Political Parties and Electoral Systems: Preference Voting in New Democracies

Introduction

Early debates over electoral-system design in post-communist Europe often began with concerns about how best to foster the development of a coherent party system. At the same time it was widely recognised that the nascent political parties were little known to the wider public, while the concept of 'party' generally carried with it negative associations with the *apparatchiks* of the hitherto ruling communist parties (Birch et al., 2002). One way of reconciling these concerns was the introduction of systems of preference voting, enabling voters to endorse both political parties and specific candidates. Five countries - Poland, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia - adopted PR list systems with varied mechanisms of voter choice.[1] All types of preference systems appear to have implications for the behaviour of political parties, though this is generally an under-studied aspect of party behaviour.

One reason for this lack of research may be that the subject of ballot format has not appeared to be very fruitful. Some studies have argued that voters make little use of optional preference systems. Rule and Shugart classed Austria, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden as countries with 'non-utilized' preference votes (Rule and Shugart, 1995; see also Fitzmaurice, 1992). In Italy the negative image of preference voting, associated with corruption, was one reason for changing the electoral law (Rule and Shugart, 1995; Katz, 2001: 97). At the aggregate level Lauri Karvonen found preference voting to have 'few discernible effects' (Karvonen, 2004: 203).[2]

On the other hand, Raunio has argued that Finland's longstanding open-list system definitely does make a difference. The decentralised system of candidate selection and preference voting leads to some 'troublesome MPs' from the perspective of party leaders, as well as higher turnover and thus more deputies lacking parliamentary experience, and less parliamentary party cohesion than in other Nordic legislatures (Raunio, 2004). In the Netherlands changes that eased the conditions under which preferences had an impact also appeared to have made a difference. From the end of the Second World War to 1998 only three candidates were elected by preference votes; about 90 per cent of voters cast their vote for the first name on the list. After the changes in 1998, with a reduction in the proportion of votes needed to elect an individual candidate, the vote share for the 'list puller' declined markedly (Anderweg and Irwin, 2002: 81-2). Indeed, Bergman and his colleagues have identified a 'cross-national tendency towards a more direct link between voters' preferences and candidates for office' as 'the most important change in the relationship between voters and representatives' (Bergman *et al*. 2003: 213). Sweden provides an example where preference voting was introduced in the mid-1990s after lengthy public debate.

With few exceptions political parties cannot be regarded as a success story in post-communist Europe. Although they rapidly became the key institutions for political recruitment and government formation, they generally failed to establish solid links with voters. Parties remained fluid and changing. Wholly new parties emerged at successive elections. Parties split or merged, adopted new labels, or shifted their ideological positions. Many disappeared altogether. Parties found it difficult to develop coherent structures, and few could be regarded as fully institutionalised. All countries saw low levels of trust in political parties. Citizens were reluctant to join, so membership levels

[1] Estonia's experiment with STV in 1990 proved short-lived. Lithuania, unusually, also adopted a preference system for the PR element of its mixed-parallel electoral system.

[2] But Karvonen excluded Latvia and Slovakia and his hypotheses did not distinguish different effects for different types of preference systems.

remained very low. High levels of electoral volatility were observed in most post-communist countries.

All these factors contributed to the maintenance of high levels of uncertainty and presented particular difficulties for party strategists. Parties did not appear to have consciously considered the implications of preference voting, though in electoral-system debates they adopted positions on the broad type of electoral system, district magnitude, and formulae for translating votes into seats (Birch et al., 2002). Here we explore the question of whether they adapted pragmatically to the preference-aspect of the electoral system. In established democracies, parties take into account voters' expectations when putting up a slate of candidates, but in new democracies parties know far less about citizens' views. Therefore, the mismatch between the parties' and the voters' choices is likely to be higher in new democracies.

Given this context, we might expect parties to take advantage of all sources of information about their candidates and voters - but only if the mismatch makes a difference. Here we examine the ways in which preference voting may affect political parties and their development to see a) whether preference voting does matter and b) if so, whether there is any indication of party response. This paper constitutes no more than a first take on post-communist electoral data. All post-communist elections in Poland (1991, 1993, 1997, 2001) are included, and all post-independence elections in the Czech Republic (1996, 1998, 2002), Slovakia (1994, 1998, 2002), and Estonia (1992, 1995, 1999, 2003), along with two Latvian elections (1998, 2002).[3] The types of full data sets needed for more systematic hypothesis-testing - for example on party cohesion in parliament - are not available. Preference-effects on turnover cannot be tested either, because so many other factors generate high turnover of deputies, including high levels of electoral volatility and the ease of entry of new parties. But election results can tell us whether political parties need be concerned about preference voting and also in some measure how they have responded to it.

We discuss the impact of preference voting in three respects. The first concerns the use voters make of their varied choices in different countries. In particular, we focus on support for first-placed candidates. Secondly, we examine the overall consequences of preference voting for the composition of parliament. Thirdly, we investigate whether there are detectable differences between individual political parties. In this regard voters' choices may have implications not only for candidate selection and list ordering but also for parties' alliance strategies. Electoral alliances or coalitions are common in Central and Eastern Europe. However voters can respond differently to different parties within an electoral alliance. If they did indeed do this, parties might need to reconsider their alliance strategy. Finally, we attempt to detect whether parties alter their list placings as a result of increased knowledge about the popularity of their candidates.

Preference Systems in Post-Communist Democracies

Preference systems are less convenient for political parties than non-preference systems, since they reduce party control of political recruitment. With closed lists the party itself dictates the order in which it wishes its candidates to be elected. Voters determine the number of seats but the party determines who wins them. With preference systems voters also have a say in who is elected to fill the seats won. In general terms preference voting increases uncertainty. Although Pedersen found that in Denmark preference voting aided incumbents (Pedersen, 1966), Katz observed that the possibility

[3] See www.essex.ac.uk/elections for the electoral results. Data not posted on the website or not accessible may be obtained from the author.

of rewarding and punishing individual legislators may lead to higher legislative turnover, with more incumbents losing and newcomers winning than in systems without preferential voting (Katz, 1980: 34). The lack of 'safe seats' in Finland has been attributed at least in part to Finland's open-list system (Raunio in Bergman p. 306. citing Ruostetsaari).

However - assuming the desire of party élites to maximise party control - some preference systems are more preferable than others. First, parties should prefer to order their own lists because they can put their leaders, their most visible candidates, in top list places to act as list-pullers or 'locomotives'. First-placed candidates normally enjoy a considerable advantage (Marsh, 1985; Lakeman, 1974). All five of our cases have party-ordered lists. There are no examples of list ordering by random draw or in alphabetical order. [4]

Open-list systems are the least desirable preference systems for political parties, since parties have least control over outcomes. In open-list systems it is voters' preferences for individual candidates that determine who sits in parliament. In theory, parties should be more concerned to select popular candidates in open-list systems, i.e. to match their own preferences with those of their voters. Of our cases only Poland after 2001 had fully open lists, though the consequences of the Latvian system brought it close to the open-list system (see below). Before 2001 Poland, like Estonia, had an open-list system with a closed-list element. With open lists voters must vote for an individual candidate and, while the sum of the individual votes constitutes the total vote for the political party,[5] it is the totals for individuals that determine which candidates sit for their party in parliament. However, with a closed-list element parties have an insurance policy; through the closed list they can still hope to place candidates in parliament who are valued by the party, if not fully appreciated by the voters.

In Poland in 1991, 1993, and 1997 69 seats (15%) were allocated to parties that crossed the national-list threshold (5 per cent in 1991, 7 per cent in 1993 and 1997). When the electoral law was again under discussion in 2001 smaller and medium-sized parties supported the elimination of the national list, as arguments about greater party control of deputies yielded to arguments that the higher threshold made the national list of particular benefit to larger parties. They succeeded when the-then governing grouping Solidarity Election Action (AWS) joined them, as a result of a growing fear of an outright social democratic (SLD) majority in the forthcoming election (Millard, 2003).[6] So for the first time in 2001 Polish voters wholly determined the composition of the Sejm.

Estonia maintained a distinctive seat allocation mechanism which also left room for party-determined seats. In Estonia, as in Poland, the party vote is the sum of votes for individual candidates. The 'personal votes' for candidates are also treated separately however; and the first seat allocations go to candidates achieving a full district (Hare) quota of votes. After the allocation of these 'personal' seats, the remainders are added up for each party. In 1992 those parties receiving a full quota received district seats for their next leading vote-winners. Then the district remainders were aggregated at national level (for parties exceeding the five per cent threshold) and allocated by party-list order with a modified d'Hondt formula. In 1992 17 seats (of 101) were awarded in the first stage, but

---

[4] It should be noted that established parties may indeed voluntarily relinquish some of their power to the voters. In Denmark, where the parties may but do not have to submit their own ordering increasingly they have increasingly using alphabetical lists to give voters more choice (Damgaard 2003: 285).

[5] Independents may stand in Estonia; but none has been elected.

[6] The abolition of the national list did not in fact disadvantage the SLD, though changing the electoral formula did indeed work against it; see Millard, 2003.

the large number of electoral contenders reduced the likelihood of achieving full quotas at district level, so few lists gained the full quotas needed for seats at the second stage of allocation. Indeed, 59 per cent of parliamentary seats in 1992 were allocated by closed lists at the third (national-level) stage, often to candidates who had received low personal votes but were well placed on their party's national list. As a result of public dissatisfaction (Grofman et al., 1999), in 1995 seats were awarded in the second allocation only a) to parties that had crossed the five per cent national threshold and b) to candidates whose personal votes constituted at least ten per cent of the Hare quota for their constituency. In 2003 parties receiving one full quota received seats at district level for each .75 additional quota. Moreover, to be elected at national level a candidate had to receive at least 5 per cent of the quota for his/her district; otherwise the seat went to the next candidate on the national list meeting the quota requirement. The proportion of seats allocated in the closed-list third-round allocation remained substantial, but it dropped steadily: it was 59 per cent in 1992, 52 per cent in 1995, 46 per cent in 1999, and 27 per cent in 2003.

The Latvian system is a complex optional preference system. Voters may choose to vote simply for the party of their choice (placing the party's ballot paper in the ballot box). Alternatively they may place a plus sign beside the name of as many candidates as they wish, as well as deleting all candidates for whom they wish to express a negative judgement. In practice the Latvian system works like a fully open-list system. This is because votes are counted by taking the sum of votes cast for the party (i.e. those of voters not expressing a preference plus those of voters expressing at least one preference). To this is added the sum of the positive preferences expressed for a candidate minus the sum of the negative preferences. Candidates are then elected in order of these aggregated totals. In other words, all voters determine how many seats a party gains, but only preference voters determine who is elected to those seats.

The Czech Republic and Slovakia have semi-open lists with the weakest form of preference voting. First, as in Latvia, the expression of preferences is optional. Voters may vote only for a party or they may circle the numbers of preferred candidates on their party's ballot paper. Secondly, unlike Latvia, preferences do not necessarily matter; if they do not, then the party's list order prevails. In federal Czechoslovakia and in the Czech Republic in 1990 up to four preferences were permitted; if at least ten percent of a party's voters in a constituency expressed a preference, then those votes would be taken into account. Then, candidates gaining the preferences of a majority of preference-expressing voters would secure seats in order of their vote. In 1990 in the Czech section of the Chamber of the People 17 of 200 deputies were elected by preference votes and in the Slovak element 13 of 150 (Kopecký, 2001: 61). The 1995 Czech law specified that to be taken into account, ten per cent of a party's voters must have indicated preferences; a candidate would move to the top of the ballot in that district if ten per cent of that party's voters circled his or her number. The law changed again for the 2001 elections: the maximum number of preferences was now two, and candidates gaining at least seven per cent of a winning party's constituency vote moved to the top of the list. In the Slovak Republic the number of preferences remained constant at up to four per voter. Ten per cent of voters had to indicate preferences and a candidate needed the preferences of ten per cent of a party's voters in order to gain election. These provisions remained in independent Slovakia. But Slovakia also introduced a single national constituency in 1998, making it difficult for locally respected candidates to gain the requisite share of preference votes.

Since preference voting is compulsory in Estonia and Poland, voters cannot avoid it. They can take the easiest option of voting for the first-placed candidate in their

constituency (of course, the first-placed candidate may also be the voter's own first choice). If large numbers of voters do this, then any successive seats will go to candidates with relatively few votes so the parties will gain little information from candidates' preference rankings. In Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia voters may simply take the 'party only' option. It is the easiest way to vote. Some voters may also actively wish to endorse or passively to accept their chosen party's candidate choices. However, in Latvia at least there is a strong counter-incentive against the party-only option: all preference votes matter; indeed party lists affect outcomes only in the event of a tie. If voters make little use of preference voting - by choosing the top candidate on the list or by voting simply for a party, then we would expect no detectable effect on parties' recruitment and list-placing strategies. If they do use their choices, and if those choices matter, then we would expect some party response at the next election.

The Use and Impact of Preference Voting

In Poland and Estonia we can compare the preferences of voters easily. Since voters had only one vote, they could either choose the first-placed candidate or not. They lacked the discretionary choices of Latvia (with unlimited options to express positive or negative judgements), the Czech Republic (with up to four preferences in 1996 and 1998 and two in 2002), and Slovakia (with up to four preferences). Preference-voters in the optional preference systems could vote for the first-placed candidate along with other favoured candidates.

Estonian and Polish voters did indeed choose first-placed candidates ahead of other candidates (see Table 1). With one early exception, in all their elections, as well as those in Slovakia, more than 80 per cent of candidates placed first by their parties were also the first choice of the voters. Yet we can also see that support was far from overwhelming, even in Estonia, where first-placed candidates generally received a majority of preference votes cast but where those who actually won seats saw their share decline at successive elections. Poland's list leaders did far worse, gaining about one-third of preference votes, though winning candidates did slightly better than losers.

Certainly, both countries had some extremely popular leading candidates who did serve as 'locomotives' for their party's list. In Estonia the most successful candidates were US army veteran Jüri Toomepuu, who took the country by storm in 1992 with his new 'anti-party'[7] Estonian Citizens (*Eesti Kodanik*), winning 99 per cent of his party's constituency votes; Arnold Rüütel, the former communist president, in 1995, with 96 per cent; and the controversial former prime minister Edgar Savisaar, who topped the poll in 1999 and 2003. In Poland in 1991 the outgoing prime minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki gained 97 per cent of his party's constituency votes; in 1993 the social democrat (SLD) leader and future president Aleksander Kwaśniewski garnered 95 per cent; in 1997 Leszek Miller (future SLD prime minister from 2001-04) gained 86 per cent; and in 2001 Marek Borowski, who later left the SLD to form a new party, took 96 per cent.

Table 1. Performance of 1st-placed candidates

[7] David Arter, Parties and Democracy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of Estonia, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996, p. 202.

country/ election	average % preference vote of 1st placed candidates	average % preference vote of winning 1st-placed candidates[2]	% of 1st-placed candidates ranked 1st by voters' preferences	total competing 1st placed candidates
Estonia92[1]	54.9	65.0	77.6	103
Estonia95[1]	55.5	57.3	83.0	165
Estonia99[1]	44.6	49.7	80.0	130
Estonia03[1]	52.1	44.0	83.2	113
Estonia, average	**51.8**	**54.0**	**81.0**	**128**
Poland91	33.6	36.2	81.5	933
Poland93	37.1	37.4	86.0	860
Poland97	33.3	36.2	80.1	559
Poland01	30.7	33.5	82.6	403
Poland, average	**33.7**	**35.8**	**82.6**	**689**
Slovakia94	20.2	21.1	80.9	68
Slovakia98	20.4	22.6	88.2	17
Slovakia02	23.6	25.6	92.0	25
Slovakia, average	**21.4**	**23.1**	**87.0**	**36.7**
CzechR96	15.6	16.9	61.2	116
CzechR98	14.2	17.7	64.3	98
CzechR02	18.6	21.3	45.5	312
Czech R., average	**16.1**	**18.6**	**57.0**	**175**
Latvia98[3]	28.5	23.3	72.1	104
Latvia02[3]	26.6	26.6	71.0	100
Latvia, average	**27.6**	**25.0**	71.6	**102**

[1] excluding Independents and those who gained 100% of their party's vote through standing as their party's single candidate in a constituency.
[2] excluding candidates winning from national lists
[3] candidates standing in more than one constituency are counted separately in each constituency. Candidates with negative % are omitted (voters expressed more negative than positive preferences for their party's candidates in these constituencies) - 4 were omitted in 1998 and 6 in 2002.

In Latvia in 1995 48% of voters expressed preferences (52% voted for a party only), while in 2002 58.6% of voters expressed preferences. Unfortunately data are not available for 1998,[8] but it is likely that voters were already beginning to appreciate the implications of preference expression. Preference voters did endorse candidates at the top of their lists, who received an average of 28.5 % of preference votes; the figure was not much lower in 2002, at 26.6%. It should be noted that the addition of positive and negative preferences for Latvian candidates can produce strange-looking figures, including candidates with more than 100 per cent of their party's total preferences (positive minus negative) or less than 0%. However, it is also the case that first-placed

[8] The data were not collected in 1998. Figures for preference voting were provided by Liena Muraskina of the Latvian Electoral Commission, August 2004.

candidates attracted more positive preferences and fewer negative preferences than candidates in other list places. Given the range of choice, list-leaders did quite well. Over 70% of leading candidates also came first with the voters - but this left about one-third of first-placed candidates who did not.

Despite the similarity of their electoral systems, Slovak and Czech voters behaved rather differently. Slovak voters made more use of preferences than Czech voters. In 1994 48.7% of Slovak voters expressed preferences; in 1998 this figure rose to 52.4% and in 2002 to 66.1%.[9] Slovak preference-voters supported their list-leaders while also using their multiple preferences for other candidates. On average each Slovak preference voter favoured about three candidates. Like Polish and Estonian voters, Slovaks put first-placed candidates first in large numbers (Table 1, column 3). However, changing the electoral system also made a difference. In Slovakia in 1994 19.1% of list-leaders did not come first. After the introduction of the single national constituency in 1998 this figure dropped to 11.8 % and then to 8% in 2002. The leader of each party now led the single list, rather than standing in only one of several constituencies. Of the *winning* parties in 1994, 20.8% of first-placed candidates did not come first with the voters. In 1998 only one list-leader from a winning party did not place first in preferences and in 2002 all leaders topped their voters' preference ordering. Multiple preferences diluted the proportion of total preferences received by the top of the list, so list-leaders gathered about one-fifth of preference votes as Slovak voters also distributed their preferences to favoured lower-placed candidates.

In the Czech Republic, however, preference-voters appeared more similar to those in Latvia, albeit less supportive of party leaders. However, a majority of Czech voters did not express preferences: in 1996 a *maximum* of 45.7% of voters used the preference option; in 1998 the maximum was 38.7% and in 2002 39.2%.[10] In 1996 only twenty candidates met the requirement to gain preferences exceeding ten per cent of their party's constituency vote. Of these, 14 were already placed at the head of their constituency lists. Overall party leaders did best. The highest proportions of their party's preference votes[11] went to Miroslav Sládek, leader of the radical Republicans (35.4%), future prime minister Miloš Zeman of the Social Democrats (30.2%), leader of the Civic Democratic Alliance Vladimir Dlouhy (30.3%), and incumbent prime minister Vacláv Klaus of the Civic Democrats (30.2%). In 1998 the picture was little different. 16 candidates gained the requisite ten per cent of their party's vote, including 11 ranked first on the list. Generally party leaders again did well, and 8 of the 11 came from winning parties.

In 2002 the number of electoral contenders increased and thus too the number of candidates. At the same time the electoral system was somewhat more favourable to effective preference-voting, with voters having only two preferences and a new threshold. The number of candidates gaining sufficient preferences (more than seven per cent of their party's vote) was now 192 and their profile changed. 111 did not head their party's list, though 82 came from small parties that were incapable of securing a seat. Of the preferred non-list-leading candidates from winning parties, one was a social

---

[9] These data were calculated on the basis of information provided by Vladimir Cicmanec of the Slovak Statistical Office.

[10] The precise figures are not available; the maximum is obtained by dividing the number of preference votes by the number of possible preferences: four (1996 and 1998) and two (2002).

[11] This is the share of preferences expressed for the party in the constituency, not the share of the party's total vote, which is used to calculate eligibility for a seat. We do not know how many of these candidates met the requirement that at least one-tenth of the total number of voters for the party exercise the right to a preferential vote.

democrat, two were civic democrats and 26 came from the Coalition. Of the 45 *winning* candidates gaining over seven per cent of their party's votes, 26 were first on the list, including all six communists, eight out of nine social democrats, three out of five civic democrats, but nine of 25 from the Coalition.

However, Czech preference-voters did appear more dissatisfied with their leaders than voters elsewhere. Leaders attracted a smaller share of the preferences cast and voters ranked first-placed voters first less often than any other voters. Indeed, in 2002, when voters' preference choices were reduced to two, preference-voters' ranking coincided with the parties' ranking for only 45.5% of list-leaders.

The Effects of Preference Voting

Despite these differences we cannot assume that they provides parties with differential incentives to respond to their voters, though Slovak voters appeared most satisfied with party leaders. We need to establish whether voters' preferences made a difference to electoral outcomes. Here we find considerable differences between Slovakia and the Czech Republic on the one hand and Poland, Estonia, and Latvia on the other (see Table 2).

In Slovakia in 1994 13 deputies (8.7%) were elected by voters out of party list-order; but there were none in 1998 and only one in 2002. The introduction of the single national constituency in Slovakia virtually negated the role of preference voting, despite the fact that more and more voters used the preference option. In the Czech Republic in 1996 only one deputy owed election to preference votes (0.5%). In 1998 it was four (2%). In 2002 the figure rose to eleven, but the proportion of deputies remained low at 5.5 per cent. It is clear that neither in the Czech Republic nor in Slovakia did voters' preferences matter much to outcomes. In both countries a very small number of deputies were elected by virtue of preference votes. On the strength of this evidence successful parties did not really need to adjust their strategies of candidate selection and list ordering to accommodate voters' preferences. Voter mobilization in favour of particular candidates presumably gave voters a measure of satisfaction. However, given the very small overall changes wrought by voters, this might seem a sensible price for a party to pay - and one that did not require any further response.

Table 2. Deputies elected by preference votes at successive elections[1]

Country	Year	number of deputies elected due to preference votes	% deputies elected in constituencies	% total deputies
Poland	1991	73	18.7	16.0
	1993	111	28.4	24.1
	1997	128	32.7	27.8
	2001	122	26.5	26.5
	Mean	108.5	26.6	23.6
Latvia	1998	24	24.0	24.0
	2001	32	32.0	32.0
	Mean	28	28.0	28.0
Estonia	1992	9	22.0	8.9
	1995	9	18.4	8.9
	1999	11	20.0	10.9
	2003	16	21.6	15.8

	Mean	11.25	20.5	11.13
Czech Republic	1996	1	0.5	0.5
	1998	4	2.0	2.0
	2002	11	5.5	5.5
	Mean	5.67	2.83	2.83
Slovakia	1994	13	8.7	8.7
	1998	0	0.0	0.0
	2002	1	0.67	0.67
	Mean	4.67	3.12	3.12

[1]deputies who would not have been elected in their party's list order
Source: authors' calculations

The position in Poland, Latvia, and Estonia was rather different. In all three cases voters made a significant difference to the composition of parliament. Deputies elected out of party-list order constituted a considerable share of total deputies (see Table 2). In Latvia the figures were high: almost one-quarter of deputies in 1998 and almost one-third of deputies in 2002 were elected because the voters preferred them. In Poland too at each election from 1993 onward voters' preferences accounted for more than one-quarter of deputies. In Estonia parties gained advantage from the national closed-list element of the electoral system. We see in Table 2 that the proportion of Estonian deputies elected out of list order from the constituencies was quite high; but because so many deputies owed their election to the national list, the proportion of total deputies was initially rather low. As the proportion of deputies elected from national lists decreased over time, the parties became more vulnerable to voters' preferences. So in these three cases parties appeared to have reason to respond. However, we can probe all our cases further by looking at particular countries and individual parties.

Parties and Their Preference-Voters

Often in early elections new or incipient parties did not manage to field full slates of candidates. Many parties, alliances, or groupings disappeared quickly, including some parliamentary parties that did not survive successive elections. Party splits and mergers also had an effect, and parties entered different electoral alliances. Even when parties won seats at consecutive elections they experienced considerable fluctuations in the number of seats won. Each of these factors made it difficult for parties to draw conclusions from electoral outcomes and to behave strategically.

In Estonia only Pro Patria (101) and the Popular Front (103) fielded full slates of candidates in 1992. Nine groupings entered parliament, two with only a single seat (see Table 3). The Independent Royalists, Estonian Citizens, Entrepreneurs, and Greens disappeared from parliament in 1995. In 1995 a Pro Patria (Isamaa) splinter became the Right-wingers, and Isamaa stood in electoral alliance with the National Independence Party. The Right-wingers disappeared in 1999, though Isamaa survived, albeit with few seats. The Popular Front fractured into a number of elements after 1992, the most important of which was the Centre Party. The only survivor of the parties gathered in Secure Home was the Coalition Party. Parties' electoral support fluctuated wildly from election to election. Individual deputies often changed their party allegiance. So this was a complex and changing political landscape. From 1998 electoral alliances were not permitted in Estonia, and parties appeared rather more stable, though in 2003 the Coalition Party did not survive, and a new party, Res Publica, entered parliament shortly after its founding.

Table 3. Impact of Preference Voting in Estonia by Parliamentary Party

year	Party/Coalition	type of electoral contender	total deputies elected	elected in constituency	elected from constituency out of list order	% constituency party deputies elected out of list order	% total party deputies elected out of list order
1992	**Pro Patria (Isamaa)**	alliance	29	17	2	11.8	6.9
	Secure Home (Kindel Kodu)	alliance	17	7	2	28.6	11.8
	ERSP (National Independence Party)	party	10	3	2	66.7	20.0
	Independent Royalists (Sõltumatud Kuningriiklased)	party	8	3	2	66.7	25.0
	Moderates	party	12	2	1	50.0	8.3
	Popular Front	movement	15	4	0	0	0
	Estonian Citizen (Eesti Kodanik)	new party	8	3	0	0	0
	Entrepreneurs (Erakond)	alliance	1	1	0	0	0
	Greens (Eesti Rohelised)	party	1	1	0	0	0
1995	**Coalition Party + Rural Union**	alliance	41	27	8	29.6	19.5
	Reform Party	new party	19	10	1	10.0	5.3
	Centre Party	party	16	8	0	0	0
	Moderates	party	6	1	0	0	0
	Right-wingers	new party	5	1	0	0	0
	Isamaa + ERSP	alliance	8	1	0	0	0
	Our Home is Estonia!	alliance	6	1	0	0	0
1999	**Centre Party**	party	28	18	5	27.8	17.8
	Reform Party	party	18	10	2	20.0	11.1
	Moderates	party	17	11	2	18.2	11.8
	United People's Party	party	6	3	2	66.7	33.3
	Isamaa	party	18	9	0	0	0
	Country People's Party	party	7	2	0	0	0
	Coalition Party	party	7	2	0	0	0
2003	**Centre Party**	party	28	22	8	36.4	28.6
	People's Union	party	13	10	1	10.0	7.7
	Reform Party	party	19	16	2	12.5	10.5
	Res Publica	new party	28	21	5	23.8	17.9
	Isamaa	party	7	3	0	0	0
	Moderates	party	6	2	0	0	0

Source: author's calculations
Note: Parties in bold contested successive elections.

Table 3 shows not only how the national-list element diluted the impact of voters' preferences in Estonia, particularly in 1992, but also the differential impact of preference voting. Some parties clearly matched their voters' preferences more closely than others. Isamaa is a case in point: in 1992 11.8 per cent of deputies elected for the party in the

constituency were elected because of voters' preferences; but when the national list is taken into account the total proportion of Isamaa's deputies was only 6.9 per cent. At subsequent elections the voters did not disturb the party's list order at all. Other parties that also demonstrated a measure of continuity showed variation across elections. The Popular Front had no deputies elected out of list order in 1992, and neither did its main offshoot the Centre Party in 1995. In 1999 however 17.8 per cent of Centre Party deputies owed their election to preference votes, and in 2003 it was 28.6 per cent. For the most part numbers were quite small, and it might be thought rash of us, and of the parties themselves, to take much notice of them (but see below).

The Polish case appears rather different. Polish parties were extremely volatile. The first fully democratic election of October 1991 saw an exceptionally high number of contenders (111), with a large number (29) gaining seats in parliament. This fragmentation led to the introduction of a 5% threshold for constituency representation which led in turn to a savage reduction in the number of parliamentary parties in 1993. Many of the excluded parties regrouped around the Solidarity trade union as Solidarity Election Action (AWS) to win the 1997 election; AWS also included elements of two small parliamentary parties, the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN) and the Non-party Reform Bloc (BBWR). Yet AWS and its erstwhile coalition partner the Freedom Union both disintegrated just before the election of 2001, providing scope for three new entrants to parliament and the breakthrough of a hitherto marginalised populist party, Andrzej Lepper's Self-Defence (SO).

Voters frequently used their capacity to disrupt the parties' list order and only one party, the leader-oriented KPN, maintained its list intact, but only in 1991 (see Table 4). In 2001 Self-Defence, also the creature of its leader, had voters who largely accepted the party's choices. AWS by contrast experienced high levels of displacement of its list order. Almost forty per cent of the candidates elected under the AWS banner in constituencies owed their seats to the voters. It is not implausible to suggest that this factor contributed to the already-fissiparous tendencies of the AWS and its subsequent inability to maintain parliamentary discipline.

However, voters of the two successor parties, the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), were also prone to displacing their parties' favoured candidates - roughly one-third of their constituency deputies owed their parliamentary seats to the voters. It seems likely that in all three cases voters were knowledgeable about the candidates, who often had local bases of support, and about divisions within their party or alliance. The constituent parties of AWS in particular were determined to maintain visible, separate identities. The SLD gathered to itself the 'old' trade unions and former communist-ancillary organisations until it became a unified party in 1999 - and then entered an electoral alliance with the Labour Union. In 2001, when the PSL was particularly divided, 40 per cent of its deputies were elected out of list order.

Table 4.The Impact of Preference Voting by Party in Poland

year	Party/Coalition	type of contender	total deputies	no. elected from constitu-ency	no. elected from constituency out of list order	% constituency party deputies elected out of list order	% total party deputies elected out of list order
1991[1]	**Polish Peasant Party (PSL)**	party	48	41	12	29.3	25.0
	Centrum (POC)	party	44	37	7	18.9	15.9

	Catholic Election Action (WAK)	alliance	49	42	6	14.3	12.2
	Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD)	party	37	31	5	16.1	13.5
	Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN)	party	46	38	0	0	0
	Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD)	alliance	60	50	13	26.0	21.7
	Democratic Union (UD)	party	62	51	7	13.7	11.3
1993[2]	**Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN)**	party	22	22	5	22.7	22.7
	Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD)	party-dominated alliance	172	145	45	31.0	26.2
	Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	party	132	112	38	33.9	28.8
	Democratic Union (UD)	party	74	60	11	18.3	14.9
	Non-Party Reform Bloc (BBWR)	new party	16	16	4	25.0	25.0
	Labour Union (UP)	party	41	32	7	21.9	17.1
1997[2]	**Freedom Union (UW)[3]**	party	60	49	11	22.5	18.3
	Solidarity Election Action (AWS)	alliance	201	172	68	39.5	33.8
	Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD)	party-dominated alliance	164	141	43	30.5	26.2
	Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	party	27	21	6	28.6	22.2
	Movement for Rebuilding Poland (ROP)	new party	6		0	0	0
2001[2]	**Democratic Left +Labour Union (SLD-UP)**	alliance	216	216	66	30.6	30.6
	Self-Defence (SO)	party	53	53	6	11.3	11.3
	Law and Justice (PiS)	new party	44	44	10	22.7	22.7
	Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	party	42	42	17	40.5	40.5
	Civic Platform (PO)	new party	65	65	16	24.6	24.6
	League of Polish Families (LPR)	new party	38	38	7	18.4	18.4

[1]larger parties only [2]excluding German Minority [3]formed from the merger of the Democratic Union and Liberal-Democratic Congress in April 1994.

Note: Parties in bold contested successive elections.

Source: authors' calculations

The position in Latvia is far more complex. Parties often place candidates in more than one constituency, and a candidate wins in that constituency where his/her preference vote is highest. A popular candidate may thus come top of voters' preferences in several constituencies where s/he does not win the seat. So in those constituencies a candidate appears as a 'loser', while his/her removal from the list of eligible candidates frees up seats for other candidates from otherwise non-eligible positions, despite the latters' lower preference totals. In order to calculate the number of candidates winning out of list order we excluded all winning candidates with multiple candidacies from constituencies in which they did not win a seat. We have also used this approach as the basis for calculations in Table 5.

Table 5. The Impact of Preferences on Latvian Parties

year	Party/Coalition	type of contender	total deputies	no. elected from constitu-ency	no. elected from constituency out of list order	% constituency party deputies elected out of list order	% total party deputies elected out of list order
1998	**Latvia's Way** (LC)	party	21	21	4	19.0	19.0
	National Harmony (TSP)	alliance	16	16	5	31.3	31.3
	New Party (JP)	new party	8	8	1	12.5	12.5
	People's Party (TP)	party	24	24	5	20.8	20.8
	Latvian Social-Democratic Alliance (LSDA)	alliance	14	14	7	50.0	50.0
	For Homeland & Freedom/ LNNK (TB/LNNK)	alliance	17	17	6	35.3	35.3
2002	New Era (JL)	new party	26	26			
	For Homeland & Freedom/ LNNK (TB/LNNK)	alliance	7	7			
	For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL)	alliance	25	25			
	People's Party (TP)	party	20	20			
	Latvia First (LPP)	new party	10	10			
	Green and Farmers Union (ZZS)	alliance	12	12			

Note: Parties in bold contested successive elections, whether individually or in an electoral coalition.

Latvia was the country most susceptible to new parties; but they did not always survive. In 1995 the radical right Sigurist Party had entered parliament, but it performed miserably in 1998, when the New Party made its breakthrough. In 2002 the new parties New Era and Latvia First gained seats, with New Era topping the poll. Table 5 seems to

give some credence to the view that voters for new parties are less likely to disrupt party-list order, while alliances appeared more susceptible to displacement of their list order by the voters than parties that stood alone. In 1998 only one deputy from New Era was elected out of order. The three alliances saw more than one-third of their deputies elected out of list order because of voters' preferences. In 2002

The Czech Republic and Slovakia essentially confirm expectations that the small numbers render preference votes of little import so far as the parties are concerned (see Table 6). In the Czech Republic in particular the parties were far more stable, with a large party of the right, the Civic Democratic Party, and a large party of the left, the Social Democrats. The Christian Democrats and the Communists also maintained a continuous presence. The Freedom Union, an offshoot of the Civic Democrats, entered parliament in 1998. All these parties had a core of loyal voters, and although new 'outsider parties' contested elections, they did not win seats. Voters opted for their party and thus did not generally meet the conditions necessary to disturb the parties' list order. However, in 1998 disgruntled voters demonstrated their capacity to use their preference votes with the success of Christian Democratic candidate Vlasta Parkanová, who gained 30% of her party's constituency vote and 46% of preference votes cast for Christian Democrats in the constituency; she moved to victory from a losing fourth list place. Similarly in 2002 all but one of the deputies elected out of list order came from the alliance of the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) with the newly but uncomfortably merged Freedom Union-Democratic Union (US-DEU). Indeed, of the ten deputies elected by the voters, eight came from the Christian Democrats and two from the US-DEU. The latter effectively lost eight seats, with its two candidates displacing candidates from among their own party colleagues, while all eight Christian democrats displaced US-DEU candidates above them on the alliance-list. Generally Christian Democratic voters have been regarded as particularly loyal in the Czech Republic (Vlachová, 2001: 487).

Table 6. The Impact of Preference Voting on Czech and Slovak Parties

year	Party/Coalition	type of contender	no. of deputies	no. of deputies elected out of list order	% deputies elected out of list order
Czech R 1996	Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	party	68	0	0
	Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	party	61	0	0
	Communist Party (KSČM)	party	22	0	0
	Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL)	party	18	0	0
	Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)	party	13	0	0
	Republicans (SPR-RSC)	party	18	1	5.6
Czech R 1998	Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	party	74	1	1.4
	Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	party	63	0	0
	Communist Party (KSČM)	party	24	0	0
	Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL)	party	20	1	5.0
	Freedom Union (US)	new party	19	2	10.5
Czech R 2002	Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	party	70	0	0

	Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	party	58	1	1.7
	Communist Party (KSČM)	party	41	0	0
	The Coalition (KDU- ČSL & US-DEU)	alliance	31	10	30.3
Slovakia 1994	Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)	party[1]	61	0	0
	Common Choice	alliance[2]	18	5	27.8
	Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	party	17	1	5.9
	Hungarian Coalition	alliance	17	3	17.6
	Demokratická únia Slovenska (DUS)	new party	15	1	6.7
	Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS)	new party	13	2	15.4
	Slovak National Party (SNS)	party	9	1	11.1
Slovakia 1998	Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)	party	43	0	0
	Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK)	alliance[3]	42	0	0
	Party of the Democratic Left (SDL')	party	23	0	0
	Hungarian Coalition	party	15	0	0
	Slovak National Party (SNS)	party	14	0	0
	Party of Civic Understanding (SOP)	new party	13	0	0
Slovakia 2002	Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)	party	36	0	0
	Slovak Democratic & Christian Union (SDKÚ)	new party	28	0	0
	Direction (Smer)	new party	25	0	0
	Hungarian Coalition	party	20	1	5.0
	Alliance of New Citizens (ANO)	new party	15	0	0
	Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)	party	15	0	0
	Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS)	party	11	0	0

[1] This was a nominal alliance of the HZDS with the Agrarian Party (RS)
[2] The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL') was clearly the strongest partner, in alliance with the Social Democrats, the Green Party, and the Farmers' Movement.
[3] In legal terms the SDK was a party, having registered as such to avoid the high coalition thresholds introduced by the Mečiar government; but in practice it was an electoral coalition of five parties.
Source: authors' calculations

In Slovakia three electoral alliances stood in 1994, the Hungarians, Common Choice, and the Movement for Democratic Slovakia's (HZDS) alliance with the Agrarians. The Hungarian Coalition was a genuine partnership. The Democratic Left certainly dominated Common Choice, but it did not provide the overwhelming preponderance of its candidates (100 of 174). However, HZDS was so clearly the dominant partner that is difficult to see it as a genuine coalition: 182 of 194 candidates were members of HZDS and only five came from the RSS. No candidate was elected from that 'coalition' because of preference votes.

Table 6 shows that Common Choice saw the highest proportion of deputies elected out of list order in 1994; its voters, however, did not favour junior partners. The perpetual conflicts of the SDL' (Haughton, 2004) appear to have made a difference: All five candidates elected out of list order came from the SDL' itself. The Hungarian Coalition had become a party in 1998; but it retained its clearly identifiable elements and loyal personal followings. The three Hungarian winners saw strong personal votes, but Coexistence was the beneficiary in two cases and the MKDH in one. In 2002 the sole deputy elected out of list order was also a Hungarian.

The data from individual parties indicate decisively that Slovak parties need not concern themselves with preference voting, though voters' enthusiasm for preference-voting suggests that a return to constituencies might alter this situation. This is generally true in the Czech Republic as well, where most parties saw their candidates returned in list order. The US-DEU suffered from its electoral coalition with the Christian Democrats in 2002. Its decision to stand in the 2004 Euro-elections as part of the Union of Liberal Democrats could well have resulted from a strategic reassessment. In Estonia, Latvia, and Poland parties did less well in securing seats for their preferred candidates, thus inviting some re-evaluation of candidate placement strategy. We can gain some notion of parties' responses by examining changing list order from one election to the next.

Without full data on all candidates standing at subsequent elections we cannot assert confidently that candidates obtained higher list places because they had been more popular than other party candidates. Indeed it is more than likely that these candidates proved themselves effective deputies and hence useful party activists during their term of office. Evidence of popularity, however, could hardly have harmed their chances of gaining a higher list placing.

Table 7. Changes in List Order for Deputies Elected by Voters' Preferences

election	total no. of candidates elected out of list order	no. elected out of list order who stood at next election for same party	no. of these candidates with higher list place at subsequent election	no. of candidates elected out of order who did not stand again	no. of candidates elected out of order who stood for another party	no. changing party with higher list place at next election[12]
Estonia						
1992	9	5	5	3	1	1
1995	9	5	3	2	2	0
1999	11	9	7	1	1	0
total	29	19	15	6	4	1
Poland						
1991	73	46	39	17	10	6
1993	111	79	59	26	6	2
1997	128	80	59	28	20	20
CzechR						
1996	1	1	1	0	0	0

[12] Unlike Shabad and Slomczynski (2004) we do not regard a change of party as occurring when the candidate simply moves to an entity with a different label. If a candidate stays with his/her party when it merges or when an electoral alliance of parties is not reconstituted, the candidate is not regarded as a political tourist.

1998	4	3	3	1	0	0
total	5	4	4	1	0	0
Latvia						
1998	28	21	15	5	2	2

note: higher list places start from no. 1
Source: authors' calculations

In all countries deputies elected by preference votes did see an improvement in their list placing at the next election (see Table 7). In Estonia this was the case with 15 out of 19 (78.9 %) of those who stood again for the same party or for one of its constituent elements. In Poland too winning a seat on the basis of preference votes appeared beneficial. 84% of those elected in 1991 out of list order who stood for the same party in 1993 were placed higher and thus more visibly on their party's list. In 1997 it was 74.7% and in 2001 72.8%. In 2001 we can also see clearly the consequences of the intense splits in Solidarity Election Action (AWS). Whereas in 1997 only one-third of (few) defectors gained higher list places after changing parties, in 2001 in was 100%. All the defectors bar one came from AWS and went to new political parties, and all gained higher list places after changing their allegiance. We may also note that defection did not harm these candidates. 16 of the 20 won their seats, and voters ranked only 2 of them below their official list order.

In Latvia 15 of 21 candidates winning out of list order and standing again had higher list places in the 2002 election (71%). Moreover, nine of these candidates and one other (48%) also stood in more constituencies than they had in 1998. It is perhaps unlikely that the parties themselves would engage in the complex calculations needed to assess candidates' performance in Latvia. It would be far easier to compare the voters' ordering with the parties' own. Of *all* the 79 deputies who stood again in 2002, 46 (58%) were given a list place higher or equal to their 1998 voters'-preference ranking in at least one constituency; conversely 33 were given lower list places than that in which the voters placed them.

In the Czech Republic the numbers are very small but they convey a similar message. In 1998 the single Republican candidate who had triumphed over list order in 1996 now moved to a potentially winning list place; in 2002 all three candidates elected in 1998 by virtue of preference votes stood again in higher list places. Slovakia is not included in Table 7 because the shift in 1998 to a single party list with one national constituency changed the principles of list ordering. Nevertheless, of the 13 deputies elected out of list order in 1994 four had a higher list placing on the national list in 1998 than they had had on their 1994 constituency list, while another six were moved into apparently safe list positions. Of the others, two did not stand again and one suffered a lower list place.

Finally, we did another test for Poland and Estonia to see what happened to losing candidates who were overtaken by a winner from a lower list place. Again, it is important to stress that many factors affect list placings. One might expect that candidates who have proved less popular with the voters might be placed lower at the next election. Yet a party might wish to secure the candidate's election and so place him/her in a higher, more visible place than before.

Table 8: Changes in List Placings of Displaced Candidates in Estonia and Poland

election	no. of candidates displaced by preference votes	displaced candidates who stood at next election for same party		displaced candidates with lower list place at next election	no. displaced with same or higher list place at next election	displaced candidates who did not stand again		displaced candidates who stood for another party
Estonia		no.	%			no.	%	
1992	17	5	29.4	3	2	12	70.6	0
1995	20	11	55.0	4	7	7	35.0	2
1999	38	17	44.8	9	8	20	52.6	1
Poland								
1991	165	36	55.4	24	12	128	77.6	1
1993	307	64	20.8	41	23	238	77.5	4
1997	410	49	12.0	24	25	328	80.0	33

Note: Data include all candidates positioned above the winning candidate, not the single candidate losing the seat due to changed list order. An electoral alliance or a new party arising from a merger is treated as the same party for previous candidates of its constituent elements. A lower list place is farther from first place; a higher list place is closer to first place.
Source: authors' calculations

What is most striking in Table 8, however, is not the alterations in list placement from one election to another. Certainly in Estonia one cannot conclude that losing to a more popular candidate led to a lower list place at the next election. Indeed, the difference between those candidates who stood again in a lower list place and those who maintained or improved their list placing was marginal in 1995 and 2002, while in 1999 more candidates improved their list placings than not (see Table 8). In Poland at two elections the differences were greater but in 2001 more candidates maintained or improved their list placing in comparison with 1997, if only just. Few of these candidates defected to other parties. In 2001 all such candidates came from the fractured AWS alliance; most went to the new Civic Platform (PO), a few to Law and Justice (PiS) and one to the League of Polish Families (LPR).

More interesting is the hemorrhaging of the parties' candidate bases. Although more uneven and less dramatic in Estonia, a high proportion of losing candidates from winning parties did not contest the next election. In Poland it remained above three-quarters for each election. This is similar to the data presented by Shabad and Slomczynski for all candidates in early elections in both Poland and the Czech Republic (Shabad and Slomczynski, 2004). It is possible, but it seems unlikely that these candidates were available but not selected by their parties in preference to newcomers. If parties needed to recruit so many new candidates, then tested loyalty might well be more important than popularity witnessed a few years earlier.

Conclusion

The significance of preference voting varies with the precise type of electoral system. Uncertainty for parties is far greater when there is an open list, even if it applies only partially as in Estonia and in Poland until 2002. Parties operating in the context of the open-list systems of Poland and Estonia cannot count on candidates being returned to parliament in accordance with their own list order. The complex Latvian system also operates to all intents and purposes like an open list system. Substantial numbers of deputies are elected to parliament out of their party's list order.

On the other hand, the impact of optional preference voting in the Czech Republic and Slovakia has been very limited. This fits in with findings on other

European countries that preference votes do not matter much. Most Czech voters rested content with the party-only vote. Yet preference voting does no apparent harm. Indeed, it gives the aura of choice and offers the safety valve of a potential voters' revolt on behalf of particular candidates or groups of candidates. In Slovakia in particular, despite the fact that the single constituency renders the preference obstacles almost insuperably high, voters were enthusiastic users of the preference vote. There is no indication that party authorities worried about individual or factional campaigning.[13]

Again similarly to general findings in Western Europe, first-placed candidates did best. Latvia offered a distinctive case. Party leaders usually stood in all constituencies, but they did not always stand in first place in all of them; they often won their seat in a constituency where they were ranked lower than first. Generally, however, where a party won a constituency seat, its first-placed candidate won. But in Poland and Estonia first-placed candidates did not do so well as to rule out significant differences in the popular vote of other candidates. The list-pulling dimension of votes for first-placed candidates was not trivial, and many individual candidates attracted very high levels of preference votes; but it was not dominant. In Slovakia when a party won a constituency seat, its first-placed candidate always won. This was also true in the Czech Republic, save for three candidates in 2002, when voters distinguished between the parties constituting the electoral alliance of the 'Coalition'.

This suggests that political parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia need take little account of voters' preferences in drawing up their candidate lists. However, the distinctive behaviour of alliance voters might appear to warrant further attention. Electoral coalitions seemed rather more vulnerable to voter disruption of their list order than political parties. However, there is also some indication that factionalised or divided parties experienced greater displacement of their candidate lists by voters. At the same time there were tentative indications that voters for new parties were less likely to disrupt party-list order.

Parties in Estonia, Latvia, and Poland did appear to respond to voters' preferences. Deputies elected by preference votes saw an improvement in their list placing at the subsequent election. However, losing an election to a candidate with more preference votes did not always lead to a lower list place. Other factors clearly weighed more heavily, including general issues of candidate replacement in circumstances of very high withdrawals of candidates from the electoral contest.

References

Andeweg, Rudy B. and Galen A. Irwin (2002), *Dutch government and politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Bergman, T., Müller, W., Strøm, K., and Blomgren, M. (2003), 'Democratic Delegation and Accountability: Cross-national Patterns' in Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds), *Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies*, Oxford : Oxford University Press, pp. 110-220.

Birch, Sarah, Millard, Frances, Popescu, Marina, and Williams, Kieran (2002), *Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-communist Europe*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

[13] We have found examples of such campaigning in Slovakia (courtesy of Tim Haughton) and Poland.

Fitzmaurice, John (1992), 'Belgian Paradoxes: The November 1991 Election', *West European Politics*, vol. 15, pp. 178-82.

Grofman, Bernard, Mikkel, Evald and Taagepera, Rein, 'Electoral System Changes in Estonia, 1989-1993', *Journal of Baltic Studies*, vol. 30, no. 3, 1999, p. 227-49.

Haughton, Tim (2004), 'Explaining the Limited Success of the Communist-Successor Left in Slovakia: The Case of the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL')', *Party Politics*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 177-91.

Karvonnen, Lauri (2004), 'Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects', *International Political Science Review*, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 203-26.

Katz, 1980: 34

Katz, Richard (2001), 'Reforming the Italian Electoral Law' in Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg eds., *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 96-122.

Kopecký, Petr (2001), *Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Party competition and parliamentary instittutionalization*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Lakeman, Enid (1974), *How Democracies Vote*, London: Faber and Faber (4th edition).

Marsh, Michael (1985) 'The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 13, pp. 365-378.

Pedersen, Morgens (1966), 'Preferential voting in Denmark: The Voters' Influence on the Election of Folketing Candidates', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, vol. 1, pp. 167-187.

Raunio, Tapio (2004), 'The Changing Finnish Democracy: Stronger Parliamentary Accountability, Coalescing Political Parties and Weaker External Constraints', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, vol. 27, pp. 133-52.

Rule, Wilma and Shugart, Matthew (1995), 'The Preference Vote and Election of Women, Women Win More Seats in Open List PR', Center for Voting and Democracy, 1995 at http://www.fairvote.org/reports/1995/chp7/rule.html

Sartori, Giovanni (1994)

Shabad, G. and Slomczynski, A. (2004), 'Parliamentary Candidates in Post-communist East Central Europe', *Party Politics*, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 151-76.

Vlachová, Klara, (2001), 'Party identification in the Czech Republic: inter-party hostility and party preference', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 479-99.