



Center for Policy Studies



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## POLICY PAPER

# SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

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## PREFACE

This report is a product of the one year long study and research of the author following the award in January 2002 of the International Policy Fellowship by the Center for Policy Studies without which I could not have completed successfully this project. The report represents an attempt to conceptualize the security sector reform in South East Europe and to put down some important tools in dealing with challenges posed by the security services in the region. It is a by-product of the research paper that was written on the same subject in the framework of the International Policy Fellowship.<sup>1</sup> My deepest appreciation goes to the International Policy Fellowship program, to Pamela Kilpadi, the Director of the International Policy Fellowship, and her staff, Csilla Kaposvari, Mladen Momcilovic, Merrill Oates and Olean Sydarenko, for their support during the Fellowship and to Stevo Pendarovski and Paul Roe for their mentorship of me on this fellowship.

Although they may not recognize their influence on the pages that follow, my thinking on the issue in general owes much to their wisdom and insight: Ronald Asmus, Robert Baric, Joseph C. Bell, Janusz Bugajski, Esther Brimmer, Frances Burwell, Eva Busza, Gheorghe Ciascai, Bart d'Hooge, Miroslav Dimitrov, Nikola Dimitrov, Viorel Duema, James Goldgeier, Stewart Henderson, John Hulsman, Zlatko Isakovic, Zeljko Ivanis, Bruce Jackson, Obrad Kesic, Charles Kupchan, Donald Kursch, Gary Litman, Paul McCarthy, Ronald McNamara, Steven Meyer, Konstantin Nesterov, Minna Nikolova, Jim O'Brian, Daniel Serwer, Radek Sikorski, Jeffrey Simon, Stoyan Stankulov, Katarina Staronova, Stanimir Tchernes, Edwin Truman, Vatroslav Vekaric, Vladimir Velichkov, Yantsislav Yanakiev, Maria Yordanova. The manuscript was read in its entirety by Stevo Pendarovski, Paul Roe, each of whom contributed a variety of helpful criticism and suggestion.

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<sup>1</sup> The research paper can be accessed at <http://www.policy.hu/yusufi>.

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All these friends, critics and associates facilitated the creative process, but in the end, of course, it remains my study and my responsibility. With all this help, the remaining errors and deficiencies must be clearly mine alone.

Islam Yusufi

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### *Unreformed Security Sector*

- ❑ For decades, the security sector services in the region of South East Europe were widely associated with violence, discrimination and insecurity. Only very recently, the commitment for reform of the security sector started to occupy the agenda of the South East European countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro.
- ❑ The programs and initiatives of the international community such as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe of 1999 created a new momentum for transforming and restructuring the security sector in the region, particularly as the problems posed by the unreformed security sector would jeopardize other efforts for enhancing the democracy, rule of law and human rights and for creating functioning market economies in the region.
- ❑ The current framework at the national, regional and international level for the security sector reform does not provide a comprehensive and suitable framework for how to fulfill reforms in the current local circumstances and conditions in the region of South East Europe. The fundamental premises of the current approaches to the security sector reform are based on the conditionality of the international organizations and there is a lack of local ownership on the issue.
- ❑ The complexity and unpredictability of the region's security reforms calls for the rethinking and rearrangement of some of the available instruments for security reforms in the direction of strengthening democratization and stabilization in the region.

### *The Challenges and Opportunities Ahead*

- ❑ Many factors distinguish the security reforms in the region of South East Europe from other reforms. There are some specifics in South East Europe that merit

deeper attention in the process of defining strategies for security sector reform in South East Europe, including historical legacies; politicization of reform efforts; inability to deliver security; weakness of the state; weakness of the civil society; and corruption and organized crime.

- ❑ Several suggestions for creative policies with respect to the security sector reform in South East Europe: more local ownership and greater local responsibilities; development of democratic practices; professionalization; security sector-community interaction; and reforms in civilian side of government.

#### *New Agenda for Security Reforms in South East Europe*

- ❑ Adopting an agenda for security sector reform in South East Europe would signify the progressive and balanced shift of the position of the national governments and the international community: from stabilization to democratization and integration and from international to greater local responsibilities.
- ❑ Even in the best-case scenario, a set of strategies and institutions different from the ones employed in the other areas are needed in security sector reform in order to cope with the specific requirements for democratization and stabilization in the region.
- ❑ What may have worked reasonably well in other reforms areas requires additional endeavors in the case of security sector reform due to the different challenges this sector poses.

## **POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

- **More local ownership and greater local responsibilities:** The governments of the South East European countries in pursuing their efforts for security sector reform should pursue more ownership in the undertaken reforms rather than seeing it as a conditionality of international factors.
- **From Defense to Security:** There has been growing blurring of police and military roles, which is unhealthy in the long term. The countries of South East Europe should shift their resources from the military to the civilian police forces. In particular, greater resources need to be allocated to public-order policing and border security, as violent crowd incidents, mass protests, illegal immigration, and cross-border smuggling of arms, narcotics and people are on the rise.
- **Stability Pact:** So far we cannot say that the Stability Pact has been able to change the status quo in the region and it does not stand to do so. Therefore, it is of the interest of South East European countries to transform it into an institution that will serve for the region's integration into EU and to serve as a clearinghouse to promote cross-border cooperation in road construction, telecommunications and energy supplies.
- **Governance:** In all seven countries of South East Europe efforts to be made to institute sound and continuous cooperation among the relevant governmental agencies and to strengthen the professionalism in the security sector services in order to increase the ability and willingness of the bureaucrats in these services effectively and efficiently to implement policies.
- **Reforms in Civilian Side of Government:** The governments of South East Europe should undertake efforts to deal with the ills that lie outside the security sector and within the public administration and at large. Adequate necessary reforms shall be undertaken in ministries of defense, ministries of interior, parliaments, and offices

of presidents that will increase their ability to control and oversight the security sector agencies.

- **Civilian Security Community:** Development of the strong community of civilian intellectuals that will be engaged in security issues is of crucial importance to security sector reform as civil society is a central to the legitimization of security sector. Creation of a security community is also central for the public's support for the security sector's participation in the humanitarian and other missions that require wider public support for their successful realization and implementation.
- **Judiciary:** It is essential to build a security system based on rule of law and human dignity. There is inability and lack of desire on the part of judiciary to prosecute law enforcement officials who cross the line. Much remains to be done in rooting out corruption, improving the working of courts and protecting individual liberties.

## I. UNREFORMED SECURITY SECTOR

For decades, the security sector services were widely associated with violence, discrimination and insecurity. The army, police, intelligence agencies and other security sector agencies overstepping their constitutional and legal bounds and engaging in widespread abuses, organized crime and corruption became frequent cases in South East European countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. The entire check and balances and control system became inefficient and ineffective. The national parliaments under the influence of the corrupt and organized crime syndicates functioning within the state security structures were not able to oversight and control the actions of these agencies. Judicial branches of the government, not willing and able to act independently, predominantly became in the service only of a particular group or faction of the political elites. Expectations for higher returns, combined with the increased rates of poverty and unemployment and decreasing standards of living, led to the involvement of the security structures in the smuggling and trafficking of arms, drugs, and people.

In sum, security sector agencies became obstacles in the strengthening of the governance and in the improvement of the security situation, contributing to the increase of the instability and insecurity in the region and hindering the efforts for democratization and integration of the region into Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and EU.

Today, the unrefined security sector continues to plague democratization efforts of the countries of South East Europe. Only very recently, the commitment for reform of the security sector started to occupy the agenda of the countries of the region. The security sector reform has become the political talk in their capitals. It is emerging as the last point of the entire process of the stabilization and democratization of the region, providing both the countries of South East Europe and the international community with a real prospect for a breakthrough that would lead the region away from the instability and insecurity and towards the stability, democratization and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures of NATO and EU.

Thus, the security sector reform is emerging as the important part of the process of democratization and integration of the region into Europe as the effective and efficient

security sector can enable the citizens to conduct their political, economic, social and cultural activities without being under the fear of possible violence. Inefficient and ineffective security sector can cause major violations of human rights and can disrupt the democratization efforts. Security sector reform is also important for conflict prevention. Efficient security sector, can add to stability. It can facilitate the effective management of tensions and it can act as an important confidence building measure.

The programs and initiatives of the international community such as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe of 1999 has created a new momentum for transforming and restructuring the security sector in the region, particularly as the problems posed by the unreformed security sector would jeopardize other efforts for enhancing the democracy, rule of law and human rights and for creating functioning market economies in the region. Besides Stability Pact, other multilateral and bilateral donors such as NATO, EU, OSCE, World Bank, OECD, and DFID, and USAID, have demonstrated a considerable readiness to pledge and commit substantial funds for the security sector reform.

There is also an ever-growing awareness in the region and internationally, that the role of security sector reform has implications for the overall democratization of the region. The South East European countries have by now accepted that the unreformed security sector is damaging their efforts for democratization and integration and that the challenges posed by it are comprehensive, and that solutions should be pursued in national, regional as well as in international level simultaneously. This gives the prospect for democratization and stability of the region a new momentum to enhance the region's governance structures, to achieve higher democratization and to promote overall further integration into EU and NATO institutions. It also provides additional impetus in the creation of the strong and viable state security structures as the countries of South East Europe possess weak security governance structures that are under the heavy influence of corruption and organized crime.

Security sector reform process is an important accession criterion for South East European countries wanting to join Euro-Atlantic institutions. While future decisions on accession are likely to be decided as much by political reasons as by specific security sector reform successes of the countries of the region, security sector reform remains an important factor in South East European countries' endeavors to join these institutions.

Reform of the security sector is a continuing process. Political and security environments surrounding security sector are inherently dynamic. All countries have to be able to adapt their security structures to the new conditions fast and effectively as established and functioning democracies adapt their security sector in accordance with the changing circumstances. However, the political pattern and inherent instability in their political systems, the transitional countries of South East Europe have confronted with great difficulties in adapting their security sector structures. The fragility of the public opinion as crucial factor in promoting reforms in security sector oscillating between reformist and nationalist agenda, has exacerbated the ability of the South East European countries to adapt to the new environment.

It has been the snowball effects of democratization waves coming from the north that have enhanced the agenda for reforming the security sector. Domino-style influences of the changes in Central Europe, have encouraged the countries of South East Europe to follow the suit and institute democratic procedures in the security sector. Also, the increased interest of the countries of South East Europe to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures of NATO and EU and the readiness of the western democracies to assist these countries, have further strengthened the reform agenda in security sector.

Generally, there has been slowing reform pace in the region. What has compromised the process of security sector reform has been the continuous identification of security sector reform with simple personnel removal and changes of structures, even where this has been done based on personal desires and interests, or political interference. There has also been lack of clear strategy for security reforms.

The security sector reform is basically promoted institutionally in the region at the international level by the Stability Pact as well as in some respects by NATO, EU, OSCE, Western European Union, World Bank, OECD, and other bilateral donors such as DFID and USAID. The Stability Pact with its special provisions on security sector reform has stimulated thinking about how to implement comprehensive reform in the security sector. Security sector reform has become a major area in the framework of the Stability Pact. It has helped to strengthen the concept of security sector reform, and gave further option for the coordination among international organizations in the field.

With its Working Table III on defense and security issues, the Stability Pact has worked on reforming the security sector and on creating a climate of confidence and

security throughout the region. It has worked on different areas of security sector reform and accordingly has established various initiatives and institutions for the fulfillment of the security sector reforms, for which the Stability Pact has been credited as success. Conversely, from its very inception it has also suffered from a considerable lack of credibility, both among its local and among its international partners, particularly with respect to its role of producing more words than action.

The current framework at the national, regional and international level for the security sector reform does not provide a comprehensive and suitable framework for how to fulfill reforms in the current circumstances and conditions locally in the region of South East Europe. The fundamental premises of the current approaches to the security sector reform are based on the conditionality of the international organizations and there is a lack of local ownership on the issue. These premises cause confusion in the policies for reform. By their very logic, these approaches have been successful in the countries that have successfully faced the challenges of political and economic reform, however they have not been realizable in the countries such as the South East European ones.

In sum, while there is both regional and international commitment for security reforms, difficulties in realizing them in practice persist. The complexity and unpredictability of the region's security reforms calls for the rethinking and rearrangement of some of the available instruments for security reforms in the direction of strengthening democratization and stabilization in the region.

## II. THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES AHEAD

There are number of factors that distinguish the security reforms in the region of South East Europe from other reforms. Unlike in other reform areas, the issues of peace and security have predominated this sector. In sum, there are some specifics in South East Europe that merit deeper attention in the process of defining strategies for security sector reform in South East Europe.

1. Historical Legacies: The complex historical legacies such as ethnic divisions, totalitarian and authoritarian inheritances, play a crucial role in the reform agenda of these countries. The historical legacies do not as such prevent reforms, but they inhibit their fulfillment and depending on the circumstances, divert the process of reforms from democratic outcomes. The current implications of these legacies whether in the form of weak governance and fragile civil society, derail the process of security sector reform. All these legacies and implications act as “confining conditions” constraining the reform efforts.

2. Politicization: The process of security sector reform is proceeding when there is high politicization of the reform efforts. The results of the process of security sector reform will depend on the outcome of the clash of nationalist, on the one hand, and reformist/integration-oriented politicians, on the other.

3. Inability to deliver security: In all the countries of South East Europe there is generally a continued inability of the political and security system to deliver security as a public good that leads to a heightened sense of insecurity and continued social and economic stratification.

4. Weakness of the State: Capacity problems of security sector have manifested themselves in a number of ways across South East Europe. These include inexistence of the cooperation among the governmental structures of the same government; state structures unable and unwilling to implement security policies; and lack of expertise among civil servants in security sector bureaucracies. The governmental institutions of the states of South East Europe, because of their weak economies and democracies, and lack of managerial cultures, do not cooperate instead they compete over spheres of competence. A fact that undermines a state’s legitimacy and promotes uncontrolled conflicts.

Moreover, in most countries in the region there is an absence of effective political elites that will show an ability to establish effective and efficient governmental structures. This leads to a lack of commitment to reform at the mid-level bureaucrats who remain unconvinced of or does not understand the rationale behind the reform efforts. Finally, due to the lack of experienced and well-prepared civilians that can undertake reforms, reform programs are not becoming realized.

5. Weakness of the Civil Society: Another problem that poses major challenges to the reform efforts of the countries of South East Europe concerns the weakness of the civil society and lack of its contribution to the overall reforms in the region. The countries of the region shall develop civilian security cadre and intellectuals that have skills and experience in security issues. Development of the strong community of civilian intellectuals that will be engaged in security issues is of crucial importance to security sector reform as civil society is a central to the legitimization of security sector.

6. Corruption and Organized Crime: Among other obstacles that prevent solid security sector reform in South East Europe are corruption and organized crime. South East Europe is major case where is the strong relationship between corruption and organized crime on the one hand, and security sector on the other. Corruption and organized crime stand as key impediments to a process of sustained security reform, as they have become endemic and they have had impact upon security relationships and institutions with following implications: have weakened the ability of the states to provide security for society as a whole; have compromised policy and have exposed domestic political and economic processes to external influence, and have called into question the credibility of the rule of law.

Several suggestions for creative policies with respect to the security sector reform in South East Europe:

1. More local ownership and greater local responsibilities: Security sector problems are most important problems of the societies in transition in South East Europe. The real question South East European societies are confronted is whether their governments will be guided by the logic of conditionalities of the international and transnational organizations or by the logic of reforming the security sector as a result of the demand of the national and local public opinion. Security reforms guided by the general public

opinion and framed according to the national circumstances, would serve to a great extent to the overall goals of security sector reforms and institute sound basis for sustainable democratic and civil reforms in this area. Without a strong national public support and without more local responsibilities and leadership, undertaken reforms will not create sustainability in adapting the security structures according to the developments in the society and wider.

2. Development of Democratic Practices: For the security sector reforms to be successful, attention should be paid on overall transformation of the sector from its organizational, administrative, functional, cultural and operational standpoint and in this context, major emphasis should be put on development of the democratic forms within it. These processes should be continuous and they should be shaped in accordance with the changes and democratic developments in the society, as a whole.

3. Professionalization: New challenges facing security sector in South East Europe increasingly are characterized as very sophisticated, which worsens the capability of the security sector to face them. Therefore, the imperative is to increase the level of professionalization of civil servants in the security sector in order to better come to terms to the demands of the citizens.

4. Security Sector-Community Interaction: Security sector is most effective and most easily fulfills its functions when has the sympathies of the public and when it cooperates with the wider public. Therefore, there should be community involvement in the work of security sector and there should be a local partnership between citizens and security sector. However, it is the obligation of the security sector and not of the citizens to initiate this cooperation and partnership. Only in that way, the security sector can become a model and give a confidence, and only then the people will seek it for support and cooperation.

5. Reforms in Civilian Side of Government: Security sector reforms without adequate necessary reforms in the civilian side of a given government as well cannot have its effects. For security sector reform to be successful the reforms in ministries of defense, ministries of interior, parliaments, and offices of presidents as the oversight organs of security sector should also be taken into consideration. These in the initial period of reforms do not attract the attention of reformers, however these factors if not included in the reform agenda, become contributors to the disorder and also provide conditions which breed further inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the work of the security sector.

### III. NEW AGENDA FOR SECURITY REFORMS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

The countries of South East Europe were successful in completion of the first generation reforms that included the establishment of new institutions, structures and chains of responsibility for the security sector and appropriate structures for its democratic control. With these reforms, the South East European countries laid the basis of the principles and structures for oversight of the security sector; empowered the parliaments to oversee and approve security sector budgets; to a great extent civilianized the security sector bureaucracies; and provided the legal ground for reforming and professionalizing security sector formations.

However, the current conditions require more than the first generation reforms. They are not enough, what is also necessary is to undertake reforms that can be titled under the second generation reforms that will be concerned with the further consolidation of democratic control of security sector; strengthening of the procedures of transparency in the security sector; wider engagement of civil society and creation of a strong civilian security community; development of the community policing processes; enhancing the ability for effective border protection; reforming intelligence services; tackling the proliferation of small arms; and complementarily reforming the judiciary.

These reforms are crucial in transforming South East European countries' security sectors, which is in support of creation of a functioning democratic state and society in which the citizens are able to live without fear, whose human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed and whose property rights are protected.

*Democratic Control:* The countries of South East Europe have succeeded in creating legal structures that subordinates the security sector to political and civilian role, and at the same time have divided control over security matters between the legislative, executive and judiciary branches. However, this legal framework have not been adequately operationalized in the practice as a result of the ambiguities in the institutional framework; polarized domestic politics, influencing badly the general national security situation of a country; the low level of civilian expertise in security issues; and the

inadequate balancing of the separated powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of a government.

Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania are facing problems of gaps in the legislative framework and there is an unclear division of responsibility between the President, Ministry of Defense and the Chief of General Staff. In particular, power to mobilize the armed forces during an emergency needs to be legally clarified in the future as they leave substantial room for bureaucratic battles.

In Croatia problems remain in a disproportionate balance of power between the president and parliament. A primary concern for the future is the need to enhance the role of parliament controlling the security institutions, and serious efforts need to be made in order to circumscribe some of the authority of the presidency in this area. In Albania, the establishment of the legal democratic control of the security sector has not made it possible to keep the security sector off the services required by the political elites.

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro hardly fulfill the requirements for having instituted civilian control over the security sector because they lack unity in their security sector structures. Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks a ministry of defense at the state level. Serbia and Montenegro is a new state and it is yet to be defined the responsibilities of the civilian structures that will be entitled to oversight and control the security sector.

Particularly, parliament as a legislative branch of the government in all these countries does not yet have political influence comparable to that of many analogues western institutions. Parliaments committees that are entitled to oversight the security sector, very often lack necessary information and appropriate financial and human resources or necessary professionals and experts. There is also general lack of knowledge among parliamentarians about security issues.

*Transparency:* Transparency is a challenging concept for South East European societies with weak or even non-existent, traditions in holding security sector actors to account. That is particularly true in sensitive areas such as security, where myths and culture of secrecy prevail. The lack of transparency has created a space for creation of the non-accountable security forces under the authority of the elected ministers, prime ministers and presidents. In Serbia, Prime Minister Djindjic controlled certain ministry of interior forces for political reasons. President Kostunica as well has used the army troops in his dealings

with his political opponents. In Macedonia, non-accountability of the security sector brought to the creation of the paramilitary forces, Lions, controlled by the former minister of interior who were often involved in the violation of human rights.

These and other paramilitary forces, continue to function and flourish and become more politically and economically viable at the expense of security sector reform efforts. These structures have become defenders of the ruling party's interests and they have become extended hand of the ruling elites for the functioning of the politics by other means. As politicians have become creators of these informal structures, they have been unable to reform or to dismantle them. The existence of these shadow networks is highly probable to remain for many years to come as they continue to receive funds from illicit trade of arms, drugs and human beings.

Some countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro still lack doctrinal security documents such as national security strategy that would provide a solid basis for transparency in security policy and the process of security planning. Therefore in many cases, the problem is not in non-accessibility but in non-existence of these strategic documents. The security policy of a given country may be considered transparent if decision-makers are aware of and society is informed on the policy goals, existing and planned means to achieve the goals, and the cost of sustaining those means.

Of South East European countries that were lucky not to be involved in conflict, such as Bulgaria and Romania, they were able to establish transparency procedures more easily than the countries that were affected by the conflicts in the region

*Civilian Security Community:* Another second-generation issue concerns the development of civilian security cadre and intellectuals that have skills and experience in security issues. Post-communist security sector of South East Europe possess hardly security communities as they are still closed to civilians and resist civilian interference.

Development of the strong community of civilian intellectuals that will be engaged in security issues is of crucial importance to security sector reform as civil society is a central to the legitimization of security sector. Creation of a security community is also central for the public's support for the security sector's participation in the humanitarian and other missions that require wider public support for their successful realization and

implementation. Moreover, it provides an alternative source of information on security issues for both policy makers and wider public. Furthermore, it also provides the opportunity for popular debate, discussion and criticism of security issues. In addition, it can act as an important mechanism for holding other actors in the security sector to account through exposing malpractice, forming critical judgments and so on.

*Community Policing:* South East European countries require police reform to be designed and implemented in a way that will deepen and strengthen democratic values, increase the community policing and overcome the confidence gap between citizens and police. One of the central sources of the community policing is the organizational and functional decentralization of the police structures. Following 1989 changes, not all South East European countries adopted the common European trend of decentralizing the police and empowering the local governments with policing.

Another source of the community policing is the adequate representation of the minority groups in the police structures. One of the internal deficiencies of the police in the region is the lack of minority and women police officers. Over the years, there has been growing number of minority and women police officers being recruited in the police, however, they still do not correspond to the current composition of the minority ethnic groups and women in the overall population of a given country. This applies to all South East European countries, as they possess large minority groups that are not represented adequately in the police structures. The countries have undertaken efforts to close this gap, however there are still things to be made and there much work remains to be done to tackle the recruitment and promotion practices in the region.

*Border Protection:* Military definition of border security - which characterized the cold war era - is not relevant any longer given the completely changed security environment. According to the contemporary democratic procedures and practices, border protection should be carried out by a special police force that will not form part of the regular state police but neither it should belong to the national defense forces and that will operate under the auspices of either the ministry of interior or ministry of justice.

The task of creating such a system now confronts the countries of South East Europe. Over the last years, they have gradually undertaken reforms in reorganizing their structures of the border protection, changing it from a military organization with conscripted staff into a police organization with purely professional staff.

*Intelligence Services:* The South East European countries, as part of their first generation reforms, in early 1990s adopted a necessary legal framework in which intelligence services operate. This framework defined the area of responsibility of these services, the limits of their competence and the mechanisms of oversight and accountability.

Due to the enormous role that the intelligence services have played before 1989 and during the transition process, their transformation entails great political, security and societal difficulties. Therefore, because of the possible implications of the reform of the services, the countries of South East Europe, have adopted gradual reform of these services.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, until very recently several intelligence services were operating under the heavy influence of the ruling governments. Currently, there is not yet state level intelligence service, instead there are two separate intelligence services operating separate in both entities of the country.

In Romania, intelligence services pose different challenges. It is of great concern the presence of members of former Securitate in the current security sector of the country. In Albania, former Sigurimi's former agents unable to be reintegrated into the new circumstances have found work in the black market, and particularly in the running of people, drugs and arms.

*Proliferation of Small Arms:* Although South East European countries have made significant improvements to their arms export, import and production control policies and legislation in recent years, the region continues to be important source, destination and transit route for transfers of weapons and illicit shipments of arms. The illicit trafficking of arms, coupled with high unemployment in the region and mistrust between the ethnic communities remains a serious threat to the peace and stability in the region. The legacy of a decade of violence led to the wide-spread illicit possession and trading of the small arms

and light weapons, which in turn led to the resurgence of gun culture in some parts of the region.

There have been number of disarmament actions in the region, including in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro. Both Bulgaria and Romania have the capability to develop major weaponry and produce a range of small arms and ammunition that they export to outside world, sometimes happening to enter to the sensitive destinations such as Iraq. These two countries have to make efforts to prevent their countries of continuing of being the arms bazaar for rebels and rogues and other five South East European countries should make steps to prevent of becoming destination and transit route for small arms and to prevent their own citizens of possessing illicit weapons.

The region is also suffering from inconsistent policies at the international level and by the lack of regional cooperation in this field. Although certain steps have been taken by the Stability Pact with its Regional Implementation Plan for Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons to fill out the gap that exist in a regional-level approach, the Plan is yet to be operationalized in practice.

*Judiciary:* It is essential to build a security system based on rule of law and human dignity. In South East Europe judicial branches of the government are subject to manipulation by the executive branch. Investigations into security sector abuses frequently prove fruitless and charges of wrongdoing are rare. There is inability and lack of desire on the part of judiciary to prosecute law enforcement officials who cross the line. Much remains to be done in rooting out corruption, improving the working of courts and protecting individual liberties.

## CONCLUSION

As evidenced, much yet needs to be achieved. It is an imperative that this reform process develops in a holistic and efficient manner, so that the security sector can continue to develop in the direction of responsiveness, representation and greater professionalism. The

challenge for the security sector in South East Europe as a whole is to create a modern system of governance that promotes, supports and sustains law and order.

In conclusion, a set of strategies and institutions different from the ones employed in the other areas are needed in security sector reform in order to cope with the specific requirements for democratization and stabilization in the region and in order to successfully complement the process of security reforms. A more realistic scenario calls for a consistent and transparent overall strategy with more coherent sets of policies and instruments providing concrete “stepping stones.” The paradigm for security sector reform should change from peace and security to democratization and integration. Thus, what is necessary now is a comprehensive re-arrangement of existing tools and policies in a single framework. The development of a flexible and informal national common roof under which all current strategic objectives, actors and initiatives would be re-arranged to create dynamic synergies would be the acknowledgement of this paradigm shift.