

Preference voting in post-communist Europe
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Abstract: Proportional representation with preference voting gives opportunities to voters to choose both their party and their particular parliamentary representatives. Voters in five post-communist democracies have such extended choice, but the use made of these opportunities and its impact on the composition of parliament varies considerably with the particular electoral arrangements as well as within countries across time. Voters in the open-list systems of Estonia and Poland have less choice but their choices make a greater difference than in the optional preference systems of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The impact of preference voting is greatest in Latvia, which operates effectively as an open-list system; but its complexity makes it difficult for both voters and parties to calculate the effects of their decisions. The type of political party appears to make little difference but there is some preliminary evidence that voters respond distinctively to electoral alliances.

Keywords: electoral systems; preference voting; post-communism

1. Introduction

Preference voting systems now characterise the majority of West European PR electoral systems,¹ and five post-communist democracies also use proportional representation and preference voting in parliamentary elections. Yet the impact of this element of ballot format remains an underdeveloped aspect of electoral systems' research. This is also an area where research has yielded neither empirical nor normative

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¹In Western Europe preference voting is currently employed in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden (since 1998), Luxemburg, and Liechtenstein; Italy had

consensus. It remains virtually unexamined in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

Preference voting aims to give voters more direct input in the election of their representatives and to increase legislators' accountability in list PR systems (Horowitz, 2002; Bergman *et al.*, 2003, p. 213). Preference voting increases direct accountability of individual MPs to their voters by giving candidates who have performed well in parliament the opportunity of election through preference votes even if the party leadership does not place them in an eligible list place. Accountability may also be increased indirectly by preference voting, since candidates with good performance in terms of voters' preferences are likely to improve their standing in the party, for parties can hardly ignore voters' judgements if they wish to preserve their support. But this positive effect on legislators' behaviour towards their electorate is likely only if voters' views regarding individual candidates matter. Thus the basic requirement for preference voting to act as an incentive for increased accountability is that preference voting is used and is used effectively, i.e. it has an impact on list order (Pedersen, 1966). Indeed, in Western Europe preference voting has often been dismissed on the grounds that voters make little use of their opportunities for choice. For example, Rule and Shugart identified Austria, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden as countries with 'non-utilized' preference votes (Rule and Shugart, 1995; but cf. Anderweg and Irwin, 2002, pp. 81-2).

There is reason to anticipate that in this regard, as in much else, the new Central European democracies may differ from their neighbours. Political parties are in the early stages of development, and both parties and voters are still learning how the electoral process functions. This renders new democracies particularly appropriate cases for

preferential voting until 1994 (Bergman *et al* 2003: 131-133 Table 4.5). Preferential voting is also

examining the impact of preference voting. These cases provide enough variance regarding the type of preference voting employed to see links between legal provisions and differences in the use and impact of preference voting. Last but not least, new democracies provide a good testing ground regarding the relationship of political parties to their voters, since the extent of effective preference voting is by and large a function of the match between a party selectorate's views and voters' views.² In established democracies, parties take into account voters' expectations when putting up a slate of candidates, but in new democracies parties know far less about citizens' views. Therefore, the mismatch between the parties' and the voters' choices is likely to be higher in new democracies.

This paper examines whether preference voting meets the basic requirement for its role of increasing accountability, i.e. whether it is used and used effectively. First, it is important to assess whether (where expressing a candidate-preference is not obligatory) voters make use of their capacity for choice. Second, if voters express preferences, do their views make any difference to the overall outcome? We use two approaches to assessing impact - the first gauges the extent to which party list order is changed by preference votes and the second the extent to which the election of particular candidates is determined by preference votes. First the paper reviews the variations in the five preferential voting systems and their potential implications. Then we formulate a set of expectations regarding the use and impact of preference voting in circumstances of post-communist development. The third section checks these expectations against election data. Finally, we analyse the effects of preferences from the candidates' point of view. We conclude that voters make considerable use of their opportunities for choice but that

employed in Latin America in Brazil, Chile, Panama, Ecuador and Peru (Schmidt, 2003).

² It is also a function of the fractionalization of the party and its level of institutionalisation within the party (Katz and Bardi 1986: 102).

electoral-system design remains vital for the extent to which preferences make a difference to electoral outcomes and to candidate selection strategies.

Our analysis is based on legislation, election results, information regarding party and party system development, and data on parliamentary candidates. The datasets include parliamentary elections to the lower or sole chamber in the Czech Republic (1996, 1998 and 2002), Estonia (1992, 1995, 1999 and 2003), Latvia (1998, 2002), Poland (1991, 1993, 1997, 2001) and Slovakia (1994, 1998, 2002).³ With the exception of Latvia they include all post-communist elections (Poland) or all post-independence elections (Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) to 2003.⁴

2. Preference-Voting Systems

Our five cases reflect the broad distinction between PR preference systems⁵ and closed-list systems, which do not permit voters to express candidate-preference. With preference voting, whether under list PR or other preferential systems such as STV, the ultimate decision as to who is elected lies with the voters, since the principle is that the voters themselves (may or must) pick individual candidates. With a closed list the choice of individual representatives depends on the list order determined by the party.⁶

Preference systems embrace open lists as well as the many 'soft' or 'weak' systems variously construed as flexible, semi-closed, or semi-open list systems. So cross-national variation arises because, although the same principle applies - that voters decide who is

³ Legislation and election results and some candidate data are available at www.essex.ac.uk/elections. Data not posted are available from the authors.

⁴ The absence of Latvian elections in 1993 and 1995 is due entirely to practical problems of funding, data collection, and linguistic competence but we believe that it is unlikely to influence our findings significantly.

⁵ We use 'preference voting' and 'preferential voting' interchangeably. Terms such as 'personal voting' (Shugart, 1994: 37) may be confused with the vote for an individual candidate characteristic of majoritarian electoral systems, while the notion of 'intra-party choice' (Katz, 1980: 31–2) evokes the use of primaries for candidate selection in some countries or some parties.

⁶ Although the exact share of seats a party wins for a certain percentage of the votes cast depends on the electoral system, under any electoral system the seat share of a political party is a function of the vote share.

elected - there are important differences in the way preference voting takes place and in the manner in which voters' preferences are used to determine seat allocation.

One basic difference in list preference systems is between those with the option of voting simply for the party list and those where voters must express a choice of candidate (Katz, 1986, p. 88). Of our cases the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Latvia have optional or additional preference voting, while Estonia and Poland have obligatory candidate voting within systems of open-list PR. In the latter the party decides who can be nominated as a candidate but has no say in who wins a seat, since while the number of votes received by all candidates determines the vote (and thus seat) share of the party, the number of votes received by each candidate determines whether s/he is elected. The distinction is blurred in the case of Latvia, where preference voting is optional, yet voters' preferences determine outcomes (see below).

Preference systems also differ as to whether voters are presented with a list of candidates ordered by the party according to its preference or with a list ordered, say, alphabetically or by random draw. All five of our new democracies use party-ordered lists. In addition, preference systems vary in the extent to which voters are encouraged to express preferences. In open-list systems where voters *must* choose a single candidate, the impact is notionally greater, though preferences may make little difference to the outcome if voters merely plump for the first name on the list. Where voters *may* choose a party, one may assume that some voters will exercise this option, so the proportion of preferences expressed for individual candidates will often be lower and thus too the likelihood of changing the list order (though this is not true in Latvia).

Optional preference systems differ in the number of permitted preferences and in the number or proportion of votes needed to elect a candidate at the seat allocation stage. Finally, there are also differences in the extent to which voters are encouraged by the

political parties to express preference votes. For example, in some cases candidates campaign actively on their own behalf, in others parties may prohibit individual campaigns.

With party-ordered lists, the ease with which the list order may be upset depends on (a) legal requirements as well as on (b) district and party magnitude and (c) the availability of information regarding candidates, which is at least in part a function of the extent of intra-list competition. In terms of legal provisions, the principal aspect is probably the number of votes needed to change the list order, i.e. the number of preference votes that can make a difference between the last candidate elected and the first candidate not elected. This number can be used as a single numeric criterion regarding the likelihood of effective use of preference voting, i.e. the extent to which voters change list order (Pedersen, 1966). However, the *impact* of 'effective use' is determined by the ratio between preference votes cast and the legal requirements for these votes to change election outcomes. If preference votes alone determine who is elected, then the numeric criterion is one vote, and this is so in Estonia, Poland, and Latvia. If this number is expressed as a percentage of preference votes cast, the likelihood of effective preference voting is higher depending on both the numerator and the denominator, thus on the number of preference votes cast. This in turn depends on the ease with which voters may express a preference and the ease with which they can avoid doing so.

Yet voters expressing preferences need not find it difficult. When parties order lists, their list leaders (list-pullers or 'locomotives') have a clear advantage and a few candidates tend to garner most votes (Marsh, 1985, p. 374). Voting for the first-placed candidate may be a positive endorsement of the party's leading figure in a constituency, but it may also be a means of accepting the party's list order when candidate-choice is

compulsory. This support for highly placed candidates means that (at least in Western Europe) the difference between the number of votes garnered by candidates at the top of the list and those elected from lower list places is usually high, but the difference between the last candidate elected and the first candidate not elected is usually small. Because of this distribution of votes, preference voting is most likely to have a direct impact on those candidates bordering the threshold of seat eligibility. (How important this is for the party itself depends in part on its competence in judging the election result and in ordering its list so that its 'certain' and 'possible' candidates reflect its own preferences).

Finally, the direct impact of preference votes depends on party and party system features. Stable parties should in theory better match their own preferences with those of their voters and so see less disruption of their own list order. But much also depends on the extent and visibility of intra-list competition among candidates. Competition is likely to be more intense when the contender is an alliance or coalition of parties fielding a single list (Marsh, 1985, p.371; cf. Wildgen, 1985, p.950), with each party having identifiable profiles and candidates. Assuming that the candidates enjoy some visibility, it is indeed plausible that supporters of the parties forming the electoral alliance will wish to support candidates of their own parties. Yet it is also true that the visibility and clarity of the party affiliation of individual candidates, as well as of the component parties themselves, varies within and across alliances, often making it difficult in practice to establish an easy, clear-cut distinction between alliances and parties.

Following the same logic, parties that have identifiable, openly competing factions are likely to experience higher use of preference voting. However, it is difficult to establish a direct and systematic link between vigorous intra-party competition and widespread preference voting beyond a few examples such as the Italian Christian

Democrats (Wildgen, 1985). Since variation in party procedures and conduct regarding intra-party competition is high, often unclear, and changeable, the number of cases needed to establish such a link is huge; this is a colossal task beyond reach for most researchers.

If over time parties 'learn' about their voters and better match voters' preferences and their own list order, this should reduce the impact of preference voting. However, this does not necessarily apply to new political parties that emerge suddenly on the national stage. Of course only successor parties were not new at the start of 'transition', but new parties continued to appear at successive elections in many countries. It seems likely that voters will have little knowledge of the particular candidates of a new party. This would suggest little effective preference voting for new parties, with voter support concentrated on the party (if this is an option) or the list leaders.

All five countries included in our analysis have party-ordered lists because electoral-system designers were concerned to introduce party-strengthening mechanisms associated with PR. At the same time they took into account the weakness of political parties and the absence of strong links between the population and the parties, with preference voting designed to enable candidate choice (Birch *et al.*, 2002). As earlier in Western Europe (Marsh, 1985, p. 365; Pedersen, 1966, p. 172; Bergman *et al.*, 2003, p. 213), giving voters choice was seen as providing a means for fostering the link between voters and representatives (Birch *et al.*, 2002). In Estonia and Poland voters *must* vote for a candidate, and the party's constituency vote is the sum of the individual candidates' votes. Voting in Poland is easiest. Party lists are provided in one ballot leaflet, so voters find the page for their party and mark an X in the box opposite the name of their favoured candidate. In Estonia party lists are posted at polling stations and voters write the code number of their preferred candidate on their ballot paper.

The three optional preference systems also differ. Latvian voters may vote for a party merely by dropping their party's ballot paper into the ballot box. Alternatively, they may place a plus (+) mark opposite the surname of any number of candidates for a positive preference; or they may delete the name of any candidate to express a negative preference. Czech and Slovak voters may circle the numbers of preferred candidates on their party's ballot paper. In 1990 in federal Czechoslovakia up to four preferences were permitted; if at least ten percent of a party's voters in a constituency expressed a preference, then those votes would be taken into account. Then, candidates gaining the preferences of a majority of preference-expressing voters would secure seats in order of their vote. The 1995 Czech law specified that 10% of voters for a party must indicate preferences, but a candidate would move to the top of the ballot in that district if 10% of that party's voters circled his or her number. In 2001 the maximum number of preferences was reduced to two, and candidates gaining at least 7% of a winning party's constituency vote moved to the top of the list. In independent Slovakia the number of preferences remained constant at up to four per voter. 10% of voters must indicate preferences and a candidate needs the preferences of 10% of his/her party's voters to gain election. But Slovakia also introduced a single national constituency in 1998, making it difficult for locally respected candidates to gain the requisite share of preference votes.

In Latvia voters are the final arbiters in deciding who will sit in parliament. The vote for each candidate is determined by taking the number of votes cast for the party alone, subtracting the number of ballots expressing a negative preference for the candidate, and adding the ballots expressing a positive preference. Candidates are elected in order of their aggregated votes. Unlike some countries (Lakeman, 1974, pp. 104-8), in Latvia votes for the party alone are allocated equally to all candidates on the

party's list. Thus the list presented by the parties has little formal significance,⁷ and voters have a strong incentive to express candidate choice.

But party lists played a greater role in Estonia and Poland because the electoral systems included a closed-list element, while Estonia also developed a distinctive seat allocation mechanism, which it adapted over successive elections. Poland had closed national lists for 69 seats (15%) in the elections of 1991, 1993, and 1997. Only with the abolition of the national list in 2001 did voters hold total sway in determining the composition of the Sejm. In Estonia any candidate achieving a full district (Hare) quota of votes is elected. After the allocation of what are known as 'personal' seats, the remainders are added up for each party. Parties receiving a full quota received district seats for their leading vote-winners in 1992. Then the district remainders were aggregated at national level (for parties exceeding the 5% threshold) and allocated by party-list order with a modified d'Hondt formula. In 1992 17 seats (of 101) were awarded in the first stage, but the large number of contenders reduced the likelihood of achieving full district-level quotas, so few lists gained full quotas at the second stage of allocation. 59% of parliamentary seats in 1992 were allocated by closed lists at the third (national-level) stage. As a result, changes were introduced such that in 1995 seats were awarded in the second allocation only to a) parties that had crossed the 5% national threshold and b) candidates whose personal votes constituted at least 10% of the Hare quota for their constituency. In 2003 parties receiving one full quota received seats at district level for each .75 additional quota. Moreover, to be elected at national level a candidate had to receive at least 5% of the quota for his/her district; otherwise the seat went to the next candidate on the national list meeting the quota requirement. Thus

⁷ If two candidates receive equal votes, party list order determines who is elected.

Poland, Estonia, and the Czech Republic gradually made effective preference voting easier. In Latvia provisions remained the same.

3. The Use of Preference Voting in Central and Eastern Europe

What, then, did we expect to find in the functioning of preference systems in Central and Eastern Europe? We have divided our expectations into two categories. The first addresses voters' use of preferences. The second considers the impact of preference voting. Clearly some factors reinforce each other while others pull in opposite directions. Nor are the explanations we proffer always fully testable.

1) The Use of Preference Voting

We anticipated that

- (a) Preference voting would be widely used in the three countries where it is optional, namely Latvia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.

It seems likely that voters long denied the capacity for effective electoral choice under communism would relish the opportunity to choose. At the same time, 'Party' evoked negative connotations of communist control and manipulation throughout the region. Personalities remained a strong element of political competition. Moreover, political parties cannot be regarded as a success story in post-communist Europe. Although they rapidly became the key institutions for political recruitment and government formation, they generally failed to establish solid links with voters.

- (b) There would be a clear division between the use of preference voting in Poland, Estonia, and Latvia on the one hand and the Czech Republic and Slovakia on the other.

This is because preference voting is a requirement of the system in Poland and Estonia, so by virtue of the rules it must be 100%. Although avoidance is easy in Latvia, all preferences count so that the positive incentive appears to have a clear advantage over the 'easy option' of voting for the party. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia by contrast,

it is easy to avoid preference voting and a higher number of votes is needed to change the party-ordered list.

- (c) First-placed candidates would attract the highest share of preference votes.

This is because parties place their leaders (their most visible candidates) high on the list, because some parties are effectively 'leader-parties', and because this is the easiest choice. It also seems plausible that voters would generally be less well informed about lower-placed candidates.

- (d) Electoral alliances or coalitions would see more use of preferences than single/unitary parties.

Voters who support a party will prefer that party's candidates and thus wish to vote for them, thus taking exception to the outcome of inter-party bargaining over list composition.⁸

- (e) Voters for new parties, i.e. parties contesting an election for the first time, would demonstrate stronger preferences for first-placed candidates in Poland and Estonia and Latvia but less use of preferences in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

This is because new parties are more leader-oriented and have less developed structures.

It also seems likely that their voters are also less informed about their candidates.

2. The Impact of Preference Voting

Here we expect to find that

- (a) Effective use (changes in list order) is likely to be greater in Latvia, Poland, and Estonia than in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

This is because of the greater number of votes needed to upset the party-ordered list in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and because of the ease of preference avoidance there (as above).

⁸ Faction-ridden parties may also be prone to preference voting. Unfortunately no systematic data are available on party factionalism.

- (b) The direct impact of preference voting on the composition of parliament will be greatest in Latvia and least in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

This follows from our expectations regarding effective use, since voters must change party list order in order to affect the outcome. But it is also a result of technical elements of the electoral system: Unlike Latvia, Estonia and Poland (the latter until 2001) retained a closed-list element for final seat allocation. The transformation of Slovakia into a single electoral constituency should effectively negate the effects of preference voting because few candidates have a national reputation, while voters also come to learn that preference votes make no difference.

- (c) Electoral alliances see more preference-impact than unitary parties (see above).
- (d) New parties and leader-parties are more supportive of party list-order and hence see fewer deputies out of list order (see above).

3.1 Using Preferences

Given the diverse electoral arrangements, we cannot employ the same measure of use for all our countries. In Poland and Estonia use is a function of the open list: *all* voters casting valid ballots express preferences. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, however, we do not know how many voters expressed preferences nor for how many candidates, since election results tell us only the number of preference votes cast for each candidate and each voter is entitled to express a maximum of 4 preference votes (2 in the 2002 Czech elections).⁹

In Latvia complexity is enhanced by the facility to vote either for a party or to express unlimited positive and/or negative preferences. We can use data regarding the numbers of voters who voted only for the party in order to calculate the percentage of voters that expressed preferences. In 1995 48% of voters expressed preferences (52% voted for a party only), while in 2002 58.6% of voters expressed preferences (There are

no such data for 1998).¹⁰ On average each preference voter in 2002 recorded 4.9 preferences.¹¹ Latvian voters were more inclined to express positive preferences than negative ones: in 1998 the ratio was 4.6:1 and in 2002 3.4:1.

In the Czech Republic the number of preferences expressed was consistently less than the number of votes cast; in other words, not all voters expressed a preference. In Slovakia, however, at each election voters cast more preference votes than votes. In principle each voter could have cast one preference vote, making the maximum in Slovakia 100%. If all voters expressed the same number of preference votes, on average across the three elections included in our analysis, less than one in two Czech voters expressed a preference vote (a mean of .41 per voter), whilst over three elections Slovak voters expressed an average of 1.77 votes (see Table 1).

This suggests that apart from the 100% use in Estonia and Poland, despite the differences between systems it is possible to compare the average number of preferences expressed by Czech, Slovak, and Latvian voters. As anticipated (expectation 1a), there is use of preference voting in all three countries; and we also see far more use in Latvia than in the Czech and Slovak Republics, in line with expectation 1b.

However, Czech voters were less inclined to express preferences than their Slovak counterparts and to some extent less disposed than we expected (see Table 1). Apart from the mean number of preference votes per voter, identifying maximum and minimum numbers of preference voters gives us some idea of the extent of preference voting in these two countries. If each voter expressing a preference endorsed only one candidate, then the number of preference-voters would equal the number of preference

⁹ The Election Commission did not retain figures for party-only voters.

¹⁰ The data were not collected in 1998. Figures for preference voting were provided by Liena Muraskina of the Latvian Electoral Commission, August 2004.

¹¹ The number is calculated for 2002 only, because it is the only election for which we have both the number of preference voters and the total number of preferences expressed. The figure is calculated

votes (the maximum). If each voter expressed four preferences (or two in 2002), then the number of preference-voters would be the number of preference votes divided by four/two (the minimum). Between 11% and 46% of Czech voters cast preference votes in 1996, between 10% and 39% in 1998, and between 20% and 39% in 2002 (when only two preferences were permitted). In Slovakia the figure was high in 1994 and rose with successive elections. *At least* 41% of Slovak voters expressed preferences in 1994, 43% in 1998, and more than half in 2002 (See Table 1). Slovakia registered more preference voting than the Czech Republic. Moreover, preference voting steadily increased in Slovakia. As Marsh (1985) pointed out, the perceived expectation of the impact of preference voting, linked for instance to the numeric criterion regarding the likelihood of effective use of preference voting, cannot explain initial differences. This is the case with the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the latter registering three times more preference voting than the former despite (almost) identical electoral provisions. The difference between the two countries may be due to the nature of Czech parties and party system, since party labels had more weight for voters from the beginning of the transition than in other post-communist countries, while parties remained largely the same over time; therefore more people were likely to agree with or to accept the party line.

Table 1 about here

We also applied the maximum/minimum logic to assess differences among parties and electoral alliances in the preference-expression of Czech and Slovak voters.¹²

In the Czech Republic more alliance voters expressed preferences than did voters for

from the sum of preferences expressed (positive plus negative), since both positive and negative preferences are indicators of extent of use.

¹² Since Latvian voters can express an unlimited number of positive and negative preferences, minimum and maximum number/percentage of preference voters cannot be calculated.

single parties, which confirms expectation 1d. In 1996 at least 14.5% and at most 57.9% of voters for the Free Democrats-Liberal Social Union expressed preferences (compared to the overall averages of 11.4% and 45.7% shown in Table 1). In 2002 a minimum of 31.4% and a maximum of 62.8% of voters for 'the Coalition' expressed preferences (average 19.6% and 39.2%).

In Slovakia the longest standing electoral coalition was that of the Hungarian parties, most elements of which co-operated in elections from the outset, though the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) became a single party after changes in alliance thresholds in 1998. However, the individual components - and in particular their leaders - were well known to their Hungarian electors (Sándor, 1999; Millard, 2004, Gyárfášová, 2004). In 1994 SMK voters were the most frequent preference voters; at least 59.9% expressed preferences compared to a minimum of 40.6% of all voters. In 1998 the SMK's voters were not so far removed from those of other parties, with a minimum of 47.9% preference voters (average 43.3%); but the minimum was highest (49%) for the badly divided successor Party of the Democratic Left (SDL'). In 2002 more voters for the Hungarian Coalition again expressed preferences (a minimum of 61.5%) than for any other party (average 51.1%).

Fewer voters of the other major electoral alliance in Slovakia in 1998 - the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) expressed preferences (a minimum of 40.1%), below those of the largest party, the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (46.4%) and the Party of the Democratic Left (49%). However, the ballot papers gave no indication of the partner-parties, since formally the SDK was required to stand as a 'political party', though in fact it had five distinct components. Thus, our expectation 1d is confirmed with the caveat that electoral alliances experience more preference voting than unitary parties only when the component parties and their candidates are visible/ known.

Although Slovakia - unlike the Czech Republic - also had several parties created and dominated by a single leader, their preference voting was no less than for other parties. The minimum for Rudolf Schuster's SOP voters (41.1%) was marginally below the 1998 average (43.3%). In 2002 a minimum of 43.4% of Robert Fico's Smer voters expressed preferences, below the average (51.1%); but Pavol Ruško's ANO, with a minimum of 48.1%, was rather closer. However, these individuals gained a predominant share of their party's preference votes, which means that there are mixed findings regarding expectation 1e.

3.2 Leadership Effects

As expected (1c) first-placed candidates were indeed the highest vote getters of their party but there were also considerable differences between countries. First-placed candidates did best in Estonia where on average across four elections only 13% of them gathered less than 25% of the vote (see Table 2). In 1992 over 60% of first-placed candidates won more than half their constituency vote and in 1995 it was 58%. On average first-placed voters won about 55% of the vote. However, this was no longer the case in 1999 and 2003, when roughly one-third of first-placed candidates won more than 50% of the vote, while the average dropped to 45% and 42% respectively.

Table 2 about here

In Poland voters were less enthusiastic about their party's list-leader. In the chaotic first free election in 1991 almost 20% of first-placed candidates received less than 25% of the vote, and only one-quarter received over 50% of the vote. The average vote for first-placed candidates was below 40%. These figures dropped slightly at each

subsequent election. By 2001 almost 40% of first-placed candidates received less than 25% of the vote, and less than 10% of first-placed candidates received over half the vote.

Both countries had some extremely popular leading candidates who did indeed serve as 'locomotives' for their party's list (Table 2, column 13). Such candidates, gaining vast shares of the vote, made the margin of difference for other candidates very slight indeed. However, the proportion of such candidates was consistently low in Poland. In Estonia the figure dropped sharply after the first two elections (Table 2, column 9). It seems clear that Polish voters were less enthusiastic about party leaders. However, these differences may at least in part be related to list length, which influences the percentages of the party vote gathered by first placed candidates.¹³ Estonian lists are shorter on average than Polish lists due to lower district magnitude. Moreover in Estonia list length increased over time, especially for smaller parties which initially fielded small numbers of candidates in each constituency but gradually came to submit full slates.

The Latvian data are harder to interpret, since voters may express unlimited preferences. However, in 1998 first-placed candidates attracted a higher proportion of positive preferences and a lower proportion of negative preferences than other highly-placed candidates (see Table 3). Indeed, the share of positive preferences declined and the share of negative preferences increased for each successive list place (data not shown). The position changed slightly in 2002, when list-leaders had more negative preferences than second-placed candidates. As in Estonia and Poland, some prominent party leaders did exceptionally well. In 1998 several party leaders stood in first place in all five constituencies and topped their party's poll in each of them.¹⁴ The position was little different in 2002. Most leaders of winning parties stood in first place in all

¹³ The shorter the party list, the higher the percentage of the party vote for any candidate even in cases of an equal number of votes.

¹⁴ A candidate standing and winning in more than one constituency was elected from the constituency where s/he received the most votes.

constituencies, but parliamentary party leaders were usually their voters' preferred candidates in all constituencies regardless of their list place.

Table 3 about here

Czechs and Slovaks have fewer incentives for preference voting than voters in Latvia, since their preference votes do not necessarily determine who is elected. Indeed, a majority of Czech voters did not express preferences. That voters could express four preferences (but just two in 2002) also meant that a single candidate's vote could be diluted. First-placed candidates garnered more preference votes, but they did not do so in large numbers. In 1996 only 20 Czech candidates met the requirement to gain over 10% of their party's preferences (see Table 4); of these, 14 led their constituency party's list. In 1998 16 candidates gained over 10% of their party's preference votes, including 11 ranked first on the list. Yet the victory of Christian Democratic candidate Vlasta Parkanová demonstrated the capacity of disgruntled voters to upset list order; she commanded a higher share of preference votes than any other candidate (30%) and moved to victory from a losing fourth list place.

In 2002 the number of candidates gaining sufficient preferences (more than 7%) was now 192 and their profile changed. 111 did not head their party's list, though 82 came from small parties that were incapable of securing a seat. Of the 45 *winning* candidates gaining over 7% of preference votes, 26 were first on their lists.

Table 4 about here

4. The Consequences of Preference Voting

One obvious characteristic of preference voting is the capacity of voters to displace candidates from the rank order preferred by their party. Here we are interested in how far voters' and party preferences diverged. It should be emphasised that our notion of displacement ignores the legal minimum conditions necessary for changing list order in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Our calculations simply show the match between party and voter rankings without reference to these requirements. When parties are closely in tune with their voters, mismatch should be limited. We find that this is far from the case in our new democracies.

4.1 The Disruption of Party List-Order

Table 5 shows how voters' preference votes changed their parties' list ordering, i.e. it compares the voters' ranking of candidates with the parties' preferred list order. Of course, party ranking reflects a deliberate ordering of all candidates, while voters' ranking results from the sum of choices about individual candidates. The total displacement was enormous, although there are variations in time and across countries and between all electoral contenders and those winning seats. The columns labelled '1' show the percentage of cases in which voters' ranked candidates higher than their party ranking. The '2' columns show the percentage of cases in which voters' ranked candidates lower than did their party. The '3' columns show the percentage of cases in which there was an exact match between the party list number and the voters' ranking.¹⁵

We see (Table 5, columns 3) that voters' and parties' preferences were a poor match and that parliamentary parties did not perform better in this regard than their competitors. Slovak voters proved the most willing of all to alter their parties' candidate

¹⁵ Note, however, the implications of list length, as discussed above.

order. Estonian parties were most in tune with their voters. But in general some two-thirds of voters exercised preferences not consistent with parties' list-ordering.

Table 5 about here

4.2. Direct impact on Parliament composition

One easily measurable effect of preference voting is the election of candidates who would not have been elected under a closed-list system. Unlike measures of displacement, this measure shows the direct impact of preference voting on election outcomes. Table 6 shows just how many deputies were elected out of list order thanks to voters' preferences.

Table 6 about here.

As anticipated (2b), the Czech and Slovak systems of optional preference voting made less difference than the open-list systems of Estonia and Poland or the particular Latvian variant. The proportions of Czech and Slovak MPs elected out of list order due to preference votes were low single-digit figures compared to the double-digit percentages of the other three, ranging from 18.4% in the 1995 Estonian elections to 32% in the 2002 Latvian election. The impact of preference voting in changing the party's list order was greatest in Latvia and Poland, though it was rather less in Estonia. In Estonia however the impact on the composition of parliament as a whole increased over time. In 1992 and 1995 8.9% of deputies owed their election to voters' preferences; in 1995 it was 10.9 and in 2003 15.8% (see Table 6). The proportion of seats allocated in

the closed-list third-round allocation made a difference in Estonia, and it dropped steadily: it was 59% in 1992, 52% in 1995, 46% in 1999, and 27% in 2003.

In Poland the impact changed little from 1993 onwards. In 2001, although no seats were allocated in national closed lists, the direct impact of preference voting on the composition of the Sejm (26.5%) was slightly less than in 1997 (27.8%); it was also lower in comparison with seats allocated at constituency level in 1997 (32.7%).

The Latvian electoral system produces some peculiar outcomes. When parties place the same candidate in several constituencies, s/he can – and often does – win enough preference votes to be elected in more than one district. However, the candidate can only win one seat, so in the other constituencies the preference votes cast for him/her are wasted, and the candidate with the next highest personal preference vote is elected in those districts. The figures for direct impact, 24 MPs in 1998 and 32 in 2002, include only candidates who would not have been elected in the order submitted by their party after excluding all multiple ‘successful’ candidacies (for more details on who is excluded and how see the annex).

How far did the consequences of preference voting vary according to political party? We speculated that the impact would be greater for electoral alliances because voters would support ‘their party’, not the list order agreed by party leaders. We also expected voters to be more supportive of first-placed candidates of new parties and leader-parties and thus fewer preference effects (expectations 2 c-d). Over the region preference voting did make more difference to electoral alliances than to political parties (see Table 7). On average 23.4% of deputies were returned against their alliances’ preferred choices, while this was true of 15.5% of party deputies. In the Czech Republic in 2002 this accounts for almost the entire impact-effect of preferences: of eleven deputies elected out of list order, ten came from the ‘Coalition’, whose voters preferred

Christian Democratic candidates (8) to those of the newly merged Freedom Union-Democratic Party (2). Christian Democratic voters proved particularly loyal in the Czech Republic (Vlachová, 2001: 487). Yet it was not the case that the prohibition of coalitions reduced the impact of preference voting in Estonia. Table 7 also shows that new parties proved no different from parties that had stood previously: 16% of deputies from new parties were elected by preferences. Once Slovak parties are removed (because of the overriding effect of the single constituency from 1998), successful leader-parties were too few to judge their leader appeal.

Table 7 about here

4.3. Models of Preference Voting

Thus far the analysis refers to the voters' perspective, i.e. how voters used their preferences and with what effect. This section takes the vantage point of the candidate. Here we specify the factors governing candidates' chances of being elected, including the role of preference voting. This provides further insight into whether and where preference voting is more likely to act as an accountability incentive. In Estonia, as noted above, because of the national compensatory list only about half of parliament's 101 seats are included in this analysis. The Czech parliament has 200 seats and the Slovak 150. Only in Poland were more seats allocated at constituency level: 391 seats (in 1991, 1993 and 1997) and 460 in 2001. In Latvia we had to control for the effects of multiple candidacies; we excluded all winning candidates with multiple candidacies from the constituencies in which they did not win a seat (see annex).

The first two models assess the extent to which a candidate's prospects of election depend on his/her party and on the constituency in which s/he is nominated. The

dependent variable is a dummy (coded 1 for candidates elected, 0 for those defeated). To avoid the artificial increase of coefficients only candidates of parliamentary parties are included. In Model 1, in bivariate logistic regressions, the independent variable is party size, measured as the proportion of party candidates elected, at the national level, thus controlling for party popularity and list length. It offers weak explanatory power in all five countries, and we see no more than trendless fluctuation in the importance of party affiliation for the chances of individual candidates (see Table 8).¹⁶

In Model 2 the independent variable is party magnitude in the candidate's constituency. This is a measure of party size at the constituency level accounting for variations in both party and district magnitude. The change between Model 1 and Model 2 is merely the replacement of PARTSIZE with PPMC (district level relative party size – i.e. relative to the seat allocation formula and the size of the rival parties in the district). This change has, of course, no impact in Slovakia in 1998 and 2002, with a single national district. In the other elections the increase in the R^2 between Models 1 and 2 shows the importance for candidates of the district in which they are listed. In Czech, pre-1998 Slovak, and Polish elections, the difference between the explanatory powers of Models 1 and 2 is between (roughly) ten and fifty percent of the total explanatory power of Model 1.¹⁷ The strength of the party in the district where they stand appears most important for Polish and Estonian candidates.

When taking into account the party list position of a candidate the relevant cut-off point is the number of seats a party won in a constituency. 'Top place' in this context means any one of the first n places on a list, where n equals the number of seats that a party won in that constituency. Candidates who would have been elected under a closed list system (that is, above this cut-off point) are coded one in the dummy ABOVE1. In

¹⁶ These fluctuations do not seem to reflect cross-election variation in the proportion of candidates

Model 3 the dependent variable (ELECTED) is regressed on ABOVE1 and in Model 4 it is regressed on ABOVE 1 and PPMC (party magnitude in constituency). In a closed-list system, Model 4 must perfectly explain the dependent variable. Conversely, the greater the importance of preference votes in determining seat allocation, the lower will be the explanatory power of both Models 3 and 4. Comparing the size of the R^2 for Model 3 in Table 10, Latvia registers the lowest explanatory power of Model 3 (.433 and .287 in 1998 and 2002 respectively), thus offering the most space for preference voting. By contrast preference voting is likely to be negligible in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where Model 3 accounts almost perfectly for a candidate's chances of being elected (see Table 8).

Table 8 about here.

Looking at the parameter estimates regarding the effect of percentage party magnitude in constituency (see Table 9), a broad similarity across elections is apparent, with only the 1991 Polish election and the Slovak single-constituency elections standing out as deviant cases. For every percentage increase in the party's share of seats in the district, a candidate's probability of becoming a deputy improves by about 0.05, i.e. 5 percentage points. Although the impact again seems slightly greater in Estonia, the cross-national differences in the parameters are not statistically significant.

Multivariate models involving candidates' placement on lists are hard to estimate for Slovakia 1998 and 2002 because the single dummy variable ABOVE1 was perfectly correlated with whether or not the candidate was elected. In Model 5 (data not shown) a number of variables characterising the place of the candidates on the list (first-placed

elected from candidates running, save to a limited extent for Poland.

candidate, eligible place, one (two) place(s) above and below the cut-off point), were added to model 1) to show the total impact of list placement on candidates' chances of election. Ideally, one would like to explore the differences related to party size in a constituency and list length, as well as various types of list placement by including all relevant variables. However, this is not an option because they cannot all be simultaneously included on the left-hand side of the equation without causing serious estimation problems due to collinearity between the variables and the nearly-deterministic impact of a single independent variable in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, already indicated by Models 3 and 4.

Thus we preferred a stepwise model-building method for model 5, allowing the inclusion of a slightly different set of independent variables in the equation for each election. Obviously, for Czech and Slovak elections the R^2 value cannot increase much further through the inclusion of additional variables. However we refine these models, the explanatory power of the candidate's list placement remains much lower in Estonia and Poland than in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This suggests that one is more likely to be elected as a consequence of preference votes obtained in Latvia, Estonia and Poland than in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

These models offer further confirmation of our general expectations that given the specific electoral and party system contexts, the Czech Republic and Slovakia would offer less scope for effective preference voting than Estonia, Latvia and Poland. Moreover, they suggest that despite the high displacement figures, the Czech and Slovak systems work largely as closed-list systems due to the ratio between preference votes cast and legal requirements. Moreover, we saw above that Czech and Slovak voters *can* elect popular candidates. Thus there is a potential for preference voting to encourage

party responsiveness to the public mood even in countries where the direct impact of preference voting is minimal. They also provide further indication that in the different countries in our analysis, candidates need to pay unequal attention to other things than their individual standing with the voters, such as the party strength in the constituency in which they are running or in deciding where to run, or in their position on the party list. If preference votes are likely to matter for any candidate in Latvia, the constituency in which one runs given his/her party affiliation remains important in Estonia and Poland although all else being equal preference votes are likely to increase one's chances of being elected.

5. Conclusion

We anticipated that although optional, preference voting would be very widely used in Latvia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. In fact, many voters were content simply to cast a party vote. Czech voters, however, were less likely than the others to take advantage of their available choice. We were less surprised at this relative Czech disinclination to utilise the candidate-choice option than at the high levels of preference voting in Slovakia, since negative incentives appeared to apply in both cases. In fact, Slovakia showed not only high and increased levels of preference voting but also maximum disruption of party list-orders.

We did find the expected advantage for first-placed candidates, though it was far from overwhelming. Nor did voters for new parties vote more often for first-placed candidates (in Poland, Estonia and Latvia) or express fewer preferences (in Slovakia and the Czech Republic). There was some indication, however, that voters for electoral alliances used their preferences more often than did other voters.

In regards to effective preference voting (the ability of voters to alter a party's list order) we expected greater changes in list order in Latvia, Poland, and Estonia than in

the Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, this did not prove to be the case (see Table 5). Slovak voters' preferences were least consonant with those of their parties, but the phenomenon of list-place movement was common everywhere. Generally some two-thirds of voters exercised preferences not consistent with parties' list-ordering.

We expected that the effect of preference voting on the composition of parliament would be greatest in Latvia and least in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Indeed, a clear line separates Latvia with its distinctive preference-counting and Estonia and Poland with compulsory open-list voting from the Czech Republic and Slovakia with their weaker form of optional preference voting. Latvia had the highest percentage of deputies elected out of list order at constituency level and the highest average (28%). Poland saw more than a quarter of the deputies elected at constituency level winning their seats due to preference votes. In Estonia the average was 20.5% of constituency deputies; but the impact on parliament was less because of Estonia's particular seat allocation mechanisms. The Czech and Slovak figures were very low, an average of 2.8 % and 3.1% respectively - and consistent with the findings of Models 3 and 4 above. But this is not a distinction based on compulsory choice versus optional choice. In Latvia preference voting is optional but its effects are most marked of all.

Our paper offers some evidence that preference voting is used and used effectively, including a direct impact on parliament's composition in all four countries in our analysis. The differences in the extent to which it matters depend on the different weight of voters' and party's ordering preferences assigned by the law. Our findings suggest that if voters find the right incentives to use it, preference voting can be more than a formal means of increasing voter choices. This nominal component of list PR systems can indeed function to increase voters' role in deciding who gets elected and thus in improving the accountability of elected representatives in list PR systems.

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Appendix A: Note on Latvia

All our original datafiles treated candidates standing in multiple constituencies as separate individuals. However, ignoring the fact that Latvian candidates often stood in several constituencies created problems in assessing the impact of the candidate's nomination in terms of party, constituency, and list place because many leaders came top in several seats, winning that seat where their vote was highest. This meant that in other constituencies they appeared as 'losers', while other candidates from non-eligible positions were elected, despite having lower preference totals. The number of cases of candidates running in multiple constituencies and winning in more than one is relatively high: 140 in 1998 and 150 in 2002. This is, respectively, 40% and 50% more than the total number of seats in the Latvian Parliament, and 23.76% and 25% from the total number of candidates running for the parliamentary parties - 589 positions on party lists in 1998 and 600 in 2002 - would have won a seat in at least one constituency than the one in which they became an MP. Among them 58 in 1998, and 53 in 2002 occupied an eligible place on the party list in the districts where they did not actually take a duly deserved seat. These cases have to be excluded and the position on the party list as well as in the voter's ranking has to be recalculated among the remaining candidates.

Moreover, the total number of votes gathered by candidates elected in more than one constituency (excluding the votes in the constituency where they were allocated a parliamentary seat) represents 41.8% of the total vote for parliamentary parties in 1998 and 38.3% in 2002. In other words, the preference votes that really count are not the bulk of preference votes for the top-placed candidates but rather the few votes that differentiate between candidates lower down the list (cf. Marsh, 1985), even if the

difference between them and the top-placed candidates (both in party list place and voter ranking) can be very large.

The calculation of the direct impact of preference voting and the regressions exclude all winning candidates with multiple candidacies from constituencies in which they did not win a seat (140 cases in 1998 and 150 in 2002), with listplac recalculated among the remaining candidates (to avoid confusion the variable is called rlistplac). A candidate with a previous listplac 5 has rlistplac 1 if the candidates for the same party with listplac 1 to 4 inclusive were elected in other constituencies. Also a candidate with listplac 7 can become rlistplac 2 if the candidate with listplac 6 was also elected in another constituency. PMC remains the same. The regressions are the same as for the other countries but variables such as ABOVE are calculated using rlistplac.

This enables one to examine the relevance of list place without the interference of candidates with multiple candidacies whose votes in the particular constituency do not count because they won seats elsewhere. The calculation of the direct impact of preference voting on the composition of parliament is now comparable with that in the other countries but underestimates the direct importance of preference votes for lower placed candidates, its magnitude is however captured by the indicator of displacement even if in Latvia. Yet a number of cases are unavoidably lost. This is not a major problem because we have only 1 or 2 independent variables in most models, while the stepwise models have no particular relevance for Latvia but are only used in this paper for cross-national comparisons. The R^2 s for Latvia remain the lowest, suggesting that preference voting among the low-ranking candidates is important.

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Tables

Table 1. The Exercise of Preference Voting in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

election	preferences expressed	valid votes cast	maximum number of preference-voters	maximum (% voters casting valid votes)	minimum number of preference-voters	minimum (% voters casting valid votes)	average preferences per voter
CzechR 1996	2770581	6059215	2770581	45.7	692645	11.4	0.45
CzechR 1998	2310667	5969505	2310667	38.7	577666	9.7	0.39
CzechR 2002	1867114	4768006	1867114	39.2	933557	19.6	0.39
Czech mean				41.2		13.57	.41
Slovakia 1994	4667888	2875458	2875458	100.0	1166972	40.6	1.6
Slovakia 1998	5818893	3359176	3359176	100.0	1454723	43.3	1.7
Slovakia 2002	5876574	2875081	2875081	100.0	1469143	51.1	2.0
Slovak mean				100.00		45	1.77

Source: authors' calculations

Table 2. Support for First-placed Candidates in Poland and Estonia

election	no. with up to 25% of the vote	% with up to 25%	no. with 25 to 49.9%	% with 24- 49.9%	no. with 50 to 74.9%	% with 50- 74.9%	no.with over 75% ¹	% over 75% ¹	lowest no. of votes	highest no. of votes	lowest (%)	highest (%)	average % votes won by 1 st placed candidates	total competing 1st placed candidates ¹
Est92	14	14.0	26	25.2	40	38.8	23	22.3	73	16904	5.7	98.8	54.9	103
Est95	17	10.3	52	31.5	56	33.9	40	24.2	9	17189	11.4	96.3	55.5	165
Est99	18	13.9	68	52.3	36	27.7	9	6.6	20	14320	8.5	95.7	44.6	130
Est03	15	15.5	50	51.6	30	30.9	2	2.1	17	12960	5.8	80.5	42.3	97
Estonia average		13.3		40.2		32.9		13.8			7.9	92.8	49.3	
Pol91	182	19.5	521	55.9	198	21.2	32	3.4	59	11500 2	5.6	97.3	39.6	933
Pol93	163	19.0	568	66.1	108	12.6	21	2.4	71	14855 3	3.0	94.8	37.1	860
Pol97	177	31.7	304	54.4	67	12.0	11	2.0	45	12465 1	4.2	86.2	33.3	559
Pol01	156	38.7	209	51.9	33	8.2	5	1.2	40	14923 3	6.9	95.6	30.7	403
Poland average		27.2		57.0		13.5		2.3			4.9	93.5	35.2	

¹In Estonia these figures exclude those who gained 100% of their party's vote because they stood as their party's single candidate in a constituency.

Source: authors' calculations

Table 3. Performance of Highly-Placed Candidates in Latvia (% total positive or negative preferences for all candidates)

Year	Positive vote for all 1 st -placed candidates	Positive vote for all 2 st -placed candidates	Positive vote for all 3rd-placed candidates	Negative vote for all 1 st -placed candidates	Negative vote for all 2nd-placed candidates	Negative vote for all 3rd-placed candidates
1998	18.7	10.6	8.7	3.3	4.3	4.5
2002	17.6	7.8	7.1	4.8	4.4	5.2

Source: authors' calculations

Table 4. Distribution of Preference Voting in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

election	% of total 1 st -placed candidates below threshold*	% other candidates below threshold *	% of total 1 st -placed from threshold to 24.9%	% others from threshold -24.9%	% 1st placed with 25-49.9%	% others with 25-49.9%	% 1 st placed with 50-74.9%	total no. of candidates with preference s above threshold*	total competing 1st placed candidates	average % preference votes won by those in 1 st place
Cz96	87.9	99.8	12.1	0.2	0	0	0	20	116	6.4
Cz98	88.7	99.8	11.3	0.12	0	0	0	16	97	5.9
Cz02	74.0	98.1	11.3	1.9	0.3	0	0	192	311	6.2
Czech average	83.5		11.5		0.1	0	0			6.2
Sk94	4.4	91.1	64.7	8.2	29.4	0.7	1.5	232	68	24.8
Sk98	5.9	98.1	47.1	1.4	41.0	0.5	5.9	46	17	26.8
Sk02	0	97.3	12.0	2.1	52.0	0.7	36.0	50	25	42.9
Slovak average	3.4		41.27		40.8		14.46			31.5

*the threshold for preferences to count was 10% in all elections save in the Czech Republic in 2002, when it was 7%.

Source: authors' calculations

Table 5. Voters' Ranking of Candidates and Party Ranking

	all contending parties/ groups (%)				parliamentary parties (%)		
	1	2	3		1	2	3
Latvia02	40.46	47.72	11.82		37.50	51.00	11.50
Latvia98	40.99	46.57	12.44		12.74	51.44	35.82
Latvia mean			12.13				23.66
Poland01	38.33	46.75	14.92		38.55	46.30	15.15
Poland97	36.55	42.50	20.95		37.01	44.41	18.58
Poland93	34.92	39.42	25.66		35.78	41.23	22.99
Poland91	31.70	36.73	31.56		32.13	37.75	30.12
Poland mean			23.27				21.71
Estonia03	32.53	36.81	30.66		34.42	37.96	27.62
Estonia99	39.12	42.41	18.47		40.43	44.39	15.18
Estonia95	35.27	35.59	29.14		37.27	38.85	23.88
Estonia92	27.19	27.34	45.47		27.22	30.37	42.41
Estonia mean			30.94				27.27
Slovakia02	46.58	48.99	4.43		46.59	49.57	3.84
Slovakia98	46.26	48.92	4.82		47.39	49.05	3.56
Slovakia94	40.83	46.81	12.36		42.05	47.78	10.17
Slovak mean			7.20				5.86
Czech R02	45.94	45.32	8.74		40.69	45.87	13.44
CzechR98	44.82	46.88	8.30		42.77	46.94	10.29
CzechR96	45.94	45.32	8.74		45.08	45.25	9.67
Czech mean			8.59				11.13
MEAN C			16.43				17.93
MEAN E			18.03				18.39

1: voters' candidate ranking > party list number

2: voters' candidate ranking < party list number

3: voters' candidate ranking=party list number

Mean C: mean of all country figures/means; countries given equal weight; countries are the cases

Mean E: mean of figures of all elections; each election given equal weight; elections are the cases

Source: authors' calculations

Table 6. Deputies elected by preference votes at successive elections¹

Country	Year	number of deputies elected due to preference votes	% deputies elected in constituencies	% total deputies
Poland	1991	73	18.7	16.0
	1993	111	28.4	24.1
	1997	128	32.7	27.8
	2001	122	26.5	26.5
	Mean	108.5	26.58	23.6
Latvia	1998	24	24.0	24.0
	2002	32	32.0	32.0
	Mean	28	28	28
Estonia	1992	9	22.0	8.9
	1995	9	18.4	8.9
	1999	11	20.0	10.9
	2003	16	21.6	15.8
	Mean	11.25	20.5	11.13
Mean for countries with numeric criterion = 1			25.03	20.91
Czech Republic	1996	2	1.0	1.0
	1998	4	2.0	2.0
	2002	11	5.5	5.5
	Mean	5.67	2.83	2.83
Slovakia	1994	13	8.7	8.7
	1998	0	0.0	0.0
	2002	1	0.67	0.67
	Mean	4.67	3.12	3.12
Mean for countries with numeric criterion > 1			2.96	2.96

¹deputies who would not have been elected in their party's list order

Mean C = mean of country means; this way each country is a case and weights equally rather than each election being considered a case.

The numeric criterion is the number of preference votes needed according to the law for a candidate to be elected out of list order.

Source: authors' calculations

Table 7: Electoral contenders by preference impact

type of electoral contender	number	% deputies elected by preferences
party	52 ¹	15.5
electoral alliance	20	23.4
new party	12	16.0
leader-party	2	5.7

¹including party-dominated alliances SLD in Poland and HZDS in Slovakia in 1994.
note: Slovak parties have been excluded in 1998 and 2002.

Table 8. Nagelkerke R^2 for models 1, 2, 3 and 4

COUNTRY	Election Year	Model 1 PARTSIZE	Model 2 PPMC	Model 3 ABOVE1	Model 4 ABOVE1 & PPMC
Czech Republic	1996	0.099	0.109	0.983	0.984
	1998	0.095	0.105	0.946	0.947
	2002	0.027	0.039	0.872	0.873
Estonia	1992	0.076	0.158	0.605	0.627
	1995	0.153	0.186	0.662	0.681
	1999	0.049	0.112	0.646	0.660
	2003	0.086	0.148	0.563	0.583
Latvia	1998	0.068	0.128	0.433	0.458
	2002	0.072	0.130	0.287	0.326
Poland	1991	0.083	0.129	0.654	0.668
	1993	0.117	0.175	0.507	0.536
	1997	0.187	0.207	0.445	0.491
	2001	0.095	0.122	0.536	0.552
Slovakia	1994	0.096	0.123	0.813	0.817
	1998	0.083	0.083	1.000	1.000
	2002	0.043	0.043	0.979	0.979

Table 9. Regression coefficients for models 1 and 2

COUNTRY	Election Year	Model1		Model2	
		PARTYSIZE		PPMC	
		b	se	B	se
Czech Republic	1996	0.093	0.010	0.059	0.006
	1998	0.085	0.010	0.054	0.006
	2002	0.081	0.018	0.047	0.009
Estonia	1992	0.124	0.031	0.030	0.005
	1995	0.159	0.026	0.039	0.005
	1999	0.277	0.063	0.076	0.013
	2003	0.085	0.016	0.061	0.009
Latvia	1998	0.105	0.024	0.081	0.014
	2002	0.072	0.016	0.060	0.010
Poland	1991	0.184	0.016	0.135	0.009
	1993	0.101	0.007	0.047	0.003
	1997	0.107	0.007	0.051	0.003
	2001	0.089	0.006	0.043	0.003
Slovakia	1994	0.070	0.009	0.054	0.006
	1998	0.070	0.010	0.069	0.010
	2002	0.079	0.016	0.080	0.016