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AZAMAT TEMIRKULOV

# Combating Open Society Threats: Regionalism, Nepotism and Corruption

Recommendations for NGOs from the Kyrgyz Republic

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## Abstract

This report is a result of the research project sponsored by IPF (International Policy Fellowship) Soros Foundation. The report is devoted to the problem of tribalism and regional division in Kirghiz society. It has been revealed that these phenomena are closely linked to the problem of corruption. The report looks at the potential role of civil society organizations in the struggle against nepotism, regionalism and corruption. The report will then make a set of recommendations for NGOs.

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The views contained inside remain solely those of the author who may be contacted at [temirkulov@policy.hu](mailto:temirkulov@policy.hu).

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International Policy Fellowship Program

Open Society Institute

Nador Utca 9

Budapest 1051

Hungary

[www.policy.hu](http://www.policy.hu)

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# 1 Introduction

Regionalism and tribalism is, today, a problem that may disturb each and every citizen of Kyrgyzstan. Politicians, analytics, scientists and the mass media do not cease to speak about the danger of such phenomena. In the opinion of some, this phenomena represent a real threat not only to the stability of the state but even to the very existence of the Kirghiz Republic. The main argument is that rivalry between northern and southern regional groups undermines national unity and may well become a source of internal strife.

Authorities apply different methods to try to resolve this problem.<sup>1</sup> The authors of the Strategy of Development of the Country 2007-2010 have noted the problem.<sup>2</sup> Having recognized the important role of state institutions, they also emphasize that the main initiator of, and the engine of the struggle against nepotism and regionalism, should be civil society - which fact has also been recognized by representatives of NGOs.<sup>3</sup>

This report takes a look at the potential role of civil sector organizations in moves to be made against nepotism and regionalism within the limitations of the Strategy for Development of the Country 2007-2010; and it studies possible actions that might come from NGOs and other civil society organizations to counteract the phenomenon. The basic purpose here is to develop a set of recommendations for use by civil sector organizations.

The report is divided into three parts:

1) The Problem: this part examines the roots of the given problem. What are the reasons for the possible split of society on the basis of a regional belonging?

2) Purposes and tasks: here, we look at what can be done by organizations of civil society, and we also identify related purposes and tasks.

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<sup>1</sup> Example: the introduction of criminal liability for statements leading to inter-regional hostility.

<sup>2</sup> Strategy of Development of the Country (CPC) 2006-2010, points 66 and 67.

<sup>3</sup> Forum – NGO 2007, 11 July 2007, Bishkek.

3) Recommendations: this part asks how one might actually work with these objectives, to be able to act and deal specifically with issues and concerns.

The results obtained in this report are based on field research done in all regions and in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, which was carried out from June 2006 to July 2007.

## 2 Regional division as a social problem

### 2.1. *Nepotism*<sup>4</sup>

There are some minor differences in practices of tradition, pronunciation, and mentality among the inhabitants of different regions of Kyrgyzstan; and there is a traditional division of *uruu* (tribes) in the two tribal confederations.<sup>5</sup> Today, however, this is more "folklore", and it does not have any functional role to play in society.

These distinctions and the traditional clan/regional division is not a problem per se, i.e. as it seems to some researchers and politicians. Our field research has shown that the local population of various regions do not feel any feelings of antipathy or rivalry towards the other. From among interviewed respondents from different regions (excepting the capital, Bishkek), no-one gave a positive answer to the question « Are you personally disturbed by natives of other regions? ». Indeed, there seems to be an absence of any disputed subject. This question was answered in the affirmative mainly by inhabitants of the capital – for perhaps these persons are more involved in the rivalries for resources, which are concentrated by and large in the capital and its vicinity.

Yet, during the interviews, some regional inhabitants did refer to natives of other regions when referring to incidents that might be construed as discrimination - though it was not based on personal experience. When asked "Who told you this?", interviewees referred to local elite representatives. The latter said that they had personally come across displays of regional discrimination in state structures, chiefly in the capital. However, it was also surmised that such things were more likely examples of

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<sup>4</sup> Nepotism, used here as favoritism granted to relatives or close friends, without regard to their merit. See: Alexander I. D. The evolution of social behavior, *Annual Review of Anthropology* 5: 325-383, 1974.

<sup>5</sup> Kirghiz traditional social structure consisted of forty different tribal unions (*uruu*), approximately, based on family relations. Each tribal union consisted of various family divisions. These tribal unions have merged into three big confederations. This structure was the basis of the political organization of Kyrgyz. Each tribal union had political sovereignty and its own territory – in the north and the south - which today corresponds with the regional division. For detailed research into the Kirghiz traditional social structure, see: Israilova C., *Traditsionnoe obshchestvo kyrgyzov v period russkoi kolonizatsii vo vtoroi polovine XIX - nachala XX v., i sistema ikh rodstva*, Ylym, Bishkek, 1999.

corruption<sup>6</sup> rather than regional discrimination. Further research into this confirmed such conclusions.

In difficult transition period conditions - which Kyrgyzstan is experiencing today - it is not easy for the population to adapt to new economic conditions. The state is not able to provide people with the necessary conditions of social protection. Social vulnerability compels people to seek the help of informal social institutions, in which a basic element is a traditional solidarity - *tooganchilik*. Such institutions help give some social security to affiliates/participants by means of a guarantee of mutual aid. Thus, after independence, the practice of solidarity by means of informal institutions has gained wide application in society; and one such institution is a patronage network that is based on a 'synthesis' of belonging to a specific administrative-territorial unit and kinship.

The practice of such solidarity would not create any problems if it remained outside the structures of official state organizations. However, this phenomenon not only takes place *within* the parameters of official bodies - it also (and often) takes up a *dominating* position not only in personnel selection but also when there are political moves made by groups of elites seeking power and to gain access to resources.

The solidarity based on territorial/clan belonging is actively used by corrupted elites. The corrupted chief aspires to bring into his office people belonging to his solidarity grouping; for, for him, it is firstly a way of guaranteeing his own security. This corrupted chief seldom deals with bribes personally - he prefers it to do through subordinates. Negotiations about transfers of money are done by a subordinate; and when he (the latter) receives a bribe he keeps a minor part for himself and the rest is transferred to the former. Thus, the chief has no open contact with the briber. Such a way of operating is done with a view to protecting the chief from being caught red-handed.

For an effective functioning of this 'scheme' the chief needs mechanisms of informal control over his subordinates. Such informal control is used so as to prevent subordinates from concealing a large part of money; and it also prevents a subordinate who has been caught red-handed from revealing the complicity of his chief. If a subordinate does point to the complicity of his chief, the chief has an opportunity to put pressure on the subordinate via common relatives, family, aksakals, etc.<sup>7</sup> If carrying out

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<sup>6</sup> Kyrgyzstan is 150<sup>th</sup>, from among 178, in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, CPI 2007.

<sup>7</sup> From interviews with tax inspection, customs and Ministry of Internal Affairs employees.

corruption activities, such mechanisms of control strengthen the security of corrupted officials, and also provide better controls over illegal financial movements. An interviewed head (with an average level in the hierarchy) of a customs department explained: “When one works in the place where I work, he should remember that, first, his position is not secure; and, secondly, his shadow income depends on his subordinates. Hence, one needs informal methods of control over one’s subordinates”.

Thus, in personnel selection, behind a question such as « Where do you come from? » is covered an intention, namely “How can I control and use you more effectively?”. Hence, why there are incidences of regionalism/tribalism in state structures is not a hostility to natives of other regions - it is, simply, corruption. Yet a person seeing corruption in certain state institutions and finding out that given officials are natives of the same region will believe that the causes of their seeking bribes and a biased personnel selection is hostility and antipathy towards natives of *his* region.

Thus, corruption, faulty interpretations of occurrences and erroneous estimations will lead to the formation of negative opinions about natives of the other region; and such divisive opinions may potentially threaten stability and undermine national unity.<sup>8</sup> Such a situation is actively made use of by regional elites who, seeking to achieve their political and mercantile objectives, often mobilize people using patronage networks and the rhetoric of regionalism.

Regional divisions in Kyrgyz and traditional institutions of solidarity are not a problem that menaces the stability of the state. In any state, regional contradictions do exist, and not only regional – for there are also many other social conflicts that divide a society. The problem is that in Kyrgyzstan these traditional institutions based on territorial and clan-family solidarity are used by a corrupted elite and officials within the framework of state structures.

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<sup>8</sup> A similar conclusion with regard to ethnic conflict is arrived at by Tatu Vanhanen in his article “Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 55-73 (1999), where he states that a cause of ethnic conflicts is the practice of nepotism.

## 2.2 State capture

Another cause of aggravation of the regional issue is the form of government created during the first 15 years of Kyrgyzstan's independence, which is characterized by the existence of strong presidential power, restraint of oppositional movements, and clan-family rule.

During 15 years of independence, the Constitution of the Kirghiz Republic has been reformed three times, always strengthening powers of the president. The government, the heads of local state administration and judicial authority all depend on the president. Authority has been concentrated in the hands of just one person, which has given him considerable powers that are easy to use in the area of corruption.

In the reality of Kirghiz society, the expanded authority of the president leads to nepotism and corruption, as the head of state uses any opportunity to give key positions his relatives and people who are faithful to him, without taking into account their professional competences. It is no secret that a major principle of personnel selection is loyalty to the president. In turn, the president's protégés can then employ *their* own relatives and friends by this principle. As a result, there is a usurpation of power by the elite of one of the two regions. This practice strengthens the authority of the president still more, giving him informal mechanisms of control over state institutions. So there is now the phenomenon that scientists have named « state capture ».<sup>9</sup>

Thus, power is concentrated in the hands of one person, someone who, in the opinion of some, is not only head of the state but also personifies, first of all, the region of his origin; and, via this, personifies the rule of the country by natives of this region. That is why the majority of the inhabitants of the president's region support his rule – and, in the main, those persons from the non-presidential region deplore the situation; so that there is « a geographical split in opinions ».

For example, according to research undertaken by the International Republican Institute, from May 2007<sup>10</sup>, inhabitants of the southern region have been inclined to think that for last 12 months their lives have been changing for the better; they believe

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
<sup>9</sup> Combating corruption in a transition period. Contribution to a discussion of strategy, World Bank, Washington, Federal district of Columbia, 2000.

<sup>10</sup> Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll, IRI, May 2007: <http://www.iri.org/eurasia/kyrgyzstan.asp>

that economic and democratic developments are on the right path. However, most persons' living in the northern region and Bishkek think the contrary, i.e. they reckon that their lives have worsened in comparison with earlier.


This is clearly shown in the following tables:

**How satisfied are you with the way democracy is developing in Kyrgyzstan?**



Source: Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll, May 2007, International Republican Institute.

**Generally speaking, Kyrgyzstan is developing in**



Source: Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll, May 2007, International Republican Institute.

Such tables show a sharp distinction between the opinions of inhabitants of the north and the south concerning democratic procedures, the economic development of the country and also concerning general policy made by the current authorities. Inhabitants of the southern region are therefore more inclined to support developments occurring under the direction of the president (who is from the south); while inhabitants of the northern region are more likely to be critical.

In the given social conditions, the presidential form of government - with strongly pronounced characteristics of authoritarianism and nepotism - is fraught with destabilization and could split society, especially during re-election times. When the president stands for re-election for a second term or more, feelings of injustice appear among representatives of the non-presidential region; and there is a natural antipathy not only towards representatives of the elite but also among common citizens from the non-presidential region. In such a case, a non-constructive oppositional elite - based on the regional division - arises, and simple citizens have requirements of regional rotation. Such a system does not lead to stability, as an antagonism between two elites may well lead to chronic, forced changes of authority - as happened in March 24th 2005.<sup>11</sup> As well-known sociologist Juan Linz states: "The danger that zero-sum presidential elections pose is compounded by the rigidity of the president's fixed term in office. Winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of the presidential mandate - losers need to wait four or five years without any access to executive power or patronage. The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the stakes of presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and polarization."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Developed after the March, 24th, 2005 events, a tradition of authorities seeking a regional balance - the president is from one region, the prime minister from the other - is a stabilizing factor only in the short term; in the long term such an informal practice may serve to damage national unity. If there is a conflict between the president and prime minister such a conflict might 'personify' the opinions of persons from the two regions, and this could have irreversible consequences. That occurred in the first half of 2007, when Prime-minister Felix Kulov (originating from the North) was dismissed, though there was then no other choice than to nominate another northern leader as a Prime-minister.

<sup>12</sup> Linz, Juan, 'The Perils of Presidentialism', *Journal of Democracy*, winter 1990, p. 56. See also, Linz, Juan J. (with Arturo Valenzuela), *The Failure of Presidential Democracy I: Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

### 3 How to solve the problem?

As has been shown in the previous chapter, a traditional tribal/regional division is not a problem per se, for the reason here for the potential split in society is nepotism and corruption. All efforts, both from the civil sector and the state, should not be directed towards the regional division of Kyrgyzstan or in the direction of traditional solidarities, but against nepotism and corruption. A corruption decrease will lead to mechanisms of traditional solidarity being made useless and to state officials refusing to practice nepotism or produce policies based on regionalism.

Corruption has many causes. The organizations of a civil society cannot have a direct influence on all of its causes (an example, low wages). Yet they *can* concentrate their work in those directions where they will be most successful: the promotion of national (trans-regional) political parties, civil control of personnel selection, and a change of behavior when it comes to questions of nepotism and corruption.

#### *3.1 Promotion of national (trans-regional) political parties*

After the change of authority in March, 2005, Kyrgyzstan started reforming the form of government that promoted authoritarianism, nepotism and corruption. According to the December 2006 edition of the Constitution, several new important trends have occurred with the shape of government. There will be more balanced distribution of powers; the powers of the president will be limited; parliament and the prime minister will have a more important role than beforehand; and judicial authority will be more independent. Also, the parliament will be formed on the basis of a majority-proportional system.

In the given social realities, all of these gains are necessary conditions for reducing corruption, which fact will, in turn, lower the risks of regional division. The balanced distribution of powers will lead to reductions in abuse as the government will depend not on one person representing one group of interests (in this case a region) but on parliament, which consists of representatives from various groupings. Each deputy will be able to direct influence onto the government and, via this, really protect the interests of his social group. It will enhance the responsibility of the government before all groups of interests that are there in the parliament. The increase of political party influences can then, in the long-term, move the basic struggle in parliament from a

regional plane onto the ideological one.<sup>13</sup> Parliament, being a joint body representing (as an ideal) all social groupings, is the institute most protected from possible slips towards authoritarianism and family-clan rule. For research from such persons as Juan Linz and Fred Riggs shows that parliamentarism is less subject to the dangers of authoritarianism and corruption.

However, in Kyrgyzstan, the institute of parliament and the system of political parties is only in the early stages of development. Political parties are seldom created on an ideological basis. The majority are clientilistic and charismatic parties.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, as has been noted by Valentin Bogatyrev, « (in Kyrgyzstan), as well as in other post-Soviet countries, the following are inherent to the party system: the large number of parties in all parts of a political spectrum, and the crushing of parties on the basis of personal, regional-ethnic, financial and economic concerns. (...) Parties act not so much a mechanism for the representation of the interests of relevant social layers on a political plane but are a tool for inter-clan and inter-corporate fighting for control over these or other resources ».<sup>15</sup>

However, parliamentarism cannot change for the better without program-based political parties and without a stable political party system.<sup>16</sup> The presence of national (trans-regional), program-based political parties aiming to solve not only narrow territorial-family problems but to make decisions regarding problems being experienced by the wider social group is necessary for the creation of a functional system of political parties. Such parties will be able to unite people from different territorial units, different ethnic and social groupings in one union, on the basis of their joint interests and ideological adherence. The effective association of citizens in such unions will lead to politics being practiced at levels of ideological opposition, which can consolidate society around such ideological struggle.

Murat Imanaliev notes: « Institutes of a civil society should recognize (and, in parallel, induce authorities to do so) that Kyrgyzstan will never get rid of negative

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<sup>13</sup> For the regional division within Parliament see: Temirkulov, Azamat, "Tribalism, social conflict and the state-building process in the Kyrgyz Republic", BOI-Journal (Berlin Osteuropa Institute), June 2004, Berlin.

<sup>14</sup> According to Valentin Bogatyryov, there are three types of party in Kyrgyzstan: the parties in power, parties with charismatic leaders, and ideological parties. See Bogatyryov, Valentine, « The place and a role of political parties in Kirghiz society », in *Political parties in Kyrgyzstan*, Institute of Public Policy, Bishkek 2006, p. 30.

<sup>15</sup> Bogatyrev, Valentin, *Op. Cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>16</sup> Croissant, Aurel, Merkel, Wolfgang, Political party formation in the presidential and parliamentary system, Online paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

displays of traditionalism or nationalism until the political structure of society is represented not by clans-regional associations but by parties at the national level ». <sup>17</sup> Today, Kyrgyzstan's NGOs have the required organizational potential and opportunities for the promoting of political parties. NGOs play an important role not only in the formation of a responsible society - they take active part in human rights protection and the promotion of democratic principles, too; and also provide a wide spectrum of social services. In 2006, 500 NGOs made use of more than 8 million US dollars for the realization of socially significant projects. In addition, some NGOs play a political role and indeed interfere in the fields of activity of political parties. <sup>18</sup> According to an IRI opinion poll from May, 2007, 54% of the population trust NGOs, which is 9% more than those who trust in political parties (45%). <sup>19</sup>

NGOs working to handle social problems and protect the most vulnerable layers of society ideologically reflect the concepts of the left and centre-left political parties. In general, they have common interests and purposes. Organizational and institutional resources from such NGOs can then be used in the support of political parties from the left and centre-left.

NGOs can intensify interactions between political parties and the population, on one hand determining the electorate's needs and lobbying for their interests in parliament via political parties - and, on the other, strengthening the positions of political parties within the population. This collaboration can have many positive effects:

1) Strengthening political parties: an interaction of political parties with NGOs could lead to the best understanding of problems being faced by the electorate and can help increase the population's trust in a party, so that the electorate will become extended.

2) Intensification of competition between parties: increases in quality and in the electing of socially-orientated parties will bring forth responses from opponent parties that will result in active competition and, finally, will raise the *qualitative* level of all parties within the system.

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<sup>17</sup> Imanaliev, Murat, "Political parties in Kyrgyzstan», *Political parties in Kyrgyzstan*, Institute of Public Policy, Bishkek 2006, p. 55.

<sup>18</sup> Обзор истории становления и развития сектора неправительственных организаций в Кыргызстане, Ассоциация Центров Поддержки Гражданского Общества, Бишкек, 2006, pp. 185-210.

<sup>19</sup> Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll, IRI, May 2007, <http://www.iri.org/eurasia/kyrgyzstan.asp>

3) Activation of the interaction of state bodies with civil society: political parties will act not only as intermediaries between state bodies and civil society but also as agents for the given social groupings within the state system.

Such tendencies will have a positive influence on the creation of national (trans-regional), strong political parties. In its turn, it will also strengthen the system of political parties and parliament. Strong national (trans-regional) parties in a strong parliament may not do away with but will certainly weaken the display of such phenomena as regional divisions and nepotism in official bodies and in the political arena generally.

### *3.2 Combating nepotism and corruption*

As we saw in section 2.1, the problem of nepotism is closely linked to a problem of corruption; elements of nepotism in the hands of officials are tools by which to practice corruption. For a lowering of nepotism and corruption in state bodies it is necessary to have, first of all, control over personnel selection – i.e. in the area where nepotism flourishes most actively.

“The regulation of competition when it comes to filling a vacant administrative state position in the Kirghiz Republic’s Public Service” (approved by a decision from the Council on Public Service from October, 28th, 2004 N2) stipulates how competition to find replacement personnel to fill a vacant position should be organized; it also provides for the creation of an attestation-competitive commission. The state body that has announced such a competition will form the commission, which will principally consist of public servants.<sup>20</sup> As has been shown by experience, internal controls over personnel selection in the form of competition for vacant posts need not lead to success in the struggle against corruption and nepotism, for the attestation-competitive commission consists of state employees; and such employees are often merely interested in mutually supporting one another - they are neither neutral nor objective.

Point 20 of the given regulation explains that “Independent experts or representatives of professional public associations may be invited to participate in the

work of the commission”. Thus, elements of external control can be admitted - although this factor does not have great force as, firstly, the attestation-competitive commissions will have been created by state bodies which, as said, cannot be relied upon as regards objectivity; and, secondly, civil society is not showing any initiative here.<sup>21</sup>

Nevertheless, external control over personnel selection to fill a vacant administrative state position is very relevant. Inclusion of representatives from civil society in a selection committee will give a character of transparency to the process; for officials will have many more difficulties trying to organize a non-fair personnel selection procedure in the presence of independent and non-partisan representatives from society at large. In turn, it will increase the value of the objectivity principle regarding employment and will promote the selection of more qualified personnel. Additionally, in the case of a contesting of results, participants can address themselves to civil society representatives, i.e. to independent and non-partisan commission members.

These factors will lower the influence of kin and region and will also reduce the probability of the creation of informal relations between a subordinate and his ‘boss’. The result of such control will be a reduction in the practice of regionalism and nepotism in personnel selection and also a reduction of corruption in official bodies. The organizations of a civil society should take on board point 20, and use it to help create external control of personnel selection in official bodies.<sup>22</sup>

One more problem is a lack of information available to people, i.e. that the reason for a potential split in society is not a traditional regional division, but nepotism and corruption. The population does not suspect that nepotism and corruption are the phenomena dividing the society into ‘us and them’, so leading to a split. Moreover, given persons’ lack of information, politicians and officials can easily manage to make use of regional division rhetoric and also utilize traditional solidarity and traditional institutions for the achievement of their own narrow goals.

Educating the population here could have a positive influence on the behavior of citizens with regard to regional division and corruption issues, making citizens aware

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<sup>20</sup> “Regulation dealing with competition to find personnel for vacant administrative state positions in the Kirghiz Republic’s Public Service” (approved by a decision from the Council for Public Service from October, 28th, 2004 N 2), clause N 19.

<sup>21</sup> From interviews with employees from the National Agency for Public Service Affairs.

<sup>22</sup> Representatives of civil society need not only be independent experts or representatives from professional public associations – they can also be former workers from the given organization who have retired/are on sabbatical.

that, behind speeches about regional-clan unity and solidarity - to the detriment of the other region, *uruu*, (an ethnic grouping, etc.) - lie the personal ambitions and interests of politicians and officials; and this would make it less easy to manipulate a given rhetoric. Awareness that corruption is not « a harmless prank » but a form of harm that might lead to a split in society will change the behavior of some citizens, and probably also of many civil servants.

In this regard, it is necessary for NGOs to make efforts to educate people. It is necessary to show the population that the real harm is not from persons from the other region/family-clan group but from the corrupt official. Moreover, training in how to react to corruption cases will also have a positive effect.

## 4 Recommendations

Within the limits of the Strategy of Development for the Country 2007-2010, civil society can make a major contribution to the struggle against nepotism, regionalism and corruption. In particular, NGOs can promote the development of national (trans-regional) political parties and a reduction of nepotism and corruption in state structures; they can also give the population the necessary knowledge in the struggle against corruption. To do this, it is necessary to act as follows.

With the purpose of creating close mutual relations/cooperation between the civil sector and political parties, it is recommended that NGOs:

- 1) Identify political parties that are close to them in their own purposes and ideological conceptions;<sup>23</sup>
- 2) Create permanent organizational structures (forums, councils, etc.) for closer cooperation with political parties having a related ideology;
- 3) Coordinate their work with a given political party, lobby for the most essential laws, etc.

With a purpose of building up "external" controls over personnel selection in official bodies, it is recommended that NGOs:

- 1) Identify ministries, agencies and other state structures that can respond to interests and specific requirements emanating from a given NGO;<sup>24</sup>
- 2) Coordinate, with a human resources service from involved establishments, the participation of civil sector representatives in the attestation-competitive commissions;
- 3) Coordinate such an initiative with the Council and Agency of KR in relation to public service dealings with a view to obtaining their aid and support.<sup>25</sup>

To be able to educate the population as regards nepotism and corruption, NGOs should:

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<sup>23</sup> The list of political parties and their coordinates can be found on the site of the Central Electoral Committee <<http://www.shailoo.gov.kg>>

<sup>24</sup> For a list of the Ministries, agencies and other state structures, with coordinates, see: <http://www.gov.kg>

<sup>25</sup> Coordinates from the Agency of KR for Public Service Affairs, in Appendix 1.

- 1) Develop and bring to fruition projects dealing with the education of the population in questions of nepotism and corruption, according to the requirements of donors;<sup>26</sup>
- 2) Help facilitate a desire to cooperate with National Agency experts on the prevention of corruption in development and project realization;<sup>27</sup>
- 3) Help facilitate the desire to involve experts from research centers and consulting firms in the creating and carrying out of projects.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> The list of donors who support activities fighting corruption can be found at <http://www.donors.kg>

<sup>27</sup> Coordinates for the National Agency on Prevention of Corruption, see Appendix 1.

<sup>28</sup> List of research centers, see Appendix 2.

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# Appendices

## *Appendix 1. Coordinates*

Name	Coordinates
National Council of KR on Public Service Affairs	Has no permanent address Contact via the National Agency KR on Public Service Affairs
National Agency KR on Public Service Affairs	Bishkek, street Razzakova, 59 62-75-22, 62-73-67 < <a href="http://www.csa.gov.kg">http://www.csa.gov.kg</a> >
National Council on the Struggle against Corruption	Has no permanent address Contact via the National Agency KR on Public Service Affairs
National Agency on Corruption Prevention	Bishkek, street Kiev, 96, a 3-floor 900-469, 900-378, 901-644, 900-436 <a href="http://www.nacp.kg">www.nacp.kg</a>

*Appendix 2. List of research centers and consulting firms*

	<b>Name</b>	<b>Address</b>	<b>Telephone no.</b>	<b>Email</b>
1	Aiten group	Kievskaja 149 Bishkek	61-20-00 61-20-02	info@aitengroup.com www.aitengroup.com
2	Institute of Public Policy	Isanova 42/1 Bishkek	+996(312) 215763	office@ipp.kg http://www.ipp.kg
3	MNT Consulting	Toktogula 96/2 Bishkek	66-46-87 62-36-96 62-37-81	info@mntconsulting.org www.mntconsulting.org
4	M-Vector	Ahunbaeva 42 a Bishkek	51-18-15 51-08-29	office@m-vector.com www.m-vector.com
5	Siar-Бишкек	Chui, 164, a rooms 406-411 Bishkek	21-08-33 21-09-25 66-36-36	siar@mail.kg;office@siar-consult.com
6	Foundation for innovative technologies, "Terra Public"	Frunze 282 a Bishkek	+10 996 (312) 28 05 36	terra_public@mail.ru www.shailoo.kg
7	Center for social research, National Academy of Science	Chui 265-a, room 328 Bishkek	(996) (312) 24 37 35 Fax: (996) (312) 21 85 22	nurbekcsr@freenet.kg