

# SECURITY GOVERNANCE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

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INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIP  
RESEARCH REPORT

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THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS PAPER REPRESENT HIS PERSONAL VIEWS, AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE INSTITUTIONS THAT HE WORKS FOR.

## THE ISSUE

Lack of critical governance structures to provide necessary means for ensuring democratic governance in an adequate level in the defense and security sector, has been a major feature of Macedonia and other transitioning countries of Southeast Europe, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Serbia-Montenegro.

For most of the 1990s and early 2000s, the unreformed security sector plagued democratization efforts of these countries. The commitment for reform of the security sector has for a long time occupied the agenda of the countries of the region and it has been one of the major phases of the entire process of the stabilization and democratization of the region. The focus on governance with regard to security and defense sector comes from the long-time effort of the countries of the region to reform these areas by mainly focusing on the defense and security structure changes rather than on governance and civilian structures that lead these sectors.

Undertaken reforms in the security sector have led to new shifts that have had implications for governance. Their impact have increased the demand for more changes which in turn have re-shaped governing structures that conduct oversight and control the functioning of the security sector.

Much has been written on the security sector reform of the transitional countries of Southeast Europe and many reports, papers, conferences and analyses have been sponsored on the subject. However, an issue that until recently has escaped much of the attention of the scholars and analysts, is very issue of governance in security sector and the implications of the overall security reforms to the governance as a whole and vice versa. This is significant as it is the governance that is essential for the democratic functioning of the security sector. Also, on the part of reformers themselves, there has been much attention given to the issue of democratic and civilian control of armed forces. But a neglected aspect of democratic control is the issue whether there are competent civilian competent institutions that can design, plan and implement defense policies setting the direction of the reform efforts.

## THE QUESTIONS, METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCE

This research in the framework of the International Policy Fellowship is a study of the impact of the security reforms upon governance structures in the 1990s and early 2000s in Macedonia and in other post-communist countries of Southeast Europe, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. Specifically, through mainly focusing on the case of Macedonia with elements of a cross-national study, the author intends to investigate the degree to which the security<sup>1</sup> reforms that occurred in Macedonia and in other countries of post-communist Southeast Europe in the period between 1989-91 to 2004 have affected the governance structures of Macedonia and other countries and how the reform of the civilian governance institutions have affected the working of the security sector.

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<sup>1</sup> The paper uses the concepts of 'defense' and 'security' as synonyms due the blurring roles of the armed forces and police and other security and defense services in facing the challenges of the new era.

Security reforms have been important pillar of the transition processes in the region of Southeast Europe since 1989-91. I define *security sector reform* in this research as a reform of the elements of the security sector that have legitimate and exclusive role in the exercise of coercive power in society to deal with external and internal threats to the security of the state and its citizens,<sup>2</sup> and *governance*, as Caporaso<sup>3</sup> and Rosenau<sup>4</sup> note, a system of collective problem-solving in the public realm, or the way in which relations are governed among the governing actors that reside in constitutive units within a system of dispersed or fragmented political authority.

A number of questions need to be answered. The most general question is: In what direction has the security governance in these newly democratized states has been moving and within it would be interesting to see how the Southeast European countries have been defining their security governance and reforms.

The second question is whether the different degree of security reforms in Southeast Europe has caused any variation in governance. The record argue that Bulgaria and Romania have experienced a more successful security transformation while other countries of Southeast Europe, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia-Montenegro, have had partial security and defense reforms. It should be interesting to see whether governance forms had a greater degree of compatibility in the more successful countries than in others, so the security reforms in Southeast European countries during 1990s and early 2000s provide us a unique opportunity to test the strength of the linkage between reforms and governance.

This report aims to accomplish following objectives. First, the aim is to discuss the current governance structure in Macedonia and elsewhere in the region and to concentrate on the implications upon the governance of the unreformed and reformed security sector. Second, to examine the reforms design from the governance perspective and to analyze the implementation of these reforms. Third, to address the issues that has resulted from unreformed or reformed security sector and their potential impact on governance and security reforms.

The study adopts a comparative approach instead of single-case analysis. Data used in this research comes from several sources. The main source of the research includes interviews conducted in Macedonia and in other six countries.<sup>5</sup> Secondly, information obtained from books, journals, official documents, legislative materials, and strategy documents of the countries of region. Thirdly, news relevant to the countries of the region obtained from NATO Enlargement Daily Briefing, international and local newspapers, journals and news agencies.

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<sup>2</sup> Jane Chanaa, "Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects," *Adelphi Paper* 344, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>3</sup> J. Caporaso, "The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-modern?," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34/1 (1996): 30.

<sup>4</sup> James Rosenau, "Governance, Order and Change in the World Order," in *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. James Rosenau, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1-29.

<sup>5</sup> During the research period number of interviews were conducted with the governmental officials, representatives of the NGOs and international organizations, experts and members of academia. All interviews were confidential. Footnoted references to these interviews represent place of interview (MK = Macedonia), and number of interviewee (in the author's research files) (e.g. Interview MK1).

## I. SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN THE REGION

### *Macedonia's and Southeast European Specificities*

Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1991, the post-communist Southeast Europe, as it became known after 1991, consisted of following seven countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. In all these countries a change of regime was undergone and in the cases of the countries of former Yugoslavia, former federal units of SFRY, became new independent countries. Macedonia and other countries of Southeast Europe are parliamentary democracy with multi-party representation in the national Parliaments and with popularly elected President.

The region in 1990s experienced one of the worst atrocities that Europe has had experienced since the Second World War. With the signing of Ohrid Framework Agreement in August 2001 that ended the crisis in Macedonia, it was marked the end of wars and conflicts in the region of Southeast Europe. Since then the countries of the region have had stable governments with reform agenda that would lead the countries of the region into the Euro-Atlantic integration.

The reform environment in Macedonia and elsewhere in the region has following characteristics. First, there is lack of public trust to the state institutions. Societies lack trust in institutions beyond the family or other highly personalized networks. There is no regime for methodical, thoughtful handling of information that would foster trust in public offices.<sup>6</sup> Second, there are widespread tendencies for the politicization of the state administration structures. Third, the transition that has been experienced since 1989 has not been able to provide a model of how these countries of the region would evolve as a consequence of the undertaken structural reforms as there has been lack of continuity in the reform processes and policies.<sup>7</sup>

In the reform environment marred with these characteristics, Macedonia driven by the overall objective of obtaining membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions, has molded every aspect of its security and defense policy with the aim to fit into the NATO and EU preferences. However, the governments so far, despite their successes in instituting broader reform policies that will consolidate democracy and market economy in the country, have faced various difficulties that have hampered the reform efforts, including the attempts to reform the security sector and establishing a stable, legitimate and accountable civilian governance able to design, plan and implement independent security reform policies. Reform attempts and efforts have seriously been hampered by political instability and fragmentation that has resulted in above-mentioned lack of continuity in the reform processes and policies. Continuous and stable defense and security policies under the guidance of professional civilians stand to be a vital symbol of a unified, stable Macedonia.

Generally, the countries of the region so far have been successful in laying down the pillars of planning for security sector reform and restructuring. It is also important to note

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<sup>6</sup> Kieran Williams, "Introduction," in *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania*, eds. Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, (London: Palgrave, 2001), 19.

<sup>7</sup> Norman M. Naimark, "Ten Years After: Perspectives on 1989," *East European Politics and Societies* 13/2 (Spring 1999): 323.

that they have made rapid progress toward the goals laid down in their reform policy documents, developing a far more efficient and flexible security sector than what existed previously. Moreover, they have been able wisely to tap into the extensive resources of NATO and EU as well as the desire of western governments to help develop Southeast European nations.<sup>8</sup> This has provided them an important baseline for restructuring and reform initiatives, though economic, and possibly some political, constraints have made the reform process a long one. The similar economic and political constraints are still in place and preventing their influence on the reform processes rests on the degree to which the political stability that the region has enjoyed in the past few years can be sustained, and on region's ongoing ability to avoid being drawn into potential conflicts.<sup>9</sup>

The regional governments have made success to overcome the obstacles that have stand on the way of these countries to initiate and carry out substantial reforms that would turn their relatively developing countries of the European continent into the area of stability and prosperity. The overall reforms undertaken, including political, security and economic ones, not only have overcome the legacies of communism, but also have been able to a great extent to overcome the lack of an independent local policy making infrastructure.<sup>10</sup>

### *The Civilian Governance and Security Sector Reform*

Governance overcomes the difficulties coming from the weak state and fragile civil society and other confining conditions constraining the reform efforts and derailing the process of overall democratic development.

The recent challenges faced by the countries of the Southeast Europe with regard to the security and defense sector such as the shortage of competent civilian specialists in security and defense policy, economic threats, ethnic hostility and religious intolerance, insecure and inefficient borders, organized crime and corruption, the proliferation of small arms and dual technology, information threats,<sup>11</sup> etc., have shown that the undertaken reforms has not been enough for sustaining democratic governance in the security sector and that it is the governance in itself that has emerged as a weakness of the countries of the region.

The reforms in the security and defense sector alone would not be enough to consolidate the governance. It is overall reform undertakings in whole important public spheres, including politics, economy and judiciary that will consolidate the reforms. As the Prime Minister of Bulgaria Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha rightly points out that Bulgaria has “done such an effort in streamlining the armed forces, with great sacrifice from a human aspect, plus all the other things which are requested as far as corruption, as far as judicially,”<sup>12</sup> with which he underlines the importance of overall efforts for the success of the security sector reform.

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<sup>8</sup> IFPA, *Defense Reform, Modernization and Military Cooperation in Southeastern Europe*, (Cambridge, MA: IFPA, 2002), 26.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., vi-vii.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 103.

<sup>11</sup> Chris Donnelly, “Reshaping European Armed Forces for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *NATO Think Piece*, September 13, 2000, <http://www.nato.int>. (Last accessed July 20, 2004).

<sup>12</sup> Richard Harteis, “The Once and Future King? An Interview with Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Prime Minister of Bulgaria,” *European Security* 12/1 (Spring 2003): 113.

A frequently neglected aspect of the security sector reform in Southeast Europe, as the Donnelly puts it, is whether the governments are actually competent to decide on and implement a defense and security policy and direct the course of security reforms.<sup>13</sup> For example, the working assumption of the Macedonia's White Paper on Defense of August 1998 and related defense planning documents was that threats would emanate from outside the country. The conflict that happened in 2001, however, changed those assumptions, and basically stalled defense reform plans as the country was facing not a threat from outside but from inside.<sup>14</sup> Thus, it is in this context that come the significance of the civilian governance able to evaluate and define the security interests and threats of a country.

### *Interdependence of the Governance and the Security Sector Reform*

The security sector reforms began in all Southeast European countries soon after the revolutionary changes of 1989-91 but there are important differences to be observed in this regard. Determining the appropriate role of the security sector in the political governance structures in the region has not been an easy task.

Establishment of the governance structures has gone farthest in the eastern Balkan states of Bulgaria and Romania, whereas in other countries, such as western Balkans states, just as questions remain about the extent of the security and political transformation,<sup>15</sup> there are doubts about the security governance structures. However, notwithstanding the above differences, the path of civilian governance reform of the security sector has followed a remarkably similar pattern all over the region.

It was an overall expectation that the initial reforms undertaken in the security and defense sector immediately after 1989-1991 changes would be enough for streamlining the security and defense sector actors and for ensuring their proper behavior in the newly established formal democratic ambient. However, the security reforms were not as smooth process as it may have seemed to both reformers and observers at the first glance. Generally, little changed in the practical aspects of the work of the security sector,<sup>16</sup> and the initial implemented reforms, in Barany's words, hardly amounted to more than cosmetic changes.<sup>17</sup>

This was most evident in the continued dominance of the former state security and intelligence agencies in the security and defense sector even after 1991, a problem that continues to dominate the agenda of the countries of the region. As new members of NATO, Bulgaria and Romania face strong pressures from the Alliance to purge the security sector from the agents who held responsible positions at the communist era services, as with these people NATO is not having confidence in the ability of the countries to handle

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<sup>13</sup> The countries of Southeast Europe have not yet been able to develop the sufficient capabilities on the part of the government to design and implement the required reforms. Chris Donnelly, "Reform Realities," in *Post Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, eds. Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc., 2002), 131.

<sup>14</sup> IFPA, viii.

<sup>15</sup> Zoltan D. Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transitions and Beyond," *East European Quarterly* 16/1 (March 1992): 15.

<sup>16</sup> Interview BG3.

<sup>17</sup> Barany, 16.

sensitive Alliance information.<sup>18</sup> This has only reinforced the need for handling properly that particular sensitive legacy issue, as it remains serious obstacle for the sound governance in the security sector in the region.

The reform of the intelligence services and placing them under proper civilian democratic control has become an issue in the recent stage of reforms in Macedonia as well. It took the country to have greater rapprochement with NATO that attracted the attention of the international community in the working of the intelligence community in the country as they were supposed to reveal to NATO what measures they have introduced to protect intelligence sources. However, insufficient reforms in the intelligence services all over the region has proven general lack of capability on the part of civilian security governance structures to institute overall and comprehensive reforms in the security sector.

At the beginning of the reforms in the region, a big problem was the lack of expertise on the security reforms and governance issue. The willing politicians wanted reforms but they did not have clear visions about the scenario. In Bulgaria, for example, there has been a lot of legislative changes, however, the country for a long time did not possess the required trained staff in order to maintain a normal working governance system, a fact that in turn has questioned the capacity of the country to pursue certain long-term reform policies.<sup>19</sup>

The government of the countries of the region have been unable economically and socially to meet the demands of the security sector, particularly of the conscripted soldiers and the maintenance of the barracks and other responsibilities. Just as an illustration, a single day costs of an army barrack to the government of Macedonia amounts to around €10,000. In a country where unemployment has reached 40%, this amount is burdening the country's budget.<sup>20</sup>

The impact of these myriad problems was felt in almost all countries of the region. With deteriorating economic and social conditions in the region, the military with conscripted soldiers,<sup>21</sup> has been not able to contribute to nation building as young people (mostly men) from all parts and from different social backgrounds and ethnic origins work together. Army no longer has served as a 'melting pot'.<sup>22</sup>

Security developments since the end of the Cold War have greatly affected the security sector around the region. The security sector, including in Macedonia was given new assignments while being asked to perform their old core tasks in a different manner. Today, it is quite common for the defense units of the country to be involved in more security functions rather than on defense actions.<sup>23</sup> This is evident as the country is finishing the process of the border control based on military to the police based border controls.<sup>24</sup> This

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<sup>18</sup> Jane's Intelligence Digest, "NATO's Intelligence Concerns," September 5, 2003; Interview ROI.

<sup>19</sup> Interviews BG2, BG4, BG6.

<sup>20</sup> Interview MK1.

<sup>21</sup> Currently all countries of Southeast Europe have obligatory military service. Romania, with the successful end of the referendum on October 19, 2003, it is to abolish the conscription in the next couple of years.

<sup>22</sup> Interview MK4.

<sup>23</sup> Philipp H. Fluri, Anders B. Johnsson and Hans Born (eds.), "Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices," DCAF and Inter-Parliamentary Union, *Handbook for Parliamentarians* 5 (2003), 53.

<sup>24</sup> The countries of Southeast Europe have gradually undertaken reforms in changing their border protection system from a military organization with a conscripted staff into a police organization with purely professional staff. The most recent example is that of Macedonia, where the country's authorities on May 1,



transformation is shifting the military from being a defender of territorial integrity to providing security to the citizens.

This is also more evident in the increased participation of the militaries of the region to the missions of peacekeeping or peace enforcement, and disaster relief.<sup>25</sup> Also, the countries of the region in 1990s and early 2000s have become increasingly faced with new non-military asymmetric threats such as terrorism, civil wars, organized crime, and corruption, all of which require specific responses that traditional defense based armies are not able to perform.

So the key question in the changed environment is whether the civilian governance structures, reflect this change. The degree of shift varies from one state to another, depending on the dynamics of national legal and administrative framework and on the general democratic development.

### *Case: Security and Defense Accountability System*

While different parts of the state, including the legislature, judiciary and executive parts of the government of Macedonia and other governments of the region have slightly different roles in security matters they share the common but separate responsibility for keeping functioning security and defense sector.

Brief examination of the system accountability in the countries of Southeast Europe, shows that the countries of the region have come a long way in their efforts to establish democratic oversight of the defense and security sector. We are witnesses that there is a system of power sharing that provides for checks and balances against political abuse of the security sector. The laws of these countries, although with some lacking clear cut lines, have established who commands and controls the security and defense sector in peacetime, who promotes officers, who holds emergency powers in crisis, and who has authority to make the transition to extraordinary or war situation.

In theory and in legal documents, it is defined and regulated that the executives in all countries exercises direct control from the central government determining the budget, general guidelines and priorities of the activities of the security services. The legislature exercises parliamentary oversight by passing laws that define and regulate the security services and their powers. The judiciary both monitors the security sector and prosecutes the wrong doings of servicemen through civil and criminal proceedings whenever

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2004 started with the transfer of the border protection authority from the army to the newly established border police.

<sup>25</sup> For instance, to the UN peacekeeping operations, as of May 31, 2004, *Albania* contributes with 3 military observers; *Bosnia and Herzegovina* with 19 civilian police and 14 military observers; *Bulgaria* with 67 civilian police, 8 military observers and 2 troops; *Croatia* with 22 military observers and 4 troops; *Romania* with 185 civilian police, 44 military observers and 2 troops; and *Serbia-Montenegro* with 8 civilian police, 9 military observers and 6 troops. For more information on this, please see UN, *Peacekeeping Monthly Summary of Contributors* (2004). At the International Security Assistance Force, peacekeeping mission of NATO in Afghanistan, *Albania* contributes with 22 soldiers, *Bulgaria* with 38 soldiers, *Croatia* with 47, *Macedonia* with 18, and *Romania* with 27 soldiers. See NATO, "NATO in Afghanistan Fact Sheet," <http://www.nato.int>. At the SFOR mission of NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina, *Albania* is contributing (with 6 commissioned officers, 6 non-commissioned officers and 57 conscripts), *Bulgaria* (with engineer platoon), and *Romania* (with an infantry company consisted of 86 personnel). The countries *Albania*, *Bulgaria*, *Macedonia*, and *Romania* are also part of the US Coalition "Operation Iraqi Freedom", where they contribute by dozens of members.

necessary. In practice, the countries of Southeast Europe, influenced by the continental European traditions tend to emphasize the executive aspect of oversight. Legislative and judicial aspect of oversight as important pillars of the system, tend not to be favored in the countries of the region.

Democratic and civilian control of the security and defense sector in Macedonia is exercised through the President, Government, Sobranie (Assembly), the Security Council, ministers of defense and interior. The basis of democratic and civilian control is derived from the Constitution of 1991 and the Defense Law of May 2001. Between the Constitution and the Defense Law, the rights, responsibilities, and relationships between the President, Sobranie, and the Government (ministries of defense and interior) in the area of the security and defense in peacetime, crisis and war are defined. However, its practical implications have not been as easy as it stands in the Constitution and the Defense Law. There is growing concern about the gray constitutional framework that does not adequately define competencies between the Government and the President, which provokes political mistrust and allows both unproductive competition and duplication of efforts in the security sector reform processes.<sup>26</sup> The constitutional framework in Macedonia as it stands, allows for functioning of the independent military establishment. That means that to a great extent army, using the possibility of having direct link with the supreme commander, is feeling protected from the pressure for political change.<sup>27</sup> Therefore it is of major importance establishing the proper relationship of the General Staff to the president and government based on consensus.<sup>28</sup>

It goes without saying that responsibility for the decision to go to war is clearly and unambiguously defined and vested in the hands of the executive branch, subject to the approval of parliaments. This is a case in all the countries of Southeast Europe. However, the problem that appears despite tightly drafted constitutions and legal frameworks is who has prime responsibility in emergency circumstances, and what is the chain of command and level of authority between political and military circles.

Currently in the region, many problems in security sector result, in part, from the scarcity of legitimate security and defense experts – whether civilian or military –, as Simon puts it, who are capable of making the defense and security case to their legislatures and broader public.<sup>29</sup> Ministries of interior and defense, particularly, need responsible and capable civilian personnel to fulfill security policy-making functions to ensure that the ministries maintain real civilian and democratic oversight of the security and defense sector.

Though efforts have been made to overcome the difficulties and existing problems by training corps of civilian defense and security professionals, for instance appointing

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<sup>26</sup> James Baxter, "Lessons of NATO Involvement in the Balkans – Military Stability and Security Sector Reform," paper presented at Conference organized by NATO Public Diplomacy Division, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Geneva Center for DCAF, "Securing Peace: NATO's Role in Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution," 16 October 2003, Brussels, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031016i.htm> (Last accessed July 20, 2004).

<sup>27</sup> Slobodanka Jovanovska, Interview with James Baxter, "To Macedonia is needed an Army of 6,000 soldiers," Utrinski Vesnik, Skopje, December 29, 2003.

<sup>28</sup> Jeffrey Simon, *NATO and the Czech & Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations*, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 239.

<sup>29</sup> Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations*, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 95.

outside advisers to the parliaments' committees on defense and security,<sup>30</sup> little progress has been made yet in developing viable civilian security and defense community able to adequately conduct oversight of the military, police or intelligence services. The primarily politically appointed civilians within the ministries of defense and interior do not have a level of technical expertise comparable to their military or police counterparts,<sup>31</sup> nor do they have a staff of trained civilian professionals to assist them. As a result, ministries of defense and interior staff have not effectively assumed the policymaking function required to ensure standards of democratic and civilian control and oversight.<sup>32</sup>

A country of Southeast Europe that until recently did not have established clear command line is Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both entities of the Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska recently passed the necessary constitutional amendments to allow the establishment of a unified military command for the country, for the first time following the end of hostilities in 1995. Previously, the two entities had their own armed forces with separate entity commands. They were linked with weak central institutions, such as Steering Committee on Military Matters, which mainly had an advisory role and which until recently was the only military institution at the state level. The new amendments adopted in fall 2003 transferred the authority of Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska armed forces supreme commander from the entities' presidents to the country's joint tripartite presidency and established a single minister of defense of the country.<sup>33</sup> The two armed forces will have also a common general staff, the same uniform and flag, but will remain ethnically distinct.<sup>34</sup> These reforms were also endorsed by Bosnia's central government and parliament under the legislation (Defense Law) passed on December 1, 2003.<sup>35</sup>

Time will show whether this success achieved at the paper will be able to be replicated in practice as well that will provide the country with a possibility of establishing stable and coherent system of civilian and democratic control over the security and defense sector. The establishment of this system will stand as a vital symbol for the viability of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the case of Bulgaria, the Chief of the General Staff should co-sign every order of the Minister of Defense. This practice is positive in order to avoid political influence but from the other hand the Chief of the General Staff does not have any political functions. Therefore, it is the Minister who should be sole responsible for taking the decisions.<sup>36</sup>

In Croatia, there are two heads of executive branch: the President and the Prime Minister. For any significant change in the security and defense system and for some actions that the whole or part of the security sector would do requires the signature of

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<sup>30</sup> OSCE and Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces have hired two outside experts who will help the Commission on Defense and Security of the Parliament of Macedonia.

<sup>31</sup> For example, usually briefings to the Commanders-in-Chief (i.e. Presidents) in the region are usually made by military or police personnel rather than the civilians. This fact brings to the light that the problems with democratic and civilian control arise primarily from the disparity in technical knowledge and experience between defense and security civilians and their uniformed military counterparts.

<sup>32</sup> Interview MK.

<sup>33</sup> Amra Hadziosmanovic, "Bosnia Adopts Key Defense Reform," AFP, December 1, 2003.

<sup>34</sup> AFP, "Bosnian Serbs Move Towards Defense Reform," November 6, 2003.

<sup>35</sup> Reuters, "PfP Membership in Sight for Bosnia after Defense Reform," December 2, 2003.

<sup>36</sup> Interview BG6.

both sides of the coin of the executive branch of the government.<sup>37</sup> Also, in Croatia there is a problem with the Parliament. In theory, the Croatian parliament is entitled to question the acquisition of military equipment, participation of the Croatian forces in international peacekeeping missions, and the ratification of the international treaties, including the ones on security and defense. However, the parliamentary history of Croatia since its independence has not shown much engagement of the parliament in this regard. Also, there is not much parliamentary oversight over the work of the security sector, and overall, there are not many concrete mechanisms in controlling the security sector in Croatia.<sup>38</sup>

In the context of Serbia-Montenegro, of vital importance was the decision of the country's Supreme Defense Council of May 6, 2003 to integrate the General Staff with the Ministry of Defense. Previously, the General Staff had high level of independence from the ministry of defense. With the decision, this autonomy was decreased to a significant level and the Chief of General Staff became responsible to the minister of defense. This meant that the General Staff no more had direct contact with the Commander-in-Chief, i.e. President and the Supreme Defense Council, with which the lack of accountability of the General Staff to the Parliament and to the government was overcome.<sup>39</sup>

The laws in Romania stipulate that the leadership of national defense system is ensured by the parliament, the president of the country, the country's supreme defense council and government, the ministry of defense and other "public authorities that have responsibilities in national defense domain".<sup>40</sup> What is most important, in Romania between these authorities there is a clear-cut division of labor.<sup>41</sup>

Budgetary control of the security sector, which in all Southeast European countries has been entitled to the legislative,<sup>42</sup> in spite of being, theoretically, main pillar of oversight, in practice, is not functioning as crucial part of the security sector control. Despite the general expectation, the legislature has not been improving its budgetary oversight capabilities. The legislature, currently, decides only on the total amount of the defense

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<sup>37</sup> This comes from the fact that the President is elected directly by the citizens. And since the control of the security sector is not only on the hands of one part of the executive, there is also oversight being done between the two elements of the executive branch: President and Prime Minister. No part of the executive can move by itself. Interview CR1.

<sup>38</sup> Exception to this has been the 2002 parliamentary discussions on the adoption of the first national security strategy and national defense strategy of the country. Interview CR2.

<sup>39</sup> SAGE, "Serbia and Montenegro," in *Defense Sector Reforms in the Southeast European Countries*, January 2004, 3.

<sup>40</sup> The Law on National Defense of Romania, 45/1994, Article 7.

<sup>41</sup> Interview RO1.

<sup>42</sup> In Albania a budget management office was established in October 2000. The defense policy document has been published outlining defense requirements until 2008. The ministry of defense is responsible for the budgeting process. In Bulgaria, the defense budget is being discussed by the Bulgarian Parliament in detail. In Croatia, the defense budget is proposed by the government and then submitted to the Parliament. In Macedonia, the ministry of defense prepares the proposal that then goes to the ministry of finance. At this stage, dialogue is established with other ministries to match the country's capabilities. Then the budget is submitted to the government. Once eventual corrections are made, the budget goes to the parliament. The minister of defense presents the proposed budget to the Committee for Internal Policy and Defense. After the vote, the budget is drafted into a decree by the president. In Romania, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System has been implemented since January 2000 by the defense ministry. Among others, its goal is to enhance transparency concerning all activities of the defense sector. There are several committees inside the parliament involved in the budget-making process: Defense, Public Order, National Security, Budget, Finances and Banks. The relevant department inside the ministry of defense is called Relations with the Parliament, Legislation, Harmonization and Public Relations. For more on these, see Fluri, Johnsson and Born (eds.), 139.

budget but not on its structure. Another important difficulty with regard to security and defense budgets, as is the case in Macedonia, is that once the budget is approved, it is returned to the Ministry of Finance and resources are distributed to each of the ministries. Within the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Interior, resources are retained at the Ministry level; subordinate agencies requiring resources must request them on a case-by-case basis throughout the year. There is not necessarily a direct correlation between resources requested at the beginning of the budgeting cycle and resources received once requested during the budget year.<sup>43</sup>

In Bulgaria there are two commissions in the Parliament for domestic order and security. This type of parliamentary control is essential for acceptance of the budget for security and defense, and mechanisms for control of its spending. Bulgaria, in principle, has established the required legal basis for functioning of the budgetary governance structure.<sup>44</sup> In Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, there is a system for transparency and accountability of the military budget and it has the skilled people trained for these purposes. And the country's institutions, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Finance are interested to promote this system further in the framework of the security sector reform.<sup>45</sup>

Besides the budgetary control, another area that calls for attention is the parliamentary oversight on arms procurement. In any consolidated democracy, budget-proposing activities, in general, and arms procurement in particular, must be transparent and accountable to the public. Unfortunately in all countries of the region parliament has a limited say in arms procurement, if any. Oversight of the arms procurement is important as public funds are involved; deciding about weapon systems is not only a matter of technical expertise and security, but also about deciding whether money has to be spent on 'guns or butter', and if it is to be spent on 'guns', then which 'guns', how much and why.<sup>46</sup>

The overall gap that exists in the above-mentioned system of accountability of the security sector in Southeast Europe, the countries of the region have sought to overcome through relevant oversight institutions such as ombudsman. The ombudsman represents an additional mechanism for monitoring the actions of the security sector, on behalf of citizens and/or parliament. The main task of the ombudsman in the case of security sector is to investigate alleged arbitrary decisions or misdemeanors committed on behalf of the responsible officials of the of the security services.<sup>47</sup> The legal provisions of the countries having ombudsman institution, in their legal framework, for example like that of Macedonia, provide that the security sector units, like army and police, to allow, with no restriction whatsoever, any one who serves imprisonment or is, as the case may be, under arrest or kept in detention, to approach the ombudsman in connection with a violation of his/her rights or freedoms.<sup>48</sup> Ombudsman is entitled in all these countries to look to the

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<sup>43</sup> Interview MK4.

<sup>44</sup> Interview BG3.

<sup>45</sup> Interview BG6.

<sup>46</sup> Fluri, Johnsson and Born (eds.), 172.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>48</sup> Article 12, Law on Ombudsman of the Republic of Macedonia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, 7/97. In the countries of Southeast Europe, the ombudsman has general competence and deals with all problems generated by a malfunctioning of the administration. Of the countries of Southeast Europe, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and Croatia have introduced the Ombudsman institution by explicit constitutional provisions followed by adoption of detailed law provisions. For more on

alleged violations of human rights by the state institutions, including the security and defense services and to inform the public about the outcome of the inquiry. However, ombudsman as a complementary mechanism has not produced the desired results in this respect.<sup>49</sup>

Besides ombudsman, as additional mechanisms for oversight, civil society, media, and auditor general make an important informal contribution to the information, formulation and implementation of security policy and in overseeing the implementation of national security policy and the corresponding budget.<sup>50</sup> These complimentary institutions as well, have not produced the desired result in keeping the security sector and the institutions that control them accountable to the wider public.

Another issue is the control of the security sector by the local self-governing institutions. Macedonia possesses one of the most decentralized system in this regard in the region. This accomplishment in Macedonia was made in 2001 when local elected municipalities were granted the authority to appoint local police chiefs, an authority that previously belonged exclusively to the minister of interior.<sup>51</sup>

### *Implications of Unreformed Security Sector and the Relationship between Unreformed Security Sector with Economic and Political Development*

Political divisions that followed 1989 changes in the region established problems with cohesion in the security and defense sector. This is particularly crucial with regard to the oversight of the security sector. There is a division of labor in the civilian structures control of the security and defense sector, however their inability to function properly in practice hampers the efforts to control the actions of the security sector effectively and to establish mutual cohesion.

Economic, political and social difficulties that the countries of the region of Southeast Europe have faced, has made it difficult to easily consolidate the control over the security sector. Also, the weak and imprecise constitutional and legal tools have put additional obstacles for establishing democratic governance in the security sector.<sup>52</sup>

Although Macedonia had to build its security and defense sector from scratch, in essence it did inherit professional security and defense sector from the old Yugoslav National Army (JNA) as it was the officer corps of JNA with origin from Macedonia that

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that, see Center for Study of Democracy, "European Standards and Ombudsman Institutions in Southeast Europe," International Conference, Sofia, June 6-8, 2002, 7.

<sup>49</sup> Interview MK3.

<sup>50</sup> Hans Born, Philipp H. Fluri, Simon Lunn (eds.), "Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its Reform a Collection of Articles on Foundational Aspects of Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector," *DCAF Document 4*, (2003): 41-42.

<sup>51</sup> In other countries, for instance in Croatia, the local self-governments do not have power to appoint the local chiefs of the police. The minister of interior only consults the municipalities when he/she appoints the local chiefs. Please see Zastupnicki Dom Hrvatskog Sabora, Zakon o Policiji, Clanak 14, 19 Prosinca 2000, br. 01-081-00-4340/2, [www.mup.hr/zakoni/z1.html](http://www.mup.hr/zakoni/z1.html) (Last accessed June 2004).

<sup>52</sup> In this context, the security sector within the environment that it deals with is a multidimensional that requires heavy engagement of the civilian governance. Ljubica Jelusic, "Continuity, Restructuring, or Development from Scratch?: Dilemmas of Slovenian Defense Reform," 1991-2001," in *Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, eds. Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc, 2002), 131. For the perception of the public opinion on the security threats, please see <http://www.idea.int>.

established the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM). The ARM tended to be formed spontaneously in response to local transformation marked with de-industrialization, lack of economic growth, inter-ethnic tension.<sup>53</sup> The resulting security and defense sector actors lacked cohesion and discipline. This undermined security sector effectiveness directly, resulting in internal instability and undermining functioning of the security sector and the civilian governance structures that are supposed to oversight and control it.

Next there has been high political and economic price of reform. In a country like Macedonia where unemployment is currently nearing 40% with negligible economic growth the downsizing of the security and defense sector is an activity overburden with political and social problems. In addition, the cost of reform has to be set against a range of other pressing priorities not least the implementation of the Framework Agreement of August 2001 resulting in a constant search for the minimalist and least disruptive solution.<sup>54</sup>

The key issue the government of Macedonia faces is how to invest and spend in the short term in order to make defense and security affordable over the long term. This has come to expression particularly when the governments of the country has faced a major difficulty to realize desired and planned reforms as budgets until recently have been tightly and centrally controlled on an annual basis and there has been insufficient appreciation of the need, particularly in defense, to plan and program over a period of years.

The interdependence between the unreformed security sector and the economic and political development in a country, has been also very evident in Croatia, where the stages of reforms has been very much depended upon the political context of the country. In the first stage, from 1992 to 1995, the war period, nobody was interested to think about democratic control of security sector. There were only some cosmetic changes. Then in the second stage, until 2000, the country was under the autocratic regime of Tudjman there was only some reaction rather than action in terms of the reforms. Then came the social democrat government following the fall of Tudjman regime that was eager and willing to institute the required reforms.<sup>55</sup>

Economic situation has also very much affected the pace of the reforms in Croatia. In the first stage (1992-1995) of political and economic development of the country, the military expenditures were around 15% of the annual budget of Croatia. In the second stage (1995-2000), the country started to cut the budget, but it did not have its desired effect as the complementary security reforms were not undertaken.<sup>56</sup> In Croatia there has been growing concern among the public about the possible social and economic implications of the restructuring and downsizing of the army.

The interdependence between the unreformed security sector and the political development, has also been witnessed in the case of Serbia-Montenegro where the post-Milosevic government that came to power with great hopes about instituting required reforms in the security sector, was reluctant to suddenly dismiss key security figures<sup>57</sup> such as General Nebojsa Pavkovic, Serbia's Chief of General Staff and top military commander

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<sup>53</sup> Shale Horowitz, "Political Sources of Military Defeat in Post-Communist Ethnic Conflicts," *European Security* 12/1 (Spring 2003): 18.

<sup>54</sup> Baxter.

<sup>55</sup> Interview CR2.

<sup>56</sup> Interview CR4.

<sup>57</sup> P. H. Liotta, "Spillover Effects: Aftershocks in Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia," *European Security* 12/1 (Spring 2003): 99.

since 1998, who have been accused of war crimes in the parts of former Yugoslavia. The new government allowed key figures in the security and defense sector that had maintained pro-Milosevic positions, to remain – thus securing the tacit support of the entire army. In many instances, politicians and previous key security figures simply overlooked troublesome issues with the understanding that the overall political environment need to remain stable. The new government declared that the sudden removal of these individuals runs counter to state interests since it inevitably would lead to destabilization.<sup>58</sup>

## II. REFORMS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

### *Timing of Macedonia's and other Countries' Focus on Security Sector Reform*

The need for security and defense reforms was felt throughout the region almost in the same time, mainly following the regime changes of 1989-91. However, their actual implementation differed widely among the countries of the region.

There has been substantial progress in Macedonia on the basis of new hierarchy of strategies – at the top end there is a new overarching National Concept for Defense and Security and the Government has started with the implementation of the recommendations that came out from the political framework of the Strategic Defense Review that was adopted in October 2003. At lower levels there are police reform and integrated border management strategies. Work has been done to establish a new system of crisis management that will coordinate security operations and the work of the intelligence agencies.

With this, a momentum of security reforms has been established in Macedonia that has led to significant results. To a great extent a progress has been achieved in the field of depoliticization and transparency of the functioning of the security sector and the remaining reforms is expected to be finished by 2007, when the country is hoping to get an invitation to join NATO.

One of the leaders in the security sector reform in the region, Romania, started with its reforms in 1990, when the so-called Committee of Action to Democratize the Army (CADA), pressed for the removing from office of officers compromised by their links with the Ceausescu regime, and for downsizing and professionalization of the Romanian armed forces. Besides CADA's action, another significant factor that contributed to the launching of the security and defense sector's restructuring in Romania was the signing, in 1990, of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which initiated a decrease in the number of military personnel and various types of conventional armaments.<sup>59</sup>

For another country that recently has been considered as one of the most successful in the region in reforming of the security sector, Bulgaria, although it was able to have from the beginning the civilian minister of defense, it took almost 7-8 years after the revolutionary changes of 1989 to undertake real security and defense reforms that would usher structural changes in the security and defense sector. The real reform in Bulgaria began in 1997 following the victory of reformist center-right coalition in parliamentary elections of April 1997. The new government, solidly pro-western, placed Bulgaria firmly on

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<sup>58</sup> Liotta: 99.

<sup>59</sup> Interview ROI.



a western-oriented track, and initiated wide-ranging reforms that brought the country in 1999 candidacy for full membership in both NATO and EU. In this regard, the first ever reform document came out in late 1998 with defense reform study. The reforms in the army started in 1998, and continued with the so-called Plan 2004. This plan included recommendations from NATO member states for the reforms in security and defense sector. In January 2003, Bulgarian government launched the Strategic Defense Review, which has a period of implementation of 15 to 20 years.<sup>60</sup>

It took number of years for Croatia to start to focus on reforming its security sector that it established following its independence in 1992. It was just after the end of the war in 1995 that voices started to be heard on the issue of democratic control of security sector and adapting it to the peaceful conditions. However, the end of the war did not change much. At this stage, which can be considered as the second phase of the security reforms in Croatia, the government did not introduce significant reforms in security sector, despite the steps undertaken for the demobilization. The real change, but not a very extensive one, began in the third wave of the reforms that came in 2000 when a new reform-oriented government came to power in January 2000 and when the country was accepted into the Partnership for Peace program of NATO in May 2000.<sup>61</sup>

Serbia-Montenegro's security and defense reforms record is very poor and mainly consist of first generation changes.<sup>62</sup> The fall of the Milosevic regime in October 2000 did not trigger much expected reforms in the defense and security sector in Serbia-Montenegro. Even the governments that came to power following the fall of Milosevic were not able to institute necessary reforms due to the highly unambiguous stance of the government towards the Euro-Atlantic integration and due to the still nationalistic electorate that favored politicians with nationalistic background. There was lack of political will and there were no human and material resources allocated for a successful reform.

The elementary security and defense reforms have just started in Serbia-Montenegro. The country is experiencing currently what the other countries of the region experienced previously: the process of adoption of the reform policy documents, such as the security and defense strategies. As of writing the paper, the chances for adoption of the defense strategy<sup>63</sup> looked slim as it was blocked by the not yet resolved conflictual relationships between the two federal units: Serbia and Montenegro.

Albania's reforms started after the total collapse of the system of governance in the country in 1997. The infamous 1997 crash of pyramid investment schemes led to major scandals in the security and defense sector. Candidacy for NATO membership awarded in

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<sup>60</sup> Interviews BG2, BG4, BG6.

<sup>61</sup> For the new government that came to power in 2000 it took three years to make a law on security agencies and another ten months to nominate directors of these agencies. In sum, it was very slow and reluctant reform. Even, in this period the reforms have not gone smoothly. Interview CR1.

<sup>62</sup> By the first generation changes or reform the authors means the establishment of institutions, structures and chains of responsibility for the security sector and laying down the basic principles of the work of the appropriate structures for democratic control of security sector actors. For more on that please see Islam Yusufi, "Security Sector Reform in Southeast Europe," Center for Policy Studies/International Policy Fellowship *Research Report*, February 18, 2003, <http://www.policy.hu/yusufi/researchreport.pdf>.

<sup>63</sup> Initially it was expected that the defense strategy would be adopted by June 2004. The planned reforms in the country will be implemented in three phases and will end in 2010. All phases of the reform process would be supported by the complimentary social support program. SAGE, "Serbia and Montenegro," in *Defense Sector Reforms in the Southeast European Countries*, January 2004, p. 1.

1999, a chaos in Kosovo mitigated by the NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and a relatively stable governments that came to power after 1999, has established a consensus in the country for instituting security and defense reforms that will overcome difficulties that resulted from 1997 crisis and that in the end will award much awaited goal of NATO membership.<sup>64</sup>

As mentioned above, Bosnia and Herzegovina is an emerging country of Southeast Europe in the area of security reforms. It has just established single ministry of defense at the state level that will combine the armies of two entities of the country, under the command of the country's joint tripartite presidency. It is after this major breakthrough in the country, that major reforms are expected as the country is expected soon to join the Partnership for Peace program of NATO that in turn will facilitate design and implementation of the required reforms in the security sector. At the policing area, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been able to establish a single, multinational State Border Service and has made considerable progress in integrating officers from minority nations into largely mono-ethnic local police forces.<sup>65</sup> Also State Investigation and Protection Agency has been established for exchanging law enforcement information, providing protection for national institutions and representatives and facilitating inter-entity and regional cooperation in the fight against organized crime, human trafficking and international terrorism.<sup>66</sup> However, despite these achievements, the country is still lacking a progress in the planning for security sector reform and restructuring.

### *The Reasons Why the Governments Undertook Reforms in Security Sector*

The reasons that have pushed Macedonia and other countries of the region of Southeast Europe to undertake security sector reforms, despite certain minor differences, were of similar character in all of them. To put it simply, following common objectives for reform can be distinguished. Among others they include:

- Integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions of EU, NATO, WEU, and OSCE that required democratic and civilian control of the defense and security sector and certain reforms that will adapt to the democratic standards and that will respect the main principles of the human rights and rule of law;<sup>67</sup>
- Making the security sector accountable to the democratically elected political leadership, as otherwise the security and defense sector constitutes a threat to democracy;<sup>68</sup>
- Balancing the resources needed for the security and defense sector with the needs of other sectors of society<sup>69</sup> and adjusting the size and budget of the military to the new

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<sup>64</sup> Interview AL3.

<sup>65</sup> ICG, "Policing the Police in Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda," *ICG Balkans Report* 130, May 10, 2002, 2.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>67</sup> Interviews CR5; BG2, BG3.

<sup>68</sup> Interview SM2.

<sup>69</sup> There is lack of resources in maintenance of the security sector and public pressure for peace dividend. Jelena Grcic-Polic, "On defense reforms and capabilities," paper presented at the conference "Toward NATO Membership: Harmonizing Efforts in Southeast Europe," organized by the Marshall Center, Dubrovnik, November 4-7, 2003, 6; Interview BG4.

security threats.<sup>70</sup> In a changing society the security sector cannot be left aside and must keep pace with the economic and social reforms in the country.<sup>71</sup>

- Adapting to the new security threats challenges and risks that the region's societies face in the new era. Security threats and risks are in a constant change that calls for the reform of the security sector that would be able to deal with the contemporary threats and risks such as the organized crime, terrorism, smuggling of weapons and drugs, etc., adequately.

- Making the security and defense sector ready for new missions, e.g. peacekeeping and in support of the national law enforcement institutions. Increasingly, the military no longer operate only within a national context, but regionally and internationally in cooperation with units of other countries. In this context, aim has been increasing the security and defense sector's ability to operate with the security and defense sectors of other countries in terms of equipment, training, language, information, command and control systems (interoperability).<sup>72</sup>

### *How the Reforms fit into the Governments' Overall Policies*

**I**t took a decade for the countries of the region to understand the importance of the security sector reform and its role in overall democratic and economic development.

There has been a general tendency for the governments to approach security and defense reforms on a compartmentalized basis with different aims and objectives without linking the processes together under an overarching strategy. Following the establishment of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe that propagated the comprehensive approach in finding solutions to the regional countries' security problems, the governments in the region started to look into the issue as part of overall economic and democratic development.

In the case of Macedonia, there has been an overall comprehensive strategy of the country's representatives and international community in instituting security and defense reforms and directing programs more precisely to the needs of the country. In the area of police reforms, based on the provisions of the Ohrid Framework Agreement of August 2001, OSCE became an agency for coordination of the work of the international and local actors in this regard. NATO Advisory Team that came to the country following the end of NATO's peacekeeping mission in the country in March 2003 became a coordination agency for the reforms in the military.<sup>73</sup>

This became true in other Southeast European countries that in 1999 became members of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. In Romania the security reform steps became part of the overall governmental policies.<sup>74</sup> In Bulgaria, as well, especially following the reformist government of Ivan Kostov, as the country did cement its pro-western

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<sup>70</sup> All these countries used to have large security sector, inappropriate for the new tasks of the sector. Interview BG6.

<sup>71</sup> Predrag Simic, "Reform of the Security Sector in Serbia and Montenegro," Belgrade, 2003, 1.

<sup>72</sup> Interview CR2; Fluri, Johnsson and Born (eds.), 54.

<sup>73</sup> Baxter.

<sup>74</sup> Interview RO1.

orientation,<sup>75</sup> and the security reform plans fitted well as part of the country's Euro-Atlantic integration priority.<sup>76</sup>

In Croatia, the issue can be looked at in two levels. One is internal, level that the government tried to do in order to respond to the calls of public. And the other level is what the international community expected from Croatia to do. It was the combination of two that produced the end results of the reforms and their relevance to the governmental policies.<sup>77</sup> The security reforms in the country, have been based upon the strategies for security and defense adopted in 2002 that recognized the importance of the newly changed security environment in the region and the requirements that the new environment asks from the government, like downsizing of the security sector, its restructuring, more transparency and more civilian expertise in the working of the security, issues that all fitted well with the overall governmental policies laid down at the security and defense strategies.<sup>78</sup>

In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, the policies for security and defense reforms has been in accordance with the government's proclaimed reform politics, however, in both countries it has not gone beyond political proclamation, as the reform plans in many segments are still not realized.<sup>79</sup>

Albania is a country that maintains widest national consensus in the region for security reforms and as a result of it, for joining Euro-Atlantic security and military structures. It has been this consensus and policy of no-scepticism for joining NATO that has been an overarching framework for the country's reform plans and programs.

### *Specific Reform Policy Model and Development of the Security Sector Reforms*

Since the beginning of the reforms in Macedonia, the governments did not have in mind any distinctive reform model or blueprint how to design, launch and implement the reforms in the security sector. Security reforms in Macedonia have never been carried out according to one generic plan. Each stage of reform had its specific circumstances and causes and often was in reaction to the outside environment or an outright necessity.<sup>80</sup> However, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, there was always

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<sup>75</sup> Interview BG2.

<sup>76</sup> It was this priority and orientation that led to the adoption of the new conception for national security of 1997 and the strategic new doctrine for membership in NATO of 1999, documents that in turn led to undertaking security and defense reforms - decreasing army personnel, transforming it in smaller but more mobile and better equipped one. Interviews BG4; BG6. However, currently as the budget is to a certain extent short for security reforms, there is not much compatibility with overall reform policies of the government. Interview BG3.

<sup>77</sup> The government that came to power in 2000 was more focused on economy than on security and defense. Just in the second half of the mandate, the government started to look into the issue more seriously. Croatia's reform program has suffered a lot from the coalition nature of government, for example one coalition partner took ministry of defense, another ministry of interior. Also, the competition that existed between the government and the president hampered the efforts. Interview CR2.

<sup>78</sup> Interview CR5.

<sup>79</sup> Interviews SM1, SM2.

<sup>80</sup> In other cases of Southeast Europe, like Romania, it was a product of a learning process than one of a clear-cut design. Interview RO1. In Bulgaria, the design of the reform was based on some programs, like the Plan 2004, which was the first stage of the reforms. The second stage was connected mostly with changes of the legislation; all efforts were directed in fulfilling the requirements for NATO membership, the requirements

widespread public consensus on the direction of the transformations: democratization, modernization and integration with NATO.<sup>81</sup>

There were examples of other countries, mainly those of NATO and EU member countries, and partly the successful examples from the Central European countries, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia. However, the use of these examples did not lead to any model that will give distinctive framework for the reform of the security sector in accordance to the country's democratic, political and economic standards. It was the adoption of national security and defense strategies and the Strategic Defense Review that established a minimal framework on how to design and proceed with the reforms.<sup>82</sup> The national strategic reform documents in other countries as well have played an essential role for instituting the reforms.<sup>83</sup>

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that can be as a semi-model in security reforms. Bulgaria, with the help of experts from NATO member states designed document and managed to establish its own system of professionals in this field. However, it did not have specific model for reform. In fact, it had a political frame for the model. It liked to have a small, mobile, well-armed army that will participate in missions outside the territory of the state, a frame that was close to the one of the armies of NATO and EU. Interviews BG1, BG2, BG3, BG4. In Serbia and Montenegro, the government did not have in mind any specific reform model that will be compatible to a modern democratic society. Interviews SM2, SM1. In Croatia, there were several models that circulated around the governmental and security sector circles. In reforming the intelligence services, the country used the American model by instituting an umbrella intelligence organization. Also in reforming the military, the country used the American model by making the battalion the basic unit of the military. It has also worked closely with the Hungarians and Slovenians on the issue. The country, with the adoption for the first time of its national security and defense strategies and a new law on defense in 2002, started to establish an overall framework for the security reforms. These documents constituted a model for the country. Croatia for a long time insisted on having its own model for security sector reform, based on the country's development potential. From development perspective due to the fact that the country has undergone difficult transition process, it was not important to have security sector that looks like the security sectors in western countries. The most important thing was to design it according to the country's traditions and potentials. As a result, the country has been able to develop a system that is optimal to the situation in Croatia. However, in both issues, Croatian security community approached the models used, cautionary, by criticizing certain aspects of that they do not serve the needs of the Croatian security sector. Interviews CR1, CR3, CR3, CR5.

<sup>81</sup> Andrzej Karkoszka, "Defense Reform in Poland, 1989-2000," in *Post Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, eds. Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc., 2002), 186.

<sup>82</sup> Macedonia has adopted Strategic Defense Review (Political Framework) of October 2003; National Conception of Security and Defense of June 11, 2003; Defense Strategy of September 1999; White Paper on Defense of August 1998; Action Plan for National Defense of 2000; Dynamic Plan for Transformation of May 2002. Also, in the case of Macedonia, Ohrid Framework of August 2001 includes provisions on security and defense reforms.

<sup>83</sup> Albania has Strategic Defense Review of 2000; National Military Strategy of July 2002; National Security Strategy of 2000; Long-Term Implementation Plan 2002-2010; Defense Guidance. Bulgaria has adopted Strategic Defense Review of March 25, 2004; National Security Concept; Military Doctrine of April 8, 1999; Military Strategy of 2002; Armed Forces Modernization Plan 2002-2015; Program for Improvement of the Quality of Life of the Military Personnel; White Paper on Defense of 2002; Plan for the wholesale reform and reorganization of the Bulgarian armed forces (Plan 2004). Croatia has adopted National Security Strategy of March 2002, Defense Strategy of March 2002, Military Strategy of December 2002, Working Plan 2000-2004. Romania has adopted National Security Strategy, Military Strategy, Strategic Defense Review (Objective Force 2007), Concept for Romanian Armed Forces: Restructuring and Promotion (FARO 2005-2010) of 1999; Romanian Army 2010; Program for the Forces 2003.

*Factors that have triggered and prevented the reforms*

Experiences of the countries in the region in the security sector reforms, generally give us clues on the factors that have triggered the reforms. As the main factors, we can number four of them. The changes of the government; dynamic leadership; conditionalities of the international community; and public pressure.

The conditionalities put down by the international community, including the governments, institutions, programs and advisers, have exerted strong influence on security reforms and Macedonia as well as other countries of Southeast Europe have encountered the entry of international community on a broad front. The entry has consisted of western governments, institutions and programs such as the EU, OSCE, independent foundations, centers and academia. Conferences, workshops, and seminars on security affairs frequently take place at the region's capitals, and local and external experts, advice, projects, and information are ubiquitous.<sup>84</sup>

The "NATO factor" as an international conditionality has been a source for some reforms in the region that has gone beyond cosmetic improvements. In the process of approaching NATO, countries of the region have taken on many new security obligations, and have actively participated in international peace support operations led by NATO. Adopting NATO standards and attending peace missions have brought the countries' security sector into the international oversight that in turn has been another trigger of reforms. Interaction with NATO established a constant positive influence, steadily pulling the reform process along when it stagnated and giving it a clear frame of reference. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation and assistance from NATO and its member states played an important facilitating function, not so much in terms of direct material help as in political and intellectual support of the indigenous institutions, political groups, and individuals planning and managing the reform process.<sup>85</sup>

The case of the reform of the unit "Lions" in Macedonia, calls our attention to the role of the combination of all these factors in instituting progressive reforms. Particularly, the role of the dynamic leadership, in this case, the (then) minister of interior Hari Kostov (now Prime Minister) of Macedonia, who came to the post of Minister of Interior following the elections of September 2002, was determined to push for positive change.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Trapans, 375.

<sup>85</sup> Karkoszka, 186.

<sup>86</sup> Police in Macedonia emerged as a relatively powerful body on the political landscape and played an important, if controversial, role in the 2001 crisis. The then Minister of the Interior, Ljube Boskovski of the VMRO-DPMNE, founded an armed unit within the Ministry, the Lions, which had uncertain loyalties and operated on the borders of legality. The new Minister of the Interior, Hari Kostov, a businessman without much political or police experience, who came to this post following the elections of September 2002, was determined to push for positive change. Action to bring the Lions to order, long demanded by the international community, started in November 2002 with the disbandment of the 4th Battalion, responsible for administrative, logistic and medical support. In January 2003 their commanding general, along with 14 other commanders, were dismissed, and steps were taken to disband the unit. However, the remaining Lions were determined not to go without a fight. A syndicate of junior officers was elected to represent the unit's interests and under their direction roadblocks were set up on the main Skopje-Blace road, where members of the unit dug in and were reportedly prepared to storm Skopje if their demands were not met. Certain number of police reservists came to their aid. After a tense stand-off with the authorities lasting two days, a settlement was reached: 600 out of 1,200 remained in the police, while the unit itself was transformed. All members who had regular contracts of employment were to be reassigned to other positions in the Ministry of Interior. The unit was finally disbanded in April 2003. Pressure of the public and the international

Romania has undertaken most far-reaching reform in the security sector: the abolishment of the compulsory military service, and full professionalization of the armed forces of the country, that provides good example of the role of the change of the government in instituting reform.<sup>87</sup> The last thirteen years have not been an easy period for the Romanian security sector. It had to deal with substantial changes and restructuring under some very difficult circumstances, as Romania was one of the countries where the governance structures still remained weak with regard to security sector.<sup>88</sup> The resources needed were not always available, and it had to downsize forces in an unfavorable economic environment. In addition, because of the lack of experience, the vision of the desired goals to be achieved has not always been very clear. Human resources management was fundamental for the country's security sector, since the quality of personnel has been an inherent requirement for any success in security reform. Therefore, Romania's leadership initiated the debate on the type of the army and the soldiers needed for the new era, which resulted with the referendum that approved the constitutional changes in abolishing the compulsory military service.<sup>89</sup>

This has been most ambitious reform ever done in the region of Southeast Europe. Other countries have not been able even to resemble certain moves of Romania. They have just been able to decrease the number of months served in the military and to change the universal compulsory military service to selective by recognizing conscientious objectors and medical dropouts.<sup>90</sup>

Romania's leadership timely understood that the quantity does not necessarily provide quality or purpose and it understood the importance of building mission-based capabilities that required professional people to perform increasingly specialized tasks and be able to rapidly adapt to different types of theaters of operations.<sup>91</sup>

Bulgaria has undertaken major downsizing effort of its military<sup>92</sup> and in this regard, it has been the role of the conditionality put forward by the international community that

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community who considered the unit Lions as one of the major violators of the human rights in the country and a unit that remained out of the public and civilian democratic control, played a critical role in the disbandment of the unit. Despite his background which lacked much political or police experience, Kostov's desire and determination for the reform of the unit led to his decisive action to reform the unit, despite the countering of the opposition as well as the pressure faced by the unit itself which still held large number of weapons and ammunition, owned by the ministry of interior, and who were determined to fight in order to remain part of the ministry of interior. The role of the change of government has also been very dominant in the case as the new government that came to power following the elections of September 15, 2002, had in its agenda launching major reforms in the security realm, including the reform of the unit Lions. More on this please see, Anna Matveeva, Duncan Hiscock, Wolf-Christian Paes and Hans Risser, "Macedonia: Guns, Policing and Ethnic Division," Saferworld and Bonn International Center for Conversion (October 2003), 40; Gordon Peake, "Policing the peace: Police reform experiences in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia," Research Report, Saferworld, January 2004, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/Policing%20PA2.pdf>, 34.

<sup>87</sup> Interview ROI.

<sup>88</sup> Barany, 20.

<sup>89</sup> MIA, "Romanskata centralna izborna komisija soopsti deka uspeal referendumot za noviot ustav," October 20, 2003.

<sup>90</sup> Due to inequality in burden sharing among members of the young population, the debate on suspending obligatory military service is inevitable in post-socialist countries. Jelusic, 134.

<sup>91</sup> Milica Neacsu, "Aspects on the Reform of Romanian Armed Forces," presented at Ministry of Defense of Slovenia and Geneva Center for DCAF International Seminar on "Defense and Security Sector Reform in the Western Balkans," Brdo-Kranj, Slovenia (3 October 2003).

<sup>92</sup> Bulgaria has been one of the most impressive cases of downsizing of the military in the region of Southeast Europe. Of a total force of 112,000 in 1999, to date it has been able to decrease it to 45,000.

helped to trigger the major downsizing effort in the history of the country.<sup>93</sup> The influence of the international organizations such as NATO, and to a lesser extent of the international NGO's or civil society groups has been supportive. One important plus has been popular support for the reforms as a result of a successful public information campaign.<sup>94</sup> However, what has been lacking is the leadership and insufficient role of the Parliament in whole of this process.

Serbia-Montenegro's leadership on August 7, 2003 sacked number of generals that were considered as Milosevic loyalists.<sup>95</sup> This was the major action of security sector reform in Serbia-Montenegro since the end of the Milosevic era in October 2000. The action, in international circles, was hailed as major step at cementing the pro-western politics of the governments that replaced the Milosevic regime four years ago.

This action came as a result of the change of the government, pressure of the international community, dynamic leader, public pressure, desire of the new government and the public to return the country to the international community, new constitution (Constitutional Charter of March 14, 2003), etc. The new government has fought hard to bring the country into the NATO's Partnership for Peace program, which is the first stage for a European country to get to the Euro-Atlantic structures. The membership in the Partnership for Peace would be impossible without shedding the dark legacy of the army's past. In Serbia-Montenegro, there has been an absence of a clear defined strategy and governance model, a fact that has led to slowness in the reforms planned and to heavy dependence on changes in daily politics. Essentially, in Serbia-Montenegro, the governance problem consists of undefined constitutional regulation with regard to the security sector.<sup>96</sup>

It is the incentive of the international community that can provide to Serbia-Montenegro by including it to the Partnership for Peace program that will establish groundwork for profound reforms and establishment of democratic and civilian control of the security and defense sector. In a sense, the security and defense sector can become an actor of democratic change in Serbia-Montenegro.<sup>97</sup>

Croatian army has been subject to a huge demobilization of officers, NCOs, and enlisted soldiers, a consequence of changing defense and security threats after the end of

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<sup>93</sup> Bulgarian News Digest, "Further Downsizing to Threaten Bulgarian Military Capabilities: Chief of General Staff," August 25, 2003.

<sup>94</sup> George Katsirdakis, "Defense Reform and NATO," in *Post Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, eds. Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc., 2002), 201.

<sup>95</sup> Serbia and Montenegro's top military committee, the Supreme Defense Council, sacked 16 generals in a purge of Milosevic loyalists on August 7, 2003. Several hundred lower-ranking officers were also axed. With the sacking, a third of 51 active generals or admirals lost their jobs. With that the army lost the remnants of its conservative and Milosevic-loyalist core, which sympathized and co-operated with the Bosnian Serb army during and after the 1992-95 war in Bosnia. Some of those who were removed were often described as sympathizers of Russia, for example the head of military intelligence, General Radoslav Skoric. One of the sacked generals included the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Vladimir Lazarevic, who was the commander of the Pristina Army Corps in Kosovo province during the 11 weeks of the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999. Some army units are believed to have been involved in the atrocities in the parts of former Yugoslavia. Vesna Peric Zimonjic, "Serbs Purge Armed Forces of Milosevic Loyalists Generals," *The Independent* (August 8, 2003).

<sup>96</sup> Interviews SM1, SM2.

<sup>97</sup> Predrag Simic, "Reform of the Security Sector in Serbia and Montenegro," not published paper, Belgrade, 2003, 4.



the wars at home and in the wider theatre. Demobilization is a huge and sometimes dangerous process in war-affected areas, as is the case with Croatia.<sup>98</sup>

It was missed opportunity for Croatia just after the end of the war in 1995 to restructure and downsize the security sector, particularly, the military sector. The restructuring plan was postponed up to the early 2003, as a result of which for around eight years that made the military to become social welfare establishment. In this case, pressure from abroad has been dominant. Also, growing transparency on the work of the security sector has helped to push for the reform.<sup>99</sup> The country had a new reformist government in 2000 that called for membership in NATO that in turn required large number of reforms.

Often there have been contradictory pressures upon Croatia within the range to impose justice on the one hand and the need to restore peace and stability in conflict-shattered country on the other. Some assert that, without justice there is no peace or at least no lasting peace. But others claim that insisting on bringing the persons responsible for the crimes before justice may delay, or even block, the peace process and, thus, impose further suffering to the populations concerned.<sup>100</sup> They are no easy answers to any of these questions, but, as Carla del Ponte points out, there are two important issues in this regard: First, often divided societies and countries lack the will or the power to prosecute and try those responsible for the worst crimes, in particular their leaders; Second, even when they establish prosecutions and trial, domestic courts in divided societies often do not provide the necessary guarantees for a due process of justice.<sup>101</sup>

Although the internal crises in Albania have had an important impact on the results of the security reform efforts, other factors, such as frequent changes of ministers of defense and lack of any realistic assessment of the results of the reform efforts, have had considerable influence on the reform efforts.

In the countries of Southeast Europe, mainly, the scandals related to the work of the security and defense sector were one of the major triggers for security reforms. Particularly, in the cases of Romania,<sup>102</sup> Bulgaria,<sup>103</sup> Croatia<sup>104</sup> and Serbia-Montenegro,<sup>105</sup> the scandals have been one of the sources for security reforms in the country.

<sup>98</sup> As Ante Gotovina case has shown, demobilization and treatment of veterans is one of the most critical issues in Croatian society, where the veterans are in the forefront of many social movements and radical demonstrations. Jelusic, 128; Interview CR1.

<sup>99</sup> Interview CR5.

<sup>100</sup> Carla Del Ponte, "The Role of International Criminal Prosecutions in Reconstructing Divided Communities," Public Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics (20 October 2003), <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Del%20Ponte.htm>.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> In Romania there were security sector-related scandals that played a major role in instituting some of the reforms. Interview RO1.

<sup>103</sup> In Bulgaria, there were a lot of scandals. For example scandals with export of weapons, as it happened with Iraq. In order to avoid such scandals in the future, Bulgaria established export control in the Ministry of Interior, and the National Assembly voted for a ban on certain military equipment exports. Interview BG2. These scandals came out from lack of coordination among the state institutions. Interview BG3. In Bulgaria, currently as well, the scandals are the main driving force for any change in the country. Interview BG4.

<sup>104</sup> Most notable scandals in Croatia include the support that the president of the parliamentary committee has provided to a member of secret service to get better position and uncovering the wire tapping capabilities of the ministry of defense. Interviews CR5, CR1. In Croatia, there have also been scandals related to the wiretapping of journalists, and also scandals related to the leaking of security documents to the media, related to the Croatian war, and from other sensitive security issues in the country. However, the scandals did not lead to the expected changes in this regard, despite the existence of a number of them. Most

It has been general assumption that it is the security sector itself that is main obstacle to the reforms and that it is staunch supporter of the status quo. There have been cases in which the governments have faced with a difficulty in overcoming the opposition of the security sector personnel itself who tend to be naturally resistant to the changes that may affect their positions, functions and jobs.<sup>106</sup> There has not been recorded so far any case where the establishment has blocked any reform process. What has been most evident has been their opposition that has derailed the reform processes.

What this research has recorded is that it is not the security actors only that are against reforms. The civilian governing structures also show reluctance for reform. This was not more evident than in the case of Serbia-Montenegro where the civilian governance structures, like the government, the president, the ministry of defense, were main opponents of the security and defense reforms. The main reason for which was the leverage that the security sector provided to the relevant civilian governance structures in dealing with their own opponents, for the fear of possible loss of power. Other stakeholders in this regard were the bureaucracy as well.<sup>107</sup> Partly, this was also case for Macedonia, where pursuance of different political interests, hindered the hopes for reforms in the security and defense sector. The opposition and support has varied from one phase of the reforms to the other. The same actors in one phase were supportive in another opposite. Opponents were those who were afraid of losing what they possessed. Mainly, the opponents were the reform targets, like the employees in the security sector who were threatened in losing the job.<sup>108</sup>

In the region, there has been case, where the judiciary has stand as the opponent of the reform. This has been most evident in Bulgaria. There have also been certain cases where the opposition of the bureaucracy has been recorded. The main motive for which was Bulgaria's membership in NATO.<sup>109</sup> In the case of Romania the most vivid opposition was visible on the part of the intelligence and counter intelligence services, which held legacy of the former regime's security agencies.<sup>110</sup>

### III. BROAD EFFECTS OF THE REFORMS

#### *The Effects to the Surrounding Environment*

Implementing security reforms has not been easy for all of these countries. Many problems recur, including some that are more country specific. The following paragraphs look at the challenges of and problems in implementing defense reform.

Despite the overall success of the region in establishment of a sustainable environment for the reform of security sector and despite the integration of a part of the region into the NATO, the countries have not yet reached their objectives in terms of the security sector

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important scandals have been ones on the purchase of S300 air system, and possible involvement of the corruption in the case. Interviews CR2, CR3.

<sup>105</sup> In the case of Serbia-Montenegro, there were scandals, and a good example is "Perisic case". Interviews SM1, SM2.

<sup>106</sup> George Katsirdakis, "Defense Reform and NATO," in *Post Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, eds. Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc., 2002), 200.

<sup>107</sup> Interview SM1.

<sup>108</sup> Interviews CR1, CR5.

<sup>109</sup> Interviews BG1, BG2.

<sup>110</sup> Interview RO1.

reform. This applies to all seven countries. Success is more evident in the defense side rather than in the police and other relevant elements of the security sector. The problems in the key areas are not solved yet as the regional countries still lack clear goals in the framework of their general vision for security sector reform.<sup>111</sup>

The countries of Southeast Europe have managed to establish civilian governance in the security sector, where all decisions are taken by civilian representatives responsible to the elected Parliament or directly to their electorate.<sup>112</sup> However, this success applies only, to the first round of reforms that happened immediately after the regime changes of 1989-91. Major difficulties were there in the second round of reforms, and are still there in the most recent wave (third phase) of the reforms including in the modernization, professionalization, education and emergence of new leaders of security sector, and participation in overseas peacekeeping operations. Also, there is still to be done more in the policing as the results to fight crime, including organized one have been not satisfactory.<sup>113</sup> Moreover, the countries have been successful in downsizing their militaries, however, they have not been able to find a dignified occupation for the discharged militaries, to change the mentality of the security sector people, to change the system of the management in the security sector, and to change the spirit of the sector.<sup>114</sup>

In all these countries there has been massive participation of the personnel of the security sector in educational and training programs abroad, particularly in the NATO countries. The people educated or trained abroad initially were great hopes both for the countries as well as to the international community who had invested much in them. They were expected to be a backbone of the new security civilian governance in the region. However, these initial hopes later proved to be generally false, as the returning personnel were not able to institute or establish an environment for sustainable reforms, they returned to their old style of working cultures or they were blocked by the mid-level structures or by their superiors who considered them as threat. Also, most of the education programs have targeted the military personnel rather than civilians, a fact that has decreased the opportunities for civilian training and education in security and defense policy management.<sup>115</sup>

The countries of the region that just joined NATO (Romania and Bulgaria) still need to focus their contribution to NATO in terms of niche capabilities and infrastructure facilities. Preparing for NATO membership as well as for a future active involvement in the EU's Common European Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defense Policy is a challenge for these two countries as it requires intergovernmental, interdepartmental and interdisciplinary cooperation.

This requirement applies to other countries of the region as well. As a result, establishing horizontal contacts between governmental officials and various security agencies is critical in all seven countries of the region. The establishment of a crisis management system and accordingly a crisis management center in Macedonia will be a major test in this regard.

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<sup>111</sup> Interviews BG4, CR2.

<sup>112</sup> Interview BG2.

<sup>113</sup> Interview BG4.

<sup>114</sup> Interviews BG6, CR5.

<sup>115</sup> Jan Arveds Trapans, "Defense Reform in Postsocialist States: The Experience of Latvia," in *Post Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, eds. Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc., 2002), 388.

Too often the countries of Southeast Europe ignored the fact that there was a pressing need to educate civil society in defense and security matters. Whilst governments did a great deal adapting old structures to new realities, reform requirements were rarely adequately exposed or discussed as part of an inclusive and transparent public debate. The paucity and often-partisan and badly informed media reporting of security issues was partly to blame.<sup>116</sup> However, due to the lack of sufficient engagement of the public, there was a serious lack of a non-governmental capacity to make a contribution to the checks and balances required in civil-military and civil-security sector relations.

The factors that stand as obstacles to the remaining reforms include bureaucratic resistance; obsolete mentalities; lack of decisive action on the part of the governments and the parliaments; lack of political vision, will and initiative; influence of the generals on the Presidents of the countries by bypassing the Minister of Defense; lack of recourses and lack of will for committing the existing resources for the sake of reforming the security sector; right people not being on the right places; decreasing importance of the security profession in the public eye that have led people to focus to more daunting problems such as unemployment rather than on security reforms.<sup>117</sup> The weaker point is also an inability of the government to synchronize and coordinate the numerous reform efforts targeted at every element of the security sector and unwillingness of the governments to take responsibility for this.

In all the countries of the region, we have the dominance of the executive branch (President, Prime Minister, Ministry of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Interior), in designing the reforms. In certain cases, the special legislative commissions and the General Staff have played great role as well.<sup>118</sup> However, the main work on the plan and design of the reforms has belonged to the executive.<sup>119</sup> The role of the legislative, i.e. Parliament, has been in adopting the proposed legislation relevant to the security reforms.<sup>120</sup>

The work of the executive in designing the reforms, in all the countries of the region, has also been supported by various experts from both public and private sector,<sup>121</sup> representatives of the international community,<sup>122</sup> and certain non-governmental organizations.

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<sup>116</sup> Baxter.

<sup>117</sup> Interviews RO1, BG3, BG4, BG6.

<sup>118</sup> In Bulgaria, in the period of 1997-2001, it was directly Prime minister, supported by Security Council and main ministries – like the ministries of foreign affairs, defense and interior. In certain cases, the special commissions in the National Assembly and the General Staff have played great role as well. Interview BG3.

<sup>119</sup> The government in Croatia that came to power in 2000 had its own “Governmental Working Plan for the Period 2000-2004”, and similar one was adopted by the new government that came to power in 2004. Interviews CR1, CR3. In Croatia, there was the dominance of the executive branch (ministry of defense), supported by the legislative, in designing the reforms. In the reform of the intelligence services it was the deputy prime minister who had an influential role. Interview CR5.

<sup>120</sup> In Romania, the responsibility for reform mainly belonged to the executive power consisted of the Government, Ministry of Defense and the President. However, there has been situation where the National Assembly has also played a role in their implementation. Interview RO2.

<sup>121</sup> In the case of Serbia-Montenegro, various experts from both public and private sector, representatives of the international community, and certain non-governmental organizations were responsible for designing the reforms in the security sector. Interview SMI.

<sup>122</sup> In Macedonia, the ministry of defense, with the support of the NATO Advisory Team, the British Defense Adviser embedded in the work of the ministry and the consultants of Booze Allen Hamilton, has played a leading role in the instituting of reforms in the security sector of the country. The President’s and Prime Minister’s offices have played complementary role in some of the reforms. Also, on the policing, the Ministry

In the case of Bulgaria, there has been successful example of government-civil society cooperation in very large scale in the reforming of the security sector.<sup>123</sup> The government of Bulgaria, with the start of reforms in 1997, it worked with various NGOs.<sup>124</sup> There was a coalition of NGOs that led the civil society representation in the reform attempts.<sup>125</sup> In Serbia-Montenegro, the government partially cooperated with the local civil society groups in designing the reforms. It cooperated in an ad hoc basis with the local civil society groups in designing the reforms.<sup>126</sup> There have been cases in Croatia, where the government has listened to the opinion of the civil society organizations. For instance, the Parliamentary Oversight Committee, held open sessions with human and civil rights organizations, like Helsinki Committee for Human Rights and Center for Human Rights. The role of the civil society was influential in the adoption of the law on military service that was considered as very liberal document from defense perspective.<sup>127</sup>

### *Stock taken from the Security Sector Reform Experiences*

There has been a direct positive influence of security sector reform upon the Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries of the region. Romania and Bulgaria joined NATO in April 2004, Macedonia, Croatia and Albania as the candidates for membership, are expected to join in the next round of enlargement of the Alliance.

With the achieved reforms, a large community of the security sector reformers has been established that has led to a continued interest in the society and media for overall reforms in the security and defense sector and all these countries as a result of the reforms achieved, can count on many local competent NGOs and political parties ready to discuss and offer their support for security reforms. Media also gradually developed competence and expertise on the issue and local businesses have become supportive of the security reforms. There have also been some changes particularly in the political interests. Previously, the people who occupied the position Minister of Defense were high profile politicians. However, the defense and security issues have lost their importance the security sector has become “normal” sector like others as economy, society, culture, etc. This change can be profiled as a success in terms of the overall reforms in the country.<sup>128</sup>

The security reforms in the region to a large extent have reduced the problems in the security sector. The reforms applied, have solved many of the problems that the security sector of these countries have faced, including, the establishment of the new organizational structure, increasing the transparency and democratic control, shortening of the army service, understanding the right on conscientious objection, decreasing the suicide rate in the armies, more investment budget allocation in the defense budgets, greater readiness on

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of Interior, with the support provided by the EU police mission Proxima and the Police Development Unit of OSCE mission in Skopje has undertaken major reforms that were unthinkable in the previous years of the transition of the country.

<sup>123</sup> Interview BG4.

<sup>124</sup> Interview BG2.

<sup>125</sup> Interview BG6.

<sup>126</sup> Interview SM1, SM2.

<sup>127</sup> Interviews CR1, CR5.

<sup>128</sup> Ten years ago, for instance in Croatia, military used to be most trusted institution by the people. This has now changed as the major threats to the Croatian security have disappeared. Interview CR1.

the part of the security to perform new security missions, less scandals then before, more money for modernization and education, etc.<sup>129</sup>

Media coverage of the reforms has constituted substantial part of the process of the security sector reform. Media has had information function to play. But due to the tendency of the media to look for scandals in the security sector that in turn would generate tension, it has been significant impediment to the spreading of the word for the required reforms. The main reason for that has been the insufficient knowledge of the journalists in the field. However, on the other hand, in general, there has been growing expertise of the journalists in the field. In these countries started to emerge the journalists who understand the reforms and who can pressure the government for more reforms, despite the general tendency on the part of journalists not to be friendly to the security sector.<sup>130</sup>

### *Prospects for Reform*

The discussion for reform in Macedonia and elsewhere in the region is not over. Issues relevant to governance are still unresolved, particularly with regard to the transparency and accountability, sustaining political will for reforms and difficulties in changing the old mentality, factors that hinder the establishment of sustainable governance. Not all the problems are solved. The security sector reform is a permanent and multidimensional process, and as such it is affected by the changes in various affairs, especially in the security and defense realm.<sup>131</sup> The three issues that has had and is to have major influence on the prospects of the security sector reform include transparency on the work of the security sector, turning the political will into the concrete action and the challenge of changing overall mentality of both security sector and the civilian institutions entitled for oversight of the security sector.

1. Transparency: What are needed most are more transparency in the work of the security sector, greater role of the parliament in the reforms, more transparent and accountable military budget, effective planning, programming and budgeting, more active role of the civilians, stronger link with academic community, greater role of the ICT, and continuous learning process as a source for change.<sup>132</sup>

Transparency of the security and defense sector is particularly important in security and defense planning and budgeting and in personnel related issues. Transparency is required to the public and toward other government sectors, political parties, parliament, and the media. It is the transparency that facilitates the interagency cooperation, an objective that has been difficult to achieve in Macedonia. The objective in this respect is to coordinate activities of the entire security sector. In many of other countries of the region, the most difficulty is faced in the crisis management situations.

Transparency is also important in the case of restructuring and downsizing where the ones being targeted with restructuring and downsizing require an access to the relevant decision making in order to make their transition smoothly and less painful as with the

<sup>129</sup> Interviews SM1, SM2, BG3, BG4, CR1.

<sup>130</sup> The counties cannot count upon semi-experts on security issues among journalists. Interviews BG1, BG4, RO1, CR1, CR5.

<sup>131</sup> Interview BG6.

<sup>132</sup> Interviews BG3, BG4.

downsizing and restructuring many personnel lose their jobs. All of the Southeast European countries have faced such problems and it is the challenge for these countries to include syndicates and the people targeted with the reforms and restructuring.<sup>133</sup>

2. Political Will: The record in the region shows that the countries have been most successful when they have used their own resources for the launch and implementation of the reforms. It has been use of the own resources that led to the commitment and determination of the governments to the importance and significance of the reforms in terms of the political, security and economic development of the country. In this context comes the importance of a need for a strong political will and clear aims in order to accomplish the reform. The efforts of the state structures won't be enough. There is a need for a broad social support, necessary recourses, consolidation of the best of the experiences achieved so far and enhancing the international cooperation already achieved.<sup>134</sup> In this context, systemic approach, with clearly defined goals, and not mere political declarations, would be helpful in this regard.

The countries have been able to achieve two of their main objectives: establishing democratic and civilian control of the military and except in two country cases, of that of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, embedding into the way for membership in NATO. It is the third goal, and that is the stable, legitimate and accountable civilian security and defense governance that will prepare ground for crafting a cohesive, long-term plan to restructure, modernize and develop modern security sector that is able to respond to the needs of the countries in the new era of security challenges. There is growing worrying that Macedonia as it has been recognized by the international community as one of the leading reformers in the region, is to adopt hands-on attitude toward security sector reform, an attitude that can hamper the goals and objectives. Despite this, the direction of the security sector reform with the adopted Strategic Defense Review seems to be on the right track.

Convincing the political elite of Macedonia of the need for security reforms has been an important challenge since many other sectors, besides that of security require urgent attention. For Macedonia, it took around seven to eight years since its independence in 1991 to become convinced of the need for security and defense reforms, as it did not perceive a need for reforms. This has also been particularly evident in all former Yugoslav republics, which did look to the past as something that they can be proud of rather than as a legacy that needs to be questioned. This has not been case in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, which viewed the past as a bad legacy and were convinced for urgent restructuring. For the countries of the region, it has also not been an easy ride in instituting reforms in security sector, as they had to run the process of reforms with the unprecedented dynamics of the change that was going on in the fields that indirectly have affected the work of the security sector. In some circumstances, the most important challenge has been to take decisions as they entailed many implications to the overall development of the countries of the region.<sup>135</sup>

Another challenge with regard to the political will in Macedonia and elsewhere in the region is to convince the countries' elites to continue their reform efforts with the same

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<sup>133</sup> Katsirdakis, 195.

<sup>134</sup> Interview BG6.

<sup>135</sup> Tudor Munteanu, "Political Challenges to the Defense Reform," paper presented at the conference "Toward NATO Membership: Harmonizing Efforts in Southeast Europe," organized by the Marshall Center, Dubrovnik, November 4-7, 2003, 1.

momentum. It has been much easier for NATO member countries (Bulgaria and Romania) and Membership Action Plan countries (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) to maintain momentum than for the non-MAP or non-PfP countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro whose path to NATO membership has not been clarified yet.

The environment within which the security sector acts is very dynamic and accordingly the reform of it requires continuous effort as the challenges change day by day. As the reviewed examples from the countries show, what is most important is the clear vision and political will of the executive supported by the legislative, and capabilities of administration that can be an engine for moving the security sector reform forward.<sup>136</sup>

3. Changing Mentality: The reforms and transformations of the magnitude of those undertaken in the region over the last decade cannot help but incur enormous social costs in terms of material well-being, disrupted family life, and derailed personal careers of the officer corps, which had to undergo many reductions and relocations. If the process drags on for too long, as in case of the region's reforms, public's support for the changes may disappear.<sup>137</sup> The other challenges that are being faced include also personal and national uncertainty, constant changes, material depravations, and intellectual and physical strains. Dynamism of social phenomena inherently possesses a lot of inertia. Changes that are supposed to be undertaken in the security sector cannot be introduced overnight. The subject to change is not only the procedures and legislation, but the attitudes of people, and their mentality, also. That takes time. In addition, you have to go slowly, and include all levels of security sector in the reform agenda.<sup>138</sup>

It is a challenge to these countries also in their security and defense concepts and practices to adjust them to the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic environment of these countries. In practical and down level it comes that as the countries of the region are moving towards professionalization of their security and defense sectors, they should attract suitable candidates for professional soldiers who possess high level of communication skills, able to tolerate the diversity and skillful to absorb different customs and manners of behavior coming from various ethnic, religious, race, and language background.<sup>139</sup>

Education of people on security matters remain important challenge to the countries of the region. You cannot expect needed level of expertise on the security issues, if you are not investing in producing the relevant experts.<sup>140</sup> It is also essential that the initial focus of reform is to work top down – to empower key decision makers and officials charged with the implementation of change.<sup>141</sup>

In this context, it is also important to define in law, rules and regulations the new functioning of the security and defense sector, reformulating the national security concepts and policies accordingly. For example, in the very important area of using the military in supporting civilian law enforcement activities, it is not clearly defined, restricted and regulated by law as to the circumstances in which it may be resorted to, nature, limits and

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<sup>136</sup> Interview BG4.

<sup>137</sup> Karkoszka, 186.

<sup>138</sup> Interview CRI.

<sup>139</sup> Rizvan Sulejmani, "Candidate Countries and Their Challenges Towards NATO," paper presented at the conference "Toward NATO Membership: Harmonizing Efforts in Southeast Europe," organized by the Marshall Center, Dubrovnik, November 4-7, 2003, 6.

<sup>140</sup> Interview CRI.

<sup>141</sup> Baxter.



duration of the involvement, institutions in charge to take a decision to involve the military, competent jurisdiction in case of breach of the law or of human rights violations in that context, etc. and to ensure that the involvement of the military in civilian law enforcement is consistent with international humanitarian and human rights law and principles.<sup>142</sup> In a democracy, it is essential that the different roles of the armed forces and the police be clearly defined. Therefore, the relationship between the ministry of defense and the ministry of interior should be clearly enshrined in the laws defining and establishing the system of crisis management. It is also essential, as the management of resources in certain emergency and disaster situations is an extremely complex function, sometimes involving the coordination of services, such as the police, fire, ambulance and health services, that the legal framework is precise in terms of the circumstances in which armed forces can be used to provide assistance to the police in internal security situations and clearly confirms the primacy of the police in dealing with the internal security situations.<sup>143</sup>

As the functions of the military become varied, the oversight organizations such as the parliament should shape its work on controlling the security sector accordingly. The countries of the region have not yet set up sub-committees for specific fields of defense, such as the budget, procurement, personnel and peace missions.<sup>144</sup>

With the changes, it is also necessary establishing mechanisms within the security sector that will contribute to raising awareness of and respect for democratic values and institutions as well as human rights principles. These internal mechanisms are necessary to complement parliamentary, government and civilian controls over the armed forces and to help in enhancing the democratic disposition of uniformed personnel.<sup>145</sup> A shortage of these mechanisms in security sector renders countries very vulnerable to destabilization.

## CONCLUSION

Fifteen years long history of the security sector reforms Macedonia and in other countries of Southeast Europe exposes the interaction between the security and defense sector and the overall democratization and developments processes. The record of the transformation of the security sector in Southeast Europe underscores the importance of the governance for ensuring stability and prosperity.

Fifteen years had not been enough in order to establish stable and sustainable civilian security governance that will direct and oversight effectively and efficiently the security sector actors. Thus, it was pre-optimistic to expect in the beginning that the civil society (NGOs, academia, etc) would offer required expertise, on the one hand, and the security sector or the state institutions entitled to oversight them, to be ready to listen to the views and expertise of the civil society, on the other.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> Fluri, Johnsson and Born (eds.), 56-57.

<sup>143</sup> Interview MKI.

<sup>144</sup> It is worth mentioning here as the positive development the commission established in the Croatian parliament "the Council for Security Services Oversight," consisted of seven members coming from academia and civil society.

<sup>145</sup> Fluri, Johnsson and Born (eds.), 149.

<sup>146</sup> From the experience of searching relevant experts in the individual countries of Southeast Europe to interview them for the purpose of this research, it has shown that in average the number of civilian experts

Macedonia has emerged as from the decade long of security “transition” with a new reform environment that, as is the case with the security sector reform, has established clear benchmarks for the future shape of the necessary reforms that will award the country, the long –desired and –awaited goal of membership in EU and NATO.

In the recent past the process of structural reform has gone through a period of slow pace followed by some acceleration. The crises in the country detracted policy makers’ attention from the reform agenda. After the resolution of the crises, the process of structural reform gained some momentum again, but suffered other setbacks due to the economic and political crises in early 2000s. In the course of 2003 and 2004, significant progress was achieved in security reforms, including new multiyear planning, programming and budgeting system, as well as significant change in the legal framework that regulates the functioning of the security sector.

Despite those improvements, Macedonia still suffers from a number of structural shortcomings, especially regarding the budgetary prospects of the reforms. Within the security and defense budgets, personnel expenses account for close to 80% of total security and defense expenditures, leaving little room in the budgets for reforms, investment and other activities supporting professionalization and modernization of the security sector.

Security sector reform is still an area where the considerable progress is lacking all over the region of Southeast Europe. It remains to be “critical weakness” of the countries of the region. Produced reform policy documents such as the strategic defense reviews, working plans, etc. represent positive statements of good intent. However, there remains considerable record of unfulfilled security reform commitments and the reform documents themselves, lack concrete proposals and objective targets. In this context, it is premature to talk about the end of the era for the required security reforms in the region. Promoted good intentions by the capitals of the regional countries need to be reflected in concrete results and there is a good deal to be done.<sup>147</sup>

Generally, the region has been faced with the tough decisions on security sector reform that have had major implications. The countries so far have been successful to mitigate the negative implications of the transformation. However, the challenges still stand and the key to successfully face these challenges rests on the degree to which the political stability that the region has enjoyed in the past few years can be sustained, and on region’s ongoing ability to avoid being drawn into potential conflicts.<sup>148</sup>

It may be concluded that the countries have made quite substantial progress with reform policies and that an adequate and ambitious reform policy agenda for the medium term has been established. However, in view of past experience and in view of the current security and political crisis the commitment and willingness to quickly implement the reform agenda needs to be upheld and the international community should underpin this through applying suitable conditionality, wherever appropriate.

Following factors seem to have become crucial in measuring the success of the security sector reform agenda in Macedonia and in other countries of Southeast Europe, including:

1. The distinctive cultures of security sector elements must undergo fundamental change before truly substantive reform is likely to occur. New habits of intra- and

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who would be able to offer the required views, does not go beyond ten people in each country of the Southeast Europe.

<sup>147</sup> Interview MK2.

<sup>148</sup> IFPA, *Defense Reform, Modernization and Military Cooperation in Southeastern Europe*, (Cambridge, MA: IFPA, 2002), vi-vii.

interagency cooperation are required. Reform processes, in essence, represent a huge process of legal harmonization. In this context, it is important to develop more efficient mode of cooperation with the parliaments for the required legal reforms and their harmonization with the Euro-Atlantic standards.<sup>149</sup>

2. The countries have to develop personnel management system that will attract the new and qualified people into the sector;

3. There should be energetic move to establish benchmarks for the security sector reform as it was the case with the abolishment of the compulsory military service in Romania and accordingly, full professionalization of the security sector able to carry out the new missions acquired by the sector;

4. The security sector cannot adapt itself to the dynamics of the environment within which it acts if it is unable to plan its activities and resources needed for them years in advance. Therefore, the establishment of the multi-year planning, programming and budgeting is must to all the countries of the region;

5. Intelligence reform remains a daunting challenge to the countries of the region and reform in the services will benefit to the stability of the governance in the region. In the transitions, the intelligence services, as Williams puts it, play a far more exposed, ambiguous role than they do in consolidated democratic politics and they are at the center of post-communism's moral panics and conspiracy theories,<sup>150</sup> yet at the same time they are expected to protect the people and enlighten policy-makers in a period of uncertainty and disquiet. In this context, their reform is a litmus test of both the functioning and accountability of the governance system in the post-communists states of Southeast Europe;

6. It is the trust of the citizens that makes the state institutions reliable bodies in the eyes of the people. And this trust cannot be acquired unless the scandals and crimes committed by the security sector elements have not found justice. In this context, reform of the juridical system that will treat seriously the cases of mistreatment or the crimes committed by the members of the security sector will be able to establish the third angle of the triangle of the civilian security governance, besides that of executive and legislative control;

7. Changes in the security environment and in the functions and missions of the security sector units, require serious consideration for the reform of the authority and competence system of the civilian governance structures on how to control the security sector and how to institute checks and balances inside and outside the sector, particularly as the security and defense sector units have acquired new functions;

8. Continuity in the security reforms is a condition sine qua non for the success of the reforms. Therefore, it is essential to establish wider security reform community in the government and outside it that will transfer the experiences from one government to another and that will establish sustainability and momentum for the required reforms. In

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<sup>149</sup> A benchmark has already been established in the Romanian case where the government established a special Ministry (department) for Parliamentary Relations as the special authority of the central governmental administration. Also, within the each ministry a State Secretary for Parliamentary Liaison position has been established for facilitating the relations with the Parliament. Tudor Munteanu, "Political Challenges to the Defense Reform," paper presented at the conference "Toward NATO Membership: Harmonizing Efforts in Southeast Europe," organized by the Marshall Center, Dubrovnik, November 4-7, 2003, p. 5

<sup>150</sup> Kieran Williams, "Introduction," in *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania*, eds. Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, (London: Palgrave, 2001), 1.

this context, it is also important to maintain momentum in the implementation of the launched reforms;

9. Although the country officials, with the support that they have got in drafting their principal reform documents such as security, defense and military strategies, have been for the most part very successful and clear in their aims for the prospective reforms, the planned reforms may take more than five years to be implemented or to reach the results as the officials in the emerging democracies of Balkans tend to be a little over-ambitious and may suffer a bit from 'overreach',<sup>151</sup> as witnessed in their negotiations with NATO in the framework of both MAP and PfP; and as a last but not least,

10. Civil society has a major role to play in the area of the strengthening the governance in the security sector. The forging of a new security culture based on a genuine partnership between government and civil society has been particularly needed. A public-private partnership in the area of security is to establish a new awareness on the part of the population of the country of the need for its active involvement in countering the existing security threats.<sup>152</sup>

Looking ahead, there are many obstacles to the region's security reform progress, not least of which is still lacking necessary efficient, effective, legitimate and accountable civilian governance structures. Whether there is progress in this regard or not, the lacking of necessary strong civilian governance will continue to have negative implications to the overall reform processes in the security sector.

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<sup>151</sup> IFPA, *Defense Reform, Modernization and Military Cooperation in Southeastern Europe*, (Cambridge, MA: IFPA, 2002), 92.

<sup>152</sup> Interview ROI.