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Class Voting and the Orange Revolution: A Cultural Political Economy Perspective on Ukraine's Electoral Geography

VLAD MYKHENKO

The coloured revolutions in the post-communist countries are widely regarded as bourgeois democratic breakthroughs in a classical liberal tradition. Statistical analysis of the structural side of the Orange electoral success in Ukraine – examining in a range of regions the effect on electoral support for an anti-regime candidate of a district's class composition, the activity of non-governmental organizations, ethnic-linguistic characteristics, the prevailing mode of human settlement, the church influence, and economic links with Europe – shows the class composition of an electoral district to be the single most important factor behind Viktor Yushchenko's electoral success. However, the Orange victory in 2004 was achieved with support from the *least* bourgeois areas rather than those where the urban capitalist class had been the most developed.

Introduction

There is an assertion which has become commonplace in materials and texts dealing with the turbulent political events surrounding elections that occurred in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It postulates that these democratic breakthroughs or coloured revolutions have had a particularly close affinity with the great French revolution of 1789, European liberal revolutions of 1848, and a series of anti-communist 'velvet' revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe. It has been often claimed that this resemblance is rooted in the fundamental nature of such revolutions, for they are truly bourgeois in a classical liberal tradition. Fundamentally, the coloured revolutions are seen as the direct social product of the economic transformation of the 1990s and following years. As the capitalist system of economic pluralism and competition was built across the vast post-Soviet

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space, it prepared the ground for expanding political pluralism, generating and further fostering a surging middle class, fully confident of its rights, needs and interests. For this reason, the revolutionary emphasis during the colourful popular uprisings is said to 'lie single-mindedly on democracy and freedom'.¹ At the height of the Orange revolution's success in December 2004, a prominent transition specialist reported from Kyiv's Independence Square (the Maidan): 'This rising against lawlessness and repression, for democracy and freedom, is a true bourgeois revolution'.² 'A triumph of the civil society' was another popular portrayal.³

As a new received wisdom, these statements confirm rather neatly Barrington Moore's 40-year-old dictum, 'No bourgeoisie, no democracy'.⁴ Among the most vocal supporters of this proposition one can easily find former economic advisers of the radical 'shock therapy' reforms of the 1990s. History, as it may appear, has exonerated them of all the previous charges of unduly inflicting losses upon the post-communist countries for the sake of free-market ideology. Yet the literature on the coloured revolutions, particularly on its most studied phenomenon of the Orange revolution in Ukraine, is full of other, complementary and, at times, competing triumphant propositions. Besides the liberal, civil-society-driven, bourgeois-democratic characteristics commonly attributed to the event, another popular assertion in the field has a geo-cultural, geo-political bent. It points to Ukraine's well-known historical divide between the Ukrainian-speaking, 'reform-oriented' and 'pro-Western' west (and centre) of the country, and its Russian-speaking, 'retrograde', 'pro-Eastern' east (and south). This literature unashamedly celebrates the revolutionary–electoral victory of the former over the latter as a 'civilization breakaway' from Russia, confirming Ukraine's long-overdue 'return to Europe'.⁵

Despite the growing body of knowledge devoted to the phenomenon of coloured revolutions, a good deal of the analysis generated so far has been, as one critic put it, 'journalistic in approach, partisan in orientation and normative rather than objective in content'.⁶ Although we have learnt by now a lot about various immediate technological, organizational and logistical issues involved in engineering and performing coloured revolutions, there have been very few systematic, scholarly, data-informed studies about the fundamental determining factors capable of explaining victories, failures and longer-term consequences of such events. This essay is a preliminary attempt to provide such an explanation. However, the present study is solely focused on the Ukrainian case. Moreover, it considers only the *electoral* side of the party-political conflict. My major aim is to conceptualize, model and test the determinants of the electoral victory of the chief Orange candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, during the last round of voting. If the Orange revolution were a truly bourgeois one, should its leader not have attracted more electoral

support in bourgeois areas of the country? Alternatively, what features of Ukraine's electoral geography had ensured the Orange victory in the contentious poll of 26 December 2004? And what implications could this have for the future direction of the country?

This study begins with a brief discussion of the two main theories of electoral behaviour, before reviewing the available research on the Orange revolution. The growing and diverse body of literature is then used to formulate a set of propositions that I wish to test empirically. This provides a basis for considering the role of class, social, economic, demographic and cultural factors, for the electoral geography of Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections. I then describe the research design of this study and the operationalization of its key variables: Yushchenko's support, on the one hand, and class position along with five additional independent variables, on the other hand. This allows me to analyse the cross-sectional Orange voting data with aggregate-level data for Ukraine's 27 administrative regions by running a series of least-squares regressions for the Orange support. I then consider the study's major findings, and conclude that a region's class composition was the single most important factor behind Yushchenko's electoral success in 2004. However, in striking contrast to most accounts, in the present analysis the Orange victory was achieved by the majority of votes cast in the *least* bourgeois areas of the country. Voters in electoral regions with the highest proportion of the urban capitalist class were the most *opposed* to the self-identified anti-regime candidate.

Societal Cleavages and Partisan Conflict: Hypotheses about the Orange Voting

There are two broadly popular schools of thought on voting behaviour which cut across disciplinary boundaries of political science, economics, human geography and sociology: rational-choice institutionalism and alternative theories of cultural and structural modernization. Rational-choice institutionalism stresses the importance of formal rules, particularly the choice of electoral systems, for electoral engineering designed to alter voting behaviour. The alternative theories focus on structural prerequisites for a well-functioning polyarchy and emphasize the existence of various entrenched, primary societal cleavages capable of generating partisan conflict and determining electoral behaviour.⁷ While institutionalism has been increasingly popular as applied to the study of electoral and political phenomena in post-communist countries, I contend that theories of societal cleavages and voting behaviour would better fit the purpose of this study.⁸ Building upon the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan in the 1960s, Lijphart has further elaborated the so-called structural theory of voting by developing a typology of

major social cleavages and issue dimensions of inter-party conflict. Lijphart's list of social cleavages includes seven conflict arenas deemed relevant for advanced industrialized countries. First, the socio-economic dimension covers the traditional class-based left–right differences on socio-economic issues, income distribution, employment, public spending and social welfare. Second, the religious dimension highlights potential differences between religious and secular parties, or the existence of a prolonged sectarian conflict. Third, the cultural–ethnic dimension is concerned with ethnic, linguistic, regional or secessionist agendas within a particular polity. Fourth, the urban–rural dimension focuses on a potential conflict between the nation's rural and agrarian periphery and its urban, industrialized core. Fifth, the popularity of the present government and the electoral chances of its re-election are reflected in the dimension of regime support. The sixth issue dimension deals with the country's foreign policy orientation and its broad external relations strategy. Finally, the materialism versus post-materialism dimension covers issues such as participatory democracy, environmentalism and human rights.⁹

The theory of social cleavages has been widely applied in electoral studies and the present study is no different in this regard.¹⁰ Moreover, Lijphart's typology suggests a few testable propositions that have a solid presence in the literature on Ukraine's Orange revolution. Considering the complexity of the phenomenon, this may seem not at all surprising. As the introduction to this essay has highlighted, the *socio-economic* dimension, similarly to the original hierarchy of social cleavages, rose to the top of issues during the Orange revolution. In a rather startling move for a proponent of *laissez-faire* capitalism, Anders Åslund has resorted to Marxian historical materialism to supply a narrative of the event.¹¹ Echoing the argument put forward by Barrington Moore in the late 1960s, the Orange victory in 2004 has been typically considered a natural historical outcome of the evolution of the urban bourgeoisie as 'a social group with an independent economic base which attacked inherited obstacles to a democratic political outcome'.¹² According to Åslund, the occurrence of this 'truly bourgeois revolution' alongside the rising prosperity of ordinary Ukrainians was not a coincidence:

Although the standard of living rose at an ever increasing rate, people remained dissatisfied. As Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out about France before the revolution in 1789, the problem was not the efficiency of the old system, but that its injustices became less tolerable. De Tocqueville's old dictum about the French Revolution appears applicable to another feature of Ukrainian society. The revolution happened not when things were getting worse, but when they were getting better. To put it in Marxist terms, the high economic growth convinced people

that the economic base had outgrown the political superstructure. And the rising welfare enhanced the self-confidence of the rising middle class.¹³

Data-mining in search of an empirically-informed structural account of the event, Åslund found not much divergence in terms of per capita income between different Ukrainian regions, and concluded that

it is difficult to make too much economic sense of this selection of regional data . . . [as] the economic and social differences are strikingly limited . . . To the extent that economics mattered, the steady high rate of growth emboldened the Ukrainian majority to demand a better life.¹⁴

I believe that Åslund's hypothesis, if applied to our understanding of the electoral victory of the Orange forces, firmly leads towards a study of traditional accounts of class voting rather than economic voting, in which, for instance, economic decline or rising unemployment imposes electoral costs for incumbent governments.¹⁵ Indeed, recently, the subject of class voting has seen a certain revival in both comparative disciplinary research and area studies.¹⁶ Setting a fine example of a robust quantitative study, Evans and Whitefield uncovered the emergence and resilience of class-based preferences resulting in the persistence of class voting for presidential candidates in post-Soviet Russia in the period 1993–2001.¹⁷ By analysing the class dimension of the Orange victory in Ukraine, therefore, this study aims to add to a growing body of scholarly work on the class dimension of East European politics and electoral geography.

The second most often cited cause of the Orange victory has undoubtedly been that of 'people's power', of a self-organizing (and very well-organized) civil society based upon a newly emerging 'pro-European civic culture', duly supported by the student youth and a host of non-governmental organizations, including the so-called Orange people from 'transnational liberation networks'.¹⁸ Whereas in Lijphart's typology the dimension of *post-materialist* issues of participatory democracy and civic values comes last, in our case it ought to appear along the socio-economic factors. This is because, in addition to the primarily Western literature discussed above, the class and civil society features of the Orange revolution have also been highlighted by a number of authors professing a markedly different ideological and geo-political persuasion.

In a special volume edited in the aftermath of the turbulent events by Mykhailo Pohrebyns'kyi, a Kyiv-based political analyst who had enjoyed close links to the Kuchma–Yanukovych camp, six out of nine contributors emphasized the role of the urban middle class and small and medium entrepreneurs as a major force behind Viktor Yushchenko's successful campaign. Most authors approvingly repeated the popular quip about 'the revolt of the

millionaires against the billionaires', while two – Markov and Fesenko – considered the event an 'NGO revolution', a 'post-modern happening'.¹⁹ A few of the contributors to Pohrebyns'kyi's volume disagreed, however. Popov claimed that, according to his sociological research about the actual voters and supporters of Yushchenko and Yanukovych, the first-named candidate's success was not at all the result of the victory of Western bourgeois-democratic values among the Orange electorate. Popov argued – as did Nikonov – that the Orange victory was delivered, on the one hand, by the left-leaning protest vote against the oligarchic Kuchma regime, and, on the other hand, by the anti-Russian, nationalist electorate from the Ukrainian-speaking, economically deprived areas of the country.²⁰

There hardly exists a piece of scholarly work about the 2004 election-cum-revolution that would fail to mention the impact of Ukraine's geo-cultural divide on the course and outcome of the event. Whereas the class and civil society issues have only recently emerged as a topic for academic scholarship on Ukraine, the country's cultural geography – with its deepening *ethno-linguistic, religious* and *urban–rural* fault lines, and its historical identity divisions – is fairly well researched and documented. Indeed, well over a decade ago, Wilson's hotly debated study of Ukrainian nationalism brought to light the country's omnipresent 'east–west' geo-cultural rift.²¹ It is well beyond our remit to discuss this literature.²² Suffice it to say that the essence of the argument, as captured in Barrington and Herron's article, is that there is not one Ukraine but many.²³ The question, therefore, is not whether the above-mentioned dimensions need to enter the model of the 2004 elections which the present essay is constructing, but which of these factors would prove more significant (if not uniquely decisive) in explaining the Orange victory. Clem and Craumer, in a statistically-based study, looked at the social, economic and cultural–ethnic correlates of the Orange vote. They concluded that taken together in a multiple regression model (which they did not present), the single most powerful variable in terms of explaining regional differences in electoral preference for Yushchenko or Yanukovych was the 'Ukrainian Russophone measure, followed by the industrial and mining work force variable, and then by the change in income variable, which together generate an R^2 of .8632; that is, these three measures explain virtually all the variation in the regional voting patterns at this level'.²⁴ In other studies, the ethno-linguistic and urban–rural attributes of the Orange supporters and their opponents seem to emerge also as the only clearly distinctive difference between the two camps, with the Ukrainian speakers and the countryside coming out disproportionately in favour of Yushchenko (and the opposite holds).²⁵ In the following sections, these competing explanations will be tested in an attempt to resolve the controversy.

A Cultural Political Economy of Ukraine's Electoral Geography: Data and Operationalization

Having considered the rich variety of potential explanatory variables, one ought to avoid constructing a mono-dimensional (class-based or other) model of Ukraine's electoral geography. Following some recent advances in critical theorizing of social relations, the present study adopts a cultural political economy perspective which takes a closer look at the social and cultural embedding of economic activities and acknowledges the significance of culture in economic relations, while at the same time trying to avoid reducing economic systems and mechanisms of capital accumulation to the 'lifeworld' in which they operate.²⁶ In electoral studies, Achterberg, for example, demonstrated how long-term changes in political cultures in major Western democracies affected the level of class voting and transformed electoral behaviour patterns.²⁷ Hence, by building a combined model of Ukraine's 2004 elections, this essay attempts to uncover the complexity of interactions, interrelations and interdependencies between the major social, economic and cultural cleavages in the country. The main research question here is not whether the Orange revolution was a truly bourgeois one, or more of a national(ist)-democratic breakthrough, or something else entirely – especially when, as Lane suggested, the better way to theorize this phenomenon would be in terms of a 'revolutionary *coup d'état*'.²⁸ What we are interested in is how the economic and the extra-economic characteristics of Ukraine's regional geography were reflected in the contentious presidential elections of 2004. If the Orange revolutionary coup were bourgeois in nature, its leader should have attracted more electoral support in those areas of the country where the urban capitalist class was more numerous. If not, what were the other factors that had determined the anti-regime victory on the final day of polling? My dependent variable *Orange support* is operationalized as the percentage of votes cast in favour of Viktor Yushchenko in the repeated second round of presidential elections on 26 December 2004. The electoral data come from the official regional distribution of results as approved by the Central Electoral Commission (TsVK) of Ukraine.²⁹ The first independent variable is class structure. A primary level of differentiation of class positions, widely recognized in sociology from both Marxian and Weberian standpoints, is that which distinguishes between employers, the self-employed and employees. In Wright's renowned Marxist class structure matrix and also in Goldthorpe's classic Weberian class typology the first two categories correspond to the capitalist classes, thus combining the *haute bourgeoisie* of industrialists and other large employers and owners of the means of production, and the petty bourgeoisie of small business owners, with a small number of employees or no employees at all (besides themselves and unpaid family

members).³⁰ Further differentiation involves the occupational status of employees themselves, that is their market capacity in exchange relations. The top three occupational categories, including officials, professionals, administrators, managers, and high-grade supervisors and technicians, are usually taken as a proxy for the bourgeois 'upper' and 'middle' classes. Both employment status and occupational typologies are widely used in the class analysis of electoral behaviour.³¹ In its base model, the present study applies the employment-status-based definition of the bourgeoisie. In addition, it uses the top three occupational categories (namely, professionals, managers and technicians) as an alternative concept of the capitalist class. The data are my own calculations on the basis of the 2001 All-Ukrainian population census carried out by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (Derzhkomstat).³² Average household per capita income may also be applied as yet another alternative variable within the socio-economic dimension to measure directly the level of affluence of an electoral district. These figures are sourced from Derzhkomstat's *Regions of Ukraine* data set.³³

The issue of participatory democracy is reflected in the second independent variable *civil society* which is operationalized in terms of the activity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs – political parties, trade unions, churches, social clubs, charities and so forth) measured as the total number of local organizational entities per 10,000 persons. A more accurate appraisal of the development of civil society would naturally have involved the actual number of active (fee-paying) members of NGOs but, to the best of my knowledge, such statistics are not available at the sub-national level for Ukraine. The third independent *cultural–ethnic* variable is operationalized through the number of people who affirmed Ukrainian as their mother tongue (*ridna mova*) in the population census.³⁴ This declaration of linguistic allegiance ought to reflect better the cultural and ethnic mosaic of the country than the alternative concept of inherited ethnicity (*natsional'nist'*). The fourth independent variable *urban* relates to the prevalent type of human settlement in an electoral district and is operationalized simply through the percentage of urban population in Derzhkomstat's demographic data for 2004.³⁵

The fifth independent variable *church* evaluates the strength of local religious activity. Since neither the Ukrainian census authorities nor the religious entities themselves collect or provide data on the number of active believers or churchgoers, no comprehensive statistics are available at all to measure the level of religiosity in the country, so the investigator has to resort to proxy measures. In this study, this variable is operationalized as the total number of religious organizations (churches, monasteries, mosques and so forth) active per 10,000 inhabitants in 2004. The data are the author's own calculations on the basis of reports by the State Committee of Ukraine for Nationalities and Religions (Derzhkomnatsrelihi) and Ukraine's Religious Information Service (RISU).³⁶

The final of this study's independent variables presents an attempt to capture the *foreign policy* dimension of the 2004 elections. It has been argued in some of the literature, especially in the popular media commentary on the Orange revolution, that one of the main reasons for the observed hostility in some parts of Ukraine towards the Orange cause was those regions' close commercial and trade links with Russia. Supposedly, the pro-Orange regions had much stronger ties with the European markets, especially through labour migration. A region's international orientation may be measured, for example, through its foreign trade direction, and outward and inward movements of capital, labour or both. Considering the volatility of international capital and labour markets, the most reliable measure appears to be foreign merchandise trade. This is operationalized as the share of total foreign trade turnover (the sum of exports and imports) with European non-CIS countries in a region's total foreign trade turnover in 2004.³⁷ All the data are suited for an aggregate-level analysis of the Orange support and cover Ukraine's 27 regions, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 24 *oblasti* (provinces), and the special-status cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol. Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of all the variables concerned.

Method, Estimation Strategy, and Results³⁸

Our baseline model is as follows:

$$VOTE_i = \alpha + \beta_1 BOURGEOIS_i + \beta_2 NGO_i + \beta_3 UKR_i + \beta_4 URBAN_i \\ + \beta_5 CHURCH_i + \beta_6 EURO_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where $VOTE_i$ is the proportion of the vote obtained by Yushchenko in electoral region i , $BOURGEOIS_i$ is the proportion of the economically active population defined as the capitalist class in electoral region i , NGO_i is the measure of the civil society spread in electoral region i , UKR_i is the proportion of the population who declare Ukrainian as their mother tongue in electoral region i , $URBAN_i$ is the proportion of the population living in cities and towns in electoral region i , $CHURCH_i$ is a measure of religiosity in electoral region i , and $EURO_i$ is a measure of the proportion of exports and imports that go to or come from Europe in electoral region i . The explanatory variables are all calculated using data collected before the date of the election so as to preclude problems of endogeneity. The simplest means of estimating this model is to use ordinary least squares (OLS), and results using OLS are presented below. However, as the dependent variable is bounded between zero and one (that is, between 0 and 100 per cent of obtainable votes), it is desirable that the predicted values should also fall within these bounds. OLS does not

TABLE 1
ISSUE DIMENSIONS OF INTER-PARTY CONFLICT, CORRESPONDING VARIABLES,
DATA SETS AND SOURCES

Issue dimension	Code of base variable	Description of base variable	Data set	Source
1. Orange anti-regime support	<i>VOTE</i>	Percentage of final vote received by Yushchenko, 26 Dec. 2004	Elections of President of Ukraine 2004	Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, 2005
2. Socio-economic (class)	<i>BOURGEOIS</i>	Combined percentage of large and small employers and the self-employed as of total economically active population, 5 Dec 2001*	Employed Population of Ukraine: 2001 Census Data	State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2004
3. Participatory democracy (civil society)	<i>NGO</i>	Number of civil society/non-governmental organizational entities per 10,000 population, 1 Jan. 2004	Regions of Ukraine 2005	State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2006
4. Cultural–ethnic	<i>UKR</i>	Percentage of population with Ukrainian as mother tongue, 5 Dec. 2001	All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001	State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2004
5. Urban–rural	<i>URBAN</i>	Percentage of urban population, mid-2004	Demography of Ukraine 2004	State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2005
6. Religious	<i>CHURCH</i>	Number of churches and other religious establishments per 10,000 population, 1 Jan. 2004	Religious Organizations in Ukraine 2004	Religious Information Service of Ukraine, 2001–2008
7. Foreign policy	<i>EURO</i>	Percentage of the region's foreign trade turnover with European countries (non-CIS), 2004	Regions of Ukraine 2005	State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2006

Note: * In addition to the employment status-based definition of the capitalist class, an alternative – occupational – definition of bourgeoisie was also applied as combined percentage of the three highest categories of the economically active in Ukraine's standard occupational classification system, including: (i) law-makers, senior public officials, managers; (ii) professionals; and (iii) experts. An extra purely economic voting variable – a region's average household disposable per capita income in 2004 – was also applied instead of the class variable within the socio-economic dimension.

guarantee this; we therefore use the model suggested by Papke and Wooldridge, which has this property.³⁹ This involves estimating equation (1) using a generalized linear model (GLM) with a logit link. The consequence of using this model is that the marginal impact of an explanatory variable on the percentage of the vote received by Yushchenko is no longer constant. Assuming a positive coefficient, the marginal impact of a one-unit increase in the value of the explanatory variable tends to zero as the dependent variable tends to one. The data are also weighted to reflect the different sizes of the electoral regions across Ukraine.

If the Orange revolution is a bourgeois revolution, the coefficient on *BOURGEOIS_i* should be positive. *A priori* expectations are that the coefficients on *NGO_i*, *UKR_i*, *URBAN_i* and *EURO_i* will be positive and significant as well. It should be noted at the outset that our statistical analysis suffers from a lack of observations. Ukraine is divided into 27 regions and, whereas it has been possible to obtain voting results at a more disaggregated level, no census or socio-economic data are readily available at the sub-regional level. Furthermore, Ukraine's local electoral districts usually do not overlap with boundaries of its local authorities (*raiony*), rendering any quest for more observations practically futile. This undoubtedly calls into question the robustness of our results. However, it must be emphasized that what is presented here represents a substantial improvement on the analysis that has been carried out so far in this area, most of which has been at the level of simple correlation coefficients. Results using OLS and GLS are shown in Table 2.

Column 1 gives estimates of (1) using OLS. *URBAN*, *CHURCH* and *EURO* are not significant at the 95 per cent statistical confidence level. Examination of the correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables revealed a (negative) correlation coefficient of 0.87 between *URBAN* and *CHURCH* which suggests that their mutual insignificance may be the result of collinearity. Most political science studies agree that rural areas are typically more religious. It was therefore decided to remove *CHURCH* so that our second model *URBAN* would capture the impact of both the urban-rural divide and religiosity. *EURO* was also removed as this was insignificant and this could not be explained by collinearity with any other explanatory variables.

A more parsimonious OLS model is given in column 2 of Table 2. All variables are significant at the 95 per cent level. The coefficients suggest that a 1 per cent increase in the proportion of the population defined as bourgeois leads to a *fall* of 8.51 percentage points in the vote for Yushchenko.⁴⁰ Care must be taken in the interpretation of this result. The statistical strategy here is not designed to explain who votes for either candidate. The class variable is to be understood only as a broad measure of the capitalist development under

TABLE 2
DETERMINANTS OF THE ORANGE VOTE IN THE REPEATED SECOND ROUND OF
UKRAINE'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL, 26 DECEMBER
2004 (OLS AND GLM REGRESSIONS)

Column	1	2	3	4
Model	OLS1	OLS2	GLM1	GLM2
BOURGEOIS ^a	-7.21*	-8.51**	-8.04*	-9.36**
NGO	1.75***	2.04***	2.28***	2.63***
UKR ^b	0.70***	0.68***	0.97***	0.95***
URBAN ^c	-0.34	-0.55***	-0.46	-0.75***
CHURCH	0.70		1.16	
EURO ^d	0.12		0.11	
Constant	0.08	0.31		
Observations	27	27	27	27
R-squared/AIC	0.96	0.96	31.1	27.2
Adjusted R-squared/BIC	0.95	0.95	40.2	33.7

Notes: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Dependent variable is the percentage of the vote received by Yushchenko. ^a Others (employees) as reference category; ^b Linguistic minority (non-Ukrainian as mother tongue) as reference category; ^c Rural population as reference category; ^d Other (CIS and rest of the world) foreign trade turnover as reference category.

post-communism as its coefficient cannot tell us about whether the bourgeois electors actually voted for Yushchenko.⁴¹ This coefficient informs us, however, about the electoral behaviour of all the voters resident in a bourgeoisie-saturated area, where the number of capitalists is higher. The other coefficients are to be interpreted similarly: a 1 per cent increase in the degree of NGO activity creates a 2.04 percentage-point increase in those voting for Yushchenko; a 1 per cent increase in the proportion of the ethnic-linguistic Ukrainian population leads to a 0.684 percentage-point increase in the Yushchenko vote, and a 1 per cent increase in the urbanization rate is associated with a *decrease* in the vote for Yushchenko of 0.547 percentage points. The R-squared indicates that our variables have a lot of explanatory power, practically covering all the variation in the model.

The GLM model's results are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. The signs and significance of the variables are identical to the OLS results and the rationale for the removal of *CHURCH* and *EURO* is therefore the same. This gives us our preferred model in column 4. The coefficients here inform us by how many percentage points the vote for Yushchenko would increase, if the value of the explanatory variable increased by 1 from its mean value. Again, the bourgeois class variable has the largest coefficient, with an increase of 1 per cent from the mean value leading to a *decrease* of 9.36 percentage points in the vote for Yushchenko. The other coefficients are again far smaller but significant at the 99.9 per cent level. Two alternative definitions of the bourgeois class variable were also applied. These results are not

reported here, since neither the occupational nor the income-based characteristics of an electoral district proved significant.

Discussion: Class Voting, the Orange Coup, and the Future of Ukrainian Capitalism

Two sets of issues warrant further discussion. First, this study has empirically tested a number of earlier propositions concerning the origins and causes of the Orange revolutionary coup. My main finding suggests that Yushchenko's candidacy met its strongest opposition in those areas of the country where the national urban bourgeoisie – the country's entrepreneurs, industrialists, merchants and self-employed professionals – were the most numerous. My aggregate-level analysis of Ukraine's electoral geography can hardly disprove the individual-level hypothesis about inclinations of the actual bourgeois voter. None the less, this study's findings evidently call that hypothesis into question. Moreover, this analysis provides further empirical backing to the argument that the Orange revolutionary coup was broadly a product of real economic grievances and 'decremental relative deprivation' suffered by the majority of the Ukrainian electorate during the transition.⁴² The often-alleged bourgeois nature of this phenomenon has thus been firmly refuted.

Rather unexpectedly for the present author, another major finding of this study has been the strength of civil society as the second most important factor in the Orange victory. The biggest puzzle here seems to be the apparent dissonance between, on the one hand, the positive impact of (primarily urban) NGOs on the Orange vote, and, on the other hand, the Ukrainian urban voters at large opposing the Orange candidate. And how could the *least* bourgeois or urbanized areas of the country be capable of developing such a large network of pro-Orange organizations? One plausible explanation would be to point at the extensive activities of Ukraine's foreign-sponsored NGOs, which were undoubtedly instrumental in bringing about the Orange revolutionary coup. This calls for a closer scrutiny of the literature on the role of the 'soft power' and external forces in assisting pro-Western electoral campaigns overseas.⁴³

This study has also confirmed its original propositions about the support of the Orange presidential candidacy by the rural voters and by that segment of the electorate that is culturally and linguistically Ukrainian. However, taken together, the ethno-cultural dimension has not topped the list of the pro-Yushchenko factors. Contrary to the earlier accounts, allegiance to the Ukrainian language was not the single most important issue determining the Orange electoral success. This may be good news for Ukraine's democratic prospects and its territorial integrity.

These findings and the consequent development of the post-Orange Ukraine prompt some broader comments. In particular, they raise serious doubts about the further direction of Ukraine's political economy and the sustainability of Ukrainian capitalism *per se*. In the course of the decade preceding the Orange revolutionary coup, a national system of coordinated capitalism had enjoyed ascendancy over the country's socio-economic development. Ukrainian capitalism under President Kuchma, based upon targeted state involvement in the economy and characterized by a very close relationship between the government and Ukraine's largest financial–industrial conglomerates, was a successful, highly profitable accumulation regime.⁴⁴ High rates of economic growth were achieved, with capital investment financed from domestic sources. Vast state productive assets were preferentially distributed among the emerging national capitalist class of industrialists and entrepreneurs, geared towards domestic production for export markets in Europe and Asia. Yet by 2004 that old system had run out of support both at home and overseas.⁴⁵

Domestically, there was an increasingly hostile perception of a massive concentration of the national wealth in the hands of a few business conglomerates and their private owners (dubbed 'oligarchs'), which eventually resulted in the Orange revolutionary coup. The ensuing re-privatization of Ukraine's largest company Kryvorizhstal' by the government of Yulia Tymoshenko and its massive expansion of social spending should not have come as a big surprise, considering the revealed class composition of the Orange supporters.⁴⁶ Externally, Kuchma's 'capitalism for the few' was criticized for 'freezing' the nation's 'transition to a free-market economy'. The Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank accused the new capitalist class of 'capturing' the state and effectively blocking any further liberalization and marketization. They argued that concentrated ownership was not conducive to competitive efficiency.⁴⁷ For an advocate of *laissez-faire*, the electoral dilemma faced by Ukraine in 2004 was strikingly simple: 'It was thus not a choice between left and right but between liberal and oligarchic capitalism'.⁴⁸

The beginning of a major global economic crisis in the autumn of 2007 rendered the neo-liberal 'Washington consensus' model of economic development intellectually and morally bankrupt. As the crisis unravels and the global economy starts to shrink, Ukraine's short-lived yet devastating experiment with liberal capitalism is coming to an abrupt end. At the time of writing (December 2008), Ukraine's export markets have virtually disappeared, the country's foreign-credit-fuelled consumption boom has come to a halt, and the real economy has appeared to be on the verge of a major depression. In a frantic attempt to rescue the country's rapidly falling currency, in October 2008, Prime Minister Tymoshenko managed to obtain a \$16.5 billion bail-out loan from the IMF. The splendid triumph of Orange politics has eventually met with economic failure. With the country approaching bankruptcy

and with no viable socialist alternative at hand, the Orange political elite has no option but to negotiate a workable solution with Ukraine's big business. The state coordination of the economy in active and close partnership with the national bourgeoisie appears once again to be the only method to manage a major economic crisis and to navigate the country out of the present turmoil. If one is thinking of forging a new class compromise, there is no time like the present but lost time can never be recovered.

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NOTES

1. Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul, 'Introduction: Perspectives on the Orange Revolution', in Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul (eds.), *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 2006), pp.1–8 (p.4).
2. Anders Åslund, 'Ukraine Whole and Free: What I Saw at the Orange Revolution', *The Weekly Standard*, Vol.19, No.15 (27 Dec. 2004); see also Anders Åslund, 'The Orange Velvet Revolution', *Project Syndicate*, December 2004, available at <<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/aslund18/English>>, accessed 1 March 2007.
3. Nadia Diuk, 'The Triumph of Civil Society', in Åslund and McFaul (eds.), *Revolution in Orange*, pp.69–83.
4. Barrington Moore Jr, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1966).
5. Similar to the Orange hagiography, accounts of the events provided by sceptical or hostile 'counter-revolutionary' commentators are also fairly partisan and normative. While recognizing the 'objective reality' of the previous regime, these authors consider the coloured revolutions mostly as a geo-political technology, skilfully applied by the USA and its Western allies in the struggle for the post-Soviet space. For a view from the opposing side, see Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, 'International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.39, No.3 (2006), pp.283–304; Michael McFaul, 'Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution', *International Security*, Vol.32, No.2 (2007), pp.45–83; Oleksandr Sushko and Olena Prystayko, 'Western Influence', in Åslund and McFaul (eds.), *Revolution in Orange*, pp.125–43.
6. David Lane, 'The Orange Revolution: "People's Revolution" or Revolutionary Coup?', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol.10, No.4 (2008), pp.525–49 (p.526). On the Western media bias, see Andrés Schipani-Adúriz, 'Through an Orange-Colored Lens: Western Media, Constructed Imagery, and Color Revolutions', *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol.15, No.1 (2007), pp.87–115.
7. See Pippa Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
8. For recent applications of rational-choice institutionalism, see Paul D'Anieri, *Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2007); Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson, *The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results* (Cambridge: Cambridge University

- Press, 2008); Joshua A. Tucker, *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990–1999* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
9. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1999), pp.78–89.
 10. For example, see W. Jefferson West II, 'Regional Cleavages in Turkish Politics: An Electoral Geography of the 1999 and 2002 National Elections', *Political Geography*, Vol.24, No.4 (2005), pp.499–532; Stephen Whitefield, 'Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics', *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol.5 (2002), pp.181–200.
 11. See the back cover praise for Anders Åslund, *How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
 12. Dennis Smith, *Barrington Moore: Violence, Morality and Political Change* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983), p.9.
 13. Anders Åslund, 'The Economic Policy of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution', *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol.46, No.5 (2005), pp.327–53 (p.330); and Anders Åslund, 'The Ancien Régime: Kuchma and the Oligarchs', in Åslund and McFaul (eds.), *Revolution in Orange*, pp.9–28 (p.25). Michael McFaul is fully supportive of this claim: 'In the long run, modernization theorists have identified a positive correlation between the rising wealth of a country and (in particular) the emergence of a middle class and democratization. In Ukraine, recent economic growth and an expanding middle class were causes of the Orange Revolution. Åslund has noted, however, that the real class drama in that breakthrough was the clash between billionaires and millionaires': see Michael McFaul, 'Conclusion: The Orange Revolution in a Comparative Perspective', in Åslund and McFaul (eds.), *Revolution in Orange*, pp.165–95 (p.186). In the same volume, Adrian Karatnycky considers the Orange revolution as a fight of 'minigarchs' against 'oligarchs', emphasizing that 'support for the mass protests came from domestic Our Ukraine donors, who were mainly the country's emerging upper middle class and new millionaires': see Adrian Karatnycky, 'From Kuchmagate to the Orange Revolution', in Åslund and McFaul (eds.), *Revolution in Orange*, pp.29–44 (p.41). Similarly, Igor Yurgens, head of a Muscovite neo-liberal advocacy group and President Medvedev's chief lobbyist, expressed the opinion in *Financial Times* (27 April 2008): 'Give a chance to a new generation of Russian leaders who want to modernize the country. Just as middle class people want a choice when they shop in Moscow's boutiques, they will want a choice in politics'.
 14. Åslund, 'The Economic Policy of Ukraine', pp.334, 337.
 15. For recent studies on economic voting, see Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Martin Paldam (eds.), 'Economic Voting: An Introduction', *Electoral Studies*, Vol.19, Nos.2–3 (2000), pp.113–22; Raymond M. Duch and Randy Stevenson, 'Assessing the Magnitude of the Economic Vote Over Time and Across Nations', *Electoral Studies*, Vol.25, No.3 (2006), pp.528–47; Jan Fidrmuc, 'Political Support for Reforms: Economics of Voting in Transition Countries', *European Economic Review*, Vol.44, No.8 (2000), pp.1491–513; Marcus A.G. Harper, 'Economic Voting in Postcommunist Eastern Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.33, No.9 (2000), pp.1191–227; Robert S. Kravchuk and Victor Chudowsky, 'Ukraine's 1994 Elections as an Economic Event', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.38, No.2 (2005), pp.131–65; Andrew Roberst, 'Hyperaccountability: Economic Voting in Central and Eastern Europe', *Electoral Studies*, Vol.27, No.3 (2008), pp.533–46; Tucker, *Regional Economic Voting*; Guy D. Whitten and Harvey D. Palmer, 'Cross-National Analyses of Economic Voting', *Electoral Studies*, Vol.18, No.1 (1999), pp.49–67.
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19. See A. Litvinenko, "'Oranzhevaya revolyutsiya': prichiny, kharakter i rezul'taty' [The Orange revolution: causes, character and outcomes], in Mikhail Pogrebinskii (ed.), *'Oranzhevaya' revolyutsiya: Versii, khronika, dokumenty* [The 'Orange' Revolution: Versions, Chronicle, Documents] (Kyiv: Optima, 2005), pp.9–18; V. Malinkovich, 'O prichinakh "oranzhevoi" revolyutsii v Ukraine' [On the origins of the 'orange' revolution in Ukraine], in Pogrebinskii (ed.), *'Oranzhevaya' revolyutsiya* [The 'Orange' Revolution], pp.19–51; S. Markov, "Oranzhevaya" revolyutsiya – primer revolyutsii global'nogo soobshchestva XXI veka, revolyutsii nepravitel'stvennykh organizatsii' [The 'Orange' Revolution – an example of a 21st Century's global community revolution, a revolution of non-governmental organizations], in Pogrebinskii (ed.), *'Oranzhevaya' revolyutsiya* [The 'Orange' Revolution], pp.52–75; M. Pogrebinskii, 'Kak Ukraina shla k "oranzhevoi" revolyutsii' [How has Ukraine come to an 'orange' revolution], in Pogrebinskii (ed.), *'Oranzhevaya' revolyutsiya* [The 'Orange' Revolution], pp.106–18; A. Tolpygo, 'Chto proizoshlo v noyabre–dekabre 2004 goda?' [What has happened in November–December 2004?], in Pogrebinskii (ed.), *'Oranzhevaya' revolyutsiya* [The 'Orange' Revolution], pp.164–70; V. Fesenko, 'Vybory popolam s revolyutsiei' [In half election, in half revolution], in Pogrebinskii (ed.), *'Oranzhevaya' revolyutsiya* [The 'Orange' Revolution], pp.171–81; A. Fin'ko, "Vybory 2004 goda: osnovnye konflikty i ikh posledstviya" [The 2004 elections: primary conflicts and their consequences], in Pogrebinskii (ed.), *'Oranzhevaya' revolyutsiya* [The 'Orange' Revolution], pp.182–203.
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 24. Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, 'Shades of Orange: The Electoral Geography of Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections', *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol.46, No.6 (2005), pp.364–85 (p.383).
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38. This section was prepared jointly with John Moffat, CPPR, University of Glasgow.
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40. Note that because of the specification of the model, the coefficients inform us by how many percentage points the Yushchenko vote increases in response to an increase of one percentage point in the explanatory variable rather than the percentage increase in the Yushchenko vote associated with a 1 per cent increase in the explanatory variable.
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45. For details, see Aleksandr Paskhaver and Lidia Verkhovoda, 'Privatization Before and After the Orange Revolution', *Problems of Economic Transition*, Vol.50, No.3 (2007), pp.5–40; Heiko Pleines, 'Manipulating Politics: Domestic Investors in Ukrainian Privatization Auctions 2000–2004', *Europe–Asia Studies*, Vol.60, No.7 (2008), pp.1177–97.
46. One commentator was deeply puzzled: 'Rather unexpectedly, this liberal revolution yielded an outburst of socialist populism. How could this happen?': Åslund, 'Economic Policy of Ukraine', p.327.
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