Russian Outpost or Window on Europe?
A Region in Transition: From Past to Present
Why does the Kaliningrad problem remain unsolved
and why is it important to solve it?
Data and Method
The Kaliningrad Problem in the Domestic Policy Context
Russia-Europe Collaborative Experience on Kaliningrad:
an Institutional Framework
Thinking About the Future of Kaliningrad
Books and articles
study aims at the search of ways and means to solve the Kaliningrad
problem that emerged after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and
in the context of EU enlargement. The paper recommends to develop
a clear and coherent Russian strategy on the Kaliningrad issue that
should be based on providing the Kaliningrad Region with a special
legal status and broader foreign policy and economic powers. The
author also suggests to conclude a EU-Russia biding agreement on
Kaliningrad that could solve the most important problems related
to Kaliningrads sovereignty, elimination of trade barriers,
development of energy and transport infrastructure, freedom of movement
of goods and people, fighting organized crime, environment degradation
and mass diseases. The paper concludes that Kaliningrad could be
successfully integrated into the single European economic, social
and cultural space and could become a meeting place
for different civilizations and cultures.
is a small Russian enclave on the Baltics sandwiched between Lithuania
and Poland. It is a unique region due to its both history and geopolitical
location. Kaliningrad was a Soviet military outpost on the Baltics
in the Cold War period. With the breakdown of the USSR the region
was separated from mainland Russia and had to deal with numerous
problems ranging from provision of basic supplies and transit to
visa and customs regimes. NATO and EU enlargements created a new
set of problems that are far from being solved.
are several actors in case of Kaliningrad the Kaliningrad
regional authorities, Russias federal center (presidency,
government and numerous ministries, and parliament), EU candidate
countries (Poland and Lithuania are most important among them),
EU and its member states and various international organizations
and financial institutions (e.g., NATO, Council of the Baltic Sea
States, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and so
main dilemma for Moscow is to keep its sovereignty over Kaliningrad
and, at the same time, to integrate this region into a European
economic, social, legal and cultural space that is gradually emerging
in the context of EU enlargement. If Moscow fails to cope with this
problem Russia could loose its control over the region and the latter
could become a source of instability for the whole Baltic Sea area.
Region in Transition: From Past to Present
many current problems of the enclave are deeply rooted in the past
it is important to take into account the historical context. The
town and region have a long history. Kaliningrad is former Königsberg,
the capital of East Prussia. The first historically recorded inhabitants
were the Prussians, the Baltic people (similar to Lithuanians and
Latvians). In the 13th century the Teutonic Order conquered this
territory and Prussians were baptized by the winners. German colonizers
gradually assimilated the Prussians and their language died out
by the 17th century. Nonetheless they went down in history by lending
their name to the area and the German state of Prussia.
was founded by Teutonians in 1255 and named in honor of the crusading
Bohemian king Otokar II. Prussia was subsequently a subject of dispute
between Germans, Lithuanians, Poles, Swedes and Russians. In the
17th century Prussia was gradually taken over by the German state
of Brandenburg. The Kurfürst of Brandenburg here crowned himself
King of Prussia in 1701.
Russia had occupied East Prussia in 1758-62 during the war with
Prussia and partly in 1915 during the World War I. In April 1945
Soviet troops conquered Königsberg again. At the Potsdam Peace
Conference (July-August 1945) Stalin demanded Königsberg and
the surrounding area on the grounds that the Soviet Union needed
compensation for its war losses, wanted an ice-free port on the
Baltic Sea, and on the claim that the area originally was Slavic.
He also promised the southern two thirds of East Prussia to Poland.
The Western countries had to agree to Stalins claim. The Memel
(Klaipeda) region was soon handed over to Soviet Lithuania. Thus
East Prussia was divided into three different parts.
should be noted, however, that from the international laws
point of view, the legal status of Kaliningrad is to some extent
uncertain. It was stated in the Potsdam Protocol that US President
and British Prime Minister would support the transfer of territory
to the USSR at the forthcoming peace conference. According
to some lawyers, since a peace conference, providing a de jure termination
of World War II, never occurred, that pledge was never acted upon.
Henceforth the United States would concede Soviet administrative
control of the territory but not Moscows de jure possession
1946 the Kaliningrad Region (Oblast) was formed as a part of the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Ethnic Germans were
moved away from this territory and the region was populated mainly
by Russians (or Belarussians and Ukrainians).
the Cold War period the region was perceived as an important Soviet
military outpost in the confrontation with NATO. It was one of the
most highly militarized areas in Europe. The Headquarters of the
Baltic Sea Fleet was (and is) located there. The 11th Guards
Army equipped with offensive arms such as tanks, artillery, missiles
and aircraft were deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast (Region). 100.000
servicemen (every tenth Kaliningrader) were located in the area.
The region was totally sealed from Poland and the West, and even
Soviet citizens had limited access. Along with Murmansk, Archangel,
Sevastopol and some other Soviet regions with a formidable military
infrastructure Kaliningrad became a symbol of a garrison town.
with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union
Kaliningrad found itself in a completely new situation.
First, it was separated from big Russia
by the newly independent states such as Lithuania and Belarus. The
new geopolitical situation led to numerous problems in areas such
as supplying the region with basic provisions, energy, raw materials
and equipment, transport, communications, military transit and travel.
A new customs, border-crossing and consular infrastructure had to
be created in the region. An increasing feeling of isolation from
mainland Russia is widely spread in Kaliningrad. For
this reason, many experts prefer to call Kaliningrad a Russian
exclave rather then enclave.
Second, the military significance of Kaliningrad has
been dramatically declined in the 1990s. The Russian military presence
has diminished significantly over ten years, with the current number
of military personnel in the region variously assessed at between
18,000 and 25,000 (from a total of 100,000 during the Cold War),
plus some 5,000 Border Guard troops and some 1,000 Internal Forces.
In addition Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, the governor of the region
since November 2000 and the former commander of Baltic Sea Fleet,
stated in February 2001 that Moscow would reduce its troops stationed
in the western part of the enclave by 8,600 by 2003.
late 1997 the Kaliningrad Special Defense District (the only remnant
of the former Baltic Military District) was abolished (including
the 11th Army). The residual land units were subordinated to the
Commander of the Baltic Sea Fleet. The latter was radically reduced
as well. Now it is comparable in terms of the number of battle
ships with the German and Swedish navies. The configuration
of the regions military structure became purely defensive.
Many military analysts doubt that Kaliningrad is really defendable
from the strategic point of view because of its remoteness and low
the direct economic importance of the military has greatly diminished.
However, it remains of some weight in the sense that many retired
military personnel have opted to stay in the region and are among
the 2,000 entrepreneurs who make up the Kaliningrad Employers' Union
and the 70,000 or so traders or craftsmen officially known to the
authorities. Many of these former servicemen are also engaged -
as are some active military - in the "shadow economy", which is
estimated to account for more than 50 percent of GDP.
Third, in contrast with the Soviet time, now Kaliningrad
is open for international co-operation and has one of the most liberal
economic, customs and border/visa regimes in the Russian Federation.
First, a Free Economic Zone (FEZ) and then a Special Economic Zone
(SEZ) were established in the region in order to attract foreign
investment. The German and South Korean automobile giants
BMW and Kia opened production lines in Kaliningrad and Norwegian
ships are repaired there. Unlike other Russian citizens the Kaliningraders
enjoy a visa-free regime with Lithuania and Poland.
to the image of a garrison town or military outpost
that was the case in the Cold War era, now Kaliningrad is perceived
as a most pro-Western or cosmopolitan region in the country. In
this regard Kaliningrad exemplifies a most dramatic change in economy,
society, foreign policy and mentality that ever had happened in
along with positive changes the region had to face numerous problems
both stemmed from the Soviet past and are looming ahead because
of the EU/NATO enlargement. These challenges can be grouped into
the following categories:
vulnerability. Kaliningrad, as an integral part of Russia,
will become a piece of foreign territory within the wider European
space. From traditional security point of view, Kaliningrad
is hardly defendable in strategic and controllable in socio-political
terms. Although anyone does not even plan to attack Kaliningrad
geopolitical thinking is still strong among the Russian military
and some politicians and this should be taken into account when
security perceptions of the Russian élites are examined.
Geopolitical location, in turn, could question the Russian sovereignty
over Kaliningrad that is separated from mainland Russia and in
terms of economy, trade, transportation and mentality is oriented
to or dependent on the West.
challenges. Kaliningrad has suffered from an economic
decline since the introduction of the market economy (similar
to other Russian regions). Production has fallen by more than
half since 1990. Kaliningrad was particularly strongly affected
by the Russian financial crisis of August 1998 because of its
dependence on foreign trade and particularly imports.
Russia's concern is that after enlargement, the Baltic Sea will
become an almost exclusive EU fisheries zone. The Commission suggested
to settle the issue in the context of a new Russia-EU fisheries
agreement, negotiations for which began in June 2000. Russia,
however, worries that these negotiations have started too late
to prevent negative effects of enlargement on the Kaliningrad
and transit. Given its enclave status, Kaliningrad is
dependent on imports, the value of which is three times that of
its exports, with heavy reliance on trade and economic interaction
with mainland Russia. Every year more than 6 million tons of goods
transit, mainly by rail, through Lithuania to and from Russia.
55 percent of this traffic is oil, coke and coal. Kaliningrad
also imports many goods (including most of its food) from its
immediate neighbors, Poland and Lithuania, which, with Germany,
are Kaliningrad's most important foreign trade partners. Although
Kaliningrad has relatively more trade links with its non-Russian
neighbors than other Russian border regions, it is still relatively
poorly integrated into the regional economy.
The Oblast produces only 20 percent of its own needs (mainly
at small fuel oil and coal-fired plants) and, for this reason,
is almost totally dependent on imported energy from the Russian
mainland. The delivery of fuel oil and coal is costly
and complicated, dependent upon the transit regime agreed with
neighboring countries. Gas is received from Russia through a
pipeline, which transits Belarus and Lithuania. The Kaliningrad
authorities want to increase the share of gas for electricity
production. A new gas-fired power station is under construction
and the construction of another gas pipeline is under consideration.
problems. Oblast's social indicators are bad. The standard
of living is lower than the already poor Russian average. A
third of the Kaliningrad Oblast's population lives below the
poverty line. With EU enlargement, the present development
gap between Kaliningrad and its neighbors as well as the prospect
of this gap widening, can become a factor of destabilization
in the entire Baltic Sea region.
Kaliningrad has six higher education institutions, including the
Kaliningrad State University. Unfortunately, their faculties and
courses do not cater sufficiently for sectors such as microelectronics,
biotechnology, new manufacturing processes, business administration,
international relations and political science. The level
of foreign language training does not correspond to international
standards as well.
care system. Public health care services in Kaliningrad
are also in trouble. Diseases such as, tuberculosis, diphtheria,
measles and epidemic paratyphoid are widespread. TB is becoming
multi-resistant and its prevalence is growing, especially among
the inmates of Kaliningrad prisons. 280 people had died of tuberculosis
in 2001. Drug use and prostitution have led to the alarming
spread of other communicable diseases. For instance, Kaliningrad
is among the worst regions in Russia for registered cases of
HIV, and is by far the most affected area in the Baltic Sea
Kaliningrad is the second worst source of pollution in the Baltic
Sea region after St. Petersburg, generating more than 400,000
tons annually of domestic and industrial waste. Sanitary
conditions in urban areas are deteriorating, and the sewage system
dates back to pre-World War II. Russia has committed itself to
decrease marine pollution. As a result, the discharge of pollutants
has diminished somewhat since 1991.
Organized crime, trafficking in human beings, drugs and stolen
vehicles and illegal migration are all present in the Oblast.
Drug use is spreading at an alarming rate (the enclave is said
to have over 10,000 heroin addicts). Smuggling - notably
of amber, alcohol and cigarettes and prostitution are
also prevalent. According to official statistics, the level
of crime is 20 percent higher than the Russian average, in particular
for organized crime, as well as crime by minors and by people
acting under the influence of alcohol. Organized crime has,
as elsewhere in Russia, a negative effect on the business and
investment climate. Criminality, linked to corruption, poses
a threat to economic development and the development of a democratic
system governed by the rule of law.
on the mobility of persons. Contrary to the Soviet period
when Kaliningraders traveled freely within the country, now they
have to overcome numerous border barriers on their way to mainland
Russia (via Lithuania and either Latvia or Belarus). The same
applies for other Russian citizens who want to visit their relatives,
friends and business partners in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Moreover,
non-residents of the Oblast have to get Lithuanian transit visa
if they travel by car or bus.
In view of EU enlargement Poland intends to introduce the Schengen
acquis on October 1, 2003 and Lithuania at the latest upon accession.
Russia feared that the introduction of the acquis by new EU member
states would have an impact on the freedom of movement of people.
Travel, for whatever purpose, to or through EU member states would
require possession of a visa. Moscow worried that visa-free transit
(currently available to the residents of Kaliningrad and certain
categories of Russian citizens transiting Lithuania) would no
longer be possible. In addition, Kaliningraders will be obliged
to travel in possession of a national passport (as opposed to
the internal identity documents, which are currently accepted
by the Lithuanian authorities).
the EU-Russia summit in November 2002, a decision to establish a
Facilitated Travel Document (FTD) for trips to and from Kaliningrad
was taken. For multiple entry direct transit via all forms of transport
by land to and from Kaliningrad, an FTD is obtainable on the basis
of an application to a Lithuanian consulate, and subject to necessary
checks and controls. In addition, for those Russian citizens intending
to make single return trips by train through the territory of Lithuania,
a Facilitated Rail Travel Document (FRTD) is obtainable on the basis
of personal data submitted at the time of ticket purchase. Lithuania
has agreed to accept Russian internal passports as a basis for issuing
both types of FTD until December 31, 2004. Thereafter, an FTD or
FRTD would only be valid when accompanied by passport valid for
international travel. FTD system could be seen as a temporary solution
for the transitional period but it will not work when Lithuania
joins the Schengen rules. Moreover, it applies only to Russia-Lithuania
relations, Russia-Poland visa problems are not covered by the above
does the Kaliningrad problem remain unsolved and why is it important
to solve it?
is difficult to find a simple and quick solution to the Kaliningrad
problem at least for three main reasons. First, major actors
Russian and international - pursue different interests in Kaliningrad,
interests that may clash each other from time to time. For example,
Kaliningrad authorities want both more freedom in their external
relations and, at the same time, more assistance from the federal
budget. On the other hand, Moscow is very suspicious about greater
Kaliningrads independence from the center and encourages the
local authorities to look more actively sources of finance other
than federal funds (private sector, international investors, etc.).
Both EU and Russia want to stimulate trade, economic and cultural
cooperation in the Baltic region but, at the same time, Brussels
fears illegal migration from Kaliningrad and potential rise of the
organized crime in the region. For this reason, EU tightens its
visa regime and border controls although this contradicts the above
intentions. Second, none of the actors has a comprehensive and forward-looking
vision of Kaliningrads future. Strategic vision is often substituted
by technical/technocratic approaches that are unable to offer a
long-term solution to the Kaliningrad problem. Finally, given the
scale and the magnitude of the problem the rebuilding of the Kaliningrad
Oblast and its integration to the single European economic space
requires considerable funds that are not always available either
domestically or internationally.
it is important to solve the Kaliningrad problem. For Russia, it
is important to prove its ability to provide its westernmost region
with one-million population with normal living conditions. On the
other hand, it is important for Moscow to make Kaliningrad a sort
of a model in EU-Russia relations that could be replicated to other
Russian border regions.
is of a great interest for EU as well. Brussels needs Kaliningrad
as a transit corridor from the newcomers (three Baltic states) to
the EU mainland and vice versa. EU is interested
in improving the living standards in Kaliningrad to make them compatible
with those in the neighboring countries and to avoid a scenario
of Kaliningrad becoming the source of regional instability. Brussels
is also eager to cooperate with Russia to prevent illegal migration,
smuggling, drug trafficking and illicit arms transfers via the Kaliningrad
territory. The disputes over Kaliningrad sovereignty also may lead
to inter-state conflicts and impede international commerce. Finally,
both Russia and EU need a success story to demonstrate
aim of the paper is to examine possible solutions of the Kaliningrad
problem and ways of integration of this Russian enclave into a single
European economic, social, legal and cultural space.
study seeks to broaden understanding of Kaliningrads place
in the EU-Russia relationship by considering the following fundamental
sort of Russias federal policies towards Kaliningrad should
can the EU and other regional and subregional institutions contribute
to the international cooperation around Kaliningrad?
can the problems stemming from EU enlargement be solved?
is the future of the region? Would it remain an isolated island
surrounded by the EU waters or could it become a gate-way
or pilot region that may offer a model which could
be attractive to other Russian border areas?
data for this research are drawn from the following sources:
search on Internet
with officials, politicians, NGO leaders and experts
publications and materials
information, yearbooks, handbooks and reference books
literature: monographs, analytical papers, and articles
the study does not just entail data collection but also data assessment
three main principles are implemented with regard to selecting and
Data should represent most important and typical trends rather
than occasional or irregular developments.
Sources that provide valuable and timely information are given
Sources that offer original data, fresh ideas and non-traditional
approaches are preferable.
Kaliningrad problem has attracted a great deal of attention from
the Russian and world academic community. One group of works examined
socio-economic development of the region in the post-Communist period.
Other scholars studied military-strategic aspects of the problem.
The third category of works analyzed the implications of NATO and
EU enlargements for Kaliningrad. Finally, some experts discussed
the future of the region and suggested specific recommendations
authors differ by their theoretical and political approaches. Some
specialists tended to be alarmists by considering Kaliningrad as
a flash point of conflict or a source of insecurity for the entire
Baltic Sea region. Others viewed Kaliningrad as a small change
in the great powers big game. There are also some
experts who see Kaliningrad as a historical chance for Russia to
be integrated into the Western civilization. For this school, Kaliningrad
is gateway or pilot region, region of co-operation
rather than confrontation. Authors also differ by their specific
suggestions and recommendations how to solve numerous Kaliningrad
works, however, lacked a comprehensive and systematic approach to
the problem paying attention only to its specific and sometimes
isolated aspects. It is an ambition of this study to offer
both a multidimensional and forward-looking view of the issue that
aims not only at theoretical but also practical angle.
this study contributes to the political and academic debate on Kaliningrad
by outlining both a Russian strategy toward Kaliningrad (including
its legislative, financial, political and administrative components)
and the contours of a possible EU-Russia dialogue on this issue.
Kaliningrad Problem in the Domestic Policy Context
Moscow and international players understand that Kaliningrad is
first and foremost a Russian problem and responsibility for the
Oblast lies with Russia itself, not with someone else. Given a unique
geopolitical location and a set of problems to be dealt to, Kaliningrad
was a hot issue in the Russian domestic policy debate
in the post-Soviet period.
the 1990s, regardless of a huge paperwork (Moscow issued numerous
normative acts on the Kaliningrad Region) the central government
lacked any sound and coherent strategy towards the Oblast.
contrast with other members of the Russian Federation, which normally
regulated its relations with the capital through bilateral treaties
and agreements, the status of the Kaliningrad Oblast was defined
mainly by the Russian President and government. Given the unique
location and strategic significance of Kaliningrad Moscow preferred
to keep its direct control over the region. For instance, in 1991-98
the federal centre adopted more than 15 normative acts on the Kaliningrad
Oblast. None of the Russian regions cannot boast by such an attention
from Moscow (probably with the exception of Chechnya).
regional economy was the most important problem both for the centre
and the Oblast itself. Since in the early 1990s the liberal thinking
prevailed among the local and federal élites measures were
undertaken to open up the Oblast for international co-operation
and to ease socio-economic situation in the region. In November
1991, President Yeltsin issued a decree granting the Kaliningrad
Region the status of a free economic zone. This legislation provided
the Oblast with a privileged status in the field of foreign economic
relations. The region became a tax free zone. The export of goods
produced in the FEZ as well as import of goods into the territory
of the zone were not the subject for quoting and licensing. The
good was considered as produced in the FEZ in case the value added
on the territory of the zone constituted not less than 30 percent.
joint ventures got substantial exemptions from the federal and local
taxation. The Russian Ministry of Finance provided the Oblast with
a credit on privileged terms. The Oblast administration was allowed
to use the regional export quotas to increase the local currency
original justification for granting Kaliningrad a FEZ and other
privileges in the first place was that it was perceived as one way
to compensate Kaliningrad for the expected inflationary effect of
the cumulative costs of crossing three borders while in transit
to the rest of Russia. Moreover, the FEZ was the first substantial
concrete measure, which Moscow has taken which is consistent with
the "pilot region" idea that Kaliningrad does have some unique attributes,
which require unique policies. Under the liberal scenario that was
dominant at the time, the area could become an WestEast trade
bridge, Russias Hong Kong. Several hundred joint ventures
have been registered, mostly small service operations.
governor of the Oblast was granted a right to deal directly with
the Polish and Lithuanian governments on the issues of subregional
co-operation, including participation in the Euroregions. A special
curator of Kaliningrad was appointed in the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the ministrys representative
office was established in the region. The Polish and Lithuanian
consulates and honorary consulates from Sweden, Denmark and Iceland
were opened in Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad Oblast opened trade missions
in Vilnius and Gdansk and a special regional legislation to define
their status and budget was adopted. Kaliningrad City Administration
also opened representations first in Bremerhaven and later in Brussels,
though these have since closed.
there was a difference of opinion between Moscow and the Kaliningrad
local authorities on the status of the region and the prospects
for its economic co-operation with foreign countries. The regional
government has proposed to transform the FEZ into a SEZ provided
with even more autonomy and privileges. However, Russian Deputy
Prime Minister Sergey Shakhrai has complained that foreign investors
there have got significant tax and other concessions while investing
insignificant amounts of money. According to Shakhrai, the region
was already being turned into a channel for the export of raw materials,
including strategic resources, and for the creeping expansion of
foreign influence in the economic and ethnic spheres, with the prospect
of the creation of a fourth independent Baltic state.
As a compromise Shakhrai proposed, instead of making the whole of
the region a free economic zone, the creation of limited zones of
free trade activity near ports and main roads in the region, stressing
that we have again to declare clearly the priority of Russias
militarystrategic interests in the Kaliningrad Oblast.
the pressure of the centralists, the federal authorities
tried to tighten their control over the Kaliningrad Region. For
example, in May 1995 Yeltsin suddenly abolished the customs exemptions
and this led to annulment of a large number of contracts.
power struggle between the centre and the region resulted in a compromise.
On January 22, 1996 the President of Russia signed the Federal Law
On the Special Economic Zone in the Kaliningrad Region
with an official purpose to provide more favorable conditions for
promoting socio-economic development of the region through the expansion
of trade, economic, scientific and technological co-operation with
foreign countries, attraction of foreign investments, know-how and
new Law had contradictory implications. On the one hand, the Oblast
got back some customs and tax privileges; on the other hand, the
regional authorities lost part of their foreign policy powers. The
centre took control over the defense industry, mineral resources,
energy production, transport and mass media. Foreigners are not
allowed to purchase land, but it can be leased for periods yet to
Law on SEZ did not stop the tug of war between the centralists
and regionalists in the Russian political establishment.
For instance, different governmental bodies ranged from State Customs
Committee to the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian Parliament)
have repeatedly attempted to abolish the zone in 1997-2001.
This contributed to the destabilization of the socio-economic and
psychological situation in the region. Only President Vladimir Putin
stopped bureaucratic attacks on the FEZ. It was decided that the
status of the zone will remain intact until a general Law on Free
Economic Zones that should replace existing legislation on FEZs
and SEZs will be approved. It is expected that a new law will be
passed by State Duma by late 2003 early 2004.
victory of Admiral Vladimir Yegorov on the gubernatorial election
(November 2000) led to improvement of regions relations both
with Moscow and foreign countries. Yegorov was seen as an alternative
to a corrupted and anti-reformist regime of Leonid Gorbenko.
Many experts believed that Yegorov is able to fight corruption and
crime, restore order and justice in the region and start real reforms.
His team was positive about developing various subregional schemes
of co-operation. He called the Kaliningrad Oblast a laboratory
for working out of new forms of co-operation between Russia and
the European Union. At the same time he was regarded
as a pragmatist and defender of Russian national interests, including
resistance to further NATO enlargement and prevention of negative
implications of EU enlargement. His administration was rather active
in formulating Kaliningrad's and Russias position on implications
of EU enlargement for the Oblast.
team together with liberal-minded experts from the Moscow-based
Institute of the Transitional Economy played a crucial role in drafting
a Federal Task Program on Development of the Kaliningrad Region
for the Period up to 2010 that has been adopted by the Russian government
on December 7, 2001.
to the document, the programmes main objective is to create
conditions for sustainable socio-economic development of the Kaliningrad
Region which should be comparable with the development level of
neighboring countries as well as for an attractive investment climate
in the region to facilitate the Russia-European Community rapprochement.
program has three main strategic priorities:
Kaliningrad a key transport junction in northwest Russia (14 projects)
sustainable energy supply to the Oblast (19 projects)
protection (9 projects)
program also has:
purposes (making Kaliningrad an export-oriented economy; upgrading
the Kaliningrad SEZ; development
of telecommunications and tourist-recreational industry, in sum
59 projects), and
objectives (development of agriculture, fisheries and social infrastructure
are two phases of the programs implementation:
basic reforms mainly directed at further developing of the SEZ
continuation of previous projects with the aim to secure positive
cost of the program is 93 billion rubles ($3,1 billion). The sources
of funding are the federal budget (8,41 percent), Kaliningrad regional
budget (3,08 percent), Kaliningrad enterprises (22,2 percent), commercial
banks loans (7,24 percent), foreign loans (14,15 percent)
and other sources (state-owned companies such as RAO-EES and Gazprom,
municipalities, etc. - 44,92 percent). The document states that
upon the completion of the program the gross regional product will
increase by 240 percent and 15,000 new jobs will be created.
the program is a positive contribution to solving numerous Kaliningrad
problems several critical comments can be made:
program is of technical/technocratic rather than conceptual
nature. The document enlists projects but does not explain why
they are needed and what sort of Kaliningrad Russia wants
both domestically and internationally.
paper calls for an export-oriented economy in the region but some
specialists doubt that other European countries (both EU member
states and candidate countries) are interested in this. On the
contrary, they do not like any new competitor and hardly will
be helpful in developing Kaliningrads export potential.
This school suggests to use the opportunities that the SEZ offers
for attracting domestic and foreign investments in order to develop
industries which are mostly oriented to the Russian domestic markets.
At the same time, these experts suggest to encourage Kaliningrads
export capabilities (where it is relevant and possible).
far as financial sources are concerned it is unclear whether commercial
banks, foreign donors, Gazprom and others have already confirmed
their financial support or it is only planned.
is also unclear whether the Russian federal and Kaliningrad regional
governments are able to keep their commitments and finance the
program in full. It is well-known from the past experience that
other federal programs often were inefficient because of the lack
of funding. As the 2002 experience shows there have already been
delays in federal transfers and some projects felt financial difficulties.
For these reasons, the new federal program on Kaliningrad can
be only seen as a first and rather modest step forward. A national
strategy on Kaliningrad remains to be developed.
Collaborative Experience on Kaliningrad: an Institutional Framework
solve the Kaliningrad problem it is very important to provide a
policy strategy with a proper institutional support. In institutional
terms there are several venues for co-operation between the European
multilateral organizations and Kaliningrad EU, Council of
Europe, NATO, Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), Nordic Council,
Nordic Council of Ministers, European and Nordic financial institutions
and so on. No doubt, EU is the most important institution among
EU believes that issues related to Kaliningrad should be discussed
within the framework of the EU/Russia Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA), the main forum for administering of EU-Russia
relations. However, Moscow objects to breaking down of the negotiations
within the fifteen PCA committees because it is difficult to have
a comprehensive view of the problem. On the other hand, the EU is
unhappy with the idea to create a single committee on Kaliningrad
within the PCA because it could provide Russia with a better negotiating
position and lead to a special agreement on Kaliningrad that could
be more profitable for Russia than for the EU.
far as a specific EUs collaborative programs are concerned
TACIS (EUs program on technical assistance to the CIS countries)
is one of the most helpful instruments for intensifying cross-border
is an annual TACIS cross-border co-operation program which begun
in 1996 with an ECU 30 million budget for projects along the borders
of Russia and its neighbors, including Finland. In the period 1992-96,
TACIS has contributed over 35 million ECU to different projects
in north-western Russia. In the 1990s, TACIS executed 18 different
projects ranged from municipal infrastructure to educational programs
in Kaliningrad. According to the EU data, TACIS spent €40
million for various projects in the Oblast.
following priority areas have received TACIS support:
economic development, with support in excess of €10 million
given to the development of the FEZ/SEZ [free/special economic
zone]; strengthening of the Regional Development Agency and preparation
of a regional economic development strategy; trade and investment
promotion and transport
restructuring, with support of roughly €3 million for the
creation of an Enterprise Support Centre and the strengthening
of the local SME (small and medium enterprises) Development Agency.
Special attention was given to the fish industry.
resource development in the private sector, with the establishment
of a Business Management department at the Economics Faculty of
the Kaliningrad State University (€1.3 million)
of innovative SMEs, with assistance of €1 million for technological
parks or "technoparks" aimed at strengthening their capacity to
provide training, marketing services and general business advice.
has been devoted to the energy sector to regional and local heat
and power utilities to help them adjust to modern market conditions
by improving efficiency in energy distribution, restructuring
and adapting tariffs; and, for a number of energy saving initiatives.
addition, Kaliningrad has benefited from programs provided more
generally in Russia. Officials and companies based in Kaliningrad
can participate in TACIS funded training programs for the banking,
insurance and fiscal sectors. Local managers participate in training
programs in EU companies. With a view to developing Kaliningrads
export potential and markets in neighboring countries, the EU
is also providing assistance to both regional and federal authorities
in areas such as harmonization of standards and conformity assessment
the geographic location of Kaliningrad cross border co-operation
and trade/transit facilitation is of particular importance. A
number of programs are being implemented which aim at facilitating
trade and movement of goods and persons through the development
of infrastructure, modernization of border procedures, and training
of enforcement agencies staff to detect unlawful activities
and increase their capacity to collect tax revenue.
present, there are 23 crossing points between Kaliningrad, Poland
and Lithuania. In order to ensure the efficient flow of goods across
the EUs future external border, investment is needed in physical
infrastructure and in processing, including through upgraded information
systems. Under the TACIS Cross Border Co-operation Programs, two
border crossings in Kaliningrad received priority funding: Chernyshevskoe/Kybartai-Nesterov
(road/rail) and Bagrationovsk/Bezledy (road), on the borders, respectively,
with Lithuania and Poland. These crossings, identified after a detailed
feasibility study, are the major ones located on the Pan European
Transport Network. Works on the Bagrationovsk/Bezledy project (€3
million) started in the spring of 2002.
development is another area of focus in the area of cross border
co-operation and trade facilitation. The EU Kaliningrad Port Development
project (€1million) aims to stimulate trade and transit via
the region, by strengthening the competitiveness of its port facilities
and their management. Ultimately, the port modernization will contribute
to a sustainable economic development of the area and its integration
into the Baltic region.
elsewhere in Russia there is a need for action to combat illegal
activities and organized crime. The Task Force on Organized Crime
in the Baltic Sea Region is making a valuable contribution to
tackling these problems. On the local level co-operation is needed
to deal with problems such as car theft. Co-operation could also
be directed at improving the independence of the local judiciary,
in particular via training and twinning programs. TACIS has provided
€1 million in funding to assist in fighting organized crime.
EU also pays attention to the social problems in the region. TACIS
has a €2 million Northwest health replication project for
the Kaliningrad, Murmansk and Archangel regions. The project aims
at reducing health and social disparities across the border by
supporting the reform of the local health system.
protection is an important priority for multilateral co-operation
in the subregion. Current activities include a water environmental
monitoring and management project (€2 million) dealing with
water quality on the borders with Lithuania and Poland and a waste
management project in Kaliningrads coastal zone (€3
million) designed to alleviate the impact of waste generation
on both public health and the environment. There is an EBRD/NEFCO/NIB
loan for a sewerage treatment plant in Kaliningrad City. The EUs
LIFE program has initiated two projects in Kaliningrad, in the
areas of urban traffic and ecotourism. The EU also financed the
establishment of an Environmental Centre for Administration and
Technology (ECAT) in Kaliningrad, which was transferred to the
local authorities in 1997.
is specifically identified as a priority in the 2002-3 TACIS Indicative
Program for Russia and in the Cross-Border Co-operation Program.
A specific focus under the Russia TACIS National Program (2002-3)
is on improving the capacity of municipal authorities to deliver
essential public services such as water, heating, housing and also
waste and wastewater treatment. In addition to the transfer of know
how to municipalities (including utility management, tariff policy,
etc.), small-scale investment in utilities will be supported with
priority given to water management and energy saving. Advice and
training for municipal authorities and utility managers will also
be provided with a view to enabling them to prepare for and make
full use of the investment provided by IFIs.
Euroregion concept is another opportunity for subregional co-operation.
As mentioned, Kaliningrad belongs to the Baltic Euroregion, which
began in 1998. It was established as an international lobbying group
of local governments from Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia
and Russia. The President of the Baltic Euroregions said the most
important task for co-operation between communes from various countries
was subregional economic planning and construction of transport
routes. Since 1999 a new Euroregion named Saule is under consideration,
involving the Kaliningrad towns of Slavsk, Sovetsk and Neman along
with participants from Lithuania, Latvia and Sweden. Kaliningrad
also can participate in the Neman Euroregion, which is designed
to link Kaliningrad, Lithuania and Belarus. However, Moscow believes
that the current charter of the Neman Euroregion does not reflect
Russian national interests and blocks the signing of the documents.
far as the CBSS is concerned the Council focuses on three priority
and training: The CBSS sponsors the so-called Eurofaculty in the
Kaliningrad State University. This project is aimed at modernizing
the curricula and teaching methods in such disciplines as law
and economics to meet modern international standards and the development
requirements of the Oblast itself. Eurofaculty-Kaliningrad
has already produced a notable positive effect on the ground and
the Russian side is interested in its successful continuation
until the end and beyond the initial three-year timeframe. In
April 2002 the Eurofaculty held a big conference to monitor the
progress of the project and invite potential partners from neighboring
countries and other regions of Russia.
organized crime and training the local staff of the law enforcement
the spread of mass communicable diseases.
the recent progress in Russia-NATO relations the North Atlantic
alliance could also be helpful in solving the Kaliningrad problem.
A possible NATO-Russia cooperative agenda on the Baltics could include:
negotiations on naval arms control in the Baltic Sea area
of the CSBMs (confidence and security-building measures) to the
and temporal limitations on Russian and NATO military activities
in the region
military-to-military contacts, joint exercises, exchanges and
of information on military doctrines, defense budgets and spending,
major arms export or import programs
a joint Russia-NATO rescue centre in Kaliningrad
a joint centre for the prevention of dangerous activities in the
Baltic Sea area NATOs assistance in converting the
local defense industry and developing military-technical co-operation
with Kaliningrad defense enterprises
use of the Kaliningrad shipyards for repairing or modernizing
assistance in developing rehabilitation and re-training schemes
for retired officers and housing programs
NATOs academic programs on supporting natural and social
sciences in the KO.
the number of organizations that are involved in cooperative schemes
on Kaliningrad there is a need to avoid duplication and coordinate
their activities. Both Russian and European experts believe that
the Northern Dimension project could be the best institutional umbrella
for the above programs.
About the Future of Kaliningrad
to the popular saying, there are two perennial Russian questions:
1) Who is guilty? and 2) What to do? The Russian political debate
on Kaliningrad addressed the first question. But the second one
is much more important for all regional actors, including Kaliningrad
is safe to assume that the previous attempts to solve the Kaliningrad
problem failed because they addressed particular issues (such as
trade, transit or visa regime) rather than offered a complex and
long-term strategy. To solve such a complicated problem the regional
players should first of all decide what sort of Kaliningrad they
want in the foreseeable future.
Russian and world research communities suggested several possible
scenarios for the future of Kaliningrad. The first scenario is muddling
through. Russia takes the wait and see position
and shifts off the responsibility for the future of the Oblast in
the EUs hands. Since this inevitably would make the Russian
transit via Lithuania more complicated and impede the movement of
people and goods in the subregion the socio-economic situation in
Kaliningrad would significantly deteriorate. Another, even more
pessimistic scenario, is rearmament of the Oblast as a result of
NATO expansion to the Baltic states and a new Cold War. This would
make impossible any co-operation between the EU and Russia on Kaliningrad.
Under the third scenario the Oblast would become an autonomous republic
within the Russian Federation. Other scenarios include partition,
the establishment of a condominium by its two neighboring states,
Lithuania and Poland, independence or reunification with Germany.
There is also a possibility for Kaliningrad to serve as an entity
with special links to a Baltic Euroregion or a Hanseatic
above scenarios except for the last one are highly improbable or
undesirable (or both). The last option is both realistic and preferable
for the most of the regional actors. It also fits in the concept
of Kaliningrad as a pilot region which is acceptable
for Russia and the EU. However, this concept still lacks a road
map and a detailed plan should be worked out.
to its unique geopolitical location and specific problems with which
Kaliningrad should deal, the Oblast is a challenge and an opportunity
at the same time. Currently, the negative developments such as a
systemic economic crisis, the lack of stable legal regulations of
business, investment and foreign economic activities, crime, corruption,
smuggling, environmental degradation impede democratic reforms in
the region and destabilize the situation within and around the Kaliningrad
Oblast. The forthcoming EU enlargement can if not addressed
properly and timely - bring new problems: tightening of the visa
regime, limitation of the freedom of movement of people and goods,
problems with providing Kaliningraders with basic supplies (foodstuff,
there are numerous opportunities for exploiting Kaliningrads
future status of an enclave in the EU. It could become a first Russian
region to be integrated to the single European socio-economic space
and thus become a new Russias window on Europe.
In contrast with some assessments, not only Kaliningrad but also
entire Russia (or at least its north-western part) could benefit
from a new status of the Oblast. As a concept of a pilot region
suggests, the Kaliningrad model could be implemented in other Russian
border regions (especially in those located at the EU-Russia frontier).
To a larger extent the future of Kaliningrad depends on how the
Russian élites perceive Kaliningrad (and its place in Russias
European strategy) as well as on the nature of relationship between
the federal centre and the regional government.
were fundamental changes both in Russian thinking and policies towards
Kaliningrad over the last decade. Although the realist/geopolitical
paradigm still dominates Russian political discourse the mainstream
of the Russian political thought does not perceive any longer the
Oblast as Moscows military outpost on the Baltics and favors
opening up of the region for international co-operation. The Federal
Task Program of 2001 and a number of other documents laid down the
foundation for developing of a Russian national strategy on Kaliningrad
as well as suggested some specific/technical instruments. The EU-Russia
PCA and Northern Dimension are seen by the Russian leadership and
élites as appropriate frameworks for searching adequate solutions.
should be noted that in contrast with the past when Kaliningrad
was perceived as only a Russian problem now there is a consensus
among the regional actors (including Brussels) that Kaliningrad
is a problem for the EU and candidate countries too. This means
that not only Russian but also the EU policy towards Kaliningrad
should be radically revised. This also calls for international rather
than unilateral efforts and solutions.
and the EU agree in principle that the Unions enlargement
should not entail the rise of dividing lines in Europe and that
the freedom of movement of people and goods in the region should
be ensured. They support various collaborative projects, including
economy, trade, energy security, social system, health care, environment,
the improvement of the border and transport infrastructures in Kaliningrad
and in the entire Baltic Sea region. They also favor concluding
of a special agreement on Kaliningrad to define procedures of trade,
transit and border management and to facilitate Oblasts deeper
integration to the European economic and legal space. There are
still numerous barriers to reaching such an agreement stemming from
the inflexibility of the EU and Russian bureaucracies and legislation
as well as from the difference of economic, political and security
interests. However, as the recent EU and Russian documents demonstrate,
the positive dynamics in the EU-Russian relationship is obvious.
generally, one of the most important lessons drawn from the Kaliningrad
case is that the subregional co-operation is increasingly becoming
an important stabilizing factor in Northern Europe (and potentially
on the entire continent). Subregionalism offers opportunities for
developing Russian democracy and civil society. Subregionalism need
not cause the further disintegration of the country. Instead, it
serves as a catalyst for successful reforms and international integration.
Subregional co-operation facilitates the rise of a mechanism of
interdependence in Northern Europe and promotes mutual trust and
understanding among the nations. By doing this subregionalism helps
to solve local economic, social, political, security and other problems
and to prevent the rise of new threats and challenges. If Russia
and the EU were able to use the opportunities of subregionalism
in full the Kaliningrad Region would become a contact zone, a bridge
between different civilizations rather than the place for the Huntingtonian-type
clash of civilizations.
make Kaliningrad a region of European co-operation a future strategy
should be based on two main pillars: (1) Moscows federal policies
with regard to Kaliningrad as a member of the federation, and (2)
Russia-EU dialogue on Kaliningrad.
Many Russian specialists underline that before Moscow negotiates
the problem with EU it should have a clear vision of the problem
and design a proper strategy on Kaliningrad. First of all
the Russian leadership should fully understand that the involvement
of the EU and neighboring states into solving the Kaliningrad problem
will inevitably challenge traditional understanding of Russias
sovereignty over the Oblast. For instance, the reaching of agreements
with the EU on trade, tariffs, transit, energy and visa regime would
mean for all parties involved giving up some national sovereignty
for the sake of a higher level of governance. The EU itself is a
manifestation of limited national sovereignties and global governance.
This means that all countries which want to joint the Union or to
get closer to it should give up a certain part of national sovereignty
albeit in a different degree for the candidate and partner states.
practical terms this implies providing the Oblast with a special
status within the Russian Federation. Moscow can not treat the region
similar to any inner/mainland territory. There is no need for Russia
to give up completely its sovereignty over Kaliningrad but, if Moscow
wants to make the Oblast a Euroregion, Kaliningrad should be provided
with broader powers in the fields of foreign economic activities,
taxation, property rights, customs formalities, border controls,
consular services and so on.
Such a special status should be provided with a proper legal framework.
This is important both from the domestic and international points
of view. Domestically, it can be an effective safeguard against
either bureaucratic encroachments on the Oblasts
powers (for example, repeated attempts of the Customs Committee
to abolish the SEZs privileges) or corrupted officials, criminals
and gray economy in the region.
such a legislation could be helpful for the dialogue with EU. For
instance, the latter says all the time that it can not treat Kaliningrad
as a special case because, from the legal point of view, Kaliningrad
is not different from other parts of Russia and providing the region
with some special status could be perceived by Moscow as an interference
into Russias internal affairs (unless Russia makes a clear
message to the Union). For example, the EU discussion paper on Kaliningrad
(January 2001) underlines:
since Kaliningrad is an integral
part of Russia it would be difficult to grant any special status,
such as free trade or a customs union. This would raise a number
of political and legal issues apart from the fact that Russia is
unlikely to grant the necessary degree of autonomy to Kaliningrad.
experts (for example, Alexander Songal, Head of the International
Relations Department, Kaliningrad Oblast Duma) suggest that it is
desirable to develop the concepts of federal policy towards the
Kaliningrad Oblast (1994, 1997 and 2001) and the SEZ legislation
(1996) into a Constitutional Law on the Kaliningrad Oblast. Such
a legislation should provide for:
more involvement and responsibility of the federal centre in the
more discretion to the local authorities in foreign economic and
trade relations; and
moving representative offices of federal bodies (primarily of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) dealing with external relations
to the region;
appointing a Russian government official dealing with EU-related
issues in Kaliningrad;
setting up a subsidiary of the EC Delegation in Russia in the
participation of Kaliningrad representatives in PCA committees
launching a joint program (TACIS-PHARE-Russian) to estimate the
impact upon the Kaliningrad Oblast of EU-related changes in Lithuania
and Poland; and
arrangements to ensure freedom of movement of people and goods
As far as the Russian-EU dialogue is concerned specialists believe
that signing a Kaliningrad Protocol to the PCA could be helpful.
Other experts suggest to conclude a special agreement on Kaliningrad
between Russia and the EU. Such an agreement should be based
on the PCA, EU Common Strategy on Russia, EU Action Plan on the
Northern Dimension and the Russian Strategy on Co-operation between
the Russian Federation and the EU (2000-2010). An agreement should
have a binding force for both parties and be very specific.
to this school, such an agreement should acknowledge Russias
general sovereignty over the Oblast (to calm down Moscow). At the
same time, the document should envisage a more active participation
of the EU in solving regions problems. Priority should be
given to integration of Kaliningrad to the European economic space.
The Russian Federation should retain the status of the SEZ for the
Oblast, but, at the same time, should introduce local FEZs that
must be applicable to the non-EU countries. The SEZ must be managed
by an administration appointed by the Russian Cabinet. The Russian
government should invest into the SEZ not less than €100 million
a year. The EU standards should be established for the Kaliningrad-produced
goods. A joint EU/Russia Standardization Committee should be created.
Foreigners should be allowed to purchase the land in the region.
A Regional Development Corporation should be set up to promote the
Oblasts development. Such a corporation could be established
not only by the Russian federal government (that should allocate
not less than €30 million) but also by the local authorities
and the EU (the latter should contribute not less than €3 million
a year to the TACIS programs). The EU should apply the PHARE program
to the Kaliningrad Oblast that is more beneficial for recipients
Regarding the movement of goods in the accession period Lithuania
and Latvia should provide Russia with lower transit tariffs and
special agreements should be concluded (in consultation with the
EU). After enlargement the EU-Russia PCA should provide for free
transit through these countries, without customs duties or any other
transit duties (other than charges for transport and administration).
With time Brussels can conclude a free trade agreement with the
Kaliningrad region and help the Oblast to be engaged in various
As far as the border- and visa-related issues are concerned many
Russian experts suggest retaining of a visa-free regime for the
Kaliningraders visiting a EU/Schengen space less than 30 days.
A reciprocal rule should be secure for the residents of the EU countries
aimed at visiting the Kaliningrad region. There should be exchange
of representative offices between Kaliningrad and Brussels at the
level of diplomatic missions to cope with consular, economic, cultural
and information issues. A Coordinating Committee on Fighting Organized
Crime should be set up as soon as possible. The more innovative
ideas include a reduction of the need for strict visa procedures
by introducing the establishment of extensive data banks combined
with the checking of fingerprints at borders. Such systems could
potentially allow the reduction of visas to a mere stamp in the
passport of those crossing borders, although they do not offer any
quick solution taking into account that the Schengen Information
System (SIS) is currently being re-designed and only expected to
be ready around 2003.
Kaliningrad City Administration believes that it is impossible to
avoid the introduction of the visa regime but the Kaliningraders
should be provided with some privileges. Administrations officials
suggest, for example, to add to the visa application form the question
about the duration of residence in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Those
who have been living in the region for more than five years should
be given greater privileges. Kaliningrad residents could be offered
multi-entry visas valid for a period of up to three years, but allowing
a strictly limited period of stay in EU countries on the occasion
of each visit. The cost of visas should be reasonable in order to
the Kaliningraders could afford them.
It seems, however, that it would be impossible to integrate the
Oblast into the European economy without liberalizing the visa regime.
Even the so-called smooth solution (providing Kaliningraders
with cheap multiple visas) will impede trade, business trips and
tourism in the subregion because of higher transaction costs and
numerous technical difficulties (the lack of consulates and consular
staff, imperfection of the SIS system, addition burden on Russian
authorities to issue national passports for Kaliningraders in a
short period of time, etc.).
the best solution is to keep the status quo for the transitional
period (until Poland and Lithuania join the Union), namely: visa-free
regime with these two countries (for Kaliningraders) and the use
of internal identification documents by the Russian citizens for
travel via Lithuania. Upon Polands and Lithuanias joining
the EU the visa-free regime for the Kaliningraders should be retained
as well (say, for the stay up to 30 days). However, the Russian
authorities should take care of providing the Kaliningrad residents
with national passports of sufficient quality. It would be easy
for the Schengen border guards to distinguish the Kaliningrad residents
because there is an indication of issuing authority (the code of
the local police directorate) in the Russian national passports.
To strengthen the border control regime in the Oblast and to fight
the organized crime, smuggling and illegal migration the Russian
and EU law enforcement agencies can work together on creating a
joint database on individuals who are non-eligible for visiting
the Schengen space.
convince the EU to liberalize its visa policies and to attract more
tourists and businessmen in mid-May 2001 Russia introduced a new
visa regime in Kaliningrad, Moscow and St Petersburg. Now foreign
visitors can get visa directly in the port of entry and stay there
up to 72 hours. Moscow hopes that there will be reciprocal measures
on the part of the Schengen countries.
U.S. also can provide a useful input to the EU-Russia discussion
on the visa issues because it has an experience of dealing with
mass migration from Mexico and other Latin American and Asian countries.
Before Sept. 11, 2001 Washington was less suspicious about Russian
travelers: in April 2001 the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
even said that the U.S. does not exclude the possibility of introducing
a visa-free regime with Russia (provided that Russian travelers
have enough money to stay in America and a return ticket).
Why could not the EU do the same at least for the Kaliningraders?
facilitate the movement of people and goods in the subregion both
the EU and Russia should provide additional funds to build new and
develop the existing border crossings and the transport infrastructure
in the area.
Victor, Ivanova, Anastasiya. 2001. Baltiyskiy uzel.
[The Baltic knot] Nezavisimaya Gazeta 28 March: 4 (in Russian).
Vladimir. 1994. Conflict developments on the territory of
the former Soviet Union in SIPRI Yearbook 1994, 169-204. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Judy. 1999. Final report of the reflection group on the long-term
implications of EU enlargement: the nature of the new border. Florence:
The Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University
Institute with The Forward Studies Unit, European Commission.
E. 2000. Border crossing in manifest perceptions
and actual needs. In Borders, regions, and peoples, edited
by M. Van der Velde and H. Van Houtum, 154-165. London: Pion Ltd.
V.S. 2002. Cross-border Economics. Olsztyn: Wydawnictwo Wyzszej
Szkoly Informatyki I Ekonomii.
Alexander. 2001. Eskadrenny subject Kaliningrad.
[Battleship-subject Kaliningrad] Nezavisimaya Gazeta
24 February: 3 (in Russian).
Guy-Michel. 2001. Prospects for Democratic Reform in Serbia, Belarus
and Kaliningrad. Civil Dimension of Security, Sub-Committee on Democratic
Governance, NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report <http://www.nato-pa.int/publications/comrep/2001/au-192-e.html#3>
Victor. 2001. Interview with Victor Cherkesov, Presidential
Representative in the Northern-Western Federal District. Rossiyskaya
gazeta 19 April: 1, 3 (in Russian).
Alexei. 2001. Vilnyus navodit mosty. [Vilnius builds
bridges] Rossiyskaya Gazeta 31 March: 1-2 (in Russian).
of the European Communities. 2000. Draft action plan for the Northern
Dimension in the external and cross-border policies of the European
Union 2000-2003. Commission working document, 28/2/2000. Brussels:
Commission of the European Communities.
of the European Communities. 2001. Communication on Kaliningrad,
January 2001. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.
of the European Communities. 2002. EU Support to Kaliningrad <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/kalin/
of the Baltic Sea States. 2002a. Kaliningrad Oblast - cooperation
projects with CBSS Member States. Summary report compiled for the
11th CBSS Ministerial Session (Svetlogorsk, 5-6 March 2002) <http://www.baltinfo.org/documents/cbsspresidencies/10russian/dbaFile1208.html
of the Baltic Sea States. 2002b. 11th Ministerial Session of the
Council of the Baltic Sea States. Svetlogorsk, Kaliningrad Oblast,
5-6 March 2002 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/doc/11cbss.htm
of the European Union. 2000. Draft action plan for the Northern
Dimension in the external and cross-border policies of the European
Union 2000-2003. Commission working document, 28/2/2000. Brussels:
Council of the European Union.
on Foreign and Defense Policy. 2000. Baltiya transevropeiskiy
koridor v XXI vek [Baltics is a trans-European corridor to the 21st
century]. Moscow: Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (in Russian)
on Foreign and Defense Policy. 2001. Interesy Rossii na severe
Evropy: v chem oni? [Russian interests on the European North:
what is it?] Nezavisimaya Gazeta 22 March: 11 (in Russian).
Yuri. 2000. Severnoe izmerenie politiki Evropeiskogo
Soyuza i interesy Rossii [The EUs Northern Dimension and Russias
interests]. Moscow: Exlibris Press (in Russian).
Lyndelle. 1998. Kaliningrad: visions of the future In
Kaliningrad: the European amber region, edited by Pertti Joenniemi
and Jan Prawitz, 178-225. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Lyndelle. 2000. Will the EU use the Northern Dimension to
solve its Kaliningrad dilemma? In Northern Dimensions 2000:
the yearbook of Finnish foreign policy, edited by Tuomas Forsberg,
85-101. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
Lyndelle; Sergounin, Alexander. 2001. Are borders barriers? EU enlargement
and the Russian region of Kaliningrad. Helsinki: Finnish Institute
of International Affairs.
Victor. 2001. Putin soglasilsya poekhat v Litvu. [Putin
agreed to visit Lithuania] Nezavisimaya Gazeta 31 March: 1 (in Russian).
Gennady. 1998. The social and economic development of Kaliningrad
In Kaliningrad: the European amber region, edited by Pertti Joenniemi
and Jan Prawitz, 32-56. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Solomon. 2000. Problemy rashireniya Evrosoyuza v kontekste
razvitiya Kaliningradskoi Oblasti. [The EU enlargement in
the context of the development of the Kaliningrad region] In Litva
i Kaliningrad: perspectivy sotrudnichestva [Lithuania and Kaliningrad:
prospects for cooperation], edited by Raimundas Lopata, Solomon
Ginsburg, Algimantas Jankauskas and Kristina Vaiciunaite, 50-51.
Vilnius: Eugrimas Leidykla (in Russian).
Government of the Russian Federation. 2001. Federalnaya Tselevaya
Programma Razvitie Kaliningradskoi Oblasti na Period do 2010
Goda [The Federal Task Programme on Development of the Kaliningrad
Region for the Period to 2010]. Dec. 7, 2001 <http://www.gov.kaliningrad.ru/ofederal.
php3> (in Russian)
Ritva; Kulmala, Meri; Päiviö. 2001. Kaliningrad: Isolation
or Cooperation? Helsinki: The Finnish Committee for European Security.
Sylvia. 2000a. EU/Kaliningrad: future aspirations. In
The EU & Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad and the impact of EU enlargement,
edited by James Baxendale, Stephen Dewar and David Gowan, 117-125.
Sylvia. 2000b. Interview with Mrs. Sylvia Gurova, Head of the International
Office, Kaliningrad City Administration, 8 June.
Ari. 2000. EUs Northern Dimension Action Plan challenges
for implementation. The Speech at the Kings College, London,
M., Timmermann, H. 1993. Kaliningrad: Russias future
gateway to Europe? RFE/RL Research Report, 2, 36: 37-43.
Vladislav (ed.). 2002. Ekonomicheskoe Programmirovanie Razvitiya
Eksklavnogo Regiona Rossii [Economic Programming of the Development
of the Exclave Region of Russia] (in Russian).
Joachim. 2000. The speech of Mr. Joachim Jahnke, Vice-President,
EBRD. In Foreign Ministers conference on the Northern
Dimension, Helsinki, 11-12 November 1999. A compilation of speeches,
edited by Marja Nissinen, 27-28. Helsinki: Unit for the Northern
Dimension in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Finland.
Pertti. 1996. Kaliningrad: a region in search for a past and a future.
Background paper prepared for the International Colloquium Kaliningrad.
Future prospects of the region. Ostsee-Akademie, Travemunde,
3-5 November 1996.
Pertti. 1999. Kaliningrad as a discursive battle-field. Copenhagen:
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI Working Paper no. 15,
Pertti; Dewar, Stephen; Fairlie, Lyndelle. 2000. The Kaliningrad
Puzzle a Russian Region within the European Union. Mariehamn:
The Åland Islands Peace Institute.
Pertti, Lopata, Raimundas, Sirutavicius, Vladas, Vilpisauskas, Ramunas.
2000. Impact assessment of Lithuania integration into the
EU on relations between Lithuania and Kaliningrad Oblast of the
Russian Federation. Vilnius: Institute of International Relations
and Political Science, Vilnius University.
Pertti, Sergounin, Alexander. 2000. 'Russia, regionalism and the
EU's Northern Dimension', in: Graem Herd (ed.), European Security
& Post-Soviet Space: Integration or Isolation? 30-45. Aberdeen:
Conflict Studies Research Center.
Anatoly P. 2000. Strategiya razvitiya Kaliningrtadskoi Oblasti kak
pilotnogo regiona sotrudnichestva Rossiyskoi Federatsii
i Evropeskogo Soyuza: mezhdunarodnye aspekty regionalnoi strategii
[A strategy of development of the Kaliningrad region as a pilot
region in the context of cooperation between the Russian Federation
and the European Union: international aspects of a regional strategy].
Kaliningrad: The Kaliningrad Branch of the All-Russian Co-ordination
Council of Russian Industrialists (in Russian).
Andrei; Kozlov, Sergei; Fyodorov, Gennady. 2002. Ostrov Sotrudnichestva
[The Island of Co-operation]. Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad State University
Press (in Russian).
Kontseptsiya federalnoi sotsialno-ekonomicheskoi politiki
v otnoshenii Kaliningradskoi Oblasti. [The concept of federal
social-economic policy towards the Kaliningrad Oblast] Kommersant
2 April: 6 (in Russian).
Richard. 2000. The Kaliningrad Question. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
Kurbanova, Galina. 2001. Teply veter s Baltiki. [The
warm wind from Baltics] Parlamentskaya Gazeta 29 March: 7 (in Russian).
Arthur. 2000. Speech at the International Conference Developing
Partnership Relations in the Baltic Sea Region in the Context of
EU Enlargement, 15-16 December.
Zdzislaw. 1998. Kaliningrad as a security issue: an expert
view from Poland In Kaliningrad: the European amber region,
edited by Pertti Joenniemi and Jan Prawitz, 130-148. Aldershot:
Igor. 2000a. Northern Dimension: interests and perceptions.
In The Northern Dimension: an assessment and future development,
edited by Atis Lejins and Jorg-Dietrich Nackmayr, 38-49. Riga: Latvian
Institute of International Affairs.
Igor. 2000b. The regional-center divide: the compatibility
conundrum. In The EU & Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad and the
impact of EU enlargement, edited by James Baxendale, Stephen Dewar
and David Gowan, 127-139. Federal Trust.
Igor. 2000c. Rossiya i Evropeiskiy Soyuz: strategiya vzaimootnosheniy.
[Russia and the European Union: a strategy of interaction] In Rossiya
i osnovnye instituty bezopasnosti v Evrope: vstupaya v XXI vek [Russia
and the main European security institutions: approaching the 21st
century], edited by Dmitri Trenin, 23-48. Moscow: Moscow Carnegie
Center (in Russian).
Bo. 2000. The Northern Dimension initiative after the adoption of
the Action Plan in Feira. Paper delivered at the international seminar
Russia and the EU: regional and economic cooperation,
St Petersburg, 13-14 October 2000.
R.C. 1999. Policy could weaken Moscows grip on its northwest,
Chicago Tribune, 1 April.
Steven. 2001. Kaliningrad 2001. Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research
Yuri. 1995. From survival to development. International
Affairs (Moscow) 41, 6: 8-14.
Valentina. 1996. The center and the regions in foreign policy.
International Affairs (Moscow) 42, 4: 88-97.
Parliamentary Assembly. 2002. Civil Dimension of Security. Visit
to Kaliningrad, 22-23 March 2002. Secretariat Report. International
Secretariat, 28 April <http://www.nato-pa.int/publications/trip/av063cc-kaliningrad.
Vladimir. 2001. A s platformy govoryat: eto gorod Kaliningrad.
[There is an announcement on the platform: this is Kaliningrad]
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 27 January: 7 (in Russian).
Rene. 2000. The Baltic as an interface between the EU and Russia.
A paper delivered at the 3rd Round Table on Kaliningrad, Palanga,
Lithuania, 2-4 June, 2000.
Marja (ed.). 2000. Foreign Ministers conference on the Northern
Dimension, Helsinki, 11-12 November 1999. A compilation of speeches.
Helsinki: Unit for the Northern Dimension in the Ministry for Foreign
Vadim. 2000. Seryoznye vybory v Kaliningrade. [Serious
election in Kaliningrad] Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 28 October: 4 (in Russian).
Klaus Carsten. 1998. Kaliningrad: armed forces and missions
In Kaliningrad: the European amber region, edited by Pertti Joenniemi
and Jan Prawitz, 107-116. Aldershot: Ashgate.
P.A., Petersen, S.C. 1993. The Kaliningrad garrison state,
Janes Intelligence Review, Feb.: 59-62.
Besik. 2001. Victor Cherkesov reshaet vse. [Victor Cherkersov
decides everything] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 April: 4 (in Russian).
Nadezda. 2000. Novoye plavaniye Admirala Yegorova. [A
new sailing of Admiral Yegorov] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 November:
4 [in Russian]
Vladimir. 2001. O podpisanii dogovora mezdy Rossiyskoi Federatsiyei
i Litovskoi Respublikoi o peredache dlya otbyvaniya nakazaniya lits,
osuzhdennykh k lisheniyu svobody. [On the signing of a treaty
between the Russian Federation and the Lithuanian Republic on the
extradition of convicted persons for serving of a sentence] Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, 7 April: 4 (in Russian).
Vladimir, Persson, Göran, Prodi, Romano, Solana, Javiero, Joint
Statement, Diplomatichesky vestnik, 2001, no. 6, pp. 27-30
Lyudmila. 2001. Chetyre sammita v Stokgolme [Four summits
in Stockholm] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24 March: 6 (in Russian).
Victor. 2000b. Report of the Head of the Kaliningrad Delegation
at the Conference The Northern Dimension and Kaliningrad:
European and Regional Integration, 17-18 May 2000, Copenhagen,
Federation. 1999. The Northern Dimension in European integration
and European cooperation: Russian position (unofficial translation)
Alexander. 2001a. Delegatsiya Belogo doma posetila Kaliningrad.
[The White House delegation visited Kaliningrad] Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
12 March: 2 (in Russian).
Alexander. 2001b. Kaliningrad integriruyut v ES? [Kaliningrad
to be integrated to the EU?] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17 February: 1,
6 (in Russian).
Alexander. 2001c. Vladimir Yegorov: Kaliningrad byl, yest
i budet rossiyskim. [Vladimir Yegorov: Kaliningrad was, is
and will be Russian] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 March: 4 (in Russian).
Alexander. 1998. 'The Russia dimension', In Bordering Russia: theory
and prospects for Europe's Baltic Rim, edited by Hans Mouritzen,
15-71. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Alexander. 2000. 'Russia and the European Union: The Case of Kaliningrad',
PONARS Policy Discussion, December 8, 2000, 143-47. Washington:
Council on Foreign Relations.
Jon. 2000. The speech of Mr. Jon Sigurdsson, President of
the Nordic Investment Bank. In Foreign Ministers conference
on the Northern Dimension, Helsinki, 11-12 November 1999. A compilation
of speeches, edited by Marja Nissinen, 71-72. Helsinki: Unit for
the Northern Dimension in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Finland.
Elena. 2001. Trudny dialog. [Difficult dialogue] Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, 12 April: 6 (in Russian).
Vladimir. 1995. Kaliningrad region: a Russian outpost.
International Affairs (Moscow) 41, 6: 6-9.
Natalya. 2001. Kaliningradskiy Eksklav: Perspectivy Transformatsii
v Pilotniy Region [The Kaliningrad Exclave: Prospects for Transforming
to a Pilot Region]. Moscow: Institute of Economy (in Russian).
N., Kapustin, A., Malygin, V. (1999). Kaliningradskaya Oblast
kak svododnaya ekonomicheskya zona. [The Kaliningrad region
as a free economic zone] Voprosy Ekonomiki (Moscow) 9: 90-107 (in
Alexander. 2000. Kaliningrad Oblast: towards a European dimension.
In The EU & Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad and the impact of EU enlargement,
edited by James Baxendale, Stephen Dewar and David Gowan, 99-115.
B (ed.). 1993. Encyclopaedia of Conflicts, Disputes and Flashpoints
in Eastern Europe, Russia and the Successor States. Longman Current
Stanislav. 2000. Rashirenie ES i voprosy bezopasnosti Rossii.
[EU enlargement and Russias security concerns] In Rossiya
i osnovnye instituty bezopasnosti v Evrope: vstupaya v XXI vek [Russia
and the main European security institutions: approaching the 21st
century], edited by Dmitri Trenin, 49-75. Moscow: Moscow Carnegie
Center (in Russian).
Viktor. 1999. Gubernator. [Governor] Dom i Otechestvo
(special issue) August: 7 (in Russian).
Anatoly. 1998. The regions security: an expert view
from Moscow In Kaliningrad: the European amber region, edited
by Pertti Joenniemi and Jan Prawitz, 117-129. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Ole. 1996. Norways Post-Cold War Security: The Nordic
Region Between Friend and Foe, or Between Cosmos and Chaos
In Visions of European Security - Focal Point Sweden and Northern
Europe, edited by Gunnar Lassinantti, 48-62. Stockholm: The Olof
Palme International Center.
Vygaudas. 2000. The speech of Mr Vygaudas Usackas, Vice-Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania. In Foreign Ministers
conference on the Northern Dimension, Helsinki, 11-12 November 1999.
A compilation of speeches, edited by Marja Nissinen, 83-84. Helsinki:
Unit for the Northern Dimension in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Alexander, Chichkin, Alexander. 2001. Anshlus pod flagom MVF?
[Einschlus under the flag of the IMF?] Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 27 January:
2 (in Russian).
Vitaly P. 2000. Napravleniya ekonomicheskogo i investitsionnogo
vzaimodeistviya Kaliningradskoi Oblasti RF i Litovskoi Respubliki
v kontekste stremitelnoi globalizatsii. [On the directions
of economic and investment interaction between the Kaliningrad region
of the RF and the Lithuanian Republic in the context of impetuous
globalization] In Litva i Kaliningrad: perspectivy sotrudnichestva
[Lithuania and Kaliningrad: prospects for cooperation], edited by
Raimundas Lopata, Solomon Ginsburg, Algimantas Jankauskas and Kristina
Vaiciunaite, 66-70. Vilnius: Eugrimas Leidykla (in Russian).
Marat. 2001. Shvedskaya prelyudiya k moskovskoi vstreche.
[The Swedish prelude to the Moscow meeting] Parlamentskaya Gazeta,
24 March: 1, 7 (in Russian).
- site of the news agency
(Copenhagen Peace Research Institute)
- site of the information agency
official site of the European Commission that covers the
Northern Dimension project, including Kaliningrad
official site of the Kaliningrad Regional Administration
the site of the East-West Institute
(International Relations & Security Network, Center for Security
and Conflict Research of the Zurich University of Technology)
site of the information agency
official site of the Kaliningrad City Administration
site of the news agency
the site of the information agency that monitors situation
in various Russian regions, including Kaliningrad
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)