

Labor Movement and Civic Attitudes in East Central Europe¹

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The aim of this paper is to explore the influence of trade unions upon their members' political participation, focusing in this respect on the situation from several East Central European countries: Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and East Germany. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Dahl, Dalton, Verba, Offe or Lipset, I have been analyzing the particularities of trade unions and their importance in the process of consolidating democracy. I have explained that trade unions offer advantages to their members, like collective deliberation, dialogical interest shaping and reconciliation of leadership and membership objectives. Non-unionized employees do not benefit from this type of advantages outside the unions and they cannot use this tool for gaining the skills necessary for political activities.

Through statistical analysis, I have uncovered differences between trade union members and non-members as regards the level of political participation. The overall conclusion of the cross-national and longitudinal studies is that trade unions seem to mobilize their members and to increase their propensity toward being politically active through such forms as attending demonstrations and joining strikes, rather than attracting people who are already more participatory.

The participation of citizens in political affairs represents a central point in the good functioning of democratic systems. The right of citizens to express freely their preferences and opinions, together with the right to associate in organizations that are able to promote citizens' interests in front of local and central administration, represent the democratic legal framework of political participation. Indeed, political participation and especially one of its characteristics, e.g. public contestation, is an important criterion used by scholars in classifying and analyzing political regimes².

Starting from the thesis that membership in associations and organizations, especially those that compose civil society, increases the propensity for participation in political actions (conventional or unconventional), I will try to explore whether or not trade unions have an important role in influencing their members' political participation. My expectation is that they have a positive impact on the political participation of their members and their propensity of being politically active.

¹ The author thanks Gábor Tóka, László Bruszt, László Neumann and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

² See Robert Dahl, *Poliarchy. Participation and Opposition*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

Scholars analyzing political participation rarely emphasize the role of this special type of association (e.g. trade unions). Many seem to deem trade unions a special type of association, with social and welfare-biased goals and poorly educated and materialist members – hardly an engine of citizens’ involvement in public affairs. Hence, showing that trade union’ members participate more than non-members do, would significantly contribute to the literature on political participation and democracy. Several countries in East Central Europe have well-developed and influential trade union organizations, with a large social basis. The implications could thus be important not only for the specialists from the trade union movement but also for the stability and deepening of democracy.³ I will use empirical data from public opinion polls in order to test the hypotheses derived from the thesis. The empirical data will address a cross-national analysis that includes cases like Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, East Germany West Germany and Norway, and a longitudinal analysis for the case of Romania. I will start by presenting the context of post-communist changes and some characteristics of the trade unions’ systems from some East Central European countries and by analyzing the importance of trade unions in the process of democratic consolidation. Then, I will try to answer the question whether it makes a difference to be a member in trade unions. I will employ statistical analysis to uncover differences between trade union members and non-members at the political participation level.

Unions are usually considered as representatives of their members’ social and economic interests⁴. Together with other formal and informal organizations, trade unions form the civil society, which was metaphorically labeled by Larry Diamond as “ideological marketplace [characterized by a] flow of information and ideas”⁵. Furthermore, trade unions as part of a “web of social and political organizations” can play a significant role in shaping the individuals’ interests. As Dietrich Rueschemeyer underlined⁶ these interests would be less clear and developed and certainly would not lead to public expression unless they are clearly organized inside the associations and the network they developed.

In East Central Europe trade unions are one of the most powerful and largest socially based organizations of civil society. Even before 1989 they were the largest organizations in terms of membership. Although their membership has declined tremendously, the trade unions have remained an important actor after 1989. Integrated in the larger European wave, Eastern European countries face the empowerment of social actors (including trade unions), a fact that led some scholars to talk of the rebirth of corporatism, viewed as the inclusion of organized labor market actors in concerted public policy formation and implementation⁷.

³ For more on the concept of “deepening of democracy” see Andreas Schedler “What is Democratic Consolidation”, 1998.

⁴ See Richard Hyman, “Trade unions in crisis – a European renaissance?”, *Transfer*, 3: 3. (November 1997): 515-533; and * * * *Guide for Social Dialogue and Partnership from Romania*, (Bucharest: Valahia, 1997).

⁵ Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy. Toward Consolidation*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999): 222.

⁶ Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer and Bjorn Wittrock, eds., *Participation and Democracy. East and West*. (Armonk, New York: M.E Sharpe, 1998): 11.

⁷ See Klaus Armingeon, “Trade unionists and politics: a comparative analysis”, *Transfer*, 3: 3, (November 1997): 578-597. Phillippe C. Schmitter, and Jurgen R. Grote, “The Corporatist Sisyphus: Past, Present and Future”, European University Institute Working Paper Series, 97/4, (Florence: European University Institute, 1997).

Political Participation

In East Central Europe, the issue of political participation raised concern almost at the same moment as issues like democratization and consolidation of democracy were at the core of discussions. Scholars in the field of political science commonly assume that political participation is related to membership in associations⁸. Scholars like Dalton, Rueschemeyer and Dawisha argue that democracy is based on active citizens and public involvement that helps in defining the public goals. Meanwhile, Richard Topf⁹ argues that citizens ensure the stability of the democratic system through their involvement in political activities. Recent studies such as that conducted by Benjamin Radcliff and Patricia Davis revealed that membership in trade unions positively influences the individuals' electoral participation¹⁰.

In their classic book *Participation in America*, Sidney Verba and Norman Nie defined **political participation** as being the individuals' activities aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and governmental decisions¹¹. They included in political participation not only the electoral process but also the whole "flow of influence" that masses exert on the rulers. As a result of this process the national interest can be defined with citizens' participation and consent.

Thirteen years later, Verba, Schlozman and Brady refined the definition of political participation and further elaborated on the concept. Political participation, they suggest, is best understood as the actions by which individuals have the opportunity to communicate to the rulers their interests, needs, preferences and to determine them to respond¹².

In a democracy (or more exactly poliarchy) political participation is seen as the core of democratic organization of the state¹³. But this raises several questions. Who participates? How do citizens participate and through what kind of processes?

⁸ See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *Cultura Civică*, [*The Civic Culture*], (Bucharest: Du Style, CEU Press, 1996). Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America. Political Democracy and Social Equality*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972). Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry E. Brady, *Voice and Equality. Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995). Robert D. Putnam, "Democracy in America at the End of the Twentieth Century", in *Participation and Democracy. East and West*, ed. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer and Bjorn Wittrock, (Armonk, New York: M.E Sharpe 1998). 233-265. Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Russell J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Second Edition, (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers 1996). Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997). Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer and Bjorn Wittrock, eds., *Participation and Democracy. East and West*, (Armonk, New York: M.E Sharpe, 1998). Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John D. Stephens, "The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions", in *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Lisa Anderson, (New York: Columbia University Press 1999): 168-192. Pippa Norris, ed., *Citizen Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

⁹ Richard Topf, "Beyond the Limits of Political Participation", in *Citizens and the State*, ed. Hans-Deieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, Vol 1 of *Beliefs in government*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995b), chap. 3.

¹⁰ Benjamin Radcliff and Patricia Davis, "Labor Organization and Electoral Participation in Industrial Democracies", *American Journal of Political Science*, 44. 1, (January 2000): 132-141.

¹¹ Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*, 2.

¹² Verba, Schlozman and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, 1-48.

¹³ See Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*; Putnam, "Democracy in America at the End of the Twentieth Century"; Rueschemeyer, Rueschemeyer and Wittrock, *Participation and Democracy*.

Scholars in the field approached different methods to answer these questions. Some of them, like Verba, Nie, and Schlozman, focused their explanations on social stratification and the behavior of citizens in attempting to influence the decision making process. Others, like John Stuart Mill, and Putnam focused on citizens' attitudes toward participation based on their sense of 'civicness'. But other scholars like Russell Dalton tried to combine these two frameworks and explained political participation using both citizens' attitudes and the social factors. In this paper I will try to base my explanation of the influences of membership in organizations over the propensity for political participation on both frames.

Regarding the first question, in this paper I will focus only on trade union members, due to statistical data constraints and to scarcity of time and space. The most relevant empirical analyses is that conducted by Robert Putnam¹⁴ and Ronald Inglehart¹⁵, who argued that political participation tends to be higher in case of individuals involved in organizational activities. Verba, Schlozman and Brady argued that those people participate, who have enough time, money and skills to do so¹⁶. However, the time and money constraints do not have the same importance for all types of participation. Individuals tend to focus on particular types of participation and to specialize in these types, as Verba, Nie and Kim, and Dalton argued¹⁷. They identified five principal modes of political participation: vote, campaign activity, contacting officials, communal activity and protest. The first four types are commonly labeled conventional participation, while the last one is distinguished by scholars under the label unconventional participation. In my analysis I will approach only voting and contacting officials due to data constraints. In addition, I will analyze the most common forms of protest politics, such as signing petitions, participating in boycotts, attending demonstrations, joining strikes and occupying buildings.

Trade Unions and the Mobilization of Employees – Implications for Democratization

In the previous section I drew attention to the importance of political participation for consolidation of democracy. I will argue for the importance of trade unions in democratization and their mobilizing role within civil society. Starting from Richard Hyman's labeling of trade unions as agencies with role of aggregation of interests¹⁸, I define trade unions as interest groups organized as non-political associations and specialized in the representation of the social and economic interests of the employees.

The issues of regime breakdowns and democratic transition are not seen as being clearly linked to labor mobilization, as some scholars suggested in their analyses¹⁹. However, other scholars such as Seymour M. Lipset, Robert Fishman,

¹⁴ Putnam, "Democracy in America at the End of the Twentieth Century"; Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*.

¹⁵ Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Changes in 43 Societies*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

¹⁶ Verba, Schlozman and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, 44.

¹⁷ Sidney Verba, Norman Nie and Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 41.

¹⁸ Hyman, "Trade unions in crisis", 515-520.

¹⁹ Theda Skocpol *States and Social Revolutions*, 1979, *Apud* Robert Fishman, *Working – Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 7n12.

Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney consider that trade unions have a significant role in the transitions to democracy. Robert Fishman assessed the role of union mobilization and the links between the unions and the parties in the democratization of Spain after the death of Franco. Fishman²⁰ argued that during the period of consolidation of democracy trade unions represent an institutionalization of social conflict, impossible to attain in non-democratic regimes. Inside the democratic system trade unions have a mobilization role through which they channel the discontent, moderate the demands and the social compromise, and increase the accountability of the government, thus participating in the stabilization of the political system.

In an analysis that focused on Latin America and Spain, Collier and Mahoney²¹ approached democratization from a particular perspective, focusing on the role trade unions played in the break-down of the hegemonic regimes and also in the period of democratic transition. The two scholars underlined that trade unions increased the social pressure that ensured the tracking of democratization. In addition, trade unions took part in the negotiations for the regime change in Spain, Peru, Argentina and Uruguay, thus winning an important role in the political and social sectors and determining the increase in political inclusion and public contestation²². A similar situation could be found in the case of the round tables from Poland and Hungary in 1989, where trade unions were important actors during the negotiations.

Union Issues in East Central Europe

After 1989 the trade unions from the former communist countries faced the necessity to change the organizational system on which they were based during the communist regime. The changes in society, politics and economy were doubled by changes in labor relations. Trade unions had to face new realities. The property bases were changing and these facts were reflected in the industry. The state progressively renounced its role in the economy and developed its relationship with the labor movement on new basis: the tripartite dialogue. Of course, each country has its specificity, for example Poland had a strong experience with independent unionism, and Hungary in the late 80s had quite autonomous unions mainly in the higher education field. However, Romania did not have this type of experience and the unions had to “learn” how to be independent immediately after the 1989 revolution.

The role of trade unions in the post-communist countries was assumed to be that of building the agreement on economic policy and to ensure social peace²³. Strong trade unions contribute to the government of society and to the success of programs for economic recovery²⁴.

I will start with the case of Hungary in analyzing several features of trade unions. In the late 80s and early 90s trade unions approached an alternative organizational type opposed to that of communism. It was influenced by the

²⁰ Fishman, *Working – Class Organization*, 180.

²¹ Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney, “Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labor and Recent Democratization in South America and Southern Europe”, in *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Lisa Anderson. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 97-119.

²² Collier and Mahoney, “Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes”, 114-116.

²³ Paul Kubicek, “Organized Labor in Postcommunist States”, *Comparative Politics*, 32:1 (October 1999): 83-102.

²⁴ Kubicek, “Organized Labor”, 83.

Solidarity experience, and emphasized the civil society-based character of unions²⁵. As in all countries from the region, the trade union movement experienced large fragmentation and decentralization²⁶. The basis of the movement has been put on lower strata that enjoyed almost complete freedom in actions. Central union headquarters played only a communication role. As Tóth András underlined, this measure could be seen as a means to prevent exit and raise chances for voice²⁷. Between 1991 and 1993 trade unions emphasized the members' mobilization based on feelings of solidarity and of civil society. Political parties realized the importance of trade unions in society and used the tripartite council to increase the legitimacy of governmental policies²⁸.

The union's strength became more and more an ideal rather than reality. The number of strikes decreased dramatically, and unions took the economic reforms for granted²⁹. At the same time membership in unions decreased dramatically. Laszlo Neumann argued that unions' membership was based almost entirely on blue collar workers while white collar workers preferred to leave union organizations. Also, he argued that the number of active union members is very low, reaching less than 10% of the membership³⁰. Tóth assessed that only in certain economic sectors (such as metallurgy and retail trade) the unions have managed to expand. The unions directed their efforts for gaining new members at previously ignored groups, like youth, women, temporary workers and service workers³¹. After the 1998 elections the center-right government did not take into consideration trade unions as the previous government did and, moreover, directed its policies toward elimination of tripartite bodies. As a consequence trade unions face the erosion of their power and influence in society³².

The path of transformation of union movement in Poland is similar to the one from Hungary. In the late 80s Solidarity revived and gained strong representation in enterprises. However, in a manner similar to that in Hungary or Romania, Polish unionism faced a high degree of fragmentation and decentralization. Economic transformation established by the Balcerowicz Program put trade unions in front of a new situation: severe reforms that affected their members' quality of life. Between 1989 and 1991 Solidarity sustained the economic reforms but after that, between 1991 and 1993, Solidarity's cells from companies withdrew their support for the economic

²⁵ András, Tóth, „Trade unions at the intersection of economy and politics: the troubled attempts of the Hungarian trade union movement to establish a social-democratic industrial relations system”. 2001. Unpublished Paper.

²⁶ David Stark and László Bruszt, *Postsocialist Pathways. Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 171, 239n9.

²⁷ Tóth, „Trade unions”. Here, “exit” and “voice” should be understood in the sense used by Albert Hirschman. For an in-depth analysis of the concepts “exit and voice” see Albert O. Hirschman. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970).

²⁸ Tóth, „Trade unions”.

²⁹ See Tóth, „Trade unions”; László Neumann, “Privatization as a challenge for Hungarian trade unions”. Paper presented at the seminar Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in Central Eastern Europe, Berlin, March 14-17, 1999; Bela Greskovits and Dorothee Bohle, “Development Path on Europe's Periphery: Hungary and Poland's Return to Europe Compared”, Unpublished paper, presented at “Rethinking Europe”: UACES 30th Anniversary Conference and Fifth Research Conference, Central European University, Budapest, 6-8 April, 2000.

³⁰ Neumann, “Privatization as a challenge”.

³¹ Csaba Mako and Agnes Simony, “Les relations du travail en Hongrie”, in *Revue de l'IRES*, 26 (Winter 1998), 61-104.

³² Tóth, „Trade unions”.

reforms³³. After the 1993 elections, Solidarity faced severe fragmentation; thus, the biggest union lost much of its powerful social support.

Workers' participation inside companies during the economic reforms also declined in importance. However, in a large number of companies, workers were co-interested in the privatization, with about 800 companies being registered as workers' commercial societies³⁴. In spite of this, the goals of reformers and trade unionists became incompatible. An important contradictory feature of Solidarity confused its members and concurred in the decline of unionism in Poland: leftist orientation in the economic sphere, but rightist orientation in politics by anti-communist positions and conservative traditionalism³⁵. As in the case of Hungary, strikes decreased in intensity in the second half of the 1990s while union representation, power and mobilization eroded rapidly³⁶.

Romania did not experience a large independent union movement before 1990. Trade unions gained their independence rapidly after the revolution. From party-controlled organizations they turned into partners of the state in the tripartite dialogue. However, the slowness of privatization meant, in fact, that the state was often both employer and mediator in the tripartite bargaining. This situation changed especially after 1996. Trade unions faced high fragmentation and decentralization (in the early 1990s there were about 30 national confederations). Their membership decreased systematically from almost 100% to less than 40%. In addition, recruitment was almost absent at the company level. Only the branch federations and the national confederations had recruitment policies.

In the Czech Republic, even from the start of the economic and political reforms, trade unions represented a partner rather than an opponent of the government. They were concerned from the beginning of post-communist transition to play an important role in the drafting of future legislation in the field of social relations³⁷. In contrast with the other East Central European countries, trade unions in the Czech Republic acted in a very cooperative way with the government: strikes were almost absent while memoranda and negotiations were the methods preferred by unions. The neo-liberal governments after 1990 preferred to reduce to the minimum their cooperation with the unions. This was clearly reflected in the low degree of capacity to obtain results that could satisfy the interests of their members.

The situation in East Germany is determined by the unification with West Germany, but still presents some aspects encountered in other post-communist countries. The formation of new parties shaped the development of trade unions. The Social Democratic Party tended to strengthen its ties with the eastern unions. However, in East Germany trade unions faced a large decline in membership, due to the high rates of unemployment in the early 90s (more than 15%). The Western unions rapidly extended their organizations in the former GDR after unification. In fact, unification introduced into East Germany the West German-based institutions of

³³ Włodzimierz Pankow and Barbara Gaciarz, "Evolution des relations industrielles dans la Pologne de l'après guerre", in *Revue de l'IRE*, 26 (Winter 1998), 7-60.

³⁴ Pankow and Gaciarz, "Evolution des relations industrielles", 36.

³⁵ Andrzej Rychard, "Institutions and Actors in a New Democracy: The Vanishing Legacy of Communist and Solidarity Types of Participation in Poland", in *Participation and Democracy. East and West*, ed. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer and Bjorn Wittrock, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 34.

³⁶ Greskovits and Bohle, "Development Path".

³⁷ Zdenka Mansfeldova and Monika Cambalikova, "Les relations professionnelles dans les républiques Tchéque, Slovaque et l'ancienne Tchécoslovaquie", in *Revue de l'IRE*, 26 (Winter 1998), 112.

corporatism, as Stark and Bruszt underlined³⁸. Because of the false impression that unions will manage to secure their workplaces, about 4 millions Eastern Germans joined the newly formed unions³⁹. A specific situation quickly developed in East Germany: workers soon preferred to be active members in works councils than to be actively involved in union based activities since they considered that the risks were higher in the case of the latter. Thus, the levels of participation were very low in trade unions due to high insecurity of the workplace⁴⁰. The union-based activity is the largest one, compared to other activities in voluntary organizations, in East Germany – more than 10% of the adult population is doing unpaid work, compared to 1.7% in case of Western Germany⁴¹.

The situation in East Central Europe seems to be paradoxical. After 1989 the conditions for a democratic regime were created. But while the avenues of political participation are enlarging in democracy, we encounter the declining of trade unions, their increasing fragmentation, declining inclusion in the policy-making process and declining membership. Thus, the mobilizing role of trade unions is endangered in East Central Europe. However, this pattern was underlined also by Robert Fishman in the case of Spain. During the democratic transition trade unions are affected by the economic crisis and the economic reforms. This could be a possible explanation for the state of trade unions in East Central Europe. It is also possible that unions developed in this region are nothing but remnants of the older, communist unions, and the current leadership is not prepared for the reshaping of union interests and mobilizing role.

Methodological Issues

I will try to test some hypotheses derived from the **thesis** that membership in associations and organizations, especially those that compose civil society, increases the propensity for participation in political actions (conventional or unconventional). The **first hypothesis** assumes that members in trade unions tend to be more inclined to participate in conventional and unconventional actions than are non-members. Scholars argue that different types of political participation have different clusters of predictors⁴². Political participation modes require from the individuals high resources in terms of time, money and skills.

Dalton, Verba and Nie argue that voting is a highly conflictual activity, which requires little initiative from the citizens, and little cooperation with others, but, ironically, affects collective outcomes⁴³. In cross-national and longitudinal studies,

³⁸ Stark and Bruszt, *Postsocialist Pathways*, 176, 178.

³⁹ Marilyn Rueschemeyer, “The Social Democratic Party in Eastern Germany: Political Participation in the Former GDR After Unification”, in *Participation and Democracy. East and West*, ed. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer and Bjorn Wittrock (Armonk, New York: M.E Sharpe, 1998), 99-131.

⁴⁰ Rueschemeyer, “The Social Democratic Party”, 116.

⁴¹ Bernhard Wessels, “Social Alliances and Coalitions: The Organizational Underpinnings of Democracy in Western Germany”, in *Participation and Democracy. East and West*, ed. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Marilyn Rueschemeyer and Bjorn Wittrock. (Armonk, New York: M.E Sharpe, 1998), 203-232.

⁴² See Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*; Verba, Scholzman and Brady, *Voice and Equality*; Verba, Nie and Kim, *Participation and Political Equality*; Dalton, *Citizen Politics*.

⁴³ Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 42; Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*, 54, 73.

scholars have found significant differences concerning voter turnout⁴⁴. Voting must be understood as being different from all other forms of political participation. Verba, Schlozman and Brady, Topf and Lijphart clearly separate the vote from other forms of conventional and unconventional participation⁴⁵. While the vote is accessible to almost every citizen (at least in electoral democracies) and offers to individuals equal maximum input for the communication of information, the other forms of participation are self-restricted because they suppose certain skills, information and costs in terms of time and money⁴⁶.

Analyzing the predictors of voting, Russell Dalton argued that in the countries where union and party attachments are high (Germany, UK and France) education is no more than a medium-strong predictor of participation. As concerns the United States, where party and union attachments are slightly weaker, education is the best predictor of voting. A possible explanation suggested by Dalton is that union and party attachments influence voting among people with low and medium education due to their networks of organizations. Union attachment, the predictor that interests us in a particular way is a medium predictor in all the four countries in Dalton's analysis, probably because of their similar degrees of unionization⁴⁷.

The campaign activity, another conventional participation mode, requires high cooperation with other individuals. Also, it needs higher resources of time and education compared with voting. Moreover, campaign activity is a collective and a conflictual one at the same time. The resources necessary for such actions can be developed by trade unions. In his study Dalton argued that campaign activity is best predicted by party attachment (in all four countries analyzed), education (in the USA, Britain and France) and union attachment (in the European countries). He explained these findings in the following way: firstly, campaign activity, along with voting, is a partisan activity and requires high resources and skills developed by education; secondly, trade unions represent in Europe a mobilizing sector⁴⁸.

Communal activity is yet another type of conventional participation. It was characterized by scholars as involving much cooperation with other individuals, much initiative, with collective scope of outcome, and with a low to high pressure that can be put on the decision makers⁴⁹. Dalton argued that communal activity is better predicted by the level of education of individuals⁵⁰.

Unlike conventional participation, protest events "often go beyond the normal channels of democratic politics"⁵¹. Protest politics can be characterized by some or a high degree of cooperation with other individuals; some or high initiative (since

⁴⁴ See Verba, Nie and Kim, *Participation and Political Equality*; Dalton, *Citizen Politics*; Lawrence Le Duc, Richard Niemi and Pippa Norris eds. *Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*, (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996); Cees van der Eijk and Mark N. Franklin eds. *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union*. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996).

⁴⁵ See Verba, Schlozman and Brady, *Voice and Equality*; Richard Topf, "Electoral Participation", in *Citizens and the State*, ed. Hans-Deieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, Vol 1 of *Beliefs in government*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995a). Ch. 2; Richard Topf, "Beyond the Limits"; Arend Lijphart, "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma", *American Political Science Review*, 91:1 (March 1997): 1-14.

⁴⁶ Verba, Schlozman and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, 23-24.

⁴⁷ Dalton, *Citizen Politics*.

⁴⁸ Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 57-60.

⁴⁹ See Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*, 53; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, 89; Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 42.

⁵⁰ Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 60-62..

⁵¹ Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 67.

participation in this type of action does not necessarily presuppose implication in their organization); collective scope of outcome; high pressure and information; and also a high level of conflict⁵².

In the same study Dalton shows that Mediterranean and Scandinavian countries tend to have higher degrees of violent protest politics (large-scale protest and meetings, clashes with police, strikes, boycotts and the occupation of buildings) than countries like Great Britain, the United States or Germany. Instead, the latter have a higher level of non-violent protest politics (signing a petition) than the former countries. An interesting finding is that the Eastern *Länder* of unified Germany display higher levels of unconventional political action (violent and non-violent) than West Germany, a potential influence of communist politics of the past and current economic problems⁵³.

Besides age and education, good predictors for unconventional participation proved to be left-right self-identification (with those on the Left being more inclined to protest) and union attachment (taking into account that strikes represent a large proportion of the unconventional activities)⁵⁴. These last findings once again seem to underline the importance of organizational mobilization for citizens' political participation. Thus, my **second hypothesis** assumes that trade unions have an impact on the actual participation of their members and not on their attitudinal participation. Trade unions tend to be characterized by high mobilization resources. These resources increase the degree of participation of the members reducing the costs of political activities.

I will explain two possible models for explaining the relationship between the trade union membership and political participation. The first model expects that union membership is more strongly correlated with activity than with participatory attitudes. In this model, trade unions mobilize members rather than attract members who are already more participatory, independently from their union membership. A difference in the correlation with attitudes and behavior would allow us to assume that individuals participate in political activities as a result of the union mobilization and not because they already are more inclined to participate. Thus, unions make people participate through organizational mechanisms such as mobilization and shaping of common interests.

The alternative model implies that union membership is more strongly correlated with participatory attitudes than with activity. According to this model trade union members are exactly those people who have stronger participatory attitudes (they are more willing to get involved in political activities than other people). I call this the '*self-selection model*'.

Taking into account these two models, the **first hypothesis** must be **reshaped** for the cross-national study, as follows: *members in trade unions tend to participate more in unconventional political activities than non-members do. Moreover, from the unconventional activities, trade unions have the highest impact on those activities that are based on mobilization and solidarity between participants, such as attending demonstrations and joining strikes.*

In my analysis I have used four databases, of which two are cross-national and the other two refer only to Romania. My analysis is both cross-national and longitudinal. The first survey used for the cross-national analysis is World Values Study (WVS) conducted under the coordination of the University of Michigan. The

⁵² Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 42.

⁵³ Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 73.

⁵⁴ Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 79-81.

WVS includes data from 1995 – 1996. The second survey was conducted in 1999 as part of the multinational study entitled Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.

Due to the questionnaire design it was necessary to combine these surveys in order to cover as much as possible from the modes of participation that I have been discussing in the second section. Therefore, in the cross-national analysis I have made use of the variables that operationalize the following modes of participation:

- Voting
- Contacting officials
- Protest politics (with the following types: signing petitions, joining boycotts, attend demonstrations, joining strikes and occupy buildings)
- Affiliation with political organizations (party membership)

In order to explore possible influences of unions on the political participation of their members I will use a simple model that includes a series of independent variables. These variables are: age, gender, education and occupation (independent and control variables) and trade union membership (as the main independent variable of interest).

The data used in the cross-national analysis represents national samples from the following countries: Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, East Germany West Germany and Norway. In the longitudinal analysis for Romania, I have used the same simple model with the following dependent variables: vote, campaign working, contacting officials and mass media, affiliation with political organizations (party membership) and protest politics (signing petitions, joining boycotts, attending demonstrations, joining strikes and occupying buildings), and the same dependent variables as the cross-national analysis.

In order to test my model and the validity of the hypotheses I have used logistic regression. Because this statistical model requires the dependent variables to be dichotomies and the independent variables to be continuous or dichotomous, I recoded all the variables except the continuous variable age.⁵⁵ As concerns the dependent variables from both the cross-national and longitudinal analyses, I transformed them into dummy variables: a dummy for participation in the political activity and a dummy for the subjective probability of getting involved in political actions, as the following model shows.

Original operationalization of the question concerning the activity to attend demonstrations, as it was formulated in the WVS 1995-1996 read:

“Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.

<i>V120</i>	<i>Attending demonstrations</i>	<i>lawful</i>	<i>Have Done</i>	<i>Might Do</i>	<i>Would Never Do</i>	<i>K</i>
			<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	

My dependent variables were the following recoded dummy variables:

<i>V120RECI</i>	<i>Attending lawful demonstrations Yes/Not</i>	<i>Have Done</i>	<i>Did not</i>
		<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>

⁵⁵ See the notes from each of the attached tables for details concerning the new codes of each variable.

Thus, value 1 of the original variable was recoded as value 0 in the first dummy variable. The values 2 and 3 in the original variable were recoded as value 1 in the first dummy variable. The value 9 in the original variable was recoded as ‘system-missing’ in the first dummy variable.

<i>V120REC2</i>	<i>Might Do</i>	<i>Would Never Do</i>
<i>Attending lawful demonstrations Might/Never</i>	0	1

Value 2 in the original variable was recoded as value 0 in the second dummy variable. Value 3 in the original variable was recoded as value 1 in the second dummy variable. The values 9 and 1 of the original variable were recoded as ‘system-missing’ in the second dummy variable. This method of transforming the dependent variable into dummy variables was applied to all the dependent variables from all databases.

Does it Make a Difference To Be a Member in Trade Unions? Empirical Evidence.

I will turn now to the findings of the analysis of the cross-national data. In the model presented above I analyzed the influence of the independent variable “union membership”, controlling for all the other independent variables. The standardized R coefficients reported in Table 1 and Table 2, reveal a pattern of possible influence of trade unions on political participation. This pattern can be identified in the case of political activities like attending demonstrations, joining strikes, party membership, signing petitions and vote. In the case of other activities, the findings do not reveal a similar pattern: for almost all the countries in the analysis the standardized coefficients are almost null and insignificant. The exception is Norway, in case of both surveys used. A possible explanation could be the higher proportion of union members in the national sample (almost three times greater than the number of trade unionists from the other countries in the analysis, see Table 5a and Table 5b from Annex).

When taking into consideration differences between the involvement in political activities and propensity to getting involved, the data shows clear differences: higher standardized coefficients (R) for involvement compared to propensity to getting involved. For certain political activities such as signing petitions, party membership and joining strikes, the coefficients tend to suggest that trade unions influence the activity rather than the propensity to be involved.

The statistically significant standardized coefficients, at $p < .05$, in column (e) of Table 1, can be interpreted in the direction that unions tend to increase their members’ propensity toward participating in activities such as attending demonstrations. Looking at Table 6a, column (e) one can observe differences between the countries. These differences are revealed by the cell entries – nonstandardized B coefficients. For example Hungarian, Polish and Norwegian trade union members tend to be slightly more active in attending demonstrations than those in Romania and West Germany.

Analyzing the standardized R coefficients shown in column (g) in Table 1 one can observe a pattern according to which trade union members tend to be more active in joining strikes than the non-members do. However, taking into account the significance levels one can argue that the pattern is obvious only in the cases of

Romania, Poland, West Germany and Norway. A possible explanation could be the fact that the trade unions from these countries are more powerful and also more active from the point of view of protest actions against the governmental policies. Observing the nonstandardized B coefficients from column (g) in Table 6a we can argue that there are no cross-national differences between Romania, Poland and West Germany as regards the influence of union membership on joining strikes. Only for Norway is there a stronger relation as the B coefficient underlines. A possible explanation could be the higher membership degree that is translated in higher mobilization resources that unions could offer for their members.

As concerning the other types of political participation, especially the protest ones, the data do not support my assumption that trade unions increase their members' political participation in all forms of activities, conventional and unconventional. The entries from columns (a), (c) and (i) are, in the majority of cases, not statistically significant. These findings do not reveal a pattern that could allow one to argue that, generally speaking, members in trade unions tend to be more inclined to participate in conventional and unconventional actions than non-members. Thus the initial first hypothesis is rejected. Instead, the reshaped first hypothesis is supported by the findings. Trade union membership positively influences the participation of their members in unconventional political activities. Moreover, from the unconventional activities, trade unions seem to have a higher impact on those activities that are based on mobilization and solidarity of participants, i.e. attending demonstrations and joining strikes.

As concerns the forms of conventional participation, like voting and contacting officials, the entries in Table 2 allow one to presume a certain degree of influence of union membership only on the inclination of individuals to go to vote. Thus, one might conclude that union membership does not influence participation or influence only the propensity for electoral participation.

Tables 1 and 6a offer some evidence that support my second hypothesis – trade unions influence directly and positively the actual participation of their members and not their attitudes toward participation. The entries in columns (b), (d), (h) and (g) allow one to argue that indeed, trade unions do not attract people that already are more participatory. The analysis rejects the *self selection* model presented above, and supports the model according to which members participate in political activities as a result of the union mobilization and not because they already are more inclined to participate.

One can conclude that the cross-national analysis supported the first refined hypothesis as well as the second hypothesis, and rejected the initial form of the first hypothesis. The cross-national comparisons reported in Table 6a revealed slight cross-national differences especially between Norway and the other countries.

Furthermore, trade union members clearly tend to be more likely to be members of political parties than non-members. For all the countries in the analysis the standardized R coefficients sustain this assumption. A possible explanation of these findings could be the high mobilization resources that trade unions commonly have and the tendency that they have formal or informal links with political parties.

Next, let me extend the analysis for the case of Romania using another two databases. The first was collected by the Faculty of Political Science from Cluj-Napoca in 1996 and the second was part of the World Values Study from 1997.

Using these data I was able to enlarge the spectrum of types of participation that I included in the analysis. Thus, I included the following modes of conventional participation: campaign working, contacting officials, affiliation with political

organization (party membership) and voting. For the latter I was able to include in the analysis four references to the general elections (parliamentary and presidential) from 1992 and 1996. Regarding the unconventional participation and protest politics I included the same variables as in the cross-national analysis. Thus, the model used in the longitudinal analysis is basically the same as that used in the cross-national study.

The entries in Table 3a and Table 4 confirm the pattern observed in the cross-national study: trade unions appear to influence the political participation of their members. Moreover, the standardized R coefficients entered in the tables seem to enhance the findings from the cross-national study. The logistic regression employed also for the longitudinal study produced standardized coefficients with high significance levels. Thus, trade unions tend to have substantial impact on their members' propensity towards involvement in political activities. Although the coefficients are not very strong, they have high levels of statistical significance that allows me to presume the influence of union membership on political participation (see Table 3a, Table 3b and Table 4).

The entries in Table 3a, column (a), suggest that in the case of Romania union membership also influences signing a petition. The same results are underlined in Table 4, column (a), and Table 1, column (a). This finding could be explained by the fact that in post-communist Romania trade unions were very active in this type of political participation. Due to the economic transition and the issues caused by the economic crisis, one of the most frequently used tool for presenting the unions' point of view and interests has been petitioning. The petitions are presented either to the local or the central administrations. Usually they deal with privatization or social security issues. Since trade unions usually appealed to their members to sign the petitions, this explains the findings of the analysis as regards the participation in signing petitions.

Furthermore, the findings for this mode of protest support the second hypothesis. This hypothesis is also supported by the entries from Table 3a and Table 4, in the columns representing the potential to participate.

Regarding the first reshaped hypothesis, the entries in Tables 3a, column (c) and Table 4 columns (e) and (g), support the assumption that trade unions have a higher impact on those activities that are based on mobilization and solidarity of members / participants, i.e. attending demonstrations and joining strikes. The nonstandardized B coefficients, which are shown only partially in table 8 in the appendix due to scarcity of space, reveal that trade union membership has a larger impact on two protest activities: attending demonstrations and joining strikes. For signing petitions (actual participation), in the case of the 1996 database, the B coefficient took the value of .76, at the significance level $p < .005$ and the standard error of .23, while the same coefficient for attending demonstrations took the value of .87, at the significance level $p < .005$ and the standard error of .20. These results allow me to argue that union membership is more important for attendance at demonstrations, which requires higher mobilization resources and higher solidarity than signing petitions.

For the 1997 data, the nonstandardized B coefficients confirm the previous findings. For signing petitions, B has the value of .70 at the significance level $p < .01$ and the standard error of .25. The same B coefficient, for attending demonstrations (1997 data), is 1.14, at the significance level $p < .005$ and the standard error of .25, and for joining strikes is 1.01 at the significance level $p < .10$ and the standard error of .52.

The entries in Table 3a, column (c), could be interpreted in the direction mentioned above – trade union membership positively influences the actual participation in the case of attending demonstrations. A possible explanation could refer to the mobilization power of unions and also the sense of solidarity that is developed inside these organizations. Concerning the party membership, the 1996 data show the same pattern as those for 1995 – trade union membership is correlated with party membership. It must be underlined that the relatively small sub-sample of trade union members in the surveys from 1996 and 1997 could influence the statistical results. Regarding the electoral participation the available data seem to show that union membership increases the propensity to go to vote (Table 3b).

Regarding the second hypothesis – that trade unions influence the actual participation of their members and not their attitudinal participation – the longitudinal analysis offers mixed results and significance levels for the standardized R coefficients, as one can see in Tables 3a and 3b and Table 4. However, the nonstandardized B coefficients, partly presented in table 8 in the Appendix, offer mixed and inconclusive results. Consequently, the second hypothesis is not supported but neither is it rejected. Further analysis extended on panel data could offer clearer results.

As a conclusion, for the longitudinal analysis one can notice the same pattern as in the cross-national study: trade unions seem to influence their members' propensity toward being politically active, especially in protest politics like attending demonstrations and joining strikes. In addition to these activities the findings showed that union membership also influences involvement in signing petitions. Thus, the first reshaped hypothesis was supported by the longitudinal analysis. The second hypothesis was neither supported nor rejected, further analysis being necessary.

Conclusions

The overall conclusion of the cross-national and longitudinal studies is that trade unions seem to mobilize their members and to increase their propensity towards being politically active, rather than attracting people who are already more participatory. Despite some technical problems like small sub-samples of trade union members and quite small standardized coefficients, one can assume that the pattern underlined in this paper could be sustained. Also, it can be assumed that membership in trade unions has a significant explanatory potential for participation in forms like attending demonstrations and joining strikes, due to the high mobilization resources of trade unions. Finally, a temporal problem of the analyses has to be stressed: the impossibility of comparison over a long period of time, using the same questionnaire and data design.

In this paper I assessed the importance of trade union organizations for the political participation of their members. First, I discussed the theoretical and conceptual context that frames such an attempt. I presented the theoretical framework, focusing on the following concepts: democracy, consolidation of democracy, civil society, political participation and trade unions. Next, I presented the theoretical link between these important concepts. I argued that the East-Central European countries (i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) are on the way to deepen their democratic systems and to conclude the transition from electoral and liberal democracies towards advanced democracies. I also argued that among the important factors that shape this transformation, civil society is a significant one. Its networks of associations and organizations can improve the social base of the regime, but it also gives citizens the chances to control governmental activities – an important condition

for an advanced democracy. Citizens are active in democracies from the political point of view, and are getting involved in solving public issues. Moreover, I argued that political participation is linked to citizens' membership in all types of organizations that compose civil society. Thus, it is also probable that membership in trade unions is linked to political activities. In addition, starting from this assumption I argued that membership in associations and organizations, especially those that compose civil society, increases the propensity for participation in political actions (conventional or unconventional).

Starting from this position I pursued an empirical analysis based on survey data from the countries of East-Central Europe mentioned above, in order to test the validity of the hypothesis. I argued that members in trade unions tend to be more inclined to participate in unconventional political activities (i.e. attending demonstrations and joining strikes) than are non-members. Also, I argued that trade unions have an impact on the actual participation of their members and not on their attitudinal participation. Since trade unions tend to have plenty of resources to mobilize, the costs of political activities tend to be reduced and the degree of political participation increased. The findings of my cross-national and longitudinal studies supported the first reshaped hypothesis. Trade unions tend to mobilize the members rather than to attract people who are already more participatory. Regarding the second hypothesis, the data used in the cross-national study seem to validate the first model and to reject the self-selection model presented in section 3.2. The second hypothesis was neither rejected nor supported in the case of the longitudinal study, a possible explanation being the data constraints and the temporal issues.

However, in assessing these conclusions I must draw attention to the fact that these findings represent a first approach to this issue, revealing moreover a pattern of influences rather than entirely proving the strength of these influences. In other words, the analyses showed the existence of the influences and a possible direction of them. A deepening of this research, using more data derived from a panel study, could better shape the findings and improve their explanatory power.

In conclusion, my analysis assessed that trade unions tend to boost their members' political participation throwing a new light on the literature on political participation and democracy. Several countries in East-Central Europe have well-developed and influential trade union organizations, with a large social basis. Thus, the implications could be important not only for the specialists from the trade union movement but also for the stability and deepening of democracy.

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Appendix

Table 1. World Values Study. Cross-national 1995

	Country	Sign petition		Join boycott		Attend demonstrations		Join strikes		Occupy building		Party membership	
		(a) Y/N	(b) M/N	(c) Y/N	(d) M/N	(e) Y/N	(f) M/N	(g) Y/N	(h) M/N	(i) Y/N	(j) M/N	(k) Y/N	(l) A/I
Trade Union membership	Romania	.13**** (.06)	.11**** v217r - (.11)	.000 ---	.02* v214r (.03)	.11**** (.04)	.08*** v217r - (.05)	.09** (.03)	.06** v214r (.04)	.09* v217r (.21)	.05* v214r (.03)	.25**** (.13)	-.26**** (.19)
	Hungary	.08*** v221r - (.14)	.000 v216 v221r - (.07)	.07* v214r (.10)	.04* v217r - v216 (.14)	.16**** (.17)	.10**** (.10)	.000 ---	.000 v216 v217r - (.12)	-----	.000 v217r - (.07)	.15*** (.10)	-----
	Poland	.000 v217r - (.10)	.07*** v216 v217r - (.13)	.000 v214r v217r - (.06)	.000 v214r v217r - (.10)	.12**** v214r v217r - (.10)	.000 v214r v217r - (.16)	.05* v214r (.08)	.000 v216 (.08)	.07* v214r (.06)	.000 v214r v216 (.04)	.18*** (.16)	.000 --- (.50)
	Czech Republic	.000 v217r - (.02)	.000 v217r - (.07)	.000 v217r - (.03)	.000 v214r (.08)	.000 v217r - (.02)	.04* v214r v217r - (.10)	.000 ---	.000 v216 (.06)	.000 v214r (.13)	.000 v214r (.05)	.02* v214r (.04)	.000 v217r - (.06)
	East Germany	.04* v217r - (.06)	.000 ---	.000 v214r (.03)	.000 v217r - (.11)	.000 v221r - (.04)	.08** v217r - (.08)	.000 v216 (.23)	.000 v216 (.06)	.000 v217r - (.03)	.000 v217r - (.03)	.13** (.05)	.000 --- (.72)
	West Germany	.000 v217r - (.05)	.05* v216 (.19)	.000 v217r - (.06)	.000 v217r - (.06)	.11**** v217r - (.14)	.08** v221r - (.08)	.03* v221r - (.04)	.04* v217r - (.13)	.000 v217r - (.05)	.000 v217r - (.06)	.21**** (.08)	.000 v216r - (.20)
	Norway	.10**** v216 (.07)	.000 v216 (.10)	.11**** v216 (.09)	.08**** v216 (.12)	.15**** v217r - (.13)	.09**** v216 (.10)	.19**** (.07)	.04** v216 (.12)	.000 v216 (.05)	.03* v216 (.03)	.10**** v216 - (.06)	.000 ---

Notes: Table entries are logistic regression standardized coefficients (R) at the following significance levels:

* p < .10

** p < .05

*** p < .01

**** p < .005

The entries in parentheses represent the pseudo R² of each model.

Also, the entries under variable labels like v216 or v217r- represent the better explanatory variable, if it explained better in the model than variable V31REC – (union membership recoded)

Independent Variables: Age: V216

Education: V217r – (the “-” after the label signifies a negative relation); (recoded into interval variable as following: 4 for incomplete education, 8 for completed compulsory, 12 for vocational / high school and 17 for high education -university)

Union Membership: V31REC (recoded as 0 for member and 1 for non-member)

Gender: V214R (recoded as 0 for men and 1 for women)

Occupation: V221R (recoded as 0 for blue collars and 1 for white collars)

Y/N: Yes/ No; M/N: Might/ Never

Table 2. CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems). Cross-national 1999

Trade Union Membership	Country	Vote (a)	Contact (b)
	Romania	.09** (.07)	.000 v90r - v89r (.16)
	Hungary	.07*** v88 - v90r - (.10)	.000 v90r - (.04)
	Poland	.04*** v88 - (.10)	.000 v89r (.12)
	Czech Republic	.000 v88 - (.06)	-.04* v95r - (.04)
	East Germany	.000 v88 - (.09)	.000 v90r - (.09)
	West Germany	.000 v88 - v95r - (.07)	.000 v89r (.03)
	Norway	.01* v88 - (.09)	.06*** v95r - (.05)

Notes: Table entries are logistic regression standardized coefficients (R) at the following significance levels:

* p < .10

** p < .05

*** p < .01

**** p < .005

The entries in parentheses represent the pseudo R² of each model.

Also, the entries under variable labels like “v88” or “v90r-” represent the better explanatory variable, if it explained better in the model than variable V92REC – (union membership recoded)

Independent Variables: Age: V88

Education: V90r – (the “-” after the label signifies a negative relation); (recoded into interval variable as following: 4 for incomplete education, 8 for completed compulsory, 12 for vocational / high school and 17 for high education -university)

Union Membership: V92REC (recoded as 0 for member and 1 for non-member)

Gender: V89R (recoded as 0 for men and 1 for women)

Occupation: V95R (recoded as 0 for blue collars and 1 for white collars)

Table 3a. Political Science Faculty Cluj. Opinion Poll 1996 Romania

Union Membership	Romania	Sign petition		Attend demonstration		Campaign working		Contacting official		Phone call mass-media		Party membership
		(a) Y/N	(b) M/N	(c) Y/N	(d) M/N	(e) Y/N	(f) M/N	(g) Y/N	(h) M/N	(i) Y/N	(j) M/N	(k) Y/N
		.11**** i3r - (.10)	.07 i1 (.19)	.14**** (.15)	.04* i1 (.16)	.000 i2r (.06)	.03* i1 i3r - (.14)	.000 i2r (.02)	.08*** i1 (.12)	.07** i2r i3r - (.10)	.000 i1 i3r - (.14)	.12**** i2r (.11)

Notes: Table entries are logistic regression standardized coefficients (R) at the following significance levels:

* p < .10

** p < .05

*** p < .01

****p < .005

The entries in parentheses represent the pseudo R² of each model.

Also, the entries under variable labels like “i1” or “i3r -“ represent the better explanatory variable, if it explained better in the model than variable i7REC – (union membership recoded)

Independent variables Age: i1

Education: i3r – (the “-” after the label signifies a negative relation); (recoded into interval variable as following: 4 for incomplete education, 8 for completed compulsory, 12 for vocational / high school and 17 for high education -university)

Union Membership: i7REC (recoded as 0 for member and 1 for non-member)

Gender: i2r (recoded as 0 for men and 1 for women)

Occupation: i11r (recoded as 0 for blue collars and 1 for white collars)

Y/N: Yes/ No; M/N: Might/ Never

**Table 3b. Political Science Faculty Cluj. Opinion Poll 1996
Romania**

Trade Union Membership	Romania	Vote 96 general elections first round (a)	Vote 96 presidential elections second round (b)	Vote 92 general elections first round (c)	Vote 92 presidential elections second round (d)
		.10*** (.08)	.04* i3r - (.04)	.12**** i1 - (.20)	.13**** i1 - (.20)

Notes: Table entries are logistic regression standardized coefficients (R) at the following significance levels:

* p < .10

** p < .05

*** p < .01

****p < .005

The entries in parentheses represent the pseudo R² of each model.

Also, the entries under variable labels like “i1 -” or “i3r -” represent the better explanatory variable, if it explained better in the model than variable i7REC – (union membership recoded)

Independent Variables: Age: i1

Education: i3r – (the “-” after the label signifies a negative relation); (recoded into interval variable as following: 4 for incomplete education, 8 for completed compulsory, 12 for vocational / high school and 17 for high education -university)

Union Membership: i7REC (recoded as 0 for member and 1 for non-member)

Gender: i2r (recoded as 0 for men and 1 for women)

Occupation: i11r (recoded as 0 for blue collars and 1 for white collars)

Table 4. World Values Study 1997. Romania

Union Membership	Romania	Sign petition		Join boycott		Attend demonstration		Join strikes		Occupy buildings		Party membership
		Y/N (a)	M/N (b)	Y/N (c)	M/N (d)	Y/N (e)	M/N (f)	Y/N (g)	M/N (h)	Y/N (i)	M/N (j)	Y/N (k)
		.11*** v91r - (.11)	.000 --- (.07)	.000 v91r - (.09)	.000 v91r - (.08)	.20**** v91r - (.16)	.13**** v91r - (.26)	.11* v90 (.08)	.06* v90 (.10)	.03 --- (.21)	.000 v88r (.06)	.000 v88r v91r - (.07)

Notes: Table entries are logistic regression standardized coefficients (R) at the following significance levels:

* p < .10

** p < .05

*** p < .01

****p < .005

The entries in parentheses represent the pseudo R² of each model.

Also, the entries under variable labels like “v91r -” or “v90” represent the better explanatory variable, if it explained better in the model than variable v2cREC – (union membership recoded)

Independent Variables: Age: v90

Education: v91 – (the “-” after the label signifies a negative relation); (recoded into interval variable as following: 4 for incomplete education, 8 for completed compulsory, 12 for vocational / high school and 17 for high education -university)

Union Membership: v2cREC (recoded as 0 for member and 1 for non-member)

Gender: v88r (recoded as 0 for men and 1 for women)

Occupation: v99_1r (recoded as 0 for blue collars and 1 for white collars)

Y/N: Yes/ No; M/N: Might/ Never

Table 5a
Country * union membership recoded yes/not Crosstabulation.
Cross-National1995

		union membership recoded yes/not		Total
		members (frequency; percentage)	non-members (frequency; percentage)	
Country	West Germany	198 19.6%	811 80.4%	1009 100.0%
	Hungary	79 12.2%	571 87.8%	650 100.0%
	Norway	530 47.1%	596 52.9%	1126 100.0%
	Poland	115 10.0%	1038 90.0%	1153 100.0%
	Czech Republic	179 16.1%	934 83.9%	1113 100.0%
	East Germany	229 22.9%	773 77.1%	1002 100.0%
	Romania	254 20.5%	985 79.5%	1239 100.0%

Table 5b
Country * union membership recoded Crosstabulation. Cross-
national 1999

		union membership recoded yes/not		Total
		members (frequency; percentage)	non-members (frequency; percentage)	
Country	Czech Republic	324 26.5%	898 73.5%	1222 100.0%
	West Germany	176 18.1%	798 81.9%	974 100.0%
	East Germany	193 18.6%	844 81.4%	1037 100.0%
	Hungary	177 11.6%	1345 88.4%	1522 100.0%
	Norway	960 46.9%	1087 53.2%	2047 100.0%
	Poland	203 10.2%	1792 89.8%	1995 100.0%
	Romania	219 18.8%	948 81.2%	1167 100.0%

Table 6a. World Values Study. Cross-national 1995

	Country	Sign petition		Join boycott		Attend demonstrations		Join strikes		Occupy building		Party membership	
		(a) Y/N	(b) M/N	(c) Y/N	(d) M/N	(e) Y/N	(f) M/N	(g) Y/N	(h) M/N	(i) Y/N	(j) M/N	(k) Y/N	(l) A/I
Trade Union membership	Romania	.76**** (.20)	.75**** (.21)	-.24 (.59)	.33* (.21)	.66**** (.19)	.58**** (.22)	.69** (.31)	.43** (.20)	1.26* (.76)	.49* (.27)	1.39**** (.21)	-1.45**** (.42)
	Hungary	.66*** (.27)	.37 (.37)	.87* (.52)	.47* (.27)	1.15**** (.34)	.93**** (.30)	-.43 (1.07)	.29 (.30)	----	1.20 (.46)	1.23*** (.51)	----
	Poland	.01 (.25)	.78*** (.28)	.25 (.40)	.11 (.25)	.93**** (.27)	.26 (.25)	.68* (.41)	-.18 (.31)	.90* (.53)	-.31 (.33)	1.66*** (.64)	-10.70 (164.26)
	Czech Republic	.08 (.20)	-.12 (.23)	-.02 (.30)	.10 (.20)	-.35 (.31)	.39* (.20)	.24 (.38)	.02 (.20)	.65 (.69)	-.15 (.29)	.46* (.31)	-.41 (.64)
	East Germany	.39* (.22)	.32 (.59)	-.30 (.36)	.28 (.23)	.29 (.24)	.74** (.34)	.37 (1.24)	.12 (.27)	-.28 (.21)	-.09 (.25)	1.07** (.51)	-10.55 (82.61)
	West Germany	-.02 (.21)	1.65* (1.12)	.17 (.26)	-.11 (.25)	.72**** (.22)	.69** (.30)	.63* (.43)	.39* (.22)	-.05 (.59)	.27 (.22)	1.26**** (.30)	-.23 (.66)
	Norway	.52**** (.13)	.31 (.26)	.63**** (.17)	.47**** (.16)	.80**** (.15)	.54**** (.17)	1.51**** (.36)	.31** (.15)	.07 (.53)	.35* (.21)	.60**** (.18)	.35 (.43)

Notes: Table entries are logistic regression nonstandardized coefficients (B) at the following significance levels:

* p < .10

** p < .05

*** p < .01

****p < .005

The entries in parentheses represent the standard errors.

Y/N: Yes/ No

M/N: Might/ Never

Table 6b. World Values Study 1997. Romania

Union Membership	Romania	Sign petition		Join boycott		Attend demonstration		Join strikes		Occupy buildings		Party membership
		Y/N (a)	M/N (b)	Y/N (c)	M/N (d)	Y/N (e)	M/N (f)	Y/N (g)	M/N (h)	Y/N (i)	M/N (j)	Y/N (k)
		.70*** (.25)	-.04 (.24)	-.25 (.69)	-.04 (.27)	1.14**** (.25)	1.00**** (.28)	1.01* (.52)	.57* (.31)	1.85 (1.30)	.34 (.41)	-.42 (.52)

Notes: Table entries are logistic regression nonstandardized coefficients (B) at the following significance levels:

* p < .10

** p < .05

*** p < .01

****p < .005

The entries in parentheses represent the standard errors.

Y/N: Yes/ No

M/N: Might/ Never