded 23,387 pieces of SALW, 7,500,000 rounds of ammunition, 98,208 hand grenades, 25,908 mines, 22,141 kg of explosives and 90,931 assorted mortars, rifle grenades and hand-made ordnance. See King, Dorn and Hodes, 30.
[79] Saferworld, 4.

export arms. In the late 1990s a number of arms scandals tarnished its image as a responsible arms exporter.[80]

SALW issue has also gained the spotlight in the regional and international arena. Gaps in a regional-level approach to the problem of SALW proliferation appear to be in the process of being filled by SP's Regional Implementation Plan for Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, as well as by the establishment of the Regional Clearinghouse for Small Arms and Light Weapons in Belgrade. It works with the governments and international organizations to formulate and develop projects, which will tackle the small arms problem.

Other relevant issues are demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. In BiH demobilization came about in three distinct phases: first as an emergency demobilization phase in late 1995/1996; second as part of an intermediate professionalization of services in 1997/1998; and then, in the country's pursuit of a peace dividend, while continuing the professionalization processes in 1999/2000.[81] Similar demobilizations occurred in Macedonia and Croatia as well.

In the region, several problems were identified with regard to the general reintegration programs. There have been serious allegations concerning misappropriation of funds. The programs while in short term provide employment opportunities in the long-term did nothing to address underlying psychological tensions and post-traumatic mental illness. Demobilized soldiers, especially those without work, represent a powerful political lobby, often manipulated by extremists and nationalist parties and pose a physical threat to the peace processes. The dangerous mixture of high unemployment, proliferation of SALW, hopelessness and mistrust between the ethnic communities remains alive.

The lack of adequate reintegration has undoubtedly contributed to organized crime, weapon smuggling, violence towards minority returnees and an export of mercenaries to other parts of the world. The failure of reintegration has also led to the recruitment of the former combatants in other regional and international conflicts.

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[80] Ibid.

[81] Of the estimated 400,000 soldiers in 1995, an estimated 370,000 soldiers were demobilized over a five-year period. See King, Dorn and Hodes, 11.

One of the key problems in demobilization and reintegration is the postponement of hard decisions, causing a lasting sense of unpredictability as well as psychological and moral hazards for officers subject to demobilization.[82]

H. Judiciary and Security Sector

The establishment of a fair and independent judiciary is urgent and practical need for the transitional countries of SEE. It is essential to build a security system based on the rule of law and human dignity.

The wars in region destroyed the judiciary. Many resources such as law libraries and offices, law books, and legal records were destroyed during the war, and many legal institutions ceased to function at all. In the case of BiH, IFOR's 1996 legal evaluation of the judiciary indicated that approximately 50 percent of judges from RS and Bosnian-Croat Federation were not aware of the European Court of Human Rights.[83]

The judicial branches of governments in SEE are subject to manipulation by the executive branch.[84] Investigations into police abuses frequently prove fruitless and charges of wrongdoing are rare. There is inability and lack of desire on the part of judiciary to prosecute law enforcement officials who cross the line. Much remains to be done in rooting out corruption, improving the working of courts and protecting individual liberties.[85]

I. Corruption, Organized Crime and Informal Security Structures

Among other obstacles that prevent solid SSR in SEE are chronic corruption, organized crime and the existence of paramilitary structures. SEE is a major case where is the strong relationship between corruption and security. Corruption stands as a key impediment to a process of sustained security reform, as it has become

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[82] Andreas Heinemann-Gruder, "Becoming an Ex-Military Man: Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Professionals in Eastern Europe," *BICC-Brief* 26 (August 2002), 6.

[83] Michael Dziedzic and Andrew Bair, "Bosnia and the International Police Task Force," in *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, eds. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldburg (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1998), 290-291.

[84] See US State Department, *1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Romania*, (February 25, 2000).

endemic and it has had impact upon security relationships and institutions that have weakened their ability to provide security for society as a whole. Among the main factors that have supported the corruption are: the economic, social, psychological and moral crises that the society as a whole has experienced during the difficult period of transition; the infiltration of many persons in security sector structures with a suspicious moral background; the mentality of temporary office and uncertainty of the job; the massive "profiting" psychosis of many employees; and the lack of punishment by the law of the incriminated employees in these actions.

The UN-sanctioned arms and oil embargoes that were imposed on the former Yugoslavia from 1992 onwards, created an ideal environment for organized crime syndicates who specialized in smuggling restricted products into Yugoslavia.[86]

The worrying dimensions of corruption, organized crime and paramilitary forces are their implications to the security situation of the region. They compromise policy and the integrity of borders, expose domestic political and economic processes to external influence, and call into question the credibility of the rule of law. Serious cross-border corruption places the integrity and security of state and society at risk. Emerging technology, and the ability to move assets internationally at the push of a computer key, make detection, monitoring, and law enforcement all the more difficult.

A weak judiciary and corrupted law-enforcement agencies are unlikely to enforce laws effectively once corrupt interests have set up shop in a country, and an ill-paid, demoralized, poorly-organized bureaucracy practically invites rent-seeking. They make cross-border corruption easier to institutionalize within a country and considerably more difficult to eradicate.[87]

In the region, there has also been a tendency to establish informal security structures or paramilitary forces consisted of single ethnic groups who have become defenders of the ruling party's interests and they have become extended hand of the ruling elites for the functioning of the politics "by other means". These elites have established a "security racket" in which they abuse official state power to provide security to their politics. As

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[85] See Human Rights Watch, *Romania: Human Rights Developments*, World Report 2000.

[86] SWP, *CPN Western Balkans Final Security Report*, (March 2000): 19-21.

[87] Michael Johnston, "Cross-Border Corruption," Points of Vulnerability and Challenges for Reform," Presented at a conference on "Corruption within Security Forces: A Threat to National Security," George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Garmisch-Partenkirchen, (May 2001).

politicians have become creators of these informal structures, they have been unable to reform or to dismantle them.

The existence of these shadow networks is highly probable to remain for many years to come as they continue to receive funds from illicit trade of arms, drugs and human beings.[88]

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[88] Chanaa, 71.

CONCLUSION

In the conclusion, I aim to accomplish three tasks. First, to assess some of my findings with regard to the security reforms in SEE. Second, to explain some of the general rules that are applicable to all the countries of the region. Finally, briefly to elaborate upon the insights that security reforms suggest.

Assessment of the Reforms and Current Challenges

This study attempted to underline some of the important dimensions that have affected the transformation and restructuring of the security sector. Thus, one of my concerns was to emphasize the importance of reforming the security services for enhancing the stability, instituting strong governance structures in the region and intensifying the countries' integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

Another important theme of this work is the issue of the reforms themselves in different areas of security sector. The countries of SEE have successfully implemented the first generation security reforms that were directed towards the creation of the necessary basis for the functioning of the security services. In the countries of SEE it has proven that these reforms are fragile and that there is a need for second generation reforms that will strengthen and make sustainable the transformed services and agencies.

Second generation reforms have been crucial in transforming SEE countries' security sectors, which are in support of creation of a functioning democratic state, and society in which the citizens are able to live without fear, whose human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed and whose property rights are protected.

In general, there should be stressed the fact that the security sector reforms, despite the ways in which they were implemented and the objectives they accomplished, had their own importance having regard to the difficult period SEE societies and institutions of law enforcement have been facing during the transition period.

Generally, there has been slowing reform pace. What has compromised the process of SSR has been the continuous identification of SSR with simple personnel removal and changes of structures, even where this has been done based on personal desires and

interests, or political interference. There has also been lack of a clear strategy for security reforms.

The changing domestic and regional environment becoming favorable for profound reforms in security sector and the growing interest and commitment of the international community for SSR, are turning points for SEE countries' undertakings in reforming their security sectors.

It is too early to evaluate the results and the implications of this new reform undertakings. However, one thing is sure: these reforms are far more profound than other reforms in different areas as they are set to transform the security sector from an abuser of human rights and contributor to the conflicts into a part of the security sector that is strongly controlled by civilian democratic institutions and is in the service of democracy, human rights and rule of law.

With the turn of the new century and sweeping changes in the region, the security reforms have taken a new shape and urgency that are to have a serious impact in instituting stability in the region and integrating them into the European family of democracies. The expectation is that the long lasting reforms will open the possibility to engage more actively in institutional and capacity building and re-building trust between security sector and society. Eventually, this should result in the professionalization of security sector and the development of participatory methods of governance at all levels, which over time will lead to the creation of good governance practices in SEE.

As evidenced, much yet needs to be achieved. It is an imperative that this reform process develops in a holistic and efficient manner, so that the process can continue to develop in the direction of responsiveness, representation and greater professionalism. The challenge for the security sector of SEE as a whole is to create a modern system of governance that promotes, supports and sustains law and order.

The most important question of future security sector reforms in SEE is whether the countries will be able to keep the momentum and create the environment that will facilitate continuous security reforms adapting the security services to the new circumstances. It seems that the first generation reforms have already established the basis for democratic functioning of the security services. Whether these security services will be compelled to play according to the democratic rules remains important challenge. The

evidenced role of the security services in corruption and organized crime in the region serves as a timely warning to SEE countries. Completing the second generation reforms, strengthening the democratic governance structures and alleviating the security problems such as the abundance of the illicit arms and weapons are essential for preventing the security sector to remain as last obstacles in the way towards the democratization of the countries of the region.

General Rules for Security Sector in SEE

A careful examination of the briefly examined reforms in the seven countries of SEE is bound to demonstrate that in this area which is of major importance to the security and stability of the countries of the region there are, indeed, many rules that are germane to all of them. I have arrived at a synthesis consisting of a group of empirically testable generalizations that are applicable to all seven SEE states.

1. In all seven states of SEE, there has been lack of a political will to reform the security sector. It has been the outside factors rather than inside factors that haven given impetus for reform. In recognition of the fact that security sector reforms are cornerstones for both stability and integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, the countries of SEE have undertaken efforts for reforming these services.

2. In all these states, security services are grossly overstaffed and labor intensive. Political parties possess great influence in these services and as a result, instead of check on, they have become weapon of ruling governments.

3. In every SEE state, civilian and democratic control of the security sector remains weak as a result of the ambiguities that exist in the legal and institutional framework and the existence of inadequate balancing of the separated powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government.

4. Transparency is extremely important everywhere in SEE. It is relatively new for SEE countries, however, worrying dimension is that there is still resistance on the part of these countries to calls for more transparency in the activities of the security services.

5. In all SEE countries, there is a lack of capacity of security services to implement policies. They have failed to provide security to the citizens, there is inadequate of

cooperation among the relevant governmental agencies and there is a lack of expertise among the civil servants in the security sector bureaucracies.

6. In every state of SEE, there is also inadequate representation of the minority groups and women in security sector structures. This is especially important for the police forces that are engaged in promoting community policing practices.

7. Judiciary in all countries of SEE is subject to manipulation by the executive branch of the government. Investigations into police abuses frequently prove fruitless and charges of wrongdoing are rare.

8. Corruption and organized crime have become endemic and chronic everywhere in the region of SEE, affecting normal functioning of security sector agencies and weakening their ability to provide security to society as a whole.

These similarities do not lead to an all-encompassing theory of security sector reform in SEE, however, they provide necessary tools for addressing the problems that the security sector faces. These points are important to explore as they can help us better appreciate the specific challenges that the countries face.

Insights that the Reforms Suggest

In SEE, important improvements have been made in the promotion of the democratic forms in security sector that suggest various insights and lessons for the transformation of the security sector structures.

In SEE, security sector problems are one of the most serious problems. Therefore, the only feasible SSR strategy is reform of the state, and substituting this goal by any special security reform measure is strategically unjustified. The real question SEE countries are confronted is whether the given government will be guided by the logic of the fight against security sector problems or by the logic of general democratic and institutional reforms. Security reforms guided by overall and general public administration reforms, would serve to a great extent to the overall goals of security sector reforms and institute sound basis for sustainable democratic and civil reforms in this area. SSR concept itself recognizes that the strong links between the various security agencies must be taken into account if reforms

are to succeed. Without a comprehensive approach, one unreformed body might continue playing by the old 'dirty rules' and undermine efforts to transform not only itself but also the other agencies.

The transformation of security sector means organizational, administrative, functional, cultural and operational change in the development of the democratic forms within it. These processes are ongoing and they should be shaped in accordance with the changes and developments in the society, as a whole.

New challenges facing security sector in SEE increasingly are characterized as very sophisticated, which worsens the capability of the security sector to face them. This is worse when we talk about transitional societies, which have not yet stabilized the institutions of the system. Therefore, the imperative is to increase the strength of the public institutions in order to better come to terms to the demands of the citizens. This can best be achieved through community involvement in the work of security sector, and through organizing local partnership between citizens and security sector. Security sector is most effective and most easily fulfills its functions when has the sympathies of the public and when it cooperates with the wider public. It is necessary that the security sector agents are becoming instrument for democratic development of the society. Only in that way, the security sector can become a model and give a confidence, and only then the people will seek it for support and cooperation.

The public creates its image of security sector based not only on security sector's general functions, but also by its concrete actions and behavior in its dealings with the citizens. Each individual gains best image of security sector based on its personal experience in its contacts with the security sector. Thus, the dominant focus of the reforms should be on the human and community relations of the security sector. Only in this way the citizens will have the will to cooperate with the security sector in resolving the conflicts that exist between security sector and society. However, it is the obligation of the security sector and not of the citizens to initiate this cooperation. The security sector exists because of the people. The security sector has always a good story to tell. Security sector is always of interest to the public and it is in the best interest of the security sector to have an accurate public picture of what they contend with both nationally and locally.

The conditions for security and defense and security and defense policy-making today are fundamentally different from those some ten years ago. The more precise nature of the

newness of the environment may be argued to consist of several different factors and developments – ranging from technological developments to tendencies in public opinion. One consequence for SSR that may be argued to emerge from the changes in the new environment is an increased need for more political leadership and governance for the success in the reforms.

The control by appropriate parliamentary bodies, which already exists, should become regular and efficient. At the same time, new independent civil society institutions of external control and oversight should be introduced without delay as it has been proven that governmental and parliamentary control are not enough.

Finally, security sector reforms, without adequate necessary reforms in the economic and social conditions of a given society cannot have its effects. For SSR to be successful medical care, local economy, unemployment, income, education, and other social and economic factors should be taken into consideration. These in the initial period of reforms do not attract the attention of reformers, however these factors if not included in the reform agenda, become contributors to the criminality and disorder and also provide conditions which breed further inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the work of the security sector.