Prime ministers' identity in semi-presidential regimes: Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes

OLEH PROTSYK
European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany

Abstract. This article examines how presidential involvement in the cabinet formation process affects cabinet formation outcomes in the semi-presidential regimes of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It analyzes whether the formal distribution of appointment-dismissal powers allows for the development of useful indicators for predicting a prime minister's location on the continuum between the ideal points of the president and the legislature. First, to derive theoretical expectations about a prime minister's identity in the different types of semi-presidential regimes, the article discusses constitutional variation in the formal distribution of cabinet appointment-dismissal powers across semi-presidential constitutions. Second, the empirical outcomes of cabinet formation are then compared with the theoretical predictions. Empirical tests, while providing substantial support for the hypothesized effect of variation in cabinet appointment-dismissal powers, indicate the importance of other variables. Qualitative and quantitative differences in the character of the party system and the nature of the electoral cycle also have a systematic effect on cabinet formation outcomes.

Variations in constitutional design have the potential to explain important political outcomes in the analysis of cabinet formation under different types of constitutional regimes. Most literature on cabinet formation in parliamentary regimes with indirectly elected presidents assumes that the presidential role in nominating of the prime minister is not strategic (Laver & Schofield 1990; Laver & Shepsle 1996). At the same time, academic scholarship on semi-presidential regimes describes presidential participation in cabinet formation as highly significant. Since Duverger's (1980) seminal article on semi-presidentialism, presidential involvement in cabinet formation matters has been considered to be of great importance for understanding how semi-presidential regimes function (see, e.g., Stepan & Suleiman 1995; Baylis 1996; Pasquino 1997; Bahro et al. 1998; Elgie 1999a; Metcalf 2000; Blondel & Muller-Rommel 2001; Roper 2002; Siaroff 2003).

The proliferation of semi-presidential regimes during the early stages of democratic transformation in Eastern Europe, and the richness of institutional variation in the post-Communist world, provides ample empirical material and an important additional stimulus for studying cabinet formation under a

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

semi-presidential constitutional framework. Building on earlier scholarship, this article starts by analyzing how variation in cabinet nomination and dismissal powers affects the president's and the legislature's bargaining power over the appointment of the prime minister (for the most elaborate theoretical discussion of this issue, see Shugart & Carey 1992: 106–131). Information about the distribution of formal powers between the president and parliament is utilized to form theoretical expectations about the prime minister's location on a continuum between the ideal points of the president and the legislature. The predictions about the likely identity of prime ministers are derived first from the formal specification of a cabinet appointment game and then are tested across all cases of cabinet formation in post-Communist semi-presidential regimes between 1991 and 2002.

The second part of the article examines how the analysis of factors other than immediate cabinet appointment-dismissal norms can contribute to our understanding of the outcomes of the cabinet appointment game. Three such factors are discussed: the degree of fragmentation in parliament; the quality of legislative fragmentation; and the effect of a non-concurrent electoral cycle, which provides a 'legitimacy advantage' to the most recently elected branch of government.

Given the interest of this research in examining the outcomes of cabinet formation, it relies on Shugart and Carey's (1992) classification of regimes that meets Duverger's definition of semi-presidential government, although a number of competing definitions of 'semi-presidentialism' and interpretations of Duverger's second criteria for semi-presidential government exist (see Pasquino 1997; Bahro et al. 1998; Elgie 1999b; Siaroff 2003). These authors' classifications are explicitly based on the constitutional variation in how much power the president has over cabinet formation. Such a classification is thus most immediately relevant for the specific purposes of this research.

Shugart and Carey (1992) introduce the concepts of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes. In terms of differences related to cabinet formation, premier-presidentialim is characterized by the rather limited role of the president in cabinet appointments: the president has the power to nominate a prime minister and individual ministers for parliament's confirmation, but he lacks the power to dismiss a prime minister or individual ministers. In president-parliamentary regimes, on the other hand, the president possesses the constitutional powers to appoint and to dismiss the prime minister and his or her cabinet. In my treatment of semi-presidentialism here, a semi-presidential constitutional framework encompasses both president-parliamentary and premier-presidential types of constitutional designs. Whenever I use the term 'semi-presidential' in the text, I make generalizations about, or refer to, the features of semi-presidential regimes found both in

president-parliamentary and premier-presidential types of semi-presidential systems.

Among the specific cases discussed in this article, cabinet formation in Russia and Ukraine followed, for most of the post-Communist period, the constitutional procedures that approximate the logic of cabinet formation under president-parliamentary regime. A premier-presidential constitutional framework has been in place for a significant period of time in Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia (1991–1993) and Slovenia. The data on cabinet formation from these two groups of countries constitutes the empirical basis of the research. Neither the president-parliamentary nor the premier-presidential set of cases analyzed in this study encompasses all the relevant cases found in the post-Communist region. The existence of at least a moderately developed democratic setting influenced the choice of cases for this research.

Attention to the regulatory function of constitutional provisions is not a substitute for the detailed analysis of another regulatory mechanism – party politics. Yet it is argued in this article that formal constitutional rules are an especially important starting point for analysis of cabinet formation in the environment of a weakly institutionalized party system. A significant number of cabinets formed during the 1990s in the semi-presidential regimes included in this study did not have any formal party affiliation and were essentially 'technocratic' governments lacking organized political party support. All cabinets formed in Russia, Ukraine and Moldova during the period from 1991 to 2000 lacked formal party affiliation at the moment of their formation. 'Technocratic' cabinets were also formed on several occasions in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania (Protsyk 2000).

The cabinet appointment game

The strategic participation of the president in cabinet formation under semi-presidentialism results in the appointment of cabinets that differ from those that would have been chosen if the 'ideal' presidential or parliamentary constitutional framework were in place. Under a classic semi-presidential constitutional framework, the president is not formally constrained in his choice of the prime minister. For example, the president has no formal obligation to nominate a leader of the largest party in parliament for the post of prime minister. Three types of cabinet-related powers are of immediate interest for understanding how the cabinet appointment game is played under a semi-presidential constitutional framework. These are the powers to nominate, confirm and dismiss cabinets. The exact distribution of these powers is

expected to predict cabinet location on a continuum between the ideal points of the president and the legislature.

In the modal arrangement of a semi-presidential constitutional setting, cabinet formation has the following procedure. The first step is the presidential nomination of a prime minister. This type of constitutional setting gives the president the exclusive right to propose a candidate for the post of prime minister, thus awarding the former with the important advantage of having the initiative in the appointment game. The second step is parliament's confirmation of the candidate for prime minister as proposed by the president. Since parliament can only approve or reject the presidential nominee and not propose its own candidate, its powers in the appointment process are negative. Given the fact that both president and parliament are involved in cabinet selection, the appointment decisions can be modeled as a product of a bilateral bargaining game between the president and parliament. Situations where the president and parliament have different political orientations are of primary interest here. Even when the president and parliament belong to the same political camp, the cabinet selection process may lead to a conflict of interest.

This article hypothesizes that the stronger the presidential powers over cabinet, the closer the choice of prime minister will be to the ideal point of the president rather than parliament. Cabinet location on the continuum between the ideal points of the president and the legislature will depend on the distribution of two types of power: the power to nominate the prime minister, and the power to dismiss the prime minister and his cabinet.

The power of initiative in the appointment game

The 'first-move' advantage of the actor who, in accordance with the constitution, has this initiative is well analyzed in the literature on bargaining by the president and the Senate over appropriation bills and candidates for the positions of cabinet secretaries in the United States (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1985; Shugart & Carey 1992). A similar logic applies to the cabinet selection game under semi-presidential regimes. Figure 1 presents schematically how the power of initiative influences the outcomes of bargaining between president and parliament. The underlying assumption is that the preferences of the president and parliament over the prime minister candidature can be mapped on one dimension. Two types of symbols, related to players' preferences over the choice of prime minister, are used in graphic representation. First, there are two ideal points representing the ideal preferences of players, (L) for legislature and (P) for president. Second, there are two indifference points (Il) and (Ip) that signify spots at which one of the players is indifferent between filling the post of prime minister and leaving it vacant. The location of indifference

points is very important for understanding both the logic of the game in general and the strategic advantage of the president's initiative in particular.

When there is no overlap between the president's (Ip) and the legislature's (Il) indifference points, as in Figure 1a, the position of prime minister remains unfilled since the president will not be willing to nominate a candidate who is beyond his indifference point, and parliament will not approve a candidate who is not on line segment L-Il. In this case, the political costs of having a vacant post is lower for both players than the costs of accommodating the other side's preferences. In real world situations, the formation of an acting or caretaker cabinet is one possible outcome of this distribution of political actors' preferences.[1]

Figure 1b illustrates the situation when the indifference points of the president and parliament overlap. The power of nomination is in fact the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Given the overlapping indifference points, and the president's ability to discern the true location of parliament's indifference point, the power of initiative allows the president to choose the candidate who is as close as possible to the legislature's indifference point and thus closer to the president's ideal point than any other point on the overlapping segment. Parliaments' ideal and indifference points are a function of the political composition of parliament. Although discerning the true location of parliament's indifference point and nominating a candidate approaching this point may impose high information requirements on political actors, the president is likely to invest in obtaining information on the expected level of legislative support that alternative candidates may command.

There are two immediate implications of this spatial specification of the appointment game. First, the necessary condition for cooperation between the president and parliament with regard to cabinet formation is the existence of a bargaining space, a line segment where their indifference points overlap. The

(a) No overlap between the indifference points

(b) Overlapping indifference points

Figure 1. The president's and parliament's preferences over the choice of prime minister.

location of indifference points depends on the magnitude of costs imposed on both players by the existence of the vacant position. Second and more importantly, when cooperation takes place, it is likely that, due to the 'first move' presidential advantage, the outcome of the appointment game – the choice of prime minister – will be different from the one expected if the 'pure' parliamentary framework were in place.

The power of cabinet dismissal in the appointment game

Powers to nominate and confirm a cabinet may not be the only procedural provisions that affect the cabinet appointment game. Understanding the effects of cabinet dismissal powers may also enter the president's and legislature's calculations at the stage of cabinet formation. Two kinds of variation in the control of dismissal powers are of interest here. First, parliament has the exclusive right of cabinet dismissal, and second, both the president and parliament can unilaterally dismiss the prime minister and cabinet. Shugart and Carey (1992) call constitutional regimes that have the first and second provisions respectively, 'premier-presidential' and 'president-parliamentary'.

When a constitution grants the power of cabinet dismissal to parliament and not to the president, the latter faces the following choices. The power of initiative, or a take-it-or-leave-it offer, still means that the president has in his hands an important instrument to make parliament accept a prime minister more to his or her liking. What has changed is that the subsequent survival of the cabinet is fully dependent on parliament. This change can affect the president's calculation in a profound way: he or she knows that the selection choices made and the appointment outcomes imposed on parliament may no longer stick. If parliament at a specific point in time when the political costs of not accepting the presidential nominee were prohibitively high confirmed a prime minister more to the president's liking, it could subsequently dismiss the prime minister when the costs of removing them do not run as high. Under these circumstances, the president faces the following choices: either she nominates a prime minister who reflects the preferences of the parliament, or nominates a candidate more to her liking and is willing to accept a high rate of cabinet turnover resulting from parliamentary dissatisfaction with the president-oriented cabinet.

A different strategic environment arises when a semi-presidential constitutional framework provides for symmetrical dismissal powers, allowing both the president and the parliament to dismiss the prime minister and cabinet unilaterally. Controlling dismissal power provides additional advantages for the president in the process of cabinet formation. Presence of this norm in the constitution implies, among other things, that securing the election of a prime

minister more acceptable to parliament does not guarantee a prime minister's stay in office will last, or that the prime minister's loyalty to parliament will not be compromised by the cabinet's need to meet the expectations of another principal – the president.

It is reasonable, however, to assume that under both constitutional scenarios a number of political factors other than norms for cabinet nomination, confirmation and dismissal will affect the nature of compromise between the president and parliament over the choice of prime minister. This article proceeds in two steps. First, the basic model of cabinet formation as a function of distribution of the above-mentioned constitutional norms is specified and, second, how some other characteristics of political systems affect cabinet formation processes and outcomes is discussed.

Theoretical expectations and empirical outcomes of cabinet formation

Table 1 shows how post-Communist semi-presidential regimes can be classified on the basis of variations in how cabinets are formed. Semi-presidential regimes in the table are classified according to two constitutional criteria: the first indicates who participates in the appointment of the prime minister; and the second specifies who has the power of cabinet dismissal. These two norms regulating the cabinet formation process are found in the constitutions of all

Table 1. Cabinet formation powers in East European semi-presidential regimes, 1991–2002

		Dismiss		
		President	Parliament	Either
Appoint	President	Ukraine 95–96		
	Parliament		Bulgaria	
	Both		Croatia	Russia 93–
			Lithuania	Ukraine 91–94
			Macedonia	Ukraine 96–
			Moldova 91–00	
			Poland	
			Romania	
			Russia 91–93	
			Slovenia	

Source: Countries' constitutions, www.richmond.edu/~jpjones/confinder; author's calculations.

semi-presidential regimes discussed in this article. When more than one constitutional framework was in place in a given country, regime change is indicated by years attached to the country's name.

In a vast majority of cases, semi-presidential constitutional provisions require both the president and parliament to participate in the procedure of cabinet appointment. Ukraine 1995–1996 is the only case in the table where the president had the constitutional power to appoint a prime minister unilaterally (Wilson 1999). While formally giving nomination power to the president, the Bulgarian Constitution strictly regulates whom the president can nominate. Given that the president has only very limited discretion in nominating someone, Bulgaria was classified as a case where parliament appoints the prime minister unilaterally. Except for these two cases, the constitutions of all other political systems with popularly elected presidents require joint decisions by the president and parliament to appoint a prime minister. Constitutional norms in Macedonia and Croatia after 2000 also attempt to limit presidential discretion in the choice of a nominee, yet in neither case are the norms as restrictive and straightforward as the provisions of the Bulgarian Constitution.

Semi-presidential regimes in the table are more equally distributed according to the second criteria, the power to dismiss. Unlike cabinet appointment, cabinet dismissal does not require joint decisions by the president and parliament. All cases, with the exception of Ukraine 1995–1996, fall into two categories: the first includes semi-presidential regimes where only the parliament has the power to dismiss the cabinet; and the second lists regimes where both the president and parliament have cabinet dismissal powers and can apply them unilaterally. Cabinet dismissal rules in the case of Ukraine 1995–1996 and Bulgaria approximate provisions of 'pure' presidential and parliamentary constitutional frameworks, respectively.

Adopting Shugart and Carey's (1992: 121–123) scale of measurement, the index of presidential powers related to cabinet formation was calculated as shown in Table 2. The index is calculated on the basis of individual scores assigned to the constitutional powers of the president and parliament in cabinet-related matters. The powers to nominate and dismiss cabinet are given a value of 2. The power to confirm a nominee is given a value of 1. Such coding has a heuristic value of highlighting the difference between nomination and dismissal powers, which both allow political actors to initiate important political moves, and confirmation power, which entitles political actors only to respond to moves initiated by others. Adding the scores of presidential and parliamentary powers in cabinet formation produces an index of presidential powers for each type of semi-presidential constitutional regime.

Table 2. Index of presidential powers in the cabinet appointment-dismissal game

	Presidential powers over cabinet		Parliamentary powers over cabinet		
	Nominate	Dismiss	Confirm	Dismiss	Total
Russia 93– Ukraine 91–94	2	2	–1	–2	1
Ukraine 96– Croatia Lithuania Macedonia Moldova 91–00 Poland Romania Russia 91–93 *Slovenia*	2	0	–1	–2	–1
Ukraine 95–96	2	2	0	0	4
Bulgaria	0	0	–2	–2	–4

Two major groups of semi-presidential regimes have index scores of 1 and –1 respectively. The difference comes from the variation in dismissal powers. Premier-presidential constitutional regimes do not grant the power of cabinet dismissal to the president, therefore limiting the amount of influence that the president can have over the executive branch of government in premier-parliamentary regimes. The score for the power of confirmation is –1 for all semi-presidential regimes except Bulgaria, where the legislature controls effectively the powers to both nominate and confirm the cabinet.

The index scores in Table 2 can be conceptualized as our theoretical predictions about the outcomes of the cabinet appointment game in different types of semi-presidential regimes. Figure 2 reflects our theoretical expectations as to where a prime minister will be located on the continuum between a president's and a parliament's ideal points. Cabinets formed in Bulgaria and Ukraine between 1995 and 1996 are expected to be located at –4 and 4 parliamentary and presidential ideal points, respectively. President-parliamentary regimes are likely to have prime ministers at 1, which is closer to a president's than a parliament's ideal point. Prime ministers in premier-presidential regimes are expected to be at –1, reflecting the preferences of parliament rather than the president.



Figure 2. Theoretical expectations about cabinet appointment outcomes in different types of semi-presidential regimes.

Prime ministers' political identity: Empirical indicators of cabinet appointment outcomes

Classifying empirical outcomes of cabinet formation requires an adequate operationalization of the preferences of the president and parliament in each actual case of cabinet formation. I discuss here two alternative classifications of cabinet formation outcomes which are based on the different sources of information about a prime minister's proximity to the ideal choice of either of the principals. The first classification is based on coding the country experts' judgments available in periodic and monographic literature. The second is based on the distribution of legislative seats in parliament and draws on theoretical and empirical claims about the advantages that the largest legislative party has in the process of bargaining over the post of prime minister.

The first classification relies on interpreting the evidence from either the country experts' reports or secondary literature on a given country in order to determine the empirical location of prime ministers in relation to president and parliament's ideal points. Given the salience of cabinet formation issues in national politics, primary and secondary sources usually contain a fair amount of information about political bargaining between the president and parliament over the issue of cabinet formation.[2]

Determining legislative preferences over the choice of prime minister from the experts' reports is not unproblematic. The most elaborate attempts to operationalize legislative preferences over the choice of cabinet that are found in the literature on coalition formation involve careful specification of policy distances and ideological divisions among legislative parties in the Western European parliaments (Laver & Schofield 1990; Strom 1990; Budge & Keman 1990). No comprehensive source of information on party policy preferences for most of the East European legislatures that would be comparable (e.g., to positional party policy scales developed in the course of the Manifest Research

Group project (Laver & Budge 1992)) is yet available. In the absence of such data, interpreting the experts' qualitative opinions over the outcomes of cabinet formation is one imperfect substitute for a more systematic data on ideological preferences found in parliament.

The assumption is made here that experts form their opinion about how close or how far the actual candidate for the post of prime minister is from parliament's ideal choice on the basis of their knowledge of the policy preference of individual parties in the legislature. These judgments are relatively straightforward when a consolidated and disciplined party or party coalition controls the majority of seats in parliament. When parliament is politically highly fragmented, it is assumed that the experts aggregate the legislative preferences and form opinions about parliament's favoured choice of a prime minister in the same way as the leading scholars of empirical coalition building form their predictions about the formation of legislative coalitions in fragmented parliaments.

Laver and Schofield (1990) provide a general overview of coalition formation theories and Laver and Budge (1992) report that the majority of scholars in their volume on coalition formation in individual Western European countries opted for the hierarchical policy-driven model of coalition formation. The major assumption of this model is that parties that are closest to each other in the policy space first form indissoluble proto-coalitions that seek additional coalition members to satisfy coalition formation criterion. In a similar fashion, although in a much less explicit way, the experts in the reports analyzed in this study form expectations about most plausible legislative coalitions and about the choice of a prime minister most favoured by these coalitions.

The prime minister was considered closer to the president's ideal point (+) if at the moment of cabinet formation the country experts described the then-to-be-elected prime minister as being closer to the president than to parliament. The prime minister was considered to be closer to parliament's ideal point (–) if at the moment of cabinet formation the area specialists described the then-to-be-elected prime minister as the candidate who reflected primarily the preference of the parliamentary majority and would be the most probable choice of the legislature if the 'ideal' parliamentary framework were in place instead of a semi-presidential system.

The second classification of the empirical outcomes of cabinet formation is based on quantitative criteria, which is the largest legislative party's control of the prime minister's post. A number of studies in the office-seeking tradition of research on cabinet formation stress the power that the largest legislative party, as the 'centripetal' actor in coalition negotiations, has in the process of bargaining over the post of prime minister (Van Deeman 1989; Van

Roozendaal 1992). Martin and Stevenson (2001) provide the most recent qualified empirical support for the claim that the largest legislative party is difficult to exclude from the government.

In the second classification of cabinet selection outcomes, the prime minister was considered to be closer to the parliament's ideal point (–) if at the moment of cabinet formation he or she was a member of a political party that controlled the largest share of seats in the parliament or a party-unaffiliated member of this party's parliamentary faction and closer to the president's ideal point (+) if otherwise. When the largest number of seats was controlled by a parliamentary faction that was not party-based, which was the case in several parliaments in post-Soviet republics at the early stage of democratic transition, membership in this parliamentary faction was taken as the only criteria of the prime minister being closer to parliament's ideal point.

Instead of the detailed scale used by Shugart and Carey (1992) to illustrate the theoretical outcomes of the appointment game, the empirical observations of appointment game outcomes, both in the first classification, which is based on expert opinions, and in the second, which is based on size criteria, are put on a less enumerated scale. Shugart and Carey's intermediate points are omitted from the empirical classifications due to the practical difficulties of measuring minor differences in the prime minister's location.

The Appendix presents the scores based on the empirical classifications of cabinet appointment outcomes across all semi-presidential regimes discussed in this article. The Appendix includes only those cases of cabinet formation that were initiated by popularly elected presidents. These scores are then compared to the theoretically predicted scores of the prime minister's location on the continuum between presidential and parliamentary ideal points. The findings from the Appendix are summarized in Table 3, which provides some descriptive statistics that help to establish how well theoretical scores predict the empirical outcomes. For the purposes of presentation, theoretical scores are further simplified to include only two categories: + and –. The + category indicates that the prime minister is closer to the presidential rather than the parliamentary ideal point, and the – category signifies that prime minister is closer to parliament rather than the president.

A total of 61 cases of cabinet formation were included in Table 3. Given the variation in distribution of appointment-dismissal powers across semi-presidential regimes, the theoretical expectation for these cases was to have 14 of 61 cabinets closer to the ideal point of the president and 47 of 61 closer to the ideal point of parliament. The empirical results from the expert opinions-based classification indicate that 10 of 14 cabinets that were expected to be in line with the presidential preferences actually reflected the preferences

Table 3. Distribution of cabinet formation cases

		Empirical outcomes (no. of cases, % of cases)			
		I. Expert report-based classification		II. Largest party-based classification	
		+ (Closer to president)	– (Closer to parliament)	+ (Closer to president)	– (Closer to parliament)
Theoretical expectations (no. of cases, % of cases)	+ (Closer to president)	10 (71.4)	4 (28.6)	12 (85.7)	2 (14.3)
	– (Closer to parliament)	9 (19.2)	38 (80.8)	13 (27.7)	34 (72.3)

of the president, and 38 of 47 cabinets that were expected to be closer to parliament were in fact more to parliament's liking.

The largest legislative party-based classification produces a higher proportion of cabinets that fit the theoretical expectation of being closer to the presidential ideal point (12 of 14), and a lower proportion of cabinets that fit the theoretical expectation of being closer to the parliamentary ideal point (34 of 38). Examining the differences between two empirical classifications detailed in the Appendix and country expert reports indicates that the second classification overestimates the presidential ability to secure a prime minister more to his or her liking. This is largely due to the fact that it classifies technocratic prime ministers that lack party or parliamentary faction affiliation as closer to the president's ideal point. A careful reading of expert reports, on the other hand, indicates that supporting technocratic prime ministers was often a conscious choice of the largest parliamentary faction operating in the context of a weakly institutionalized party system.

The second major cause for the diversion of outcomes in the two classifications is due to the fact that the second classification in not sensitive to the differences between preferences of the president and the largest legislative party in situations when they were of the same political orientation. Expert reports, on the other hand, allow for the detection of such differences and facilitate the analysis of cabinet formation outcomes in cases when there was disagreement between the largest party in parliament and a president who came from the same party over a candidate for the post of prime minister.

Overall, there was a match between the theoretical predictions derived from the analysis of cabinet formation-related constitutional powers and the empirical outcomes in approximately 79 per cent of cases for the first classification and 75 per cent of cases for the second. This gives some support for the claim that the analysis of formal constitutional powers provides a useful starting point for explaining the outcomes of cabinet formation.

Cases that do not confirm to the theoretical expectations, however, also deserve close attention. They might shed light on other systematic factors that affect the process of bargaining over the choice of a prime minister. Given the above-mentioned limitations of the largest party-based classification, I chose to analyze in detail only the differences between theoretical predictions and actual outcomes of cabinet formation reported in the expert opinions-based classification. There was a significant discrepancy between the theoretical expectations of where a certain prime minister should be and that prime minister's actual standing in 13 cases of cabinet formation reported in the expert opinions-based classification. It is important to note that these cases include only situations where the sign indicating the prime minister's closeness to one of the principals is opposite to the expected sign.

The cases that meet this 'opposite sign' criteria include: the Bielecki 1990 cabinet in Poland; the Paksas 1999 cabinet in Lithuania; the Berov 1992 cabinet in Bulgaria; the Sangheli 1992 cabinet, two consecutive cabinets headed by Ion Ciubuc in 1997–1998, the Sturza 1999 cabinet in Moldova; the Drnovsek 1997 cabinet in Slovenia; the Sarinic 1992 cabinet in Croatia; the Kuchma 1992, Masol 1994 and Yushchenko 1999 cabinets in Ukraine; and the Primakov 1998 cabinet in Russia. The theoretical expectation was that in premier-presidential regimes found in Poland, Lithuania, Moldova, Slovenia and Croatia, the cabinet formation game should consistently produce the prime minister and cabinets that will be closer to parliament's ideal point than the president's. In all the above-mentioned cases there is a fairly high level of agreement among experts that cabinet formation resulted in the appointment of prime ministers whose candidacy was strongly preferred by the presidents and whose selection would not have been secured without strong presidential backing. A similar divergence between theoretical expectations and actual outcomes, although in the opposite direction, also characterizes four cases of cabinet formation (Kuchma, Masol, Yushchenko and Primakov cabinets) in the president-parliamentary regimes of Ukraine and Russia.

Explaining unexpected outcomes of cabinet formation

Although knowing the formal distribution of cabinet dismissal-appointment powers provides a good starting point for understanding the outcomes of the

cabinet formation game, it does not mean that these outcomes are predetermined by the institutional characteristics discussed earlier. A number of factors can lead to the strengthening of the president's bargaining power in premier-presidential regimes and parliament's power in president-parliamentary regimes and consequently to the alteration of cabinet formation outcomes.

Premier-presidential regimes

A closer look at nine cases of unexpected cabinet formation outcomes in premier-presidential regimes indicates that the qualitative differences in party organization in parliament and the president's 'legitimacy advantage', which results from a non-concurrent electoral cycle, may affect the outcomes of the cabinet formation game. Four out of eight unexpected outcomes of cabinet formation were registered in a premier-presidential regime with the least developed party system – Moldova. The fact that the identity of four out of five cabinets formed in this premier-presidential regime during the analyzed period was theoretically unexpected suggests that the observed diversion from the anticipated results may have a systematic character.

Clientelistic character of the party system

One important dimension on which the premier-presidential regimes discussed in this study differ is the salience of clientelistic rather than ideological factors in the political structuration of parliament. The political composition of parliament reflects the character of the party system. Political parties in each party system rely on the combination of ideological and clientelistic appeals to the electorate. The relative importance of different type of appeals, however, can differ both across individual parties in one party system and across party systems. Either clientelistic or ideological factors can provide the basis for the formation of citizen-party linkages and inter-party competition (Kitschelt 1995).

In our set of premier-presidential regimes, the political structuration of parliament along clientelistic lines especially characterized the functioning of the legislature in Moldova and Russia 1991–1993. In these two premier-presidential regimes, the political parties were rather amorphous entities, which were able neither to attract to their ranks large numbers of unaffiliated parliamentary deputies nor to discipline their own members' behaviour in parliament during the early stage of democratic transition.

A very high level of factional instability in parliament was one of the principal manifestations of the weakness of the political parties. Individual deputies would change their parliamentary faction affiliation several times

during a single parliamentary term responding to a changing power balances in the legislature and positioning themselves to maximize their individual (either political or economic) benefits without a particular regard to ideological beliefs or labels (Remington 2001).

In the case of Moldova, even after the introduction of the proportional representation electoral system prior to the 1994 parliamentary election made political parties more powerful, a high level of factional instability continued to persist. For example, the parliamentary faction of the Agrarian Party, which had controlled the absolute majority of parliamentary seats in the Moldovan legislature at the beginning of the 1994–1998 parliamentary term, lost most of its members to other parliamentary factions by the end of the term. Faction disintegration was a result of opportunistic maneuvering on the part of individual deputies (see Crowther 1997). Numerous instances of deputies' defection from parliamentary faction ranks resulted in a high level of factional instability, which, as it is argued here, is an important indication of a clientelistically rather than an ideologically structured party system.

Clientelistically fragmented parliaments face substantial difficulties in aggregating legislators' preferences over the choice of a prime minister. Being only marginally constrained by ideological considerations, the individual parliamentary factions actively engage in bargaining with other factions and candidates for the post of prime minister, contributing to prolonged uncertainty regarding the identity of the future prime minister and the exact shape of a supporting coalition in parliament. The situational character of such a majority can also affect the deputies' perception of the likelihood of cabinet stability and thus the level of their commitment to the cabinet. The president can exploit these uncertainties and use his or her power of nomination to choose a candidate who would represent a focal point around which a parliamentary majority can be constructed.

The Polish experience with the premier-presidential framework during 1991 to 1993 illustrates the importance of ideological versus clientelistic fragmentation in parliament. In Poland, both the Olszewski and the Suchocka cabinets, which were formed during this period, fully reflected the preferences of the legislature. In both cases of cabinet formation, the presidential nomination initiatives did not help to construct a working majority that would be supportive of the president in parliament. The initial nominations of Bielecki, Geremek and Pawlak, which were made by the president, were rejected and the president was forced to nominate Olszewski and Suchocka in December 1991 and July 1992 respectively. The cabinets that were led by these politicians acted in opposition to the president and intense rounds of intra-executive competition followed the formation of both cabinets (Jasciewicz 1997).

Why did the presidential choice of prime minister become a focal point of majority construction in Moldova, but not in Poland? The variation in behaviour that political parties exhibited during the process of cabinet formation is an important variable contributing to the diverging political outcomes. Ideologically structured, although very fragmented, party factions in the 1991–1993 Polish parliament, which also had a 'fresher' electoral mandate than the president elected in December 1990, were able to produce a viable alternative to the presidential choice of prime minister. Politically and organizationally, the more amorphous parliamentary factions in the Moldovan parliament faced more acutely the problem of collective action and were more willing to accept the presidential choice of cabinet.

In the absence of ideologically oriented and organizationally disciplined factions, the president's ambitions to achieve fuller control of cabinet become more easily realized. When parliament is structured predominantly along clientelistic rather than programmatic lines, the presidential choice of prime minister is more likely to become a focal point for constructing a parliamentary majority, which, however, can prove to be unreliable and short-lived.

Even in parliaments structured primarily according to ideological lines the president's role in selecting a prime minister can become crucial when the distribution of seats in parliament does not produce any easily identifiable winning coalition and parliamentary negotiation is stalled. The formation of the Drnovsek cabinet in Slovenia after the parliamentary elections in November 1996 illustrates this point. Although Drnovsek's Liberal Democratic Party was a plurality winner in the elections (the Slovene Spring), an opposing coalition of parties that controlled 45 of 90 parliamentary seats was expected to form the government. President Kucan decided to nominate Drnovsek as prime minister and after the latter failed to gain the majority of votes in the first round of voting, the president insisted on putting forward his candidacy again. Due to a single defection vote, Drnovsek was able to win parliamentary support (Miro 1999).

Recent legitimacy

The context-specific accounts of the cabinet formation process in those cases where the actual outcomes of cabinet formation contradicted theoretical expectations also suggest that a 'fresher' electoral legitimacy of the president may provide him or her with additional leverage in bargaining over the identity of prime minister. In six out of the nine cases of unexpected outcomes (the Bielecki 1990 cabinet in Poland, the Sangeli 1992 and Ciubuc 1997 cabinets in Moldova, the 1992 Berov cabinet in Bulgaria, the Sarinic 1992 cabinet in Croatia, and the Paskas 1999 cabinet in Lithuania), cabinets which were more

to the president's liking were approved by parliament either immediately or within months of presidential elections.

Due to a variety of factors including different schedules for presidential and parliamentary elections, the different lengths of office terms specified in the constitution for the executive and legislature, and the extensive practice of pre-term parliamentary elections, the presidential and parliamentary elections in post-Communist semi-presidential regimes frequently do not coincide. This non-concurrent electoral cycle provides a fertile ground for conflict between the president and parliament (see Shugart 1995). The government branch, which went through the electoral test more recently, is tempted to claim its political superiority and even to demand extra constitutional powers on the grounds that its legitimacy has more recent origins.

The fact of a more recent election increases the president's bargaining power in the appointment game by lowering the political costs the president would incur if the post of prime minister remains unfilled or the rate of cabinet turnover is high. Enjoying more recent legitimacy, the president is more likely to nominate a prime ministerial candidate who is much closer to the president's ideal point than parliament is willing to tolerate. When this happens, the indifference points of the president and assembly do not overlap, and the post of prime minister remains unfilled. The president, who has the option of appointing the acting prime minister, is likely to accept this temporary solution to the deadlock in the cabinet formation process. This is because political blame for this stalemate can be easily attributed to a 'less legitimate' parliament that ignores the 'popular will' by not supporting the presidential candidate.

The importance of the more recent legitimacy of one branch of the government can be magnified if the other branch is perceived as undemocratically elected. This was particularly notable at the beginning of the transition in countries where popularly elected presidents existed concurrently with only partially democratic parliaments that were elected according to the rules designed by the outgoing Communist elite. Walesa's ability to gain parliament's support for the unknown Bielecki in Poland, and Yeltsin's ability to keep Gaidar's cabinet in place for six months in Russia, is partly explained by the president's authority derived from electoral support.

While the Croatian president Tudjman did not formally enjoy a 'fresher' electoral legitimacy in 1992 – presidential and parliamentary elections were held simultaneously in Croatia that year – the fact that the 1992 presidential elections were the first direct presidential elections gave a significant boost to his legitimacy. The analysts agree that of all the prime ministers in the Tudjman years, Prime Minister Sarinic, who was appointed after the 1992 elections, was the closest to the president (Blondel & Selo-Sabic 2001). The cases of cabinet

formation in Croatia are, however, substantially different from the cases of cabinet formation in other premier-presidential regimes due to the semi-authoritarian style of President Tudjman's leadership.[3]

Even when presidential nomination powers are severely restricted by constitutional provisions, the more recent legitimacy can provide presidents with some additional leverage in cabinet appointment matters. The formation of the Berov 1992 cabinet in Bulgaria illustrates well the application of such leverage. After the two main parties in the 1991 to 1994 Bulgarian parliament failed one after another to form a government, the president nominated his economic advisor Berov, a non-partisan technocrat, for the post of prime minister. Berov was able to form a cabinet that stayed in power for the next two years until the end of the parliamentary term.

Although the consequences of a 'fresher' democratic legitimacy had an especially great impact on executive-legislative relations during the first years of the democratic transition, the subsequent routinization of new political practices and institutions does not always serve as a constraint on presidential claims of greater legitimacy and greater say in the formation and control of the cabinet. The formation of the Paksas 1999 cabinet in Lithuania illustrates this problem. The Lithuanian president Adamkus, who was in office slightly more than a year, was able to secure the appointment of the Paksas 1999 cabinet after forcing the resignation of an incumbent prime minister, Gediminas Vagnorius, who was backed by a majority ruling coalition in an almost three year-old parliament. Although Paksas belonged to the largest party in the ruling coalition in the 1996–2000 Lithuanian parliament (the Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives), the coalition formally distanced itself from the cabinet, transferring responsibility for the cabinet to the president who was an ardent advocate of Paksas' appointment (EECR 1999).

The Lithuanian case is especially interesting because it casts some doubts on the thesis that the growing maturity of parliamentary parties can provide sufficient restraints on presidential power ambitions. While the disciplined and consolidated parties in parliament undoubtedly deter the presidential quest for greater influence in the political system, the president's fresher democratic legitimacy, combined with the low popularity of parliament, can increase the president's ability to impose his or her preferences even on ideologically structured parliaments.

President-parliamentary regimes

There has been a smaller degree of variation in qualitative organization of parties in the president-parliamentary regimes included in this study. In both president-parliamentary regimes – Russia and Ukraine – political parties are

still in the process of maturation. Most of them arrived on the political scene relatively recently. Their maturation has been undermined by the strong party-unaffiliated presidency, and electoral laws that continue to support non-party-based representation through the system of single-member districts. Their programmatic coherence, especially in the centre of the political spectrum, has been persistently challenged by the prevailing clientelistic norms of interest representation and inter-party competition.

In these semi-presidential regimes, the presidential ability to impose his or her preferences regarding the identity of the cabinet on the parliament has been challenged at times of the most serious exogenous shocks to the political system (the Primakov 1998 cabinet in Russia and the Kuchma 1992 cabinet in Ukraine), or under specific contextual circumstances that had the effect of increasing parliament's bargaining power (the Masol 1994 and Yushchenko 1999 cabinets in Ukraine). Three out of four unexpected outcomes of cabinet formation took place in Ukraine, reflecting a higher decree of parliamentary independence from the executive in Ukraine in comparison to Russia.

The Primakov 1998 cabinet was formed after the August 1998 crisis, the worst financial crisis in post-1991 Russian history. The events led to the resignation of the Kirienko cabinet, which lasted only five months. The crisis caused a significant drop in the level of popular support, especially for the executive branch of government. President Yeltsin's credibility was additionally damaged by the fact that he insisted on appointing the Kirienko cabinet despite significant opposition in parliament just a few months before the crisis. The opposition, led by disciplined Communist factions, forced Yeltsin to nominate Primakov as prime minister in this new round of cabinet formation.

The Kuchma 1992 cabinet in Ukraine was also formed in the midst of a profound crisis. The situation was perceived at the time as a period of both dramatic economic failure and a governance crisis. Economic difficulties were precipitated by a crumbling government structure unable to deal with the challenges of simultaneous economic and political transition. President Kravchuk's efforts directed at reforming the various tiers of government were largely seen as ineffective, further weakening his ability to negotiate with parliament over the figure of prime minister.

Two other theoretically unexpected outcomes of cabinet formation – the Masol 1994 and Yushchenko 1999 cabinets in Ukraine – took place in different political contexts which, however, had the similar effect of weakening the presidents' ability to secure the appointment of their most preferred candidates to the post of a prime minister. President Kravchuk, who faced very uncertain chances of re-election, was forced to nominate Masol, a candidate favoured by the post-Communist majority in parliament, in the hope of winning a broader base of legislative support for his re-election bid. There was

a consensus among analysts that the nomination of Masol for the post of prime minister was a concession to parliament on the part of a weakened president (Wilson 1997). President Kuchma had to nominate Yushchenko after his first nominee, incumbent prime-minister Pustovoitenko, known for his personal loyalty to the president, failed to find support in parliament. Although the president expressed strong preferences in keeping Pustovoitenko in office, given the cabinet's reform failures and dismal economic record the parliamentarians did not hesitate to deny the two year-old Pustovoitenko cabinet another term in office. The debates over the appointment of a new cabinet were linked to the issue of cabinet subordination (EECR 2000; for an elaborate account of the unsettled conflict over the distribution of constitutional powers between the president and parliament in the Ukraine, see Wilson 1999; Wolczuk 2001).

The growing maturation of the party system in president-parliamentary regimes can have far-reaching implications on how the cabinet formation game is played. Consolidated and programmatically oriented political parties have the potential to make the cabinet formation process more predictable and less conflictual when the parliamentary majority is supportive of the president. On the other hand, a situation where a president, who has very substantial constitutional powers awarded to him or her by the constitution of a president-parliamentary regime, faces the disciplined and opposed parliamentary majority can lead to stalemate and conflict.

Conclusion

Building upon the theoretical expectations advanced in the literature on cabinet formation in semi-presidential regimes, this article started with constructing and evaluating a simple theoretical model of cabinet formation. The first part explored the degree of fit between such a model, which is based on the variation in the cabinet-related constitutional powers of the president and parliament, and the actual outcomes of cabinet formation. The match between theoretical expectations and empirical outcomes proved to be consistently high. The results, however, varied substantially depending on the criteria employed for evaluating empirical proximity of prime minister to the president's and parliament's ideal points. The second part of the article tried to account for those cases of cabinet formation where theoretical expectations and actual outcomes diverged most substantially.

A divergence between theoretical expectations and empirical outcomes was attributed to a number of factors. In president-parliamentary regimes, the president's ability to control the cabinet formation process was weakened at

times of profound economic management failures attributed either to incumbent prime ministers who were closely associated with presidents or linked to the presidents themselves. Facing growing popular discontent and more coordinated efforts of fragmented parliamentary opposition, the presidents were forced to take more adequately into account legislative preferences over the choice of prime minister.

In premier-presidential regimes, parliamentary fragmentation, clientelistic structuring of the party system, and the president's 'legitimacy advantage' derived from a non-concurrent electoral cycle tended to increase the president's bargaining power. The empirical analysis based on the experts' reports, however, suggests that the actual outcomes of cabinet formation in premier-presidential regimes diverged from the expected less frequently than in president-parliamentary regimes. Especially after the first few years of democratic transition, the choice of prime minister in premier-presidential regimes more consistently reflected the preferences of the parliamentary majority than the choice of prime minister in president-parliamentary regimes reflected the preferences of the president. In this sense, the outcomes of cabinet formation in premier-presidential regimes are much more predictable.

The levels of party system fragmentation and ideological structuration are the most important non-constitutional factors affecting the outcomes of cabinet formation in both types of regimes. In president-parliamentary systems, political fragmentation in parliament and a high degree of party clientelism reinforced the logic of this particular institutional design, allowing presidents to secure the election of preferred candidates for the post of prime minister in most cases. In premier-presidential regimes, the high levels of party fragmentation and clientelistic structuring worked against the expectations of the theoretical model, occasionally enabling the presidents to secure the appointment of prime ministers closer to the president's rather than parliament's ideal point.

The continuing evolution of party systems in the post-Communist region presents the most interesting research challenge for those interested in the study of semi-presidential regimes. As this article has argued, the effects of the constitutional design are mediated by the party system. Collecting additional observations and theorizing about the impact of party system maturation, party fragmentation and clientelism can improve our understanding of how semi-presidentialism works.

Appendix. Theoretical expectations and empirical outcomes of the cabinet appointment game in semi-presidential regimes, 1991–2002*

Prime minister	Term in office	Theoretical expectation	Empirical outcome I: Expert report-based classification	Empirical outcome II: Largest party-based classification
Russia				
Gaidar, Yegor	Jun–Dec 1992 (acting premier)			
Chernomyrdin, Viktor	Dec 1992–Mar 1998	–1	–	–
Kirienko, Alexander	Apr–Aug 1998	1	+	+
Primakov, Yevgeni	Sep 1998–May 1999	1	–	+
Stepashin, Sergei	May–Aug 1999	1	+	+
Putin, Vladimir	Aug 1999–Mar 2000	1	+	+
Kasyanov, Mikhail	May 2000–present	1	+	+
Ukraine				
Kuchma, Leonid	Oct 1992–Sep 1993	1	–	–
Zviagil'ski, Yuhym	Sep 1993–Jun 1994 (acting premier)			
Masol, Vitali	Jun 1994–Apr 1995	1	–	–
Marchuk, Yevhen	Jun 1995–May 1996	4	+	+
Lazarenko, Pavlo	May–Jun 1996	1	+	+
Lazarenko, Pavlo	Jun 1996–Jun 1997	1	+	+
Pustovoitenko, Valeri	Jul 1997–Dec 1999	1	+	+
Yushchenko, Viktor	Dec 1999–Apr 2001	1	–	+
Kinakh, Anatoli	Apr 2001–Nov 2002	1	+	+
Yanukovych, Viktor	Nov 2002–present	1	+	+
Bulgaria				
Berov, Liuben	Dec 1992–Sep 1994	–4	+	+
Videnov, Zhan	Dec 1994–Feb 1997	–4	–	–

Prime minister	Term in office	Theoretical expectation	Empirical outcome I: Expert report-based classification	Empirical outcome II: Largest party-based classification
Kostov, Ivan	May 1997–Dec 1999	–4	–	–
Kostov, Ivan	Dec 1999–Jul 2001	–4	–	–
Sakskoburggotski, Simeon	Jul 2001–present	–4	–	–
Croatia				
Sarinic, Hrvoje	Aug 1992–Mar 1993	–1	+	–
Valentic, Nikica	Mar 1993–Oct 1995	–1	–	–
Matesa, Zlatko	Oct 1995–Jan 2000	–1	–	–
Racan, Ivica	Jul 2002–present	–1	–	–
Lithuania				
Lubys, Bronislovas,	Dec 1992–Mar 1993	–1	–	–
Slezevicius, Aldolfas	Mar 1993–Feb 1996	–1	–	–
Stankevicius, Mindaugas	Feb–Nov 1996	–1	–	–
Vagnorius, Gediminas	Dec 1996–Jan 1998	–1	–	–
Paksas, Rolandas	May–Oct 1999	–1	+	–
Kubilius, Andrias	Nov 1999–Oct 2000	–1	–	–
Paksas, Rolandas	Oct 2000–Jun 2001	–1	–	+
Brazauskas, Algirdas	July 2001–present	–1	–	–
Macedonia				
Crvenrovski, Branko	Oct 1994–Oct 1998	–1	–	–
Georgievski, Ljubko	Oct 1998–May 2001	–1	–	–
Georgievski, Ljubko	May 2001–Nov 2002	–1	–	–
Crvenrovski, Branko	Nov 2002–present	–1	–	–
Moldova				
Sangheli, Andrei	Jun 1992–Dec 1996	–1	+	+
Ciubuc, Ion	Jan 1997–Mar 1998	–1	+	+

Ciubuc, Ion	Mar 1998–Jan 1999	–1	+	+
Sturza, Ion	Feb–Nov 1999	–1	–	+
Braghis, Dumitru	Dec 1999–present	–1	+	+
Poland				
Bielecki, Jan	Jan–Dec 1991	–1	+	+
Olszewski, Jan	Dec 1991–Jun 1992	–1	–	+
Suchocka, Hanna	Jul 1992–Sep 1993	–1	–	–
Pawlak, Waldemar	Oct 1993–Feb 1995	–1	–	+
Oleksy, Jozef	Mar 1995–Jan 1996	–1	–	–
Cimoszewicz, Wlodzimierz	Feb 1996–Sep 1997	–1	–	–
Buzek, Jerzy	Sep 1997–Oct 2001	–1	–	–
Miller, Leszek	Oct 2001–present	–1	–	–
Romania				
Roman, Petre	May 1990–Sep 1991	–1	–	–
Stolojan, Teodor	Oct 1991–Nov 1992	–1	–	+
Vacaroiu, Nicolae	Nov 1992–Nov 1996	–1	–	+
Ciorbea, Victor	Nov 1996–Mar 1998	–1	–	–
Vasile, Radu	Apr 1998–Dec 1999	–1	–	–
Isarescu, Mugur	Dec 1999–Nov 2000	–1	–	+
Nastase, Adrian	Dec 2000–present	–1	–	–
Slovenia				
Drnovsek, Janez	Jan 1993–Feb 1997	–1	–	–
Drnovsek, Janez	Feb 1997–Apr 2000	–1	+	–
Bajuk, Andrej	May–Nov 2000	–1	–	–
Drnovsek, Janez	Nov 2000–Dec 2002	–1	–	–
Rop, Anton	Dec 2002–present	–1	–	–

*This table includes only those cabinets in each of the countries that were formed under semi-presidential constitutional rules (i.e., involved the nomination of a prime ministerial candidate by a popularly elected president and subsequent confirmation of the candidate by parliament). The table also lists interim cabinets that stayed in office for at least six months.

Note

1. The formation of the first Russian cabinet under Yeltsin is probably the most publicized example of a dispute between a president and a legislature over the appointment of a prime minister in the set of East-European cases under consideration here. In June 1992, Yeltsin nominated a young reformer, Yegor Gaidar, for the post of the Chairman of Council of Ministers. The Russian parliament never accepted this nominee although Yeltsin repeatedly asked the legislature to approve Gaidar for the position of prime minister. Leaving the post vacant in the context of the highly fragmented Russian legislation meant that the presidential nominee could function as an acting prime minister as long as the president could tolerate the costs of not making another nomination.
2. Quarterly reviews in *East European Constitutional Review* of each country's political development provided the basis for systematic comparison (EECR 1992–2002). I also used extensively Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) periodic country reports. When primary accounts of cabinet formation were not sufficient for forming a judgment, the secondary literature was consulted. Croatia, Macedonia and Moldova are the only countries that were not systematically covered by the *East European Constitutional Review* (EECR) during the analyzed period (the coverage started only in the last years of the 1990s). I relied on RFE/RL country reports and secondary sources to form a judgment on cabinet formation outcomes in these countries (Cohen 1997; Perry 1997; Crowther 1997; Blondel & Selo-Sabic 2001; Blondel 2001; Blondel & Matteucci 2001).
3. Although politics in Croatia during the first post-communist decade was heavily dominated by President Tudjman, the literature I consulted did not provide any indications of the president trying to impose his preferences over choice of prime minister on his ruling party, the Croatian Democratic Union, in other cases of cabinet formation. Since neither the analysts' accounts (RFE/RL reports) nor secondary sources indicated the existence of a major disagreement or conflict between the president and his party in other cases of cabinet formation during the Tudjman years, I assume that their preferences over the choice of a prime minister coincided.

References

Bahro, H., Bayerlein, B.H. & Vesser, E. (1998). Duverger's concept: Semi-presidential government revisited. *European Journal of Political Research* 34: 201–224.

Baylis, T. (1996). Presidents versus prime ministers: Shaping the executive authority in Eastern Europe. *World Politics* 48: 297–323.

Blondel, J. (2001). Macedonia. In J. Blondel & F. Muller-Rommel (eds), *Cabinets in Eastern Europe*. New York: Palgrave, pp. 152–160.

Blondel, J. & Matteucci, S. (2001). Moldova. In J. Blondel & F. Muller-Rommel (eds), *Cabinets in Eastern Europe*. New York: Palgrave, pp. 120–125.

Blondel, J. & Muller-Rommel, F. (eds) (2001). *Cabinets in Eastern Europe*. New York: Palgrave.

Blondel, J. & Selo-Sabic, S. (2001). Croatia. In J. Blondel & F. Muller-Rommel (eds), *Cabinets in Eastern Europe*. New York: Palgrave, pp. 162–168.

Budge, I. & Keman, J.E. (1990). *Parties and democracy coalition formation and government functioning in twenty states*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cerar, M. (1999). Slovenia. In R. Elgie (ed.), *Semi-presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 232–259.

Cohen, L.J. (1997). Embattled democracy: Postcommunist Croatia in transition. In K. Dawisha & B. Parrott (eds), *Politics, power and the struggle for democracy in south-east Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 69–122.

Crowther, W. (1997). The politics of democratization in post-Communist Moldova. In K. Dawisha & B. Parrott (eds), *Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 282–330.

Duverger, M. (1980). A new political system model: Semi-presidential government. *European Journal of Political Research* 8: 165–187.

EECR (1992–2000). Constitution watch. *East European Constitutional Review*.

EECR (1999). Lithuania update. *East European Constitutional Review* 8(4): 22–24.

EECR (2000). Ukraine update. *East European Constitutional Review* 9(1): 39–41.

Elgie, R. (ed.) (1999a). *Semi-presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Elgie, R. (1999b). The politics of semi-presidentialism. In R. Elgie (ed.), *Semi-presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–21.

Jasiewicz, K. (1997). Poland. In R. Taras (ed.), *Post-Communist presidents*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 130–167.

Kiewiet, R. & McCubbins, M. (1985). Appropriations decisions as a bilateral bargaining game between president and Congress. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 9: 181–202.

Kitschelt, H. (1995). Formation of party cleavages in post-Communist democracies. *Party Politics* 1(4): 447–472.

Laver, M. & Budge, I. (1992). *Party policy and government coalitions*. London: Macmillan.

Laver, M. & Schofield, N. (1990). *Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laver, M. & Shepsle, K.A. (1996). *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Martin, L.W. & Stevenson, R.T. (2001). Government formation in parliamentary democracies. *American Journal of Political Science* 45(1): 33–50.

Metcalf, L.K. (2000). Measuring presidential power. *Comparative Political Studies* 33(5): 660–685.

Pasquino, G. (1997). Semi-presidentialism: A political model at work. *European Journal of Political Research* 31: 128–137.

Perry, D.M. (1997). The Republic of Macedonia: Finding its way. In K. Dawisha & B. Parrott (eds), *Politics, power and the struggle for democracy in south-east Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 226–285.

Protsyk, O. (2000). Semi-presidentialism: The Logic of Institutional Conflict and Implications for Public Administration Design. Doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University.

Remington, T.F. (2001). *The Russian Parliament: Institutional evolution in a transitional regime, 1989–1999*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Roper, S.D. (2002). Are all semipresidential regimes the same? A comparison of premier-presidential regimes. *Comparative Politics* 34(3): 253–276.

Shugart, M.S. (1995). The electoral cycle and institutional sources of divided presidential government. *American Political Science Review* 89: 327–343.

Shugart, M.S. & Carey, J.M. (1992). *Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Siaroff, A. (2003). Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction. *European Journal of Political Research* 42: 287–312.

Stepan, A. & Suleiman, E. (1995). The French Fifth Republic: A model for import? Reflections on Poland and Brazil. In H.E. Chehabi & A. Stepan (eds), *Politics, Society and Democracy: Comparative Studies*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 393–414.

Strom, K. (1990). *Minority government and majority rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Van Deeman, A.M.A. (1989). Dominant players and minimum size coalitions. *European Journal of Political Research* 23: 1–33.

Van Roozendaal, P. (1992). Dominant players and minimum size coalitions. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17: 5–36.

Wilson, A. (1997). Ukraine: Two presidents and their powers. In R. Taras (ed.), *Post-Communist presidents*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 67–105.

Wilson, A. (1999). Ukraine. In R. Elgie (ed.), *Semi-presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 260–281.

Wolczuk, K. (2001). *The moulding of Ukraine: The constitutional politics of state formation*. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Address for correspondence: Oleh Protsyk, European Centre for Minority Issues, Schiffbruecke 12, D-24939 Flensburg, Germany
E-mail: protsyk@ecmi.de