

**Intra-Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister:
Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi-
Presidentialism**

Abstract

The article analyzes the patterns of intra-executive conflict and cooperation in post-communist democracies that adopted semi-presidential constitutional frameworks. It explores the differences between intra-executive and executive-legislative manifestations of institutional competition under semi-presidentialism and traces the sources of these differences. It argues that changes in the constitutional provisions, which specify the presidential and parliament's powers over the cabinet, as well as the variation in the political status of cabinet and the character of parliamentary composition, affect both the type and intensity of intra-executive conflict that semi-presidential regimes experience.

Uneasy co-existence often characterizes the political relationship between presidents and prime ministers in post-communist democracies that adopted semi-presidential constitutional framework.¹ This relationship has been prone to conflict both during democratic transition period and during the later stages of democratic consolidation. Given the salience of interactions between the president and the prime minister in the functioning of semi-presidential regimes, intra-executive relations have attracted a significant amount of interest in the scholarly literature that is devoted to the problems of political regimes with a dual executive.²

The term “dual executive” is, however, somewhat misleading since there is a substantial ambiguity about whether the presidency should be regarded as part of the executive or as an institution that stands apart from the executive branch of government. Several post-communist constitutions have provisions explicitly specifying that the president does not belong to any branch of government and have “the head of state” status. At the same time, since many powers awarded by the semi-presidential constitutions to the presidents functionally belong to the domain of executive responsibilities, the usage of the terms “dual executive” is justified.³ Such conceptualization of the executive also allows us to describe the relationship between the president and prime minister as intra-executive.

This article examines how the variation in presidential and parliamentary powers over the cabinet, in partisan composition of parliament, and in the political status of cabinet affects the probability of intra-executive conflict in semi-presidential regimes. Intra-executive conflict, which is defined as political

competition between president and prime minister over the control of the executive branch of government, is first put into the framework of institutional relationship among the president, parliament, and cabinet. I argue that conceptualizing this relationship in terms of multiple principle-agent model enhances our understanding of how semi-presidentialism works.

Secondly, I discuss how the political status of cabinet, which is determined by the character of parliamentary composition and the level of party system development, affects the set of incentives that prime ministers face in a semi-presidential institutional setting. Thirdly, the instances of intense intra-executive competition and peaceful intra-executive coexistence across the post-communist region are analyzed according to the framework proposed in the theoretical part of the article. Fourthly, I specify a statistical model which allows some preliminary tests of hypotheses about the likelihood of intra-executive conflict under the different political settings. The last section of the paper provides a number of conclusions.

The empirical analysis is based on the data collected in two groups of semi-presidential regimes. The classification of semi-presidential regimes is based on the variation in the degree of presidential control over cabinet.⁴ A President-parliamentary framework which provides the president with the constitutional powers to appoint and dismiss cabinet has been in place for the most of the post-communist decade in Russia and Ukraine.⁵ A Premier-presidential institutional framework, which empowers the president to nominate a prime-minister for parliament's confirmation but does not provide him with the power to dismiss the

prime-minister or individual ministers, has been in place for most of the post-communist period in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania and Russia (1991-93). The data on cabinets formed in these two groups of countries constitutes the empirical basis of this research. There were fifty-five cases of the co-existence of the president with different cabinets in these countries during the 1991-2002 period.⁶

Principal-agent model of semi-presidential institutional relationship

Interactions between the presidency, the cabinet and the legislature occupy the center of the political scene in semi-presidential regimes. The numerous ways in which political actors that inhabit these institutions relate to each other can result in confusion about the lines of accountability and responsibility, the chains of command, and the patterns of hierarchical control. This confusion is usually attributed to the ambiguities of semi-presidential constitutions.

Several earlier attempts to unpack this complicated set of relationships between the above-mentioned institutional actors take as their point of departure the analysis of specific constellations of resources available for each of the actors.⁷ A problematic aspect of these analyses is the lack of explicit attention to the relationships of hierarchy and mechanisms of control imposed by the specific institutional contexts. Political actors are perceived as playing in a non-

hierarchical political market with each actor being endowed with a specific set of resources easily employed in the inter-branch competition.

Structuring postcommunist countries' experiences with semi-presidentialism along theoretical lines requires the explicit recognition of the hierarchical nature of government organization and the distinct patterns of superiority and subordination produced by this hierarchy. Presidents, cabinets and legislatures do not engage with each other in some non-hierarchical market-like political world. Their incentives and constraints, available resources and opportunities are shaped by formal structures and institutional arrangements.

The position of a prime minister and cabinet in semi-presidential regimes can be conceptualized as that of an agent who faces two principals.⁸ Both the president and the parliament, which jointly appoint the cabinet and have various monitoring and sanctioning powers, are the principals of the cabinet. This agency relationship is specified in the semi-presidential constitution which makes both the president and the legislature participate in the selection of a prime minister and which stipulates the lines of the prime minister's responsibility to each of the principals.

Competing political legitimacies, rigid terms of office, differing electoral bases, and often opposite ideological orientations of the president and parliament are in-built characteristics of semi-presidential constitutional frameworks which lay the grounds for the potential conflict between the president and parliament. Their political interests may be in conflict and their preferences with regard to the identity and political behavior of the cabinet may differ. The exact specification

of constitutional norms provide the essential guidelines for understanding the strategies that the principals are likely to pursue with regard to each other and with regard to their common agent, the cabinet.

Cabinets in semi-presidential regimes find themselves in a precarious situation. They face the principals: the president and the legislature, who may be rivals trying to ensure the cabinet's compliance with their distinct objectives. Since the principals' objectives often contradict each other, the cabinet's pursuit of either principals' goals may hurt the interests of the other principal. Both principals have various means to screen the agent's behavior and sanction the cabinet's non-compliance. Constitutional provisions regulate how the principals can sanction the cabinet. Constitutions also specify which of the principals has the control of the ultimate sanction against the cabinet, which is cabinet dismissal.

Principals who formally have more influence over cabinet dismissal are also likely to be more successful in securing the agent's compliance and cooperation. Thus, knowing the exact terms of the selection procedure should help to identify the likely scenarios of cooperation across principal-agent lines and the types of major conflicts that a specific semi-presidential regime is likely to develop.

There are two types of conflicts which are theoretically interesting and empirically recurrent in cases examined in this article: a) intra-executive conflict which is characterized by intense confrontation between a president and prime minister who is supported by parliament; b) conflict between a united executive and parliament that takes place when the president and prime minister co-ordinate

their efforts and are opposed by the legislature. Both types of conflict are the products of the same executive-legislative institutional divide between the president and legislature. They provide however, two alternative channels along which political competition between the executive and legislative branches can be structured.

The literature on semi-presidentialism pays a significant amount of attention to the variation in presidential and parliamentary constitutional powers, including the powers that define these institutional actors' relations with the cabinet.⁹ Much less has been done to explicitly articulate the expectations about the likely evolution of intra-executive relations and to empirically assess how important the distribution of cabinet dismissal powers is for predicting cabinet behavior vis-à-vis the president and the parliament.

The multiple principal-agent model leads us to expect that if the parliament exclusively controls the power to dismiss the cabinet, the political system is unlikely to experience situations when president will be able to secure the loyalty of the prime-minister at the expense of parliament. Wherever the president and parliament have symmetrical powers of cabinet dismissal, neither intra-executive nor executive-legislative types of conflict can be ruled out. The agent's incentives to ally with either of principals will be entirely a product of non-constitutional factors and the political circumstances that cabinets find themselves in. When the powers of cabinet dismissal are symmetrical but other constitutional provisions exist that limit the parliament's power of cabinet dismissal, which is the case in a number of constitutions tailored by the presidents

of post-Soviet republics, the political system is more likely to be characterized by an alliance of the president and prime minister vis-à-vis the legislature and the concomitant conflict between a united executive and the legislature.

Conceptualizing the relationships between the president, the parliament, and the cabinet in terms of the multiple principal-agent model may help to elucidate why some institutional alliances are more likely to occur than others. It also shows why the cabinet is not in the same structural position as the president and the legislature as well as how the cabinet's ability to act independently is more limited than it is usually perceived. It can also help to draw our attention to the puzzling cases of a prime minister's defection from one principal to the other. This is particularly important due to the fact that after getting into office, prime ministers frequently started to pursue policies that changed both the principals' and media perceptions of prime ministers' allegiances and loyalties.¹⁰ Emphasizing the constitutionally established patterns of superiority and subordination among the principals and their agent provides a stronger theoretical footing for analyzing intra-executive relationships under semi-presidentialism.

Technocratic and minority cabinets: agent's incentive structure in dealing with competing principals

Constitutional norms are not the only factor that affects prime minister's motivation in dealing with principals. Political composition of parliament is another key variable that helps to explain cabinet's stand vis-à-vis its principals.

Parliamentary support is the foundation on which the prime minister claims the authority to control the executive branch of government. Given its subordinate status, the cabinet cannot act on its own; it has to seek the support of its principals. When the principals are in conflict, the cabinet has to choose between conflicting political allegiances. Having a stable and internally coherent majority in parliament makes it more likely that the cabinet, which is partly the product of that majority's choice, will follow the preferences of the parliamentary majority. Intra-executive conflict takes place when the president in his quest for control of the executive has to face the prime minister who is backed by the legislature.

When a stable and coherent majority prevails in parliament and the parliament has unilateral power to dismiss the cabinet, the parliamentary majority should be able to secure fully the cabinet's compliance. Even if the cabinet was initially the compromise outcome of strategic interactions between the president and parliament, it is likely to drift during its tenure in office closer to the ideal point of parliament. The control over cabinet dismissal means that the parliament is legally entitled to use this ultimate sanction against the cabinet. The existence of a coherent and disciplined parliamentary majority means that the threat of cabinet dismissal is a credible threat.

Majority-backed cabinets, however, are not the only type of cabinets formed in post-communist democracies. Cabinets without party affiliation and minority party cabinets are not uncommon in the countries under investigation. Table 1 indicates the political status of cabinets and lists the total number of cabinets formed under semi-presidential framework in each of countries discussed

in the introduction.¹¹ Cabinet is defined as party-based cabinet if a prime minister and at least the fifty per cent of cabinet members have formal party affiliation at the moment of cabinet formation. The cabinet is coded to have majority or minority status depending on whether party or party coalition that the cabinet belongs to controls the majority of seats in the parliament. Cabinet is defined as technocratic when a prime minister and majority of cabinet members do not have formal party affiliation. Policy expertise and government experience rather than party ties are usually cited as the criteria employed to select candidates for ministerial positions in technocratic cabinets.

‘Table 1 about here’

The table indicates the political status and total number of cabinets in each of the post-communist countries that adopted semi-presidential institutional framework in the early stages of democratic transition.¹² Of 55 cabinets formed during 1990-02 period, 22 cabinets did not have formal political affiliation and 7 cabinets were either single party or coalition minority governments. For 22 cabinets, whose party identity could not be formally defined the term “technocratic” is used. The technocratic cabinets are usually composed of policy experts and/or experienced government officials. Comparative politics literature has produced mixed predictions about the performance of technocratic cabinets.¹³ These cabinets are often anticipated to demonstrate a higher degree of immunity

from partisan political pressure than party-based cabinets.¹⁴ The absence of a clear party affiliation, however, is the inherent political weakness of technocratic cabinets. They have to rely on a situational majority in the legislature and the support they can count on is often highly conditional.

Technocratic cabinets are mainly the products of bargaining between presidents and politically unstructured or highly unstable parliamentary majorities. The latter are produced by weakly institutionalized, fragmented and clientalistically structured party systems.¹⁵ As Table 1 indicates, the countries of the former Soviet Union, which have less developed party system than the majority of other post-communist countries, account for the greater part of technocratic cabinets listed in the table. Neither of the cabinets formed in Russia and Ukraine during 1991-02 period had party affiliation at the moment of assuming office.¹⁶ Technocratic cabinets were also a part of the political landscape in the semi-presidential regimes outside the former Soviet Union. In Romania, for example, the technocratic cabinet led by Prime Minister Vacaroiu stayed in office during the whole term of the deeply fragmented 1992-96 parliament. Politically unaffiliated cabinets, however, were much less frequent phenomena in semi-presidential regimes outside the former Soviet Union.

When a stable one party or coalition majority exists in parliament, such a majority can only rarely acquiesce to a politically unaffiliated cabinet. Control of cabinet portfolios is the goal of politicians and at the same time it is also a tool for achieving other political objectives that a party may have. Internal party divisions and weaknesses, as well as the absence of reliable coalition partners, are among

the key factors that force parliamentary parties to delegate executive power to the technocratic cabinet.¹⁷

Given the lack of the binding effect of party affiliation, the technocratic cabinets' political behavior is rarely conditioned by political ideologies or principles. The absence of ideological commitments and binding partisan legacies makes the technocratic cabinets' political loyalty especially dependent on sanctioning rules that are specified in the constitution. Premier-presidential constitutional regimes, which grant cabinet dismissal powers exclusively to parliament, leave little choice to the technocratic cabinets but to stay loyal to parliament.

It is more difficult to anticipate likely coalitions in president-parliamentary regimes. A President-parliamentary constitutional framework provides both president and parliament with the unilateral right to dismiss the cabinet. The fact that both principals can sanction the prime minister's behavior makes the distribution of cabinet dismissal powers a less effective predictor of both the cabinet's likely strategies and the resulting political conflict.

Measuring intra-executive conflict in post-communist semi-presidential regimes

Intra-executive conflict was previously described as political competition between the president and prime minister over the control of political resources available to the executive branch of government. The co-existence of the president and the cabinet is characterized as an instance of intra-executive conflict

when either the president or prime minister contests the status-quo interpretations of constitutional and statutory norms that regulate power relations inside the executive, or contests the very norms.

The manifestations of intra-executive competition are ubiquitous. Conflicts arise over policy design in specific issue areas, over the right to issue executive orders and regulations, over reporting and execution routines inside the executive, over the practices of presidential participation in cabinet meetings, etc. The presidents and prime ministers also contest the individual appointments to cabinet or other government positions made by the other side or try to dispute the decisions about the dismissals of concrete personalities.

Although numerous laws and other statutory acts often try to provide a detailed description of powers that belong to the president and prime minister, no legal document can fully regulate all the aspects of power relations inside the executive. The rights to exercise discretion power in situations that are not explicitly regulated by formal procedures are often described as residual rights.¹⁸ Intra-executive relations are often conflict-prone when there is no tacit agreement between the president and prime minister about who controls the residual rights.

Trying to change the formal distribution of powers is the most radical alternative that the rivalry institutional actors could opt for to redress the existing power balance inside the executive. As the next two sections of the paper indicate, both presidents and prime ministers resorted to the tactics of challenging the legitimacy or rationality of the existing constitutional framework. The frequently used strategy was to appeal to the parliament and/or directly to the voters,

advocating the change of the basic constitutional norms that regulate the distribution of appointment, executive, and legislative powers among the different state institutions.

Media and scholarly accounts of intra-executive relations were used to identify the cases where the high level of political contestation characterized the co-existence of the president and the cabinet. Comparative cross-country analysis of intra-executive relations was facilitated by the fact that the East European Constitutional Review (EECR) publishes quarterly country reports that include the detailed accounts of executive-legislative relations in post-communist region. Whenever the country report indicated the existence of conflict between the president and prime minister, the other sources were consulted to corroborate the EECR reports.¹⁹

In the ideal model of harmonious intra-executive relationship, no major disagreements are expected between the president and parliament with regard to appointment and policy issues. Since some manifestations of intra-executive tensions can be found in all cases of intra-executive co-existence, and detailed classification of the cases is methodologically problematic, a simple dichotomous classification was employed. Episodic conflicts which arose from specific issues were qualified as indicating a low level of conflict. When tensions between president and prime minister were persistent and evolved not around one or a few specific issues but around the general principles of subordination and accountability in the executive, or when policies were contested across a large spectrum of issue areas, the level of conflict was considered to be high.

Appendix I lists all cabinets formed under semi-presidential constitutional framework in post-communist countries included in this research and indicates the level of intra-executive conflict during the incumbency of each cabinet. Table 2 below summarizes the data from Appendix I. The cases are classified according to the regime type and level of intra-executive competition. Only the cases of high conflict are denoted by the name of the prime minister during the tenure of which the intra-executive competition took place.

‘Table 2 about here’

The table shows that the instances of high level of intra-executive conflict were recorded in all semi-presidential regimes. In some political regimes the intra-executive competition was more pronounced than in others. In the group of premier-presidential regimes, the inter-executive relations were the most conflictual in Poland. Ukraine holds the same record for president-parliamentary regimes.²⁰

In Poland, the high level of intra-executive conflict characterized most of Walesa’s incumbency as president. Analysts attribute the persistence of intra-executive competition in Poland to the unwillingness of President Walesa to

accept the prime minister's leadership in executive matters.²¹ It is important to note that in the quest for the control of executive, the Polish president had challenged not only the relatively weak minority coalition government led by Prime Minister Olszewski but also Pawlak and Oleksy's cabinets which relied on the support of a stable coalition majority in parliament. These Polish cases, as well as some East European cases, cast doubts on the claim that the premier-presidential institutional setting can have a conflict-mitigating effect during the earlier stages of democratic consolidation.²²

The growing consolidation of democratic institutions and the transfer of the presidency from Walesa to Kwasniewski, profoundly affected the nature of intra-executive relations but did not eliminate build-in structural incentives for conflict. Veto wars characterized Kwasniewski's co-existence with Buzek cabinets. While the president did not openly contest prime-ministerial leadership over the executive, the frequency with which he vetoed the laws initiated by the cabinet across a large number of policy areas, especially during 2000, indicates that the president actively and systematically contested cabinet policies.²³

In Ukraine, the instances of confrontation between the president and prime-minister over the distribution of executive powers took place during the incumbency of both presidents, Kravchuk and Kuchma. Two of three prime ministers involved in intra-executive competition – Marchuk, and Lazarenko – were perceived at the moment of their cabinets' formation as closer to the ideal point of president rather than parliament.²⁴ Yet it did not prevent them from

withdrawing their support from and opting for the open confrontation with the president.

Intra-executive competition in president-parliamentary regimes

Instances of intra-executive competition in Ukraine constitute the majority of cases in the lower right corner of Table 2. In Russia, open confrontation between the president and prime minister took place during the tenure of only one cabinet. The finding that intra-executive competition was relatively rare in the case of Russia is consistent with the hypothesis that intra-executive competition in president-parliamentary regimes, which limits the parliament's ability to sanction cabinet, is highly unlikely.

The 1993 Russian constitution, which was designed almost single-handedly by the president, gave him the option of dissolving parliament when it votes no-confidence in the cabinet. In Ukraine 1991-95, the amendments to the old Soviet constitution explicitly prohibited the president from dissolving parliament under any circumstances. The Ukrainian president Kuchma, whose bargaining power in the constitution-making process was much weaker than that of Yeltsin was also unsuccessful in securing cabinet dismissal-related dissolution powers in the new constitution adopted in June 1996. The presidential ability to threaten parliament's survival undoubtedly made cabinet dismissal much costlier for the deputies in the Russian and Kazakh legislatures than for the politicians in the Ukrainian parliament.

To modify parliament's behavior the threat of dissolution should be credible in two possible senses. Firstly, a president who threatens parliament with dissolution should be likely to dissolve parliament if the latter passes a vote of no confidence. Credibility of the threat in this sense depends on the political costs the president will have to bear if he decides to dissolve parliament. The lower these costs are, the higher the credibility of presidential threat is. Secondly, there should be a diminished chance of re-election for the majority of parliament members. A higher uncertainty about the outcome of the next parliamentary elections can encourage parliament members to comply with presidential preferences regarding the cabinet's stay in power as well.

Dissolution powers, which are available for the Russian president, cover not only the stage of cabinet dismissal but also the stage of cabinet formation. The presidents can dissolve the parliament if the process of cabinet formation is stalled. The constitutional right to exercise dissolution powers during cabinet formation helps the president to secure the selection of a prime minister who is close to his ideal point, thus further minimizing the extent of potential tensions between them in the future.²⁵

The systematic analysis of president-prime minister relations in Russia conveys the image of relatively peaceful intra-executive coexistence. The intra-executive politics have been persistently dominated by the presidents who have had final say in major appointment and policy decisions.²⁶ Disagreements between the president and prime minister were not salient issues in the press coverage of the executive branch of government and were not perceived by

political analysts as consequential for the functioning of the executive. When the dismissal of the cabinet was initiated by the president, the reasons cited as grounds for the decision included performance failures and policy mistakes. No allegations in political disloyalty of the prime minister and his cabinet were made on the part of president in the vast majority of cases. Overall, the level of intra-executive conflict was low.

Both the amendments to the Soviet-era constitution of Ukraine, which provided the legal basis for the functioning of the executive during 1991-95 period, and the new constitution of June 1996, provide the president with rather limited powers over the cabinet. Unlike the 1993 Russian constitution, the Ukrainian constitutional arrangements did not supplement the formal symmetry of the president and parliament's powers over cabinet appointment and dismissal with a constitutional clause which grants the president the effective right of dissolution. When the president cannot threaten parliament's survival, the cabinet truly faces the problem of confused or dual loyalty.²⁷

Why do prime ministers in president-parliamentary regimes defect?

It remains puzzling why some prime ministers in president-parliamentary regimes opt for open confrontation with the president. Such confrontation leads, as a rule, to the dismissal of the prime minister by the president. Assuming that staying in office is the first-order preference for the prime minister, it is irrational

for the latter to contest openly the president's leadership of the cabinet. It is certainly political suicide for the prime minister in Russia, a president-parliamentary regime with strong presidential control over cabinet. It is also true in Ukraine where the actual symmetry of the presidential and parliamentarian power over cabinet dismissal would suggest that the prime minister's dominant strategy should be to "balance" the preferences of president and parliament and to avoid contesting presidential control over the executive branch of government.

Yet in both types of president-parliamentary regimes, though at different rates, prime ministers defected. Table 2 indicates that the high level of intra-executive political conflict characterized the functioning of the following four cabinets: Kuchma 92-93, Marchuk 95-96, and Lazarenko 96-97 in Ukraine, Primakov 98-99 in Russia. Marchuk 95-96 and Lazarenko 96-97 cabinets at the time of their appointment were considered to be very close to the president, which makes the fact of their subsequent conflict with president especially puzzling.

The explanation for the prime ministers' "defection" should be sought in the specific structure of the incentives that the president-parliamentary framework produces for prime ministers, and in the prime ministers' subjective calculations of the political strength of the presidents they dare to challenge. One issue that immediately emerges from examining the details of intra-executive competition in all cases considered here is the presidential ambition of the prime minister. Under president-parliamentary arrangements adopted in Russia and Ukraine, the presidency is the office that is vested with the highest degree of power and prestige. While in premier-presidential regimes the larger share of executive

powers is awarded by the constitution to the prime minister and political practice drifts toward a higher degree of prime ministerial control over the executive branch, president-parliamentary regimes experience both formal and informal consolidation of executive power in the hands of president.²⁸ Therefore the post of president is the most desired one for ambitious politicians.

The office of prime minister, on the other hand, does not have a similar promise of prestige and power for the office-seekers. What it does however, it immediately promotes its holders to the position of national recognition and wields in their hands some substantial powers over the state apparatus. These are very important assets especially for political systems which are dominated by personalistic political networks and where both national and local politics are organized around clientalistic rather than ideological appeals. Prime ministers, because of their control of government resources and name recognition on a national level have the ability to organize electoral coalitions and party machines for seeking the highest office. In other words, serving as a prime minister has potential to put the politician in the race for presidency.

An ambitious prime minister's incentives to comply with the president can be further limited by a host of institutional and contextual factors. A president serving only the first term and hoping to be re-elected for the second is likely to use the prime minister as a shield to defend himself from the different sort of political contingencies and crises and not as a likely successor whose political standing should be defended and promoted. The political popularity of the president is one of the contextual variables affecting the prime minister's

behavior. The weaker the president is politically the higher are the prime minister's incentives to contest the presidential leadership of the executive. Conflict with the president, under the above-mentioned circumstances, is in the interests of prime minister who has already exploited the advantages of being in office to promote his political standing.

It is difficult to determine empirically all range of motivations of prime ministers which led them to political confrontations with the president. The political behavior of prime ministers after their cabinets' resignation however, can be to some extent indicative of their motivations while in office. Two types of evidence can be considered as providing some support for the arguments offered above: former prime ministers' participation in presidential races and their efforts to build political party machines both to support their presidential bids and, more generally, to serve for preference aggregation and representation of various interests.

Three out of four former prime ministers whose dismissal from office was classified above as an outcome of intra-executive competition in president-parliamentary regimes had entered the presidential race challenging the incumbent presidents' determination to renew their electoral mandate. Due to the imprisonment, which followed the corruption charges, the former Ukrainian Prime Minister Lazarenko was the only one of four rebellious prime ministers who did not officially enter the presidential race. Prior to hi imprisonment he was widely regarded as one on the potential presidential candidate.²⁹

The entire Ukrainian record is telling. In the 1994 Ukrainian presidential elections the former Prime Minister Kuchma, who during his time in office in 1992-93 repeatedly contested the presidential leadership of cabinet, faced the incumbent President Kravchuk in the run-off and won with the comfortable margin. Marchuk and Lazarenko, rebellious prime ministers during President Kuchma's term in office, were seen as major contenders of the incumbent president during the 1999 presidential elections.³⁰

It was argued here that prime ministers may opt for open political confrontation with the president when intra-executive conflict and the prime minister's dismissal which follows increase the prime minister's chances to win the office of president in the next presidential elections. Additional motivation for the confrontational stand vis-à-vis the president is the backing of an already existing political force opposed to the president. Primakov's cabinet in Russia had support from the communist party. Primakov's cabinet was a compromise struck between President Yeltsin, whose bargaining power during the cabinet formation process was severely damaged by the August 1999 crisis, and parliament opposed to him; but the political strength of the cabinet stemmed from the organized support of the Communist faction in parliament.³¹

The Russian case is indicative of the growing importance of party politics in cabinet formation in countries with weakly institutionalized party system. Although the state apparatus and not party politics has generated thus far the main presidential contenders in the regimes under consideration, the growing maturity of political parties and their increasing ability to produce political (and not

technocratic candidates) for the premiership may change the dynamics of intra-executive relations in president-parliamentary regimes.

Intra-executive conflict in premier-presidential regimes

While in president-parliamentary regimes it is prime ministers who challenge the presidential leadership over the executive branch of government, the principal executive powers in premier-presidential regimes lie in the hands of cabinets, and it is presidents who challenge prime ministers' authority over the executive. Although cabinet appointment under premier-presidentialism requires presidential participation, cabinet survival depends solely on the legislature. In view of some authors this constitutional arrangement should be conducive to the non-conflictual functioning of the political regime's executive and legislative institutions. Unlike president-parliamentary regimes, Shugart and Carey argue, premier-presidential regimes should avoid the problem of confused loyalty by clearly making cabinet survival dependent exclusively on the legislature.³²

The empirical record of premier-presidential regimes discussed below however, shows that the premier-presidential constitutional framework does not safeguard against the political conflict between the president and the cabinet. As with president-parliamentarism, the reasons for conflict are structurally determined. They stem from the institutional design which provides for the dual character of the executive. On the one hand, providing for the presidential participation in the appointment of cabinet any semi-presidential constitution

establishes the popularly elected president as a principal of the cabinet. On the other, it expects him to abstain from trying to influence the prime minister's behavior when the latter is in office.

The political composition of parliament has been the major factor influencing the dynamics of intra-executive relations in premier-presidential regimes. The political party system has been more institutionalized in premier-presidential than in president-parliamentary regimes and as such, has had a larger effect on the functioning of the executive.³³ Table 3 classifies the cabinets formed in premier-presidential regimes according to the character of majority composition in the parliament and partisan affiliation of the presidents that these cabinets had to co-exist with.

'Table 3 about here'

The table above lists all cabinets formed between 1991 and 2002 in premier-presidential regimes included in the study. Cabinets whose term in office was characterized by the high level of intra-executive conflict are underlined. These are the same twelve cabinets that were listed in Table 2.

Proportionally to the number of cases included in each cell an intense intra-executive competition appears to be least common when a stable one-party or coalition majority in parliament had the same political orientation as the president. The same political orientation diminishes room for potential conflict by

reducing the differences in opinion about cabinet policies and the appropriate people to conduct those policies. The experience of the French Fifth Republic is regularly cited in this respect due to the fact that the functioning of dual executive in that premier-presidential system was non-conflictual whenever the president and prime minister belonged to the same political coalition.³⁴

Similar to France, such political circumstances were conducive to intra-executive peace in new premier-presidential regimes as well. This was especially the case in Lithuania where President Brazauskas had a harmonious relationship with both the Lubys and the Slezevicius' cabinets. Both prime ministers and the president belonged to the post-communist Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDLP) that held the majority of seats in the 1992-96 Lithuanian parliament. LDLP was a stable and disciplined party with strong incentives for leading party members not to defect from its ranks. President Brazauskas was an undisputed leader of LDLP at the time of 1992 parliamentary and 1993 presidential elections in Lithuania.

Bottom left cell in Table 4 includes all cabinets supported by the ideologically coherent and disciplined majority opposed to the president. As the table indicates the intra-executive relations in these cases were often characterized by the intense competition between the president and prime minister. Four of seven cabinets in the cell experienced the high level of intra-executive conflict.

These patterns of intra-executive relations differ from those found in the French Fifth Republic on several occasions when the president and a prime minister who belonged to the opposite political camp had to co-exist. Robert Elgie

(1999) describes three recent cases of co-habitation in France (1986-88, 1993-95, and 1997-) as periods of a rather peaceful co-existence between the president and the prime minister. A relatively clear division of responsibility between the president and the prime minister is cited as a major factor that helped to avoid intense intra-executive competition in these cases.³⁵

When placed in the comparative perspective the French patterns of peaceful intra-executive relationships may prove to be an exception rather than a general rule of co-habitation between the president and the prime minister who belong to the opposite political camps. Presidents challenge prime ministers, who are backed by a solid parliamentary majority, more often than the French experience of co-habitation would suggest. Among the factors that influence the president's willingness to engage in intra-executive competition under these political circumstances are: nature of electoral cycle, "freshness" of electoral mandate and a host of contextual factors that affect popularity ratings of key political actors.³⁶

The upper right and bottom left cells of Table 4 contain cabinets that relied on fragmented and unstable support in the parliament. The instances of intense intra-executive competition took place both when presidents did belong to the parliamentary majority and when they did not. Parliamentary fragmentation invites the presidential claims on the executive leadership by lowering the president's political costs of attacking prime minister and cabinet that lack solid support in the parliament. The conflict took place every time when a prime

minister was not willing to accept a higher degree of presidential involvement into the executive matters.

Prime ministers did not always choose to defend their powers. Some acquiesced to the presidential ambitions to participate more actively in the executive decision-making. Technocratic cabinets, which lacked strong and consistent political backing in the parliament, were especially prone to grant to presidents a larger say in executive matters. Prime Minister Vacaroiu's cooperation with President Ilescu during the office term of the fragmented 1992-96 Romanian parliament and Prime Minister Sangheli's acceptance of President Snegur's leadership during the 1990-94 parliament's office term in Moldova illustrate this type of intra-executive coexistence.³⁷

In general, parliamentary fragmentation contributes to the perpetuation of ambiguity about where the ultimate executive authority resides. Political weaknesses of cabinets, which have been often manifested in the technocratic character of cabinet composition, only highlight the political legitimacy of popular elected presidents. While premier-presidential constitutional framework clearly privileges the prime minister, it is the political context, in which the institutional actors operate, which often legitimizes the presidential attempts to have a larger say in the executive matters.

In situations where an unstable and ideologically unstructured political party system have large problems in producing strong party-based cabinets, presidents have the opportunity to exploit the lack of coordination between prime-ministers and parliament and claim leadership over the executive. These claims of

the president, however, are not likely to be met in parliament with the willingness to delegate or transfer the additional executive powers to the president as some literature tends to suggest.³⁸ The parliamentary members not only in premier-presidential but also in president-parliamentary regimes are rather more likely to transfer some powers to the prime minister whom they can ultimately hold accountable.

The degree of party fragmentation and the extent to which party competition is structured along programmatic or clientelistic lines are two primary characteristics of the party system which shape the evolution of political practices of premier-presidential regimes. Prime ministers are more likely to assume the executive leadership when they rely on the support of disciplined and ideologically cohesive majority in the parliament. The prime minister's leadership of the executive is less certain and more easily attacked by the president when fragmented and clientelistically structure parliamentary majority is in place.

Probability logic of intra-executive conflict

To summarize some of the arguments introduced in the previous sections of the paper and to assess the importance of factors influencing the dynamics of intra-executive relations I specified a binary logit model. Observations on all fifty-five cases of inter-executive co-existence discussed in this paper were used to estimate the model. The dependent variable in my analysis is *Conflict Level*. It takes on a value of 0 when the level of intra-executive conflict was low and a value of 1 if it was high.

For each case of intra-executive co-existence I constructed a set of political variables. Three dummy variables *Majority Cabinet*, *Minority Cabinet* and *Technocratic Cabinet* were specified to capture the differences in cabinet type. I included the last two variables into the equation and used majority cabinet as a reference category. *Partisanship* was another dummy variable introduced into the equation to account for the political orientation of the president and cabinet. If both belong to the same political party or party coalition the variable was given a score of 1, and a score of 0 otherwise.³⁹

Since there is no comparative index of party clientelism, I used the *Corruption Perception Index* as a proxy for the strength of the clientelistic dimension of party competition. Following Transparency International's original three-tier grouping of Central and East European countries, I assigned a score of 1 to the cabinets formed in countries with a low level of corruption, a score of 2 to the cabinets in countries with a medium level of corruption, and a score of 3 to the cabinets formed in countries with a high level of corruption.

The argument can also be made that regime duration is a factor that could be important in explaining the probability of conflict. The earlier years of transition can generate more conflict since the political practices of mutual accommodation had not been established yet. The *Transition* variable was assigned a value of 1 if intra-executive coexistence took place during the first term of the first popularly elected president and a value of 0 otherwise.

The results of the logit regression are summarized in Table 4a.

“Tables 4a and 4b are about here”

As Table 4a indicates, only *Partisanship* and *Minority Cabinet* were found to be significant predictors of intra-executive conflict. The negative sign of a logistic coefficient for *Partisanship* means that belonging to the same political camp decreases the probability of intra-executive conflict. The positive sign of a *Minority Cabinet* coefficient indicates that minority cabinets are significantly associated with a higher level of conflict.

Table 4b quantifies these findings. It includes two variables that were found to be significant for predicting intra-executive conflict and provides the predicted probabilities for the different values of these variables assuming that other variables in the specified regression model are kept at their means. A high predicted probability of conflict when a president faces a minority cabinet of a different political orientation is consistent with the expectation that a president is willing to confront cabinets that are politically weak.

The number of observations on the cases of intra-executive co-existence is too small to have a high confidence in the model findings. Since one should consider the results with caution, I chose to present the model specification only at the end of the paper. Nonetheless since studies have used a maximum likelihood estimation technique for models with even a smaller number of observations⁴⁰ this exercise has the value of subjecting qualitative arguments to a more systematic analysis and suggesting future venues for the research.

Conclusion

This article has elaborated the concept of intra-executive conflict. Intra-executive political competition between the president and the prime minister is built upon the institutional divide between the presidency and the legislature. The character of relationships between the president and prime minister under semi-presidentialism was argued to be critically affected by the constitutional rules guiding cabinet formation and dismissal and by party system characteristics that determine the political composition of parliament.

Conceptualizing the relationships between the president, the parliament, and the cabinet in terms of the multiple principal-agent model helped to understand what are the institutional constraints on the cabinet's ability to act independently from the president and the legislature. It also explained why the alternative type of alliances - one between the president and prime minister and the other between the prime minister and the legislature – developed in semi-presidential regimes across the post-communist region. Subordinate position of cabinet in hierarchy of semi-presidential institutions made the prime minister to seek an alliance with institutionally more powerful actor.

The level of party system development was demonstrated to have a profound effect on the dynamics of intra-executive relations. Party-based cabinets dominate the political scene in semi-presidential regimes that have more consolidated and programmatically structured party system. Strong party links re-

enforce cabinets' institutional incentives to co-operate with the parliament. At the same time, cabinets without party affiliation or so-called technocratic cabinets were persistent political phenomenon in semi-presidential regimes with weakly institutionalized party system. The behavioral patterns of technocratic cabinets were argued to be primarily dependent on the institutional distribution of cabinet dismissal powers and on prime ministers' calculation of personal political costs of confronting the president.

To test the importance of the extent of political support that the governing party or party coalition have in parliament, a statistical model was specified. Minority cabinets were found to increase substantially the likelihood of intra-executive conflict. More data is needed to specify more sophisticated models and to substantiate this and other findings. Continuing functioning of semi-presidential regimes in Eastern Europe will generate such data. Alternatively, the early experiences of West European semi-presidential regimes can be of interest in this respect.

The dual executive was united most of the time in president-parliamentary regimes of Russia. The specific features of the constitutional design which is currently in place in this country limit the parliament's ability to sanction cabinet. The presidents have been able to secure the technocratic cabinets' compliance and to deter the prime ministers from challenging presidential leadership over the executive. As a result, executive-legislative conflict rather than intra-executive conflict characterized the functioning of political institutions in these semi-presidential regimes.

The weaker presidential powers over the cabinet formation and dismissal in Ukraine's president-parliamentary regime led to the mixed patterns of institutional conflict and cooperation. Periods of intra-executive competition and cooperation alternated depending on the prime ministers' willingness to risk their tenure in office. Seemingly suicidal political behavior on the part of some prime ministers took place in all president-parliamentary regimes. To explain this behavior, I analyzed the structure of incentives that a prime minister faces under president-parliamentary constitutional framework. The prime ministers' willingness to risk the survival of their cabinets does not contradict the power maximization assumption about the politicians' behavior when the presidential ambitions of the prime ministers are taken into consideration.

The dynamics of intra-executive competition differed between the regime types. In president-parliamentary regimes, the occurrence of intra-executive conflict depended on prime ministers' willingness to contest the presidential control over the executive. In premier-presidential regimes, intra-executive competition was usually initiated by the presidents who challenged the prime ministers' leadership over the cabinet. Given that the survival of the cabinet under a premier-presidential constitution depends solely on parliament, the prime ministers in premier-presidential regimes lacked any incentives to form an alliance with the presidents. Whenever conflict between the president and the parliament took place, the cabinet was on the side of the parliament.

Presidents were willing to engage in intra-executive competition in a different political context. They challenged both the prime ministers who relied

on the support of the disciplined but opposed to the president parliamentary majority and the prime ministers whose support in the parliament was fragmented and unstable. Parliamentary fragmentation contributed to the proliferation of intra-executive competition by weakening political positions of prime ministers and enabling the presidents to compete more effectively for the control of the executive.

A substantial variation in the patterns of intra-executive relationship among semi-presidential regimes has persisted over the first post-communist decade. It reflects the different trajectories of political development that regimes with the similar constitutional framework are capable to pursue. Structuring post-communist countries' experiences with semi-presidentialism along theoretical lines depends on further progress in studying how the effects of the constitutional design are mediated by the evolution of party systems across the region.

Endnotes

¹ A political regime is defined in this research as semi-presidential if it meets classical Duverger criteria: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he possesses considerable executive powers; (3) there is also a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental powers and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them. See Maurice Duverger, 'A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government', *European Journal of Political Research*, 8 (1980), 165-87.

² See, for example, Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Thomas Baylis, 'Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping the Executive Authority in Eastern Europe', *World Politics*, 48 (1996), 297-323; Ray Taras, ed, *Post-Communist Presidents* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Robert Elgie, ed, *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

³ For the recent discussion of the nature of presidential powers in semi-presidential regimes, see Lee Kendall Metcalf, 'Measuring Presidential Power', *Comparative Political Studies*, 33 (2000), 660-685.

⁴ I adopt Shugart and Carey's classification of the regimes with popularly elected presidents. These authors introduced the concepts of president-parliamentary and premier-presidential regimes in order to allow, among other things, for a more sophisticated understanding of the potential variation in how much power the president has over the cabinet in semi-presidential regimes, see Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*. A semi-presidential constitutional framework encompasses both president-parliamentary and premier-presidential types of constitutional designs. Whenever I use the term "semi-presidential" in the text I make generalizations about, or refer, to the features of semi-presidential regimes found both in president-parliamentary and premier-presidential types of semi-presidential systems.

⁵ There were a number of institutional arrangements regulating the relationships between the president, parliament, and cabinet in Ukraine during the 1990s. Rules governing these relationships were modified in 1992 (emergency powers for the prime minister), 1993 (expiration of those powers), 1995 (Constitutional Agreement), and 1996 (Constitution). Under each of these arrangements, however, the president continued to control the power of cabinet dismissal. Russia after 1993 is often described in the literature as a “super-presidential” political regime (Steven Fish, ‘The Executive Deception: Super-presidentialism and the Degradation of Russian Politics’, in Valerie Sperling, ed, *Building the Russian State* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000). A huge bureaucratic apparatus of executive power, a rule by presidential decrees, formal and informal presidential control over other branches of government and public expenditures are all described in the literature as indicators of super-presidentialism. Fish and other authors essentially rely on sociological categories to describe the political regime in Russia. In classifying Russia as a semi-presidential regime, I rely on the formal constitutional criteria proposed by Duverger. For the purposes of my analysis of the effects of formal constitutional framework, it is important that the Russian constitutional arrangement meets the Duverger criteria and thus falls into the category of semi-presidential regimes.

⁶ This study includes all cases of intra-executive co-existence in semi-presidential settings in Central and Eastern Europe and the European part of the former Soviet Union with the exception of Belarus. The immaturity of democratic institutions in the Central Asian and Caucasian republics of the former Soviet Union, which is perpetuated by authoritarian practices of conflict management in general, and by violent handling of political competition in particular, disqualified several nominally semi-presidential regimes from being included in the analysis. Semi-presidential regimes found in the Balkan region were not included either. In that region, democracy was a hostage of destructive military conflicts during most of the first post-communist decade. This made the political interactions between the presidents and prime-ministers in semi-presidential regimes in the Balkans, with the possible exception of Slovenia, follow quite a different logic.

⁷Thomas Baylis, 'Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping the Executive Authority in Eastern Europe', *World Politics*, 48 (1996); Ray Taras, ed, *Post-Communist Presidents* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁸ Principal-agent framework of analysis, first developed in the economics literature on incomplete information and risk sharing, became a major tool in organizational analysis because of its analytical elegance and applicability to a wide set of organizational phenomena. For the theoretical discussion of utility of principal-agent models in political setting see Terry M Moe, 'The new economics of organization', *American Journal of Political Science*, 28 (1984), 739-77; Torbjorn Bergman, W. C. Muller, and K. Strom. Introduction: Parliamentary democracy and the chain of delegation. *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (3):255-260, 2000; J. D. Huber and A. Lupia. Cabinet instability and delegation in parliamentary democracies. *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (1):18-32, 2001

¹⁰ Baylis, 'Presidents vs. Prime Ministers: Shaping the Executive Authority in Eastern Europe', 297-323.

¹¹ Given the scarcity of systematic data on cabinet reshuffles, only the change of prime minister was used as an indicator of new cabinet formation. Other indicators of cabinet change that can be found in the literatures on OECD countries include: simultaneous change of four or more cabinet ministers, party withdrawal from the cabinet, and inclusion of a new party in the cabinet. See annual country reports in *European Journal of Political Research* (1990-).

¹²Referring to the early adoption of semi-presidential institutional framework does not imply that the institutional choices were made immediately after communist breakdown or simultaneously across the countries. By the end of 1991, however, all countries but Lithuania had basic features of semi-presidentialism in place: popular election of president, division of executive powers

between the president and prime minister, and cabinet stay in office subject to parliamentary confidence. In Lithuania, popular elections of president were not held until the early 1993.

¹³ Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *The Political economy of democratic transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

¹⁴ The lack of political partisanship was perceived by some analysts as an advantage of technocratic cabinets facing the task of introducing unpopular measures. As Haggard and Kaufman argue, the same feature of technocratic cabinets turned into a major liability when the task of reform consolidation required the broad political support for governmental policies (Haggard and Kaufman, *The Political economy of democratic transitions*, pp. 15-25).

¹⁵ On party system evolution in the post-Soviet region, see, for example, Herbert Kitschelt, 'The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies,' *Party Politics* 4 (1995), 447-472; John Lowenhardt, ed, *Party Politics in Post-Communist Russia* (Cass Publishers, 1998); Andrew Wilson and Sarah Birch, 'Voting Stability, Political Gridlock: Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections', *Europa-Asia Studies*, 51 (1999) 1040-1060; Sarah Birch 'Nomenklatura Democratization: Electoral Clientalism in Post-Soviet Ukraine', *Democratization*, 4 (1997), 40-62.

¹⁶ While in office several technocratic prime ministers opted to acquire party affiliation which reflects the growing politicization of cabinet in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Realizing the need to have a disciplined party organization to back government policies and ensure electoral success the prime ministers have actively engaged in creating pro-government party machines. Political block "Our Home is Russia" headed by the Russian prime minister Chernomyrdin and National Democratic Party led by the Ukrainian prime minister Pustovoitenko are two prominent examples of government-sponsored political organizations. See Stephen White, *Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Post-Communist Society* (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Andrew Wilson, 'Ukraine', in Robert Elgie, ed, *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, p.276.

¹⁷ An interesting discussion of delegation problems that political parties face in the process of democratic consolidation is offered in Matthew S. Shugart, 'The Inverse Relationship between

Party Strength and Executive Strength: a Theory of Politicians' Constitutional Choices', *British Journal of Political Science*, 28 (1998), 1-29.

¹⁸ Timothy Frye, 'A Politics of Institutional Change', *Comparative Political Studies*, 30 (1997), 523-552.

¹⁹ Country Updates, *East European Constitutional Review (EECR)*, 1992-2002; Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Daily Reports, 1990-1999; RFE/RL News line, 1999-2002.

²⁰ Kazakhstan would be another example of a president-parliamentary regime in the former Soviet Union. Although the increasingly authoritarian nature of the political regime in Kazakhstan precluded the author from including Kazakh cases in this analysis, it is important to note that out of five cases of intra-executive coexistence in Kazakhstan only during the incumbency of the Kazhegeldin 1994-97 cabinet can the level of intra-executive conflict be described as high.

²¹ Krzysztof Jasciewicz, 'Poland: Walesa's Legacy to the Presidency', in Ray Taras, ed, *Post-Communist Presidents*, pp. 130-68.

²² Shugart and Carey (1992).

²³ Poland Update, *East European Constitutional Review (EECR)*, N. 1-2, 2000.

²⁴ Oleh Protsyk, 'Semi-Presidentialism: The Logic of Institutional Conflict and its Implications for Public Administration Reform' (Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 2000), pp. 53-69.

²⁵ The nomination of Kirienko cabinet in spring 1998 demonstrates the powerful effect of dissolution threats by the president on parliamentary deputies' behavior. The Russian constitution of 1993 stipulates that the president can dissolve parliament if the latter fails to confirm the president's nominee for the post of prime minister after three rounds of voting on the cabinet. Yeltsin opted to nominate the same candidate three times, leaving deputies with the choice to confirm Kirienko or to face dissolution. The communist faction, which was the largest one in the lower chamber of the Russian parliament, did not support his candidacy. Kirienko's confirmation depended on getting some of the communist votes, which he failed to receive during two rounds of voting. After two unsuccessful attempts, parliament approved Kirienko's cabinet at the third

attempt. This was partly due to a large group of opposition deputies changing their position during the third round and voting in favor of Kirienko's cabinet. The fear of dissolution was the reason for this particular change of position by communist deputies. This fear also explains the support of Kirienko by some other factions in the legislature. See Russia Update, *East European Constitutional Review (EECR)*, V.7(3), 1998.

²⁶ The Russian president's actual control of the executive after his re-election in 1996 can be legitimately questioned. On several occasions, especially in 1998 and 1999, Yeltsin's inability to guide the cabinet was a recurrent topical issue in the Russian politics. The lack of leadership on the part of the president in those instances can be attributed to the poor health of the president. It does not mean, however, that the presidential administration did not continue to be in control during the periods in question. See Stephen White, 'Russia', in Robert Elgie, ed, *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, p.230.

²⁷ Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*, p. 121.

²⁸ In the cases of Russia and Kazakhstan the overwhelming leadership of the president over the cabinet does not leave room for doubt about the direction in which the respective regimes have evolved during the last five or six years. The experiments with semi-presidentialism in Ukraine have produced a more mixed record with rather limited formal and informal advantages acquired by the president vis-a-vis the prime minister.

²⁹ See Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine: Unexpected Nation* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2000), p.201.

³⁰ Marchuk became an independent political figure engaged in rivalry with the president during the term of "constitutional agreement" which granted the president the unilateral and exclusive right to appoint and dismiss cabinets. Understanding that the president has no constraints on his ability to sanction the cabinet was a common knowledge that however, did not deter Prime Minister Marchuk from acting against the president's interests. After his resignation from the post, another Ukrainian Prime Minister - Pavlo Lazarenko - was also described in media as a potential presidential candidate. See *Ukraine: Country Profile* (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998), p. 10.

³¹ Russia update, *East European Constitutional Review*, 7 (Fall 1998), p. 31.

³² Shugart and Carey, 1992, p. 120.

³³ Premier-presidential regime in Moldova is the only exception. Due to the prolonged period of patrimonial socialism, low level of industrialization, and clientalistic social structure party system remains unstable and fragmented. See William Crowther, 'The Politics of Democratization in Post-Communist Moldova', in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds, *Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 282-330, at p. 307.

³⁴ Alfred Stepan and Ezra Suleiman, 'The French Fifth Republic: A Model for Import? Reflections on Poland and Brazil', in H.E. Chehabi and Alfred Stepan, *Politics, Society, and Democracy: Comparative Studies* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 393-414.

³⁵ Robert Elgie, 'France', in Robert Elgie, ed., *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, pp. 67-86, at p. 73.

³⁶ Given the frequent claims from the different sides of the political spectrum in premier-presidential regimes to change the constitution, the constitutional framework itself does not seem to be conducive to arrival at an equilibrium point, which would satisfy the majority of political players. The fierce debates during the 1997 Lithuanian presidential campaign about the proper scope of presidential power are one of the recent manifestations of the fact that the existing rules of the game are still contested. The debates in Lithuania were initiated by one of the most likely candidates to win the presidential elections. Arturas Paulauskas, the presidential candidate who in the course of his campaign argued for broader powers to be awarded to president, lost his presidential bid in the second round of elections by less than one percent of votes (EECR 1998). The 1999 referendum on strengthening presidential control over the executive in Moldova, which was initiated by president Lucinschi, and the subsequent parliamentary decision to abolish presidency is another example of challenging the constitutional status quo (1999 EECR).

³⁷ Tony Verheijen, 'Romania', in Robert Elgie, ed., *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, pp. 193-216, at p. 206; William Crowther, 'The Politics of Democratization in Post-Communist Moldova', p. 302.

³⁸ Shugart, 'The Inverse Relationship between Party Strength and Executive Strength: a Theory of Politicians' Constitutional Choices', p. 1-29.

³⁹ The *Partisanship* score for technocratic cabinets was assigned according to the prevailing perception of cabinet loyalty at the time of cabinet formation. If the cabinet was perceived at the time of formation as closer to the ideal point of the president rather than parliament it was assigned a score of 1 and a score of 0 otherwise.

⁴⁰ See, for example, L. Spector and M. Mazzeo, "Probit analysis and economic education," *Journal of Economic Education*, 11 (1980), 37-44.