Clientelism and Political Recruitment in Democratic Transition
Evidence from Romania

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Abstract

The literature on legislative recruitment has existed largely independently of the literature on party clientelism in new democracies. The paper uses the Romanian data on parliamentary representation to show how studying recruitment practices improves our understanding of clientelistic exchanges between political parties and resource-rich constituencies. The findings point to considerable differences in recruitment patterns in new and established democracies, which can be traced to parties and interest groups’ calculus of payoffs under different types of political regimes.

Legislative recruitment patterns can serve as an important source of information on clientelistic practices of political parties. These practices are often a product of parties’ deliberate strategies to foster clientelistic type of linkages between politicians and society. The difficulties of conceptualizing and measuring these practices, which frequently have a highly informal character, impede comparative work on the subject. Current studies offer a number of research strategies to overcome these difficulties, but pay little attention to the potential contribution of political recruitment research in addressing these challenges.

Clientelism involves contingent direct exchanges between political actors and both vote-rich and resource-rich constituencies. Refining and modifying conceptual tools developed by political recruitment studies can provide important insights into the dynamics of exchange between political parties and resource-rich constituencies that are especially valuable for understanding party development and the dynamics of political representation in transitional societies. The paper uses an original dataset on Romanian parliamentary representatives in order to test a number of propositions about the parties’ use of parliamentary recruitment for structuring clientelistic exchanges.

Scholars of political recruitment have long argued that social background characteristics are important factors in explaining who gets elected to public office and how elected representatives subsequently behave. Werner Patzelt provides a major overview of this literature and its findings in relation to Western Europe. Parliamentary recruitment has
also been one aspect of a more general research agenda on political elites in post-communist Europe.³

The amount of attention paid to social background characteristics either as dependent or independent variables in cross-country comparative research, however, has not been very significant. This can be explained partly by the prevalence of similar demographic, educational, and professional background characteristics of representatives in Western European democracies, the study of which tends to dominate political recruitment literature.⁴ Recent work on political recruitment in Latin America also underexplores the variation in social background characteristics.⁵ Convergence in terms of political representatives’ social background across different national contexts and its diminished importance of explaining various political outcomes is, however, often assumed rather than empirically proven. Furthermore, some basic social similarities in profiles of parliamentary representatives—who tend to be better educated, have higher income levels, and belong to the middle-age male demographic group—hide differences that are politically consequential.

This article focuses primarily on differences among parliamentary representatives in one key social characteristic, occupational background. Parliamentarians’ occupational background is a key variable in how political parties use parliamentary recruitment for structuring clientelistic exchanges. The study of occupational background yields certain expectations about how the occupational profile of parliamentary newcomers will look if parties indeed use their control over parliamentary recruitment as a means of rewarding resource-rich constituencies. Romanian data is used to systematically analyze the extent of empirical support for these expectations. Romanian parties’ candidate selection decisions are compared with what is known about candidate selection practices of political parties in consolidated democracies, and parliamentary recruitment patterns in Romania are compared across party families and over time. Model estimates are used to draw additional conclusions about patterns of political recruitment in clientelistic systems.

**Candidate Selection and Clientelistic Exchanges in New Democracies**

In discussing candidate selection, recruitment studies stress the importance of considering both supply and demand side factors.⁶ While recognizing the importance of supply factors for understanding the underrepresentation of social and demographic groups such as, for example, blue-collar workers, women, or ethnic minorities, the focus in this article is on demand side considerations. Parliamentary positions are positions of high political power and prestige. A cursory look at any electoral contest in new post-communist democracies reveals
a large number of parties nominating candidates from a variety of social and demographic backgrounds. How do parties with credible prospects of gaining parliamentary representation manage candidate selection?

The proposition tested here is that the selection of candidates for parliamentary office constitutes an important mechanism for establishing relations between parties and resource-rich constituencies in clientelistically oriented party systems. Positions on the winning portion of parties’ electoral lists are viewed from this perspective as a form of reward that constituencies receive from parties in exchange for their resource-based support. This form of exchange is likely to be sustainable and effective only under certain conditions.

A high level of party dependence on private financing and a weak property rights regime are two central conditions for the persistence of this form of exchange. Post-communist transition provides a good example of where these conditions are met. There is ample evidence that the business community, a quintessential type of resource-rich constituency, is a critical source of party financing in transitional countries. The absence or scarcity of public funding for political parties exacerbates politicians’ dependence on business sponsorship across the post-communist region. Parties need the resources of these constituencies in order to compete successfully in the political marketplace.7

While businesses play major roles in financing parties in many developed democracies, the specific circumstances of democratic transitions make parliamentary recruitment an important feature of clientelistic exchanges. Transitions generate a highly uncertain legal and property environment for businesses, causing them to seek personalized political protection. The uncertainty of their legal ownership status, as well as the regulatory framework precludes business groups from relying exclusively or predominantly on party promises of policy or substantive representation of their interests. Business groups instead seek direct representation in political decision-making bodies. Exchanging financial support for the share of seats that parties control in decision-making bodies, such as national parliament, thus becomes an important part of business groups’ strategies to protect and advance their interests. Having an MP status is especially beneficial not only because of its general prestige and access to key political decision makers that it allows. In many post-communist countries, a MP seat receives some degree of immunity from criminal prosecution, which is highly valued by business people operating in an uncertain legal environment.8 The above considerations make parties’ decisions on nominating candidates and allocating positions on parties’ electoral lists a part of the general exchange between parties and their supporters in business communities. Anecdotal evidence indicates the
importance of direct control of parliamentary seats for business leaders in post-communist countries. While it is rare to find top business leaders serving as ordinary MPs in Western European parliaments, the richest businessmen in such Eastern European countries as Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, or Macedonia are often found to occupy an MP seat in national legislature.9

The extent of direct business presence in national parliaments is not likely to be uniform across the new democracies of Eastern Europe. An important scope condition for the type of exchanges examined is the strength of patrimonial political practices in societies that experience democratic transition. As the extensive literature on the region’s democratization indicates, the countries of the region differ substantially in terms of historical developmental trajectories. Countries with legacies of low levels of economic development and weak traditions of rule-based and professionalized state bureaucracies provide the most conducive environment for the preserving clientelistic types of relationships. It is in these types of societies that we expect our argument to hold.10

The informal model of clientelistic relationships between politicians and business interests relied on in this article involves an exchange of places on the electoral list for financial contributions. Parties provide business representatives the possibility of entering the parliament on the party ticket; in return, business groups provide parties with the financial resources to run electoral campaigns or to cover other political expenses. The occupational backgrounds of candidates who appear in the winning portion of the party’s list are conceptualized as a source of information about the type of societal interests that the deputies can potentially represent. For the purpose of empirical operationalization, the managerial background of a parliamentary newcomer is treated as an indicator of his or her status as a representative of business group interests. The model assumes that the nature of the legal and economic environment in the post-communist transition motivates business groups to seek direct representation in the legislature.

Implications of Clientelistic Model of Candidate Selection

A model of direct personalized exchange between politicians and business interests postulated above provides a basis for empirical analysis of the patterns of candidate selection. One set of expectations derived from this model focuses on differences in candidate selection outcomes in new and established democracies. Given the added value of having an MP status in the post-communist context, one expectation is to find a proportionally larger presence of business elites in the MP’s roasters in new democracies than in the Western European
democracies (H1). Business representation will be secured at the expense of a comparatively lower share of deputies with other social backgrounds. The shares of legislators with professional or political backgrounds, which are major sources of legislative recruitment in established democracies, are expected to be significantly smaller.

Another set of expectations concerns temporal variation in the extent to which parties are willing to allocate parliamentary seats, which are highly valuable and scarce goods for parties, to business groups. The expectation is that business presence in the legislature will increase over the course of transition (H2). The share of seats allocated to business should be low at the start of transition when mass mobilization and low costs of doing politics provide more freedom for political entrepreneurs to structure their relations with the business community. The rise of the private economy and the related increase in the cost of politics are expected to translate into a relatively higher share of business presence in parliament. It is assumed that the effects of this increased demand for political funding will not be offset by limited improvements in property rights regimes and legal systems. These improvements during the period examined were not strong enough to remove Romanian business groups’ incentives for seeking direct representation.11

Finally, little cross-party family variation in the share of parliamentary seats allocated to business elites is expected (H3). Competitive politics in an environment characterized by the weak institutionalization of the rule of law and limited availability of public funding should force all political parties to seek business support in order to finance their organizational and campaign expenses.12 Given the considerable turnover of parties in the Romanian parliament, we combine data for parties of similar ideological orientation in order to examine the extent of business presence on electoral lists across the party system.

**Comparing Candidate Selection Outcomes**

A stable institutional environment characterizes the process of candidate selection in Romania. The rules of electoral competition were similar throughout the period examined. A closed-list PR system, with a medium district magnitude, was introduced at the start of the transition, although a majoritarian system was favored by some key political actors.13 Electoral rules allowed political parties to establish a high level of control over the candidate selection process. Anecdotal evidence suggests that party leadership routinely uses its powers of control over candidate selection in order to place business people in safe electoral seats. The attractiveness of these seats for the business elite is illustrated by the telling example of
the decision by the country’s richest businessman to serve as a legislator on behalf of one of the parliamentary parties.¹⁴

Parties’ dependence on sources of finance other than the public is substantial. The business community is widely recognized as a major contributor to party coffers.¹⁵ For example, an analysis of party income data, based on the combined 2003 and 2004 official reports for electorally relevant political parties, reveals the following breakdown: state subventions account on average for 19 percent of party income, membership fees for 24 percent, donations for 49 percent, and other sources for 8 percent.¹⁶ The share of donations is likely to be much higher if one takes into account unofficial party budgets. The existence of such budgets is confirmed, for example, by the estimates of parties’ media advertisement expenditures, which are often much higher than parties’ total declared income.¹⁷ Qualitative work on the mechanisms of party financing also points to the existence of a parallel system of financing through the underground economy.¹⁸

Evidence also suggests that parties use parliamentary immunity to shield former government officeholders and business representatives against criminal charges related to the abuse of office powers or illegal economic activity, some of which might have also benefited party coffers.¹⁹ Overall, stories about political corruption and lack of transparency in the operation of political parties are recurrent topics in a majority of scholarly accounts of the Romanian party system.²⁰

In analyzing the occupational background and other characteristics of Romanian parliamentarians, the coding of data was based primarily on information that was self-reported by the deputies and published in the official publications of the Romanian parliament.²¹ This data was supplemented by information originally presented by Laurentui Stefan,²² and by other published works of commercial and nongovernmental organizations.²³ The social and political background data was collected for all the deputies elected into the Romanian Chamber of Deputies during the past five consecutive parliamentary terms throughout the 1990–2007 period. The dataset has 1,950 observations, where the unit of observation is a deputy/parliamentary term. Since there is little agreement in the literature on how to classify occupational background, the classification scheme has a large number of mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, which allows occupational data to be aggregated in different ways. The last job prior to entering the parliament is the source of information on occupational background.
Cross-Country Differences in Business Elites’ Representation in Parliament  The empirical analysis of the parliamentary rosters’ data indicates much higher levels of business elites’ presence in the Romanian parliament in comparison to established parliamentary democracies. Notwithstanding recent major advances in parliamentary representation in Western Europe, no comprehensive and comparable cross-country data on occupational backgrounds exists for the purpose of comparison. In order to make such a comparison, country-specific accounts of occupational backgrounds of the West European parliamentarians were used instead. These accounts point to a limited, usually a low single-digit percentage, presence of employers or managers in the ranks of parliamentary deputies. Especially noteworthy is the fact of convergence of political systems as different as, for example, Germany, Spain, and Sweden with respect to the share of business elites in parliament.24

To illustrate the differences in occupational background, Table 1 below compares the Romanian data with the data on parliamentary representation in Germany, which is a country with one of the strongest traditions of research on legislative representation. Besides being generally representative of recruitment patterns in Western Europe, German data is based on a fairly detailed classification of occupational backgrounds. This allows a more nuanced comparison than would have been possible using available data from other Western European cases.

Table 1 shows the distribution of the occupational backgrounds of Romanian and German legislators. We used the published figures for Germany and, aggregated our Romanian data in accordance with the occupational background categories reported for the German case. The first column gives details on the distribution of occupational backgrounds of all MPs that served in the lower chamber of Romanian parliament since 1990. The second column provides the same details for the 2004 parliamentary elections. The last column lists the available German data for the 1994 elections.

As the percentages for the “managers/employers” category reveal, the share of deputies who come from business elite backgrounds is substantially higher for Romania. This is the case for both the entire dataset and the group of MPs elected in 2004. The share of business elites is especially high for the 2004 group of MPs. In comparison to the German data, the 2004 Romanian data also reveals much higher proportions of civil servants and
high-ranking politicians in the deputies’ corps. Representation of these groups was largely achieved at the expense of diminished presence of professionals.

Professionals are the major source of recruitment in established European democracies. It is usually a mode category, which is a category with the largest number of observations, in the distributions of occupational backgrounds. This category is conventionally used in the literature to summarize a wide range of occupational positions that require professional training and usually higher education, such as lawyers, doctors, and engineers. As Table 1 indicates, the share of professionals is substantially lower in the Romanian case. The difference is especially pronounced between German data and data for the most recent 2004 Romanian parliament.

Given the communist regime’s efforts to include workers into the ranks of parliamentarians, their virtual absence in post-communist Romania is especially glaring. Electorally successful parties in post-communist Romania, even those that position themselves on the left, do not send workers to public office. This provides another important contrast with what is known about patterns of representation in consolidated European democracies, where blue-collar workers still have opportunities to serve in parliament on behalf of the parties on the left.

Changes in Recruitment Patterns Over Time The longitudinal analysis of occupational data provides support for the expectation of an increase over time in the share of parliamentary seats controlled by managerial elites. Differences between the first and second columns of Table 1 suggest that the overall distribution of the occupational background of the Romanian MPs, reported in the first column, hides significant cross-term differences. To analyze these differences, the analytical lens is adjusted to focus on parliamentary newcomers rather than on the entire cohort of deputies that served in each term. Such a focus allows us to concentrate on analyzing what type of candidates other than incumbent MPs parties decided to put on the ballots.

Narrowing the focus renders numerous observations, due to the low incumbency rates in the Romanian parliament throughout the entire post-communist period. For neither one of the post-communist legislatures did the share of incumbents exceed 35 percent, and the average incumbency rate for the entire period was 24.4 percent. Overall, 1,474 out of 1,950 deputies in the dataset were coded as newcomers.

Another adjustment to the data relates to the classification of occupational backgrounds. In order to have a more nuanced understanding of where freshmen deputies
come from, the category of professionals is defined more narrowly by introducing a category of educational and cultural backgrounds. The latter is primarily comprised of deputies whose prior job was university teaching or a career in culture and arts. Given the small share of blue collar workers in our dataset, we collapsed this category with other minimally populated categories such as students and retired into “other.” Appendix 1 provides details on individual categories of occupational background.

Figure 1 indicates how the shares of parliamentary newcomers with different occupational backgrounds changed over time.

[Figure 1 here]

The share of newcomers with a business managerial background increased significantly throughout the 1990–2004 period. While only 10 percent of new deputies in the first post-communist legislature were business elites, the share of business managers in the newcomers’ cohort in the 2004 parliament was about 35 percent. In both the 2000 and 2004 parliaments business representatives constituted the largest group of newcomers. The respective shares of professionals and educators, on the contrary, declined over time. The decline in the share of professionals was especially dramatic—dropping from 42.4 percent in the 1990 parliament to a mere 12.9 percent in the 2004 parliament.

The decline in shares of professionals and educators especially at the end of the period was paralleled by the two-fold increase between the 2000 and 2004 parliamentary terms in the shares of newcomers coded as having an occupational background as professional politician or civil servant. The category of professional politicians included newcomers who served in other elected offices or worked full-time in political parties prior to entering the parliament. The gradual but significant increase in the share of this category of newcomers over time could be interpreted as an indication of a growing professionalization of political careers. A considerable number of civil servants in the ranks of parliamentary newcomers suggests a close relationship between parties and the civil service. This relationship is best conceptualized as a consequence of ruling parties’ efforts to undermine bureaucratic autonomy and politicize the civil service.

Overall, the data indicates that shares of business elites and professional politicians enjoyed the most consistent upward trends. In the last legislature for which the data is available—the 2004 parliament—these two categories account for more than 60 percent of all newcomers. One interpretation of this result is that in making decisions about new recruits for
parliamentary office, parliamentary parties increasingly prioritize the selection of candidates who have a business managerial background or prior professional political experience.

**Recruitment Patterns across Party Families** The distribution of deputies with business managerial backgrounds across party families varied substantially more than initially expected. We used our newcomers data to compare the share of business managers recruited by parties belonging to different party families. Although a number of problems arise in categorizing post-communist political parties into classical party families, the existing literature generally finds these classification efforts valid. We followed this literature in our classification of main party families in the Romanian case. Figure 2 reports the shares of business managers in the newcomers’ cohorts across five major party families in the Romanian case. Four of these five party families enjoyed a continuing representation across all parliamentary terms. The fifth party family, Christian Democrats, was represented by PNTCD only in the 1992 and 1996 parliaments. Collectively, newcomers belonging to these five party families account for 1,416 out of 1,474 freshmen deputies who served in parliament throughout the post-communist period. For space considerations Figure 2 does not include the data on party families whose representation in parliament was minor and limited to one out of five parliamentary terms, namely, communists, ecologists, and agrarians.

As Figure 2 suggests, the share of business representatives in newcomers’ cohorts of the four main party families was significantly higher than the single digit percentage share that is usually a norm in old democracies. All types of electorally successful Romanian political parties recruit managerial elites for legislative office much more frequently than their western counterparts. For each of the four party families, the Figure shows an already familiar pattern of an increase in business share over time. It also points to a considerable cross-party family variation in the shares of business managers.

Our initial expectations did not take into account the fact that liberal parties, which compete explicitly and primarily on the pro-business policy agenda, are also likely to attract a larger numbers of business elites by providing the latter with a means of fulfilling a combination of clientelistic and ideological motives. As Figure 2 indicates, the share of business managers among freshmen deputies serving on the ticket of liberal parties increased from 11 percent in the 1990 parliament to 52 percent in the 2004 parliament. More than half of liberal parties’ newcomers in 2004 thus came from a single type of elite occupational
background. This is the highest share of business representatives for all “party family per parliamentary term” type of observations in the dataset.

Two other party families that play a major role in Romanian party politics, the social democrats and the nationalists, have also actively recruited business elites, albeit in somewhat smaller proportions than the liberals. The shares of newcomers with a managerial background in the case of both party families were, for example, approximately 30 percent in 2004. In the case of the social democrats, the share of managerial elites for the newcomers’ cohort was even higher in 2000, with 34 percent of managers among the newcomers that belonged to this party family, which controlled the largest share of seats in the 2000 parliament. Although the shares of business representatives on the lists of social democrats and nationalists were similar for the last elections in our dataset, nationalists’ across-term average for business share was somewhat lower. The identified differences, however, are not strong enough to argue that nationalists depend less on business support. Such weaker dependence could be attributable to the potentially lower costs that nationalists incur in maintaining the support of their ideologically driven constituencies.

The share of business managers was much lower for the last remaining major party family in Romania, the ethnic minority. This party family was coded to include both deputies elected on the ticket of the ethnic Hungarian party, UDMR, and deputies that served in reserved seats for smaller ethnic minority groups. The lower share of business managers in this group of deputies might be related to the relative security and stability of electoral linkages that ethnic minority representatives develop with their communities. Their exclusive control of the minority vote might make minority organizations less dependent on business-provided financial resources, which other types of parties actively seek in order to increase their chances of competing successfully in the electoral market.

Modelling Business Elites’ Choice of Party Affiliation
The data on the occupational background of newcomers point to a comparatively high level of business elites on electoral lists of all types of parties in Romania. The nature of party competition and the presence of few safeguards against clientelistic exchanges in new democracies are likely to make all parties seek the resources provided by business groups. Persistent cross-party demand for the resources of business groups allows these groups to select their political partners, thus enabling business groups to choose between political affiliation alternatives.
Decisions by business elites about formal party affiliation are likely to be shaped by the nature of ties and associations they developed prior to entering parliament. Many studies of the post-communist transition have explained the initial rise of individuals and groups in the post-communist business hierarchy as reflecting the ties that these economic actors have had to the ruling parties. The main government parties are described in this literature as political machines eager to use their political power to reshuffle management of state enterprises, to handpick winners of privatization processes, and to reward a selected few with procurement orders and regulatory favors. Junior partners in governing coalitions and especially parties that are not part of government usually have little influence over these types of policy decisions and, as a result, have fewer opportunities to create business beneficiaries.29

Venelin Ganev’s treatment of the post-communist transition in Romania’s neighboring state, Bulgaria, provides an especially detailed account of the persuasive influence that government politicians have on determining the winners and losers of economic transition.30 While no single study provides a similarly focused and comprehensive examination of the role of ruling parties in shaping the outcomes of business competition in Romania, many scholarly and journalist accounts document the government’s role in creating Romania’s post-communist economic elites.31

We propose a one choice model to account for party affiliation decisions made by business candidates for parliamentary office. We hypothesize that business newcomers are more likely to appear on the lists of main government parties rather than on the lists of other parties. The entry of business elites on the electoral lists of incumbent parties is both a form of repayment for previous government favors and an insurance against possible business problems and criminal prosecution attempts. Both our interviews with party functionaries and the body of existing research on this topic indicate that parties expect candidates to cover considerable amounts of campaign costs and to make other types of financial contributions to the parties.32 Overall, the election period is a time when the ruling parties attempt to reap the benefits of their particularistic policies intended on strengthening the positions of their loyalists in the business community.

In the proposed model, business groups’ decisions are formalized as a binary choice between putting a candidate on the list of the main government party and the lists of other parties. We use a binary logit model to estimate whether occupational background and other individual level characteristics of newcomers affect the probability that these newcomers are on the ticket of incumbent government parties. Our unit of observation is an individual
newcomer. The sample includes all newcomers that served in the Romanian parliament, with the exception of those newcomers that entered parliament in the founding 1990 elections. The binary dependent variable equals 1 if a newcomer is on the list of a main government party and otherwise equals 0. Independent variables include occupational background, public/private type of employment, education level, and age.

Occupational background was coded as six dichotomous variables corresponding to the classification of occupation presented in Figure 1: professional, culture and education, managers/employers, civil service, politicians, and other. We use the professionals dummy as a reference category and exclude it from the equation. Other dummy or indicator variables for categories of occupational background are interpreted relative to this excluded category. Appendix 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables included in different specifications of the model.

Table 2 provides two different specifications of our model of the newcomers’ choice of party affiliation. Original occupational background variables are listed in italics. Models in Table 2 differ in terms of a number of independent variables. Model 2 is an attempt to account for the potential effects of public/private differences in candidates’ occupational background.

The results from an initial specification of the model, which included five dummy variables for occupation, together with other independent variables, into a regression equation, indicate that business managerial background is not a significant predictor of a newcomer’s choice of party affiliation. Managers/employers were not more likely than members of our reference category, professionals, to choose the electoral list of main government parties. The results reported in Model 1, however, indicate that members of two other occupational groups were more likely to appear on the government party lists. Coefficients for Civil Servants and Politicians are positive and highly significant. The finding that the Civil Servants variable is strongly associated with the choice of parliamentary career in the ruling party is especially significant for our discussion of clientelism. It is consistent with much of the anecdotal evidence that ruling parties use civil service jobs as rewards to their loyalists after elections. At the time for new elections, the civil service becomes a major recruitment ground in the ruling parties’ search for new candidates for political office. The finding of a positive relationship between being a professional politician and appearing
on the list of the incumbent party probably reflects the ruling party’s greater ability to maintain a large pool of professional politicians from which to choose new candidates for parliamentary office.

Model 2 revises the specifications of occupational background. This model is based on the assumption that the form of business ownership affects managers’ calculations in choosing party affiliation. A public form of ownership implies a higher degree of business dependence on government. Given what we know about how management of state enterprises has been reshuffled by consecutive governments in Romania, the members of this category of business elite should be the most likely to appear on the lists of ruling parties. We model this proposition by introducing an interaction term, the Public Managers variable. Thus in Model 2 the effect of our key independent variable, managerial occupational background, is thought to vary depending on the value of another independent variable, the public or private status of the enterprise. We also introduce the variable Public that captures the public/private differences across the various types of occupational background of parliamentary newcomers and serves as one of the source variables for constructing the interaction term.

Results for this model, presented in the last column of Table 2, indicate that the interaction term variable is significant and positively related to the dependent variable. In other words, being a public manager increases the probability of a newcomer serving in parliament on behalf of the party that controlled government prior to the elections. The coefficient for the Public variable is also significant and positive, which means that occupational background in the public sector, irrespective of specific occupational categories, increases the probability of a newcomer being on the list of the main government party.

The new model specifications do not have a major effect on the values of the coefficients for two original occupational variables that were found to be significant in Model 1. Both the Civil Servants and Politicians variables remain significant and positively related to the government party membership variable. New specifications make the coefficient for another original occupation background variable, Education-Culture, significant as well. The negative sign of this coefficient implies an inverse relationship between membership in this occupational category and the likelihood of joining the list of the ruling party. This relationship could be interpreted as a possible indication of the lack of ruling parties’ interest in this particular type of candidate, who do not constitute an example of representative of a resource-rich constituency.

Overall, these findings suggest that occupational background variables can play an important role in the recruitment-related calculations of political actors. Private/public sector
employment and specific occupational categories are important social characteristics that shape parties’ preferences with regard to the types of candidates they select. These characteristics also affect the structure of constraints and opportunities available for individuals that enter the political process in the capacity of candidates for parliamentary office.

**Conclusion**

Legislative recruitment data can be helpful in studying clientelistic exchanges in new democracies. The Romanian case demonstrates how mutual dependence between parties and resource-rich constituencies leads to a high presence of managerial elites in the ranks of parliamentary representatives. Unlike parties in consolidated Western European democracies, the Romanian parties rely heavily in their candidate selection practices on very small and highly elitist groups of business managers.

The presence of business managers in parties’ electoral lists and, subsequently, in parliament is a useful indicator of clientelistic practices in new democracies. The uncertain legal and business environment, usually associated with regime transition, makes business groups seek more than just policy representation by political parties. In exchange for providing parties with the resources needed to effectively compete in political arena, businesses also want to put their representatives on party lists and send them to such key decision-making bodies as the national parliament. High levels of business presence in parliament reveal both party preferences in recruiting candidates from business elites’ and these elites’ willingness to consider legislative careers.

While most of the parliamentary parties, irrespective of ideological orientation and government status, have been successful in recruiting business representatives, our analysis suggests that the ruling parties have especially close relationships with managerial elites from the public sector. Multiple mechanisms exist through which ruling parties convert their control of both public management and the civil service into competitive advantages in the electoral process. Both public sector business elites and the civil service serve not only as financial donors but also as a major source of new political cadres for these parties.

The findings of considerable levels of civil service presence in the parliamentary ranks of ruling parties deserves further investigation and comparative analysis. The finding indicates the politicization of the bureaucracy and its limited autonomy vis-à-vis politicians. Exploring mechanisms of political recruitment from the civil service has the potential to
deepen the understanding of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in new democracies.

Studying the patterns of political recruitment provides important leverage for analyzing cross-party and, potentially, cross-country differences in parties’ relations with resource-rich constituencies. Prospects for using political recruitment data in cross-country research on modes of parties’ interaction with resource-rich constituencies in new democracies depend, to a significant extent, on progress with data collection and conceptualization. This article offers one way to approach these tasks. Occupational background and other individual-level data on elected representatives constitute an important and underutilized source of information relevant for the study of party strategies of building linkages with society. Using this information for a hypothesis formulation and testing can significantly improve our understanding of clientelistic behavior in new democracies.

**Appendix 1. Coding Rules for Occupational Background of Parliamentary Representatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>Lawyers, economists, engineers, medical doctors, agricultural specialists,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>third sector employees (NGOs, trade unions, business associations), other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>professions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational and Cultural</td>
<td>Cultural, media, sports, university faculty, other teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and Employers</td>
<td>Private managers and entrepreneurs, state managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants</td>
<td>High office civil servants, civil servants, law enforcement personnel,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>Elected officials holding full-time public office (high office politicians,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>regional politicians, other politicians); full-time party functionaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Blue collar workers, students, retirees, homemakers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2. Summary Statistics for the Estimation Sample from the Logit Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Party</td>
<td>.2808511</td>
<td>.4496541</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.0263365</td>
<td>10.05684</td>
<td>-23.937</td>
<td>37.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education</td>
<td>-.0146457</td>
<td>1.549001</td>
<td>-5.57954</td>
<td>2.42046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Culture</td>
<td>.2234043</td>
<td>.4167488</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers Employers</td>
<td>.2276596</td>
<td>.4195449</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants</td>
<td>.106383</td>
<td>.3084913</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
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Note: Age and Years of Education variables are centered on their means.

Number of obs = 940

NOTES

We are grateful to Herbert Kitschelt, Volker Müller-Benedict, and Steven Roper for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.


9. See Laurentui Stefan, *Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania* (Bucuresti: Ziu, 2004); Sarah Whitmore, *State Building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament, 1990–2003* (London: Routledge, 2004). In Bulgaria a number of influential business people, including the executive director of the country’s largest steel mill, *Kremikovtzi*, entered parliament in the 1990s on the ticket of the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). In the Macedonian case, the owners of the country’s two major TV stations, for example, were elected to parliament as recently as 2008 (the authors’ datasets on Macedonian and Bulgarian parliaments).


11. Our data cover the period of Romanian political development until 2004. Delays in Romanian EU accession until 2007 were caused, among other things, by unsatisfactory legal reforms. Since accession, the European Commission continues to monitor justice reforms in Romanian and reserves some of its harshest criticism of Romanian authorities for political interferences in the working of the legal system. One recent study argues convincingly that the EU was tricked into offering full membership to Romania in return for substantial reforms, which the country’s authorities now refuse to carry out. Tom Gallagher, *Romania and the European Union: How the Weak Vanquished the Strong* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).

12. We focus here on the willingness and ability of parties to recruit business elites and not on the duration or strength of ties that parties develop with business groups. The latter issues, however, merit further research. They can inform our understanding of how parties and business groups’ choices of partners in clientelistic exchanges are constrained by decisions taken in prior rounds of pact-making and whether continuity or change characterizes relationships between parties and different types of businesses.


14. Dinu Patriciu, president of Rompetrol Holding, is a parliamentary deputy elected on the list of the National Liberal Party (PNL). His sponsorship of political parties is discussed, for example, in Alina Mihai, “Patriciu admite c-a pompat energie vie in Nastase” (Patriciu admits energizing Nastase), *Cotidianul*, August 3, 2006.


Financial report and financial information on Romanian parties, Institutul de politici publice (IPP), Bucharest, 2004.


19. Parliamentary refusal to allow criminal charges against deputies Adrian Nastase and Miron Mitrea, who previously served as prime minister and transport minister, respectively, is the most prominent example of the use of immunity clauses by Romanian MPs.


22. Stefan, Political Elite Recruitment.


31. Academic discussion of these practices can be found, for example, in Catalin Augustin Stoica, “From Good Communists to Even Better Capitalists? Entrepreneurial Pathways in Post-Socialist Romania,” East European Politics and Society, 18 (May 2004), 236–77. A recent example of journalistic reporting is the investigation of management salaries in the large state-owned utility company, Electrica. The report uncovered extremely high salaries by Romanian standards for the top management of this enterprise. The company’s head was appointed by a governing PDL; a previous head of Electrica was a member of the PNL party, which was a member of the government coalition prior to 2008. “Director la stat cu salariu de 400.000 de euro pe an” /State manager with 400.000 Euro salary/, Libertatea, 7 April 2009.

32. Authors’ confidential interview with the two heads of regional party organizations, Romania, June 2007. Both informants indicated that all candidates, irrespective of their occupational background and financial standing, are expected to make campaign
contributions. This suggests that business actors might finance electoral expenses not only for their representatives but also for other type of candidates that a party puts on its electoral list. For an illustration of how important candidates’ contributions are, see, for example, Andrei Ando, “Candidaţii au fost cei mai importanţi sponsori ai partidelor lor, anul trecut” /Candidates are the most important sponsors of their parties/, 10 April 2009 at http://www.observator.info.

33. The following parties were coded as main government parties: for the 1992 elections – FDSN, for the 1996 elections – PD and PNL, for the 2000 elections – PDSR, for the 2004 elections – PD and PNL.

34. The practice of politically motivated appointments and dismissals has been strongly institutionalized in the Romanian civil service in the last twenty years. The most recent example is the government decision 37/2009 to lay off 15,000 employees who were appointed to various government agencies by the previous government. See Bogdan Grosereanu et al., “Cine sunt oamenii prin care partidele de la putere controleaza tara?” (Who are the people that parties use to control the country?), 25 May 2009, Romania Libera. A good discussion of patronage practices in a comparative East European perspective is provided in O'Dwyer, Runaway State-Building.
Figure 1. Occupational background of newcomers in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies

Note: The graph shows the distribution of occupational background of newcomers at the start of each term. The number of newcomers at the start of each consecutive term was as follows: 398, 233, 224, 222, 216. Source: Authors' calculations.
Figure 2. Share of newcomers with managerial backgrounds across party families

Note: The graph indicates the shares of newcomers with managerial background for main party families in Romania. Party families were defined to include: Social Democrat - PDSR, PD, PSDR, FSN; Liberal - PUR, PNL, PAC; Christian Democrat - PNTCD; Nationalist - PRM, PUNR; Ethnic Minority - UDMR, Reserved Seats.
Source: Authors’ calculations
Table 1  Occupational Background of Deputies in Lower House of Romanian and German Parliaments (%)

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<th>All Romanian MPs (1990-2004)</th>
<th>Romanian MPs elected 2004</th>
<th>German MPs Elected 1994</th>
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<td>34.8</td>
<td>67.1</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>Public administration</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>(672)</td>
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Source: Authors’ calculations for Romania; German data adopted from Wessels (1997).
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