

EU Health Security Programs: Cooperation on Preparedness and Response to NBCR Agents Threats

NATO Advanced Study Institute

- *Strengthening National Public Health
Preparedness and Response -*

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Neda Milevska-Kostova, MSc, MCPPM

Program Director, CRPRC “Studiorum”

EU and the NBCR threats


Prior to the end of the Cold War

- Acknowledging a general problem of the international security
 - 'NBCR threat' seen as common experience shared by all European and international organizations
 - Fanciful and presumptuous discussion
- concern of competent politico-military bodies (NATO)

EU and the NBCR threats

Evolution of Perceptions

- End of the Cold War - abandonment of dominant intellectual and political framework
- Concerns over NBCR agents became more than just a matter of how or whether such weapons and technology might be used



Vast surpluses of cold war NBCR, without adequate monitoring and security, could conceivably find their way into the hands of 'rogue' states, terrorist organizations or even individuals.

History of EU's NBCR policies

- Treaty for establishment of the **European Economic Community in 1952** - central idea of common security policy
 - **Euratom Treaty in 1957** bears concerns:
 - protection of the population from radiation
 - inspection of facilities and materials
 - prevention of unauthorized users and uses
- EU perspective and contribution - a 'civil' or 'soft' power mostly concerned with the civil use of nuclear energy

History of EU's NBCR policies

End of the Cold War: concerns of BC security

- EU Council Regulation 3381/94 of Dec 1994 - Community regimen for the control of exports of dual-use goods
- EU Council Decision 94/942/CFSP of Dec 1994 - Joint Action on the basis of Article J.3 of TEU concerning the control of exports of dual-use goods
- Revised in 2000 and updated regularly

History of EU's NBCR policies

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 1991 Maastricht Treaty

- One of the 'pillars' of the EU mandating the CFSP:
'all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense'
- CFSP acknowledged the danger of NBCR proliferation and committed the EU to closer involvement in non-proliferation policy

History of EU's NBCR policies

In the wake of 9-11:

- WMD proliferation - a prominent theme

After 9-11:

- Tone and substance of EU statements changed
- Sense of urgency for preparing non-declarative documents and
- Preparing the EU and Member States for the coming threats

History of EU's NBCR policies

(2001) EU GA Council: 'targeted initiative'

(NDAC = nonproliferation, disarmament, arms control)

- ‡ strengthen NDAC regimes and initiatives;
- ‡ strengthen EU export control systems;
- ‡ help other states to manage and/or reduce stocks of NBC weapons, and associated materials; and
- ‡ seek 'enhanced political dialogue' with third countries to promote 'NDAC policies as a means of combating terrorism.'

History of EU's NBCR policies

(2003) Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD

- 13 principles
- means for slowing or reversing WMD proliferation
- indications of evolving EU NBCR threat assessment

Basic Principles for EU Strategy (1)

“The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (i.e., biological, chemical and nuclear weapons) and means of delivery such as ballistic missiles *constitutes a threat to international peace and security*. These weapons are different from other weapons not only because of their *capacity to cause death on a large scale* but also because they *could destabilize the international system*.”

Basic Principles for EU Strategy (2)

“The acquisition of WMD or related materials by *terrorists* would represent an *additional threat* to the international system with potentially *uncontrollable consequences*. Armed with weapons or materials of mass destruction terrorists could inflict damage that in the past only states with large armies could achieve.”

History of EU's NBCR policies

‘security... peoples... and interests...’
(Thessaloniki Declaration)

“10. All such weapons could directly or indirectly threaten the [EU] and its wider interests. A WMD attack on the EU's territory would involve the risk of disruption on a massive scale, in addition to grave immediate consequences in terms of destruction and casualties. In particular, the possibility of WMD being used by terrorist present a direct and growing threat to our societies in this respect.”

History of EU's NBCR policies

‘security... peoples... and interests...’
(Thessaloniki Declaration)

“11. In areas of tension where there are WMD programs, European interests are potentially under threat, either through conventional conflicts between States or through terrorist attacks. In those regions, expatriate communities, stationed and deployed troops (bases or external operations), and economic interests (natural resources, investments, export markets) can be affected, whether or not specifically targeted.”

EU Security Strategy

- Broader and more sophisticated understanding of the NBCR threat:
‘threat’ is to be understood not only in the traditional sense of an ***antagonist’s intentions and capabilities***, but also more structurally, as an ***indication of the limitations of the established control and management regimes***.

Elements of the NBCR Threats

- *Global/general threat*
- *Threat to norms and regimes of non-proliferation*
- *Neighborhood/regional threat*
- *Direct/physical threat*
- *Remote/physical threat*
- *Reputational threat*
- *Threat of accident*

Source: Cornish P, Anthony I., Dec 2005 (Conference paper)

EU fight against Bioterrorism

Strategic

- *Public Health Preparedness and Response*
- *Availability and Stockpiling of Medicines*
- *Research*
- *Building Multi-Sectoral Response*
- *International Cooperation*

PH Preparedness and Response

■ **Preparedness**

- *establish effective surveillance;*
- *familiarize clinicians with the syndromes;*
- *disseminate case management guidelines;*
- *put in place effective arrangements for prompt notifications to the authorities in charge of collecting and evaluating epidemiological information;*
- *coordinate public health responses.*

■ **Response**

PH Preparedness and Response

■ ***Coordination at EU Level***

(25 actions under 4 objectives):

- Set up ***alert and information*** exchange mechanism
- Create a capability for ***detection and identification*** for BC agents that might be used in attacks.
- Create a database on ***medicines stock and health services*** and a stand-by facility available in case of attack.
- ***Draw up rules, disseminate guidance*** for coordinating the EU response and links with third countries and international organizations.

PH Preparedness and Response

Availability and Stockpiling of Medicines

- *National stockpiles*
- *EU-level stockpiles*
- *Planned action*

Research

Sixth Framework Programme for Research

"Life sciences, genomics and biotechnology for health" and "Food quality and safety"

(with budget of EUR 3,267 Mil.)

"Euratom" (with budget of EUR 750 Mil.)

PH Preparedness and Response

Building Multi-Sectoral Response

- ***Food safety***

*Broad body of legislation and institutions
(no need for additional systems)*

- ***Animal safety***

Broad body of legislation and institutions

- ***Plant safety***

To examine the regulations

- ***Water safety***

*To examine the Community regulations for drinking and
surface waters*

PH Preparedness and Response

International Cooperation

- *Global Health Security Action Group (Ottawa 2001)*
- *WHO*
- *NATO*

EU fight against bioterrorism still in cradle years

- *“Informing the general public in the event of a radiological emergency”*