- Semi-Presidentialism: The Logic of
Institutional
Conflict and Implications for Public Administration Design Title,
Table of Contents, List of Tables, List of Figures; Part
I; Part II; Bibliography.
(Ph.D dissertaion; version: 30/12/2000) My Ph.D. dissertation examines
the effects that the constitutional choice of semipresidentialism has
on
the political process and bureaucratic design in post-Communist
democracies.
The first part of the dissertation analyzes how the variation in
semipresidential
constitutional norms and party organization in parliament affects the
functioning
of major government institutions: the presidency, the legislature, and
the cabinet. I introduce a multiple principal-agent analytical
framework
to explain the patterns of interactions among the political actors who
comprise these institutions. I utilize a number of tools developed in
spatial
and game-theoretic modeling to generate a set of testable
propositions
about the effects of semipresidential constitutional norms on the
politicians’
behavior. Cabinet identity, cabinet stability and the likelihood of
institutional
conflict under semipresidentialism are found to be influenced by the
specific
provisions of constitutional design.
The second part of the dissertation explores
the link between the design of “grand” institutions and the
organization
of public bureaucracy. To understand how the institutional interactions
under semipresidentialism affect the organization and functioning of
public
bureaucracy, I rely on two research strategies. One is a comparative
case
study. The other is large-N quantitative analysis. Both research
strategies
lead to the similar conclusions: a semipresidential constitutional
framework
produces powerful disincentives for the presidents and prime ministers
to engage in efficiency-enhancing reform of central government. The
research
findings show that semipresidential regimes have more cumbersome
structures
of central bureaucracy and larger cabinet size than parliamentary
regimes.
Semipresidential institutions are demonstrated to have adverse
effects
on a country’s ability to restructure its executive government.
- "Do
Institutions Matter? Semi-Presidentialism in France and Ukraine,"
in John S. Micgiel, ed., Perspectives on Political adn Economic
Transitions
after Communism (New York City: The Institute on East Central
Europe,
Columbia University, 1997)
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