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Overview Of Public service Broadcasting in Kazakstan factsheet printmedia broadcastmedia internet Media
in Kazakhstan In May 2002, staff members of the opposition newspaper Sol-Dat were beaten; at the independent weekly, Respublika, Molotov cocktails were hurled into its editorial offices, destroying much equipment. International press organizations strongly condemned the attacks and charged that Kazakh authorities were failing to effectively investigate attacks against media. As a result, journalists were becoming vulnerable to violence and intimidation. The International Press Institute (IPI), the global network of editors, media executives and leading journalists, wrote Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev, urging a thorough investigation of those, and other attacks. The letter added that the IPI network feared the attacks were part of a campaign to stifle critical reporting by the independent and opposition press. (1) The Human Rights Watch World Report 2002 said the Kazakh government in 2001 continued to tighten control over political life and the media. Journalists, editors, and opposition party activists who criticized the government –particularly charging corruption -- faced attacks, criminal charges, and other forms of persecution. The independent print and broadcast media incurred constant harassment and repression. Marina Soloveva, the former director of Ust-Kamenogorsk independent television, suffered a broken arm when she was attacked on March 6, 2001 by several men. Police investigators decided that no crime had taken place and charged Soloveva with making false accusations. In another incident, Gulzhan Ergalieva, a journalist affiliated with the political opposition, and her husband and son were severely beaten and robbed in their Almaty home on March 1. Shortly before this incident, Ergalieva had strongly criticized the government's participation in an electoral reform working group. A continuing means of harassing and intimidating the press was the use of defamation laws to bring criminal charges against reporters and publications critical of the president or other government officials. In April 3, 2001, Yermurat Bapi, the editor-in-chief of the independent newspaper Sol-Dat was found guilty of insulting the honor and dignity of President Nazarbaev. He was sentenced to a one-year prison term, but was released under a general amnesty. The charges related to an article alleging that President Nazarbaev and other Kazakh officials had been funneling millions of U.S. dollars from illegal oil deal profits into Swiss banks. The authorities confiscated the edition of the newspaper before distribution. No publishing house would print Sol-Dat for eight months prior to the trial. (2) In July 2002, criminal defamation charges were brought against journalist Sergei Duvanov, who writes for several Internet sites. In a May 6 story, published on an opposition Web site, Duvanov repeated virtually the same allegations that had brought charges against Sol-Dat a year earlier, regarding President Nazarbaev’s diversion of oil profits into Swiss bank accounts. By September 2000, there were 1,399 mass media and information agencies in the country. While 70 percent of these are privately owned, the government runs the daily newspapers that appear most frequently, and controls nearly all broadcast transmission facilities in the country. (3) In addition, many independent media companies are owned and run by members of President Nazarbaev's family, as nepotism remains a serious mechanism of government control of Kazakh media. A 1996 government decree transformed the state media into a joint-stock company whose shares were bought by Dariga Nazarbaeva, the president’s eldest daughter. She now heads the state news agency Khabar and controls three television and two radio stations. Her husband, Rakhat Aliev, runs the Karavan media group, which controls the largest non-government newspaper in the country, KTK television, radio stations, and a major publishing house. (4) Critics have argued that Aliev’s media empire is increasingly being used to satisfy his own political ambitions. Opposition journalist Sergei Duvanov, for example, stated that, “KTK and Karavan journalists scarcely differ from secret policemen. While they do not break bones or write threats on the walls… libeling innocent people, sullying reputations, and spitting into people’s souls is also a kind of terrorism.” (5) The Republican Party of Kazakhstan’s (RNPK) paper, XXI Vek (21st Century), was forced to publish on a small photocopier after tax officials confiscated its April 21, 2000 edition and printing houses refused to publish future issues. (6) At a July 18, 2001 briefing on Central Asian media before the United States Congress, Editor-in-Chief Bigeldin Gabdullin of the XXI Vek newspaper emphasized the need for independent media in Kazakhstan, where “there are no newspapers left which are not controlled by the regime.” He urged U.S. officials to, “help create an independent printing facility in Almaty, to allow the opposition to carry the truth to the people.” (7) Media Laws The media laws in Kazakhstan reaffirm the constitutional provision for free speech and prohibit censorship. The government, however, takes advantage of the laws’ vague language to restrict media freedom. The Kazakhstan Law on Mass Media prohibits media outlets from “undermining state security” and advocating “class, social, race, national, or religious superiority” or “a cult of cruelty or violence.” Under the law, owners, editors, distributors, and journalists can be held responsible for any violations. The law also requires all media to register with the government, but it does not set forth an appeals process, if registration is denied. (8) A vague 1998 law on national security further restricts independent media by giving the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan the authority to suspend the activity of news media which he believes “undermine national security.” (9) Furthermore, a March 1999 Law on Confidential State Affairs prohibits the “disclosure or publication of information about the president and his family and their economic interests or investments.” Basic economic information, such as the characteristics of natural reserves or the amount of foreign debt owed to foreign creditors, is also considered to be a state secret. The law was amended in May 2000, expanding the definition of state secrets to include departmental reports that were never published, and internal departmental documents marked “for office use only.” The new wording also expanded the list of crimes related to publishing such information and toughened the related penalties. (10) In March 2001, despite widespread criticism and protests by Kazakh journalists, lawmakers approved another set of amendments to Kazakhstan’s media laws. Beginning in January 2002, according to the new law, all foreign television and radio programs will be restricted to 50 percent of airtime. Currently, around 90 percent of broadcasts consist of re-transmissions of Russian networks, which government officials believe threaten Kazakh sovereignty. The 2001 amendments also impose stiff fines on newspaper, television and radio editors who use information from sources other than those officially sanctioned by the state. Media groups believe the new rules could force the closure of at least 10 local television stations, which would allegedly benefit the networks owned by Nazarbaev’s daughter and son-in-law. (11) In August 2002, Kazakh Prime Minister Imangaliy Tasmagambetov issued an order requiring all foreign media outlets operating in Kazakhstan to register with the Ministry of Information and Social Accord, which will then issue one year permits to operate in the country. The new requirements are necessary, according to the information ministry, for a “reliable and up-to-date analysis on the state of information dissemination in Kazakhstan.” Print Media The government operates and controls the most frequently published newspapers in the country. There are more than 1,260 print media outlets in Kazakhstan, some 80 percent are subject to direct government control. Advertising revenue is virtually non-existent, forcing publications to rely on government subsidies, even if the publication is considered independent.There are 39 newspapers and 26 magazines published in Almaty. Eleven newspapers are considered independent. Each major population center has at least one independent weekly newspaper of its own. (12) Broadcast Media In
contrast to print media, the Nazarbaev family generally leaves radio
and television stations alone for the simple reason that the most influential
stations are already under the direct or indirect control of the president’s
family. The government conducts auctions to assign frequencies, requiring television stations to pay an annual fee of up to $200,000 to broadcast in each city. The expensive frequency rates often force financially struggling stations to close. In the former capital Almaty, where eight private channels once broadcast, only four nominally independent television channels remain. (14) Arbitrary treatment of broadcasters is commonplace. In March 2000, managers of television Channel 31 fired Tatyana Delstsova, a well-known anchorwoman and editor-in-chief of the news program Informbureau, after she aired information about three opposition leaders. No official reason was given for her firing. (15) Internet Without access to independent media outlets in Kazakhstan, opposition activists and independent journalists have resorted to the Internet to disseminate their views. In recent years, however, the Kazakh government has taken measures to further restrict Internet access through a rigid registration system, restrictive media laws, and technology that allows the state to block specific Web sites. In 1999, Kazakhstan adopted resolution 1787, creating a state organization responsible for controlling all of the telecommunication networks in the country. Internet service providers now must register with government authorities before offering Internet access. Their lines are monitored by the country's intelligence services, which are also authorized to monitor telephone and electronic communications between certain categories of the population, including journalists. (16) In addition, the media law amendments passed in 2001 allow the government to require Web sites to register with the state as mass media outlets. By requiring sites to register, it allows the government greater control of the online content available to the Kazakh citizens. (17) In 2001, Kazakhtelekom, the nation’s largest telecom, announced plans to use cheap fiber optic cable lines from the Chinese company, Chinatelecom, to reduce access fees for its customers. While the new system is cheaper, it comes with the same Internet restrictions China imposes on its domestic users. As a result, a large majority of Kazakh Internet users will be unable to access many Western sites, or any other content the Chinese government chooses to filter. (18) Due to these restrictive measures, Reporters sans Frontieres continues to include Kazakhstan among the 20 countries that practice censorship of the Internet. (19) Bibliography (1)
Letters of Protest. Kazakhstan, 27 May 2002, International Press Institute.
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