ON THE
WAY TO THE GLOBAL WORLD:
ADMINISTRATIVE AND
NETWORKING STRATEGIES OF
THE RUSSIA’S REGIONS
Oleg Alexandrov, Andrey Makarychev
INTRODUCTION
The decade of 1990s
has witnessed the rise and fall of Russia’s regions as both domestic and
international actors. This peculiar trajectory deserves special attention.
By the end of 1990 it became clear that due to emergence of new
political, economic and public actors Russian political space became much more
complex than ever before. New patterns of institutional and non-institutional
interaction were coming into being, with new corporate actorship to emerge on
the basis of new labor ethics. These new trends were very much consonant with
the world-wide crisis of hierarchical models of organizations and mushrooming
of networking managerial models, which in Russia have however their own
specificity.
Regions’ survival
in increasingly complex and demanding environment consisting of a variety of
actors[1]
depends on how they are to be positioned in the frameworks of both horizontal
cooperation and vertical subordination. Traditionally, the regions in Russia
were perceived as administrative units looking for their room in the
“administrative staircase” of political power. Vertically, the regions
are parts of what could be called “administrative market” composed of political
institutions each having its niche in newly reconstructed “vertical of power”.
Yet this is just one part of the story, since the regions increasingly find
themselves interacting with other structures and institutions that in a strict sense
are not a part of “administrative market” and are not attached to specific
territory to the extent the regions are. Horizontally, the regions have
to discover the potential of coalition building with other “sovereignty-free
actors” (James Rosenau’s expression). What became important is social
interaction with other members of regional milieu, interchange of resources and
information, coordination of political and social practices, combination of
different experiences[2].
In our paper we
treat the regions as those units that belong to both administrative (vertical)
and networking (horizontal) areas of decision making. This paper wishes to
contribute to understanding the extent to which the coalitions of the regions
and other new actors are instrumental in Russia’s adjustment to the imperatives
of new global environment. We would like to explore whether the interactions of
the regions and other new actors could facilitate Russia’s integration to the
world community and serve as communicators with the global milieu. One of the
main aims of this paper is to identify the spheres of social interaction
between the regions and other new actors, and to appraise their results in
terms of Russia’s integration to the global world.
1. REGIONS AND THEIR CHALLENGERS
This chapter seeks
to analyze the vitality of the present form of Russian regionalism and assess the chances of Capital and
Information as its strongest challengers. “Capital actors” are exemplified by
financial-industrial groups which are alliances of industrial enterprises,
banking and insurance institutions, investment corporations, and commercial
funds[3].
“Information actors” are those professionally related to producing and
distributing the knowledge-based information products (including the media,
Internet, telecommunication agencies, public policy research institutions,
etc.). Neither of these two large groups of new actors is intrinsically
coherent, and the divergences within each of them are very significant. Yet for
analytical purposes we shall deal with them as groups of actors having common
background and interests vis-à-vis other actors.
1.1. The Rise and Fall of the
Regions
It is rather hard to comprehensively characterize the roles of
regional elites as political actors. There are contrasting attitudes to the
regional governments both in Russia and abroad. Thus, Sergey Medvedev thinks
that the regional governments are pragmatic and rational actors. They can “be
seen as a factor of stability and continuity” and “are to a large extent
preventing the authoritarian government in Russia”[4].
To confirm this view one may recall for example that this were the regions
(like Chuvashia, city of Moscow and others) that the international
organizations have addressed for cooperation projects after the August 1998
meltdown[5].
On the other hand, Gleb Pavlovsky, the head of the
Moscow-based Foundation for Effective Politics, characterized regional leaders
as “mediocre managers which found themselves at their own in the revolutionary
redistribution of property”. In the words of Pavlovsky who is one of top
political advisors to President Vladimir Putin, the mentality of the regional
leaders is a mix of prejudices inherited from the times of USSR and
perestroika, often embedded in ethnocratic and even racist colors[6].
Philip Hanson noted that “regional government activity tends ... towards
autarky”[7].
Some of the regional governments are very conservative and show no initiative
in globalization issues. Thus, it was the central government that forced the
Kuban’s legislature to pass the law giving the residence rights to the CIS
citizens who were married to the locals for more than five years. Yet the
regional anti-migration lobby is eager to convince the federal center to grant
to Krasnodar Krai the special status of border region, which might end up in
banning the residence permits for foreigners from “Near Abroad”[8].
By the same token, Moscow city authorities impose administrative barriers on
the way of capital and migrants.
Thus, it is hard to decide unequivocally
whether the regions are the sources or the impediments for innovations.
Probably they were both – depending on the nature of leadership in each
specific region and the period we are referring to.
In the beginning of
1990s there were much hopes that the regions would turn into the locomotives of
the reforms Russia badly needed. Regions were the first to undermine the
political monopoly of the center. They gradually increased their sphere of
influence both internally and externally[9].
During 1990s decentralization was a dominant tendency. Regionalism became the top issue of the
Russian political life, for it questioned the traditional forms of state
ruling. The power of the federal center was moving to regions, involving new
people in the process of governance and making forms of policy making more
complex. Russian political scientist Arbakhan Magomedov indicates two major
factors that gave start to regionalism in the beginning of 1990: crisis of
identity, which occurred against the background of breakdown of the Soviet
Union, and refusal of regional elites to follow the line of the Gaidar reform.[10]
In mid-1990s the
federal center decided on signing of power-sharing agreements as a means to
concretize the rights and status of each particular region in Russian economic
and political space. Since 1996 regions received the right to elect governors
in the same way the leaders of ethnic republics did this since 1991. Actually,
the period from 1991 till 1998 was the golden age of Russian regionalism.
Yet
the truth is that much of initial expectations have faded by the end of 1990,
with increasing incompetence and inefficiency of the regional elites, their
failures to secure the regional economic growth and provide decent living
standards. Regions’ defaults on their international financial obligations and
the defeat of the Primakov - Luzhkov regional coalition in 1999 parliamentary
election were the most notorious signs of the weakness of the regional elites.
As Piotr Shchedrovitsky puts it, the regional leaders failed to cope with mass
political processes under such rather unfavorable and imperfect conditions as
scarce information, political uncertainties, growing number of extreme
situations. A large part of them have proved their disinterest in networking
forms of social and political actions, human capital development (what is being
called “antropostructures”[11]),
and expert analysis. The broadening spheres of social and economic life were
staying behind their reach – those basically related to financial flows and
intellectual capital. The regional elites have also experienced the value
crisis[12].
Instead of formulating strategic goals and investing in long-term projects, the
regional elites were by and large obsessed by misleading slogans of
“stabilization”, “strengthening national spirit”, etc.[13]
Governors were trying to use every pretext to protect their political and
economic domains from any competition. Thus, Khabarovsk Krai governor Viktor
Ishaev has lobbied in favour of canceling the municipal elections in those
subjects of federation adjacent to the border under the guise of “security
context”[14], while Igor
Farkhutdinov, the governor of Sakhalin, has spoken out against establishing the
free economic zone in the Kuril islands explaining his position quite overtly –
“who in that case will be the governor?”[15].
As a result, the bulk of regional regimes have evolved to autocracy, which
discredited the very idea of regionalism.
The
regional elites have failed to perform the function of “spatial transfer of
innovation”[16]. Taking
into account growing debilitation of regional elites and their vanishing
innovative potential, the question has to be asked: does it manifest the
eventual “death” of the regions as strong political actors? Or the regions have
to change their roles? And who are the new non-central actors, more adequate to
the challenges of modernization?
It
is yet too early to give precise and detailed answers to these questions, but
it might be certainly assumed that the new engines of Russian modernization
have to be those actors dealing with Capital and Information, two basic
substances to predetermine further development of Russian regions.
1.2.1. Financial-industrial groups (FIGs)
Financial-industrial groups as international actors.
Much of financial-industrial groups’ resources are due to their international
credentials. Many of Russia’s major financial and industrial groups, being
regional institutions by background and the nature of their business, pursue
far-reaching international strategies. Major Russian oil companies trade in
international securities markets and have industrial assets beyond Russia. For
example, Siberian-Ural Petrochemical & Gas Co., or Sibur, bought 24,7%
stake in Hungarian petrochemicals company BorsodChem Rt.[17]
“Norilsk Nikel” trade marks were recognized as the full-fledged members of
trading list run by London Metal Exchange. Russian “Alfa” group was considering
buying Swiss-based Marc Rich Investment company which deals with security
markets, investment and trade[18].
In 2001 LUKoil has decided to earmark $ 3 million for
upgrade of the Odessa Refinery in Ukraine[19].
In March 2001 LUKoil allegedly bought the controlling stake of Austrian Avanti
(which owns about 700 filling stations in Austria, Hungary, Germany, etc.).[20]
Russian oil and gas companies based in Sakhalin, Irkutsk and Tomsk
(“Vostokgazprom” is one of the strongest among them) are competing with British
Petroleum for energy supply contracts in China and other South East countries.
“Yukos” company is heavily involved in supplying the oil to “AB Mazeikiu Nafta”
of Lithuania[21].
“Siberian Aluminum”, the second largest producer of aluminum
in the world, has its office in New York which plays pivotal role in its
financial operations within US banking system.
Among its major financial partners to open credit lines were
Westdeutsche Landesbank, Raiffeisen Zentralbank, Societe Generale, Credit
Lyonnais, and Natexis.
Of course, one should not idealize neither the current state
nor the perspectives of international actorship of financial-industrial groups.
Many of them are deeply involved in property disputes and corruption scandals.
For instance, Mikhail Zhivilo, the owner of “Mikom” group, was arrested in
France in 2001 by Interpol order. He is accused in large-scale financial
wrongdoings in Kemerovo Oblast metallurgic plants[22].
Oleg Deripaska, chief executive of Russian Aluminum, faced $
2,7 million racketeering lawsuit filed in New York by US-based companies “Base Metal
Trading” and “Alucoal”. It is alleged that Deripaska and his trading companies
defrauded the smelter and BTM of $ 900 million in aluminum sale revenues[23].
The practice of using offshore companies for money laundering
and tax evasion is very widespread. Thus, Novolipetsk metallurgic plant is
known for transferring the bulk of its revenues to those foreign companies that
were under control of its director Vladimir Lisin, including “Midmay S.A.”
(Panama), “Worslade” (Ireland), “Tuscony Intertrade” (Britain)[24].
Not all of the Russian business are happy with globalization.
Tensions are not rare between Russian industrial companies and foreign economic
actors. Major economic structures operating in the regions feel the pressure
from abroad[25] and try to
avoid competition by means of protectionist measures. An illustration of this
trend is given by “Gazprom”: part of the pressure on it to charge higher prices
than it wishes to comes from foreign sources. In 1997, for instance, the IMF
included among its conditions for extension of aid that gas prices for Russia’s
regions be differentiated on the basis of the transportation distance and
location of recipients[26].
Financial-industrial
groups as regional actors. Traditionally, Russia was ruled by institutions
“glued” to geographic segments of her vast territory. Yet the creeping logic of
globalization tends to restrict autonomy of individual territories. The
globalization paradigm is based on deconstructing the hard linkage between
administrative and economic borders.
This trend could be traced in Russia as
well. By the end of 1990s the capital – regardless of its regional affiliation
– had rushed to “new economic platforms”, i.e. those territories where the
business conditions were the most favorable. The shapes of these territories
resemble “archipelagos”[27]
(the term coined by the Expert Institute of the Russian Union of Industrialists
and Entrepreneurs) and does not necessarily coincide with the boundaries of the
subjects of federation. The new Russian business elite (emerged in the
aftermath of August 1998 crisis) came up with the idea to fend off their property
from arbitrary and incompetent decisions of regional high-ups, and to make the
business structures trans-regionally integrated. FIGs took advantage of both
the managerial weakness of the regional elites and their temporary
disorientation in the transition period from Yeltsin to Putin.
The logic of economic processes (mergers,
purchase of shares, property transfers) has given much of economic power in the
regions to newcomers, people from outside not incorporated into political and
administrative hierarchies existing in the regions. The regional elites had
sooner or later to discover that the developmental strategies of basic economic
actors are being decided not locally but either in a different region (which
may be the headquarter of oil, gas, or metallurgic or aluminum company), or
even abroad. Thus, authorities of the Pskov Oblast (which borders with Belarus,
Estonia and Latvia) fail to control the large amount of transportation and
cargo flows going through the region.[28]
Very much like in the West,
establishments owned by large corporations start playing decisive roles in
regional development. Thanks to their economic, technical and financial
dominance, large firms can, by the combined effect of their industrial and
location policies, transform themselves into “poles” for development and
profoundly influence local and regional development[29].
Needless to say that this kind of development naturally provokes conficts of
interest between the regional authorities and the big business – as this is the
case in Komi republic whose authorities are not happy with the “LUKOil” company
activities in the region[30].
In comparison with the period of
beginning of 1990s, the political interests of the Russian corporations in the
regions became more articulated by the end of 1990s. Financial-industrial
groups and large export-oriented companies tend to institute political control
over region, in which their basic economic interests are concentrated. The best
illustration of this was the electoral victory of Aleksandr Khloponin, the
former director of RAO Norilsk Nickel, who was elected governor of the Taimyr
Autonomous Okrug in January 2001.[31]
Khloponin, who has resigned from the directorate on the eve of the election
campaign, will undoubtedly become the champion of his company’s interests in
the region. In a similar way, the head of Sibneft’ and Russian Aluminum
companies Roman Abramovich became governor of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.
Another example is success of Boris Zolotarev, who used the support of Yukos
oil company to defeat his opponents and become governor of the Evenkia, the
region possessing substantial deposits of oil and gas.[32] This was the support of “Sibal” and Magnitogorski
metallurgical plant that played decisive roles for political careers of
respectively Alexei Lebed’, the governor of Khakassia, and Piotr Sumin, the
governor of Cheliabinsk Oblast[33].
It is well known
that „Tiumen’ Oil Company“ has major political stakes in Tyumen’ (the region of
rich oil deposits) and Ryazan’ (home to major oil processing plant). “LUKOil”,
another wealthiest company, is heavily involved in Volgograd and Astrakhan’
Oblasts. The same goes for “Gazprom” interests in Bryansk Oblast. “Yukos” was
supporting the former governors in Voronezh and Ulyanovsk Oblasts, while
“Kaskol” was politically engaged in the gubernatorial election in Magadan
Oblast[34].
Of course, in some
regions there is a competition between different companies and banks for
getting access to policymakers, and some of them fail to achieve sufficient
political influence. Typically, FIGs succeed in those regions which are
completely dependent upon certain types of business or natural resources. By and large, the business groups have their
political “protégés” in the key regions, yet relations between
these groups and regional elites might nevertheless be tense. For example,
there is a lot of tensions between authorities of Khanty-Mansi autonomous Okrug
and the group of investors - “Shell” and “Evikhon” companies (the later is run
by British-based “Sibir Energy” with the Russian businessman Shalva
Chigirinskii as its head). Local officials claim that investors did not
undertake sufficient measures to implement the oil extraction project.[35] The same type of conflict emerged between
the administration of Ulyanovsk Oblast and “Severstal’” company which owns
“UAZ”, major car-building factory in the region.
What is more significant is that major region-rooted
enterprises might become agents of essential political changes – positive or
negative ones - using their overseas connections. Thus, the “aluminum empire”
of brothers Chornyi - both residents of Israel - through highly sophisticated
network of affiliated structures became the major source of funding for the
projects implemented in Krasnoyarsk Krai and were able to control about three
fourth of all aluminum production in Russia. London-based Trans World Group
(TWG) created by the family of Chornyi is known for mass purchase of shares of
Krai’s enterprises (“KrAZ” is one of them) and subsequent draining the profits
abroad. The Russian media had reported that the TWG had sponsored gathering
negative information worldwide about its opponents in the Krasnoyarsk Krai[36]. In 1999 the rising “Russian Aluminum”
holding owned by Roman Abramovich and Oleg Deripaska has purchases “KrAZ” and
got rid of TWG, using the governor Aleksander Lebed’ as its tactical ally[37].
FIGs as federal actors. Of course
we should not exaggerate the degree of FIGs independence. It would be
misleading to treat them as completely autonomous actors. The federal
government benevolence was always essential for regional business (to create
“Tiumen’ oil company” and “Sibneft’”, the decision of the Chernomyrdin
government was required).
Yet under Putin the roles of the FIGs as
federal level actors have changed. Not only major FIGs have invested large
funds in Vladimir Putin’s presidential campaign. More essential is that the
interests of Putin and major FIGs coincide in their common desire to impose
greater control over the regional elites. This gives good reason to describe
Putin – FIGs alliance as long-term, well thought relationship forming a part of
the so called “new social contract”[38]. This “contract”, in a sense imposed upon
the business elite by the federal state, has its rules. The federal state
requires greater social responsibility from the business community, and denies
their independent political roles in federal issues[39].
What Putin counts on is that the FIGs
themselves would realize advantages of working under the federal government
protection. Alexei Mordashov, the general director of “Severstal’” company, was
among the first to recognize that “it is easier to bargain under the state
roof”[40].
The importance of the federal state for the FIGs was clearly demonstrated in
the lobbying campaign of major regional metallurgic enterprises protesting
against 1999 trade agreement between Russia and USA that has kept restrictions
for Russian metallurgic products in US market[41].
In 2001 these were the biggest regional car-producers that forced the federal
government to drastically raise customs tariffs for imported second hand cars.
It seems that this was one of rare areas in which the interests of all parties
involved – the FIGs, the regional administrations, and the federal government –
were almost identical.
1.2.2. Information actors
Information is of primordial importance for sub-national politics
because its distribution calls for new “epistemic strategies” based on
knowledge and expertise tending to circulate without borders. Among information
actors are media, think tanks, and a plethora of NGOs intended to make the data
and know how available to broader audience in order to make the political
process more transparent (ecology and human rights advocacy are primarily based
on information management and implementation). The social importance of
information actors is that being voluntary and self-governing institutions,
they are intended to mediate opposing forces, and invest into “social capital,
the cooperative networks that permit individuals to work together for mutual
goals”[42].
These social functions are of ever growing importance since there is a huge
demand for new ideas and approaches to reforming the Russian regional society[43].
The Russian community of
information actors is very different, representing a sort of “islands of
perfection” surrounded by the “sea” of old-style conservatism. Yet these
communities are important because they facilitate the flow of information
between regional, national and trans-national institutions. They signal to
domestic constituencies of political changes, and in doing so they play the
roles of interpreters, editors, cue-givers, and “filters”.
Taking part in the
formation of global financial and information space, Russian media - as a part
of the “knowledge market” (or “market of ideas”) - is an important actor in terms of integration of the regions
into the world communication structures and projecting the dominating norms and
standards of the “information society”. A large part of regional mass media is
broadly integrated into the international communication networks.
Presently, one can
witness a swift numerical increase of electronic enterprises and media in
Russia. In 2001 the Russian sector of Internet is 900 million dollars market of
electronic transactions. In comparison, in 2000 this index was equal to 460
million, and in 1999 – to 250 million. The same goes for Internet users. Russia
has arrived at the 15th place among the countries as to the amount of Internet
users as of 2000.[44]
The largest internet communities are in Moscow, St.Petersburg, Novosibirsk,
Ekaterinburg, Krasnodar, Vladivostok, Irkutsk, Cheliabinsk, Samara and Nizhny
Novgorod. Internet speeds up the process of interest group formation, incrementally
increases the educational level of the users, makes their voices heard before
the crucial decisions are taken[45].
That is why growing regional internet communities can seriously strengthen
positions of regional information actors and make unnecessary some of red-tape
institutions.
Thanks to growing
spread of information actors people living in remote cities and towns are able
to compare their living standards and draw their conclusions accordingly. Mass
media is also contributing to the inter-regional competition by focusing
ratings on economic attractiveness of regions and political influences of their
chief executives vis-à-vis each other.
At the same time, not all information actors foster greater
transparency. Some of them tend to monopolize certain segments of information
market and impose their owners’ views over information consumers. Taking into
account that mass media remains the main translator of political preferences
and the basic tool for reshaping the mass conscience[46],
no wonder that TV and press market developed into a major battlefield of
political and ideological factions. Information actors – apart from performing
enlightening functions - are also widely used as political tools. That is why much efforts have been undertaken to
incorporate the largest media structures into the Kremlin-run sphere of
influence.
With the spread of negative information campaigning, the governors have
started to realize how sensitive the
media policies are. Eduard Rossel, the governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast, had
personal appointment with Vladimir Gusinsky – at that time the owner of NTV –
to discuss this channel’s coverage of events in this region[47].
The governors Penza, Orenburg and Kemerovo Oblasts were among the first to face
the negative PR challenges coming from Internet. By the same token, these were
local channels (“TVK-6” and “Afontovo”) that were utilized by Krasnoyarsk
tycoon Anatoly Bykov to boost his political ambitions as opposed to the
governor Alexander Lebed’[48].
Most of the governors try to survive in the information battle by
nurturing the loyal media. Egor Stroev, the head of Oriol Oblast and the
chairman of the Council of Federation, by his order created regional TV Channel
completely funded by regional administration, with no permission from Russian
State Company for Television and Broadcasting (VGTRK)[49].
Administration of Kirov Oblast is known for forcing the state institutions to
subscribe on its official newspaper[50].
The administration of Krasnoyrask Krai is tightening its grip over the largest
regional newspaper “Krasnoyarskii rabochii”[51].
Numerous attempts have been made to introduce more restrictive changes
in the “Law on mass media” adopted in 1991. Most proposals getting from
legislative, executive and even juridical branches are directed against the
freedom of speech. Either they suggest putting mass media under direct of
indirect control of the authorities (administration of the President, regional
governors, State Duma, heads of local administration, deputy commissions etc.),
or they insist on establishment of regulatory organs that could exercise a
‘soft’ control over broadcasting or publishing materials. Endeavors to sue
regional or local authorities for violating laws had led to no positive results
as majority of Russian courts defend interests of local power elite.
Some of the governors were quick to treat the media not as information
intermediary between them and the people, but rather as their direct opponents.
General Vladimir Shamanov, being elected the governor of Ulyanovsk Oblast, in
his first interview had threatened the local media which had not supported his
campaign with repercussions[52].
The regional practice is that mass media are largely exposed to
political and administrative influences. The Glasnost Defense Foundation argues
that there is a plenty of tools that are widely used against the media in the
regions: indirect (informal bargaining)
and direct (threats) pressure, refusal to provide information, financial
control over media outlets, etc[53].
The most inimical attitudes to the free media were reported in Kalmykia,
Tatarstan, Northern Ossetia, Ingushetia, Dagestan[54].
Radio Liberty has extensively covered violations of journalists rights by
authorities in Yaroslavl’ and Belgorod Oblasts (the legal prosecution of the
leading journalists Elvira Mezhennaia and Olga Kitova, respectively)[55].
Other regional experiences testify that the governors treat the independent
media in rather unfriendly manner. Authorities of Bashkortostan has applied a
variety of administrative measures to close the “Russkii obozrevatel’”
opposition newspaper[56].
The same “sticks” were applied against the “Khronometr” newspaper which was
criticizing the administration of Kostroma Oblast[57].
Not better is the situation in Omsk Oblast, where the governor Leonid Polezhaev
has openly called for “cleasing the media from foreign evil” and made
impossible the work of opposition TV channels (“STV-3” and “Antenna-7”)[58].
The winner of the election campaign in Magadan Oblast Valentin Tsvetkov urged
the Moscow-based head office of the publishing house Argumenty i Fakty to
discontinue publications of its regional edition “AiF-Magadan” under the
pretext of his disagreement with the coverage of regional election campaign by
this newspaper.[59]
To sum up, the
regions have faced the most serious challenges from the combined efforts of
largest financial-industrial groups and the information actors. Yet this is not
to say that the regions are doomed to step down. Most likely, they are to
transform into more effective units better prepared to meet the challenges of
globalization. In course of this transformation, two kinds of resources are
open for the regions – administrative and non-administrative. In the following
chapter we are going to assess the opportunities and the limitations of each of
them.
2. REGIONS’ ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKETS
Administrative channels were always available for the regions. The
totality of these channels form peculiar “administrative market” to include a
variety of official institutions each having its predetermined and well fixed
place in the hierarchy of state power.
2.1. Regions and the Council
of Federation
For a large period preceding the
Putin’s administrative reform, Council of the Federation - the upper chamber of
the Federal Assembly - has been the institution possessing considerable power
to decide political questions of major importance - the state of emergency,
deployment of military forces abroad and impeachment of the President[60].
As the only central state institution that profited from the regionalism, it
became tribune of the regional representatives, played a key role in developing
relations between the center and the regions and received the right to control
the important part of the legislative procedure. The Council of Federation was
always a legal background for governors’ “get-together”. During 1990s Council
of the Federation continually increased its role within central state hierarchy
and achieved the highest positions in 1999 when it insisted on 55 to 45 percent
distribution of the state budget in favor of regions. Politically, at that time
it became the third major instance after President and his government.
The Council of the
Federation has already experienced three stages of transformation. From 1993 to
1995 members of the Council were elected, since 1995 consisted and till January
1st 2002 the Chamber will consists of heads of regional executive and
legislative branches. The new law on the Council, adopted in the course of the
Putin’s administrative reforms on 2000, envisages a new membership that will
finally take effect after January 2002. New members of the Council of
Federation will represent regional executive and legislative branches, but will
not include the heads of these organs.[61]
Since the Council of Federation is
a part of “administrative market”, the way it is recruited is under control of
it most weighty actors. Gennady Saveliev, the governor of Komi-Permiatsky
autonomous Okrug, and Yurii Spiridonov, the head of the Komi republic, quite
explicitly recognized that the federal center and the administration of the
federal districts very insistently pushed their own candidates from each of the
subjects of federation[62].
Not all regional leaders like it. Alexander Prokhorov, the governor of Smolensk
Oblast, and Murtaza Rakhimov, the president of Bashkortostan, have criticized
the widely spread practice of distributing the Council of Federation seats
among influential figures residing in Moscow, with no experience in the regions
they are supposed to represent in the upper chamber of the parliament[63].
Yet the new recruitment model is a good prove of changing meaning of
territoriality for Russia’s politics: for example, the republic of Khakassia
has nominated Arkady Sarkisian – deputy Director of the “GAZ” factory located
in Nizhny Novgorod and vice president of “Sibal” group – to be its
representative in the Council of Federation[64].
What matters are not regional allegiances but professional linkages and
qualifications, as well as belonginess to a certain policy group.
It is doubtful that Putin’s reforms have
undermined the power of the regional chief executives. Even being deprived of
their seats in the upper chamber of the parliament, they still have some levers
to control their new representatives there. Yet the validity of the Council of
Federation is becoming a question. Two main options are discernable for the
perspective.
The first one is
that the members of the Council of Federations will be popularly elected. Among
the proponents of this idea are liberal parties (SPS and Yabloko), Sergey
Kirienko, Konstantin Titov and some other regional leaders. The second option
would be to abolish this institution or significantly diminish its rights and,
consequently, expand the rights of the State Council (as advocated by Vladimir
Zhirinovsky, Mentimer Shaimiev[65],
Alexander Dzasokhov, Aman Tuleev, Mikhail Prusak and some others).
2.2. Regions and the State Duma
State Duma, the lower chamber of
the Federal Assembly and another administrative actor, is a successor of the
former Supreme Council that was forcefully dismissed by President Yeltsin in
October 1993. Apart from its legislative activities, State Duma approves of the
Prime Minister after his presentation by the president and is empowered to
initiate impeachment procedure. The basic channels of State Duma’s influence
are powers to decide on the state budget, ratification of international
agreements[66], and
hearing reports of ministries officials, which provide the parliament with an
opportunity to debate serious policy issues, however, without any legislative
decisions.
The State Duma is an important
link in a chain of regional interests. The experience of the last ten years
proves that state budget becomes an element in political rivalries between
executive and legislative power on the one hand, and regional lobby, on the
other. In its turn, the executive power ignored its own obligations and even
using state resources to make pressure on political opposition (by making
selective subventions not to all but only to loyal regions and newspapers).
Under the new Putin’s political
regime, the governors keep widely using the State Duma deputies as their
lobbyists. This was the case in summer 2000 when the governors succeeded in
amending the Putin’s legislation proposals concerning the reform of the
governance. These were the governors that stood behind the clauses stipulating
“soft rotation” of the governors from the Council of Federation, and the right
of the governor to unilaterally appoint and recall his representative to the
Council of Federation. To some extent, due to governors’ lobbying Putin’s project lost much of its initial
anti-regional drive[67].
3.3. Regions and the State Council
The governors actually are motivated by keeping their residual
powers and privileges. Their reaction to Vladimir Putin’s reform was a mix of
the search for compromises and opposition to the federal center (as exemplified
by Nikolay Fiodorov of Chuvashia). Putin’s reforms were applauded by those
regional leaders adhered to strengthening the central government. Thus, Oleg
Koroliov, the governor of Lipetsk Oblast, deems that “the state ought to be
either strong or non-existent. That is why we need a powerful and mighty center
capable to restore the order”[68].
The State Council was invented by President Putin in the
aftermath of launching his administrative reform. Since the governors were to
be deprived of their seats in the upper chamber of the parliament, the
President offered them a political compensation in the form of the State
Council membership. This body is not envisaged in the Constitution, which makes its functions shaky and blurred.
President himself said that he treats the State Council as a “political organ
of strategic purpose” which is not supposed however to substitute either the
parliament or the government[69].
In Putin’s concept, the State Council is the “platform” for negotiations
between the center and the provinces[70].
Yet Nikolay Fiodorov, the
president of Chuvash republic, is convinced that this institution has no power,
and nobody knows what exactly it is about[71].
Gennady Saveliev, the governor of Komi-Permiatsky autonomous Okrug, has called
the State Council “not completely legitimate organ”[72].
Political background of the State Council was revealed in the
Report issued by a group of mostly left-wing economists and presented by
Khabarovsk Krai governor Viktor Ishaev at the first session of the State Council.
This document is very uncertain with regard to perspectives of Russia’s
globalization. It stipulates that the federal government should support both
leading sectors of Russia’s economy with greater potential for global
competitiveness, and underdeveloped sectors with scarce investment
opportunities like agriculture. However Ishaev Report strongly suggests that
domestic investments are to prevail in further Russia’s economic reforms. It
even comes up with the idea of introducing limitations for foreign capital in those
industries where the Russian producers have obtained good economic results.
There is no indication in this paper that tackling ecological issues,
transportation problems, economic security and other matters is possible only
with strong international support.
The Report is very unclear with regard to which regions ought
to be given priority in terms of federal center’s economic policy. It assumes
that disparities between the leading regions and the outsiders is a menace for
the country’s integrity, and proposes that the Northern and Far Eastern
regions, as well as border territories merit special treatment and privileges.
At the same time the Report recognizes that the process of concentration of the
capital in advanced areas (“locomotive regions”) should be supported as well[73].
The political perspectives of the
State Council are still dubious. Gleb Pavlovsky admits that one of most likely
options is its transformation to the weak body of complaining regional
politicians eager to have an access to the President[74].
2.4. Experimentation
with Federal Districts
The choice in favor of Vladimir Putin has clearly demonstrated that the
notions of strong state and order supplemented by the idea of modernization
were perceived as the top priority of the future ruling group. President Putin
began his administrative reform with division of the Russian Federation in
seven federal districts, the borders of which with a small exception
corresponded to the military districts. This did not gone unnoticed, and
appointment of five high-ranking military officers to run these districts only
increased public concern about the future of federalism in Russia. These new
entities also created a new model of relationship with the federal center,
based on new distribution of resources in favor of federal districts.
There were several goals of creating federal districts:
n greater
centralization and unification;
n undermining
regional clan systems based on partonage and patrimonialism;
n elimination of
inter-regional conflicts.
In accordance with the reform, federal structures located in regions
(courts, regional offices of public prosecution and regional unites of the
Interior Ministry etc.) are to be led out of the control of regional
authorities and get under supervision of presidential plenipotentiaries. The
President explained the creation of federal districts by the fact that a great
number of regional and republican laws contradicted the federal Constitution.
Hence, the general idea of the President was to insist on implementation of
federal laws on the whole territory of Russia. Meanwhile, presidential envoys
in seven federal districts received the right to attend meetings of
the cabinet of ministers with the right of consultative voice and to
participate in sessions of the government commissions and councils.[75] Earlier, President Putin nominated
presidential envoys to be the members of Security Council.
The federal districts are
double-faced institutions. On the one hand, they are a part of Putin’s
globalist agenda, as they were designed to break down trade and commercial
barriers between the regions, and foster free movement of capitals and
information[76]. So far,
Putin argues that strengthening of the presidential vertical in response to
extreme decentralization and mismanagement in previous years poses no danger to
democratic institutions, and even strengthens them. In his opinion, fortifying
of state institutions and the leading role of federal structures in reforming
the country does not contradict the tendencies of globalization and regionalization
he would like Russia to be involved.[77]
In tune with the President, his representative in the North West Federal
District Viktor Cherkesov pointed out that “it is time to finish up with all
what complicates the life of investors – complicated accounting system,
non-transparent financial flows, and violations of minority auctioneers rights.
Investors can not feel secured in the country where from time to time rumors
about reconsidering privatization status quo are being circulating”[78].
Yet on the other hand, the federal districts are very much in
tune with the logic of administrative proliferation. The expansion of
administrative and regulative functions of the heads of the district gave raise
to harsh criticism among political experts. Leonid Smirniagin, Sergey Borisov
and other specialists had questioned the necessity to redraw the regional map
of Russia along the lines determined by Putin. Basically the arguments are that
the new administrative borders are arbitrary and ill-substantiated[79].
With nomination of seven “governors general” regions are likely to become more
dependent on the federal center and less flexible in international projects.
Political leaders had also voiced
their criticism. Thus, Nikolay Fiodorov posits that the very model Putin
adheres to – the president relying on expanding system of bureaucratic
institutions with special roles to play for the military and special services –
is the relict of totalitarian regime[80].
He is supported by the deputy chairman of “Yabloko” faction in the State Duma
Sergey Ivanenko[81]. The
regional legislature of Primorskii Krai has issued the statement accusing
Konstantin Pulikovskii, the head of Far Eastern Federal District, in
“unprecedented pressure” towards the participants of the gubernatorial election
in this Krai in order to facilitate the victory of one of his deputies[82].
The State Duma member Viktor Pokhmelkin (representing the Union of Right Wing
Forces) deems that the danger is that the representatives of the president
actively encroach upon prerogatives of other institutions[83].
A good prove of this tendency is the confession of Sergey Kirienko that his
staff gives regular consultations to the regional policy makers concerning the
nomination of candidates to the Council of Federation. “We do not hide that we
have to work with these people in the future”[84],
Kirienko said.
It is very much telling that the importance of the federal
districts is assessed by their heads in purely administrative terms – the
criteria is keeping regular contacts with the head of the state. What is more,
the Presidential representatives have their say in nomination to public
offices, control over federal subsidies and targeted federal programs in
strategically important industries. Some of the presidential representative
want to supervise the state shares in certain industrial enterprises.
Even more symptomatic is that the
representatives of the presidents resist to all attempts to frame legally – and
evidently constrain - their sphere of responsibilities, keeping them as broad
(and indistinctive) as possible. Konstantin Pulikovsky argues that the new
tasks might permanently spring up, and the “life itself” has to define the
circle of their goals. Georgy Poltavchenko, the head of the Central Federal
District, presumes that he – along with other presidential representatives –
might need some more financial powers (in particular, he discussed the idea of
creating a regional development fund, or assigning part of the federal budget
to the federal districts). Piotr Latyshev, the head of the Ural Federal District,
was even more explicit insisting that “there are no issues which I would not
treat as mine”[85]. Russian
political analyst Viacheslav Nikonov has testified that in the North West
Federal District the governors are in no position to get in touch with federal
ministries without prior reporting the case to the presidential representative[86].
In result, the competencies of the
heads of the federal districts are as broad that they tend to interfere in
almost all segments of the regions’ life[87].
This uncertainty might easily divert their attention from the top priority
issues to the peripheral ones, like repairing urban sewing networks or
supervising local parties, and deprive Putin’s reform of the much needed sense
of mission (it is quite revealing that Sergey Kirienko, when asked about his
long-term strategic goals, quite frankly responded “Don’t know yet”)[88].
Political attitudes of the districts’ heads are also very
questionable as viewed from the globalization perspectives. Thus, Grigory
Poltavchenko posits that “there should not be such a notion as free market
economy”. He complained that “the Russian market is overstocked with foreign
products of doubtful quality”[89].
Skeptical attitudes to international cooperation are also heard in Viktor
Kazantsev’s statement that “there was too much flattering with the cozy idea of
twinning relations with foreign cities”, which turned out to be ineffective and
of much less potential than twin-sister relations between Russian cities[90].
Piotr Latyshev was known for his cordial relations with
Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko (in Latyshev’s opinion, “nowadays
Belarus does not face such large-scale problems as Russia does”[91]). In tune with most Russian hard-liners,
Viktor Cherkesov praised the most recent version of the Russia’s information
security doctrine, which received rather controversial publicity in the media
community due to overwhelming emphasis on state’s secrecy and anti-liberal
wording[92].
Thus, the federal districts by and large represent
administrative response to the challenges of the regional development. The
logic of district-building resembles very much that one of region-building, with
heavy administrative measures applied. Putin’s representatives themselves
confirm this view. Georgy Poltavchenko sincerely admitted that he “served all
his life in rather hard administrative structure, and got used to receive all
decisions as orders”[93]. On another occasion he said that he is not
inclined to “discuss the issue of whether the President had to introduce
federal districts or not. The chief executive formulated the task, and we ought
to fulfill it”[94]. It is very
telling that Poltavchenko, in his own words, still has a small statue of Felix
Dzerzhinsky, the founder of KGB, in his working table[95].
Though Sergei Kirienko argues that the core function of
presidential envoys is “policy coordination”[96],
in practice most of them have allergy to horizontal forms of interactions.
Konstantin Pulikovskii was the first of the presidential representatives to
overtly call for banning the democratic elections of the governors[97].
The most noticeable illustration is Piotr Latyshev’s ostensibly negative
attitude to the “Larger Ural” inter-regional association.[98]
It is likely however that some governors could keep treating the associations
as alternative pattern of integration and communication with the federal
government. “Larger Ural” and “Siberian Accord” for example are rather active
in promoting their agenda in economic issues skipping presidential
representatives. It might be that competition between the federal districts and
the inter-regional associations will sharpen in the near future.
It is worthwhile noting that the relations between two
administrative structures – the subjects of federation and the federal
districts – are far from being peaceful as well. The Novgorod Oblast governor
Mikhail Prusak and the president of Bashkortostan Murtaza Rakhimov deem the
existence of the institution of presidential envoys unjustifiable[99].
Samara Oblast governor Konstantin Titov declared that he does not consider
himself as a political subordinate to presidential representative in the Volga
Federal District. The newly elected governor Vladimir Egorov of Kaliningrad
Oblast prefers to communicate on core issues directly with the federal
government by-passing presidential representative in the federal district. The
most notorious conflict is being developed between the governor of Sverdlovsk
Oblast Eduard Rossel and the head of the Ural Federal District Piotr Latyshev.
Latyshev, known for its caution and adherence to half-measures, have lost momentum
in such important areas as economics and foreign relations[100].
Another telling example is the President of Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev refusal to
subordinate to Viktor Kazantsev (“He has no constitutional powers... He might
elaborate on issues but is in no position to give me directions”[101]).
The troubles the federal districts have to meet dealing with
the capital and information actors, are pretty much the same as the subjects of
federation have experienced already. This is due to the fact that there is no
much difference between these two administrative actors (the regions and the
federal districts) in terms of the attitudes to the business and information
communities. Like each of the governors, each head of the federal district
tries to develop his own economic program and get an access to financial flows[102].
Like most of the governors, Piotr Latyshev “openly offers to the businessmen to
solve all their problems through his office”[103].
In the tug-of-war between Rossel and Latyshev, each side has to rely upon
support of the wealthiest entrepreneurs. Konstantin Pulikovsky has imposed a
great deal of administrative control over the media outlets that have been
serving the former governor of Primorsky Krai Evgenii Nazdratenko[104].
Latyshev, with the financial support of the Russian tycoon
Oleg Deripaska, has started a new TV project to cover his policies in the
district)[105]. Leonid
Drachevsky did the same in Siberia[106].
The big problem is that purely
administrative measures can hardly help the regions (either “small ones” or
“big ones”) to survive. Georgy Poltavchenko has recognized himself that “the
President awaits for proposals from us”[107].
Hence, what matters for district-level “anti-crisis management” (one of most
widely used phrases of Sergei Kirienko[108])
are intellectual products like new ideas, recommendation, advice, etc.
President Putin has assumed that
the presidential representatives would be the core figures in creating the
local civil societies[109].
He did not give any details on what exactly is meant by that, which itself is
very indicative. Most likely, what Putin had in mind is that his
representatives are supposed to strengthen political resources of some of the
regional actors that could contribute in divesting the governors of excessive
powers – like the regional legislatures and local branches of all-Russian
political parties. Yet it is hard to expect that the presidential envoys are
apt for the delicate task of nurturing the civil society institutions.
Presidential representatives’ attitudes to the media are for example very much
similar to that ones of the governors. In their views, mass communications are
basically instruments for mobilizing public opinions and reshaping the mass
awareness. Some of the presidential representatives have already understood
that for successful work they have to achieve some degree of personal
popularity, which is unthinkable without information actors[110].
Thus, Piotr Latyshev is eager to widely use the media to revive such
trans-regional identifications like “sibiriak” (the resident of Siberia)
and “uralets” (the resident of the Ural)[111].
At the same time, according to Leonid Drachevskii, not all
of presidential representatives’ activities ought to “go public”[112].
Even Sergey Kirienko, obviously the most pro-liberal among the seven districts
heads, assumes that only the President – not the general public – is supposed
to judge on how effective is his work[113].
One and a half year after Putin’s reform there is still no
consensus among policy makers as to its long-term effects. Federal districts go
through a period of differentiation. Relations between the federal center and
the seven federal districts are still being shaped. The process of making the
regions’ legislation to come to terms with the federal laws also gives mixed
record. Tatarstan’s President Mentimer Shaimiev, for example, still adheres to
the principles of sovereignty of this republic as a political entity associated
with the Russian Federation[114],
while the leaders of Udmurtia were quick to delete from region’s legislation
all norms taking it away from Russia’s federal legal acts (“sovereignty” was
swiftly changed to “autonomy”, the clause of Udmurtian citizenship was
canceled, private property was guaranteed)[115].
Districts are still in search for their international
identities. In some cases the concept of cultural integration is being put
forward. Sergey Kirienko, for example, noted that the territorial area of
responsibility of Russia’s leaders, both national and subnational, is defined
not by administrative borders but rather by cultural factors (he refers to the
“area within which people think and speak Russian”[116]).
In other cases (Southern federal district) “the larger regions” seek to
contribute to peace enforcing and soothe the whole bunch of security-related
matters.
It is still unclear how far the federal districts are to go.
From Sergey Kirienko’s perspective, federal districts are rather political
instruments of the President than autonomous political institutions. Nikolay
Fiodorov, on the contrary, argues that the federal districts will inevitably
evolve into new subnational governments.
There is much uncertainty with regard to the extent to which
the federal districts could be treated as new regions. On the one hand,
“districts are not new regions and will never be”[117],
Sergey Kirienko assumes. On the other hand, Piotr Latyshev deems that “the new
configuration of the Ural within the boundaries of the federal district is
fundamental organizational prerequisite for deeper integration… which fully
corresponds to the national interests of Russia”[118].
2.5. Regions and the military
Using military and security structures for civilian governance
do not correspond to classic democratic standards, yet peculiar symbiosis
between civilian and military elites at the regional level could be treated as
another response of the regions to the challenges they have to face. This
response could be neatly described in terms of the “administrative network” model.
Several high-ranking military officers have made civil political careers under
Yeltsin - Ruslan Aushev in Ingushetia, Alexander Lebed’ in Krasnoyarsk Krai,
Alexei Lebed’ in Khakassia, Alexander Rutskoi in Kursk Oblast, and Aslan
Maskhadov in Chechnia.
Choosing the “men in
uniform” as the governors, the regions have experimented with another type of
administrative market response to the challenges of modernization. As Steven
Main puts it, the generals “know how to obey orders and understand the importance
of working with a clearly defined hierarchy and, where one does not already
exist, they will create it… You cannot find more manageable governors than
generals”[119].
Russian military
forces since 1991, when by refusing to participate in the putsch they decided
the fate of the newly born Russian democracy, began to play a considerable role
in political process[120],
including its regional level. Alexander
Lebed’ seems to be the most internationally reputed of all generals turned into
governors. Before being elected as the head of Krasnoyarsk Krai, he was known
for his peace keeping efforts in Trans-Dniestr region and Chechnia (he signed
famous Khasaviurt agreements for Russian government that stopped the bloodshed
in 1996). His political views were a mix of patriotic traditionalism,
pragmatism and moderate liberalism. Lebed’ is widely known in the West -
sufficient is to recall that prior to his victorious campaign in Krasnoyarsk
Krai he went to USA discussing there for ten days the perspectives of
investments[121]. Foreign
observers have ascribed to him “enormous political strength... Only Lebed’ ...
can blame the new suffering on old policies, remove old officials en masse and
institute a new policy that gives people some hope that the new suffering will
pay out”[122].
Yet those hopes - both international and domestic - proved to
be exaggerated and misleading. Neither of the regional military of the “first
wave” became a nation-wide leader. The ex-military in their capacity of
regional politicians got involved into harsh economic and political collisions.
Alexander Rutskoi, the governor of Kursk Oblast, had enormous tensions with
local elites and the federal law-enforcement agencies in the region, which
finally had led to the end of his political career in the region[123].
Alexander Lebed’ got a very controversial reputation by calling for a
dictatorship in Russia[124]
and relying on forceful methods in solving political disputes[125].
It is believed that under President Putin the military
received a new impulse to go into politics. In fall 2000 several of them won
the governorship - Vladimir Egorov in Kaliningrad, Vladimir Shamanov in
Ulyanovsk, Vladimir Kulakov in Voronezh. In Mari El, Kursk and Cheliabinsk
Oblasts the military candidates finished rather close to the winners[126].
It is hard to unequivocally ascertain however that penetration
of the military into regional politics is a deliberate strategy of the federal
government. Nonetheless, increasing number of generals in Russian political
life speak for a new formula of governance Putin is about to introduce. The
case of Vladimir Yegorov, the Baltic Fleet commander, supported by Vladimir
Putin in his battle for a governor’s seat in Kaliningrad Oblast, reflects the
presidential approach to tighten methods of governance over military and
strategically important centers and border regions having complicated
geopolitical surrounding.
The eventual militarization of Russian politics is a
matter of major concern in the civil society. On the other hand, the paradox is
that the military governors might foster liberal reforms in the regions. Thus,
the new governor of Voronezh Oblast pledged to take this region away from
stagnating “red belt”[127],
while the administration of the Kaliningrad governor has signed the contract
with Yegor Gaidar’s think tank to draft the strategic program for regional
development.
To sum up the administrative market analysis, we conclude that
the regional political regimes still have political and institutional
resources. The electoral cycle of 2000-2001 has confirmed the vitality of the
governorship institution: in 20 regions out of 35 the incumbents have won the
elections, and in 2 regions the winners were directly supported by the former
chief executives. Statistically speaking, the governors’ regimes have scored
better than in 1996 electoral cycle, when incumbents had won in less than 50
per cent of all elections held[128].
Yet statistics does not reflect to the whole extent those essential transformations
that are taking place within regions. In the next chapter we are going to take
a closer look at these alterations which undoubtedly are a part of the
globalization agenda for Russian regions.
3.
REGIONS AND NEW FORMS OF TERRITORIAL MOBILITY: TOWARDS NON-ADMINISTRATIVE
RESPONSES
The administrative
market, as we have seen above, has its constrains and limitations. In parallel
to it there is a growing world of networking communications in which the
regions have to participate and develop new forms of interaction with other new
actors. These relations might be that ones of both conflict and partnership.
3.1. “The Burden of
Geography”: Why the Regions Are Disadvantaged?
By the end of the
first ten years of the formation of new public actors an animated discussion
intensified about the perspective models of Russia’s development. The first model was traditionally
exemplified by territorial actors, namely the regions. Since they are bound to
specific location, their operational space is constrained by fixed geographical
limits. Yurii Trutnev, the governor of Perm Oblast, has verbalized the
“philosophy of localism” in the following way: “we have more trust in our local
business operators, those who live and work in our land, because they are more
interested in the development of the region”[129].
The second model is developed by trans-territorial
actors, which are not tied up to specific geographic boundaries. These are
basically financial-industrial groups, the media, as well as NGOs. Their
greatest assets are mobility and networking potential. Their operational space
is defined not by territorial landmarks but by economic and financial rationale[130].
Their resources are much more diversified and dispersed all across the country
and the world. As Joseph Camilleri puts it, “civil society is constructed and
reconstructed, as people from a given locality (or from a multiplicity of
interacting localities) penetrate each other’s space, pursue common tasks, and
establish, or re-establish, communities that cross spatial boundaries”[131].
The administrative
model of spatial development of Russia, which can be seen in the activities of
regional elites, came in open contradiction with a liberal paradigm, favored by
other actors (financial-industrial groups, mass media, NGOs). The widespread
practice of locking out flows of goods and information within the regional
borders hurts the interests of new actors, speaking in support of free
circulation of capital, technologies and information. The most active part of
business and information actors had become the “agents of globalization” and
began to restructure the territorial, administrative and informational space of
Russia.
From the beginning
of 1990s the existence of “administrative oligarchy” (an artificially group
formed of close to the state businessmen and managers of information resources)
facilitated the interplay between the regions and new actors. A number of regions
are capable of taking control of financial-industrial groups or export
companies. The best illustration to this is the case of Tatarstan, President of
which controls the oil- and petrochemical business in the Republic.[132]
Tatarstan does not have “oligarchs” as independent political and economic
actors.
Resource rich
regions have a unique lever of influence over financial-industrial groups,
oriented at exporting of mineral raw materials. For example, it was Leonid
Polezhaev, the governor of Omsk Oblast, who initiated the creation of
“Sibneft’” oil company to become one of largest regional business operators in
Russia[133]. Natural
resources, as a rule, remain the property of a particular republic or region
and therefore any question concerning output and processing of these resources
is subject to agreements between regions and FIGs.
Yet the 1998
meltdown and coming to power of Vladimir Putin in 2000 have considerably
weakened the power of governors, depriving them of former administrative
benefits and thus giving the way to new generation of economic and information
actors.
The Report issued by Sergey Kirienko’s think tank in fall 2000
accused the regional governors in forming the economic climate suitable for a
rather limited number of “proxies” (especially those enterprises with largest
rate of export revenues), granting special immunities and privileges to them,
establishing red-tape hierarchies, erecting barriers for free movement of
goods, introducing “administrative taxation” for business operators, giving
budget subsidies to insolvent and inefficient enterprises, and other protection
measures incompatible with integration to the global world. Strategies of
survival of the regions in international arena are chiefly related to either
arms trade (the perspective which is based on maintaining international
conflicts and arms race), or raw material export.
Very few of the
regional governments proved to be capable of turning into organizational,
intellectual, or financial leaders. As a result, the capital was quick to
protest against troublesome administrative restrictions and tough regulations
by running away from the regional governments (“the revolt of capital”). The
number of depressive regions has augmented after the August 1998 financial
crisis, while the aggregate role of the regions in elaborating nation’s
strategic priorities has decreased. This was basically due to the fact that the
regional governments neglected the new spatial design of the global world in
which the shapes of the market forces do not coincide with the administrative
borders, and failed to adequately react to the most essential modernization
challenges[134].
The territorial actors are becoming increasingly disadvantaged
in case they are challenged by mobile trans-territorial actors. This was for
example the case of “Siberian Aluminum” group run by Oleg Deripaska that
succeeded in imposing its conditions to the governor of Chelyabinsk Oblast
Piotr Sumin and the governor of Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Ivan Skliarov.
There are several reasons the trans-regional holdings and
corporations might give a hard time to the regional elites. First, the
newcomers have at their disposal greater freedom of manouvres. They are in a
perfect position to mobilize resources from different territories and
industries.
Second, the corporate elites are much more consolidated
than their regional counterparts. The latters might be easily split up along
different lines which gives the business groups new chances to promote their
own agendas.
Third, business groups possess of much higher coalition
potential. To challenge the regional elites, they usually team up with the media,
NGOs, and foreign institutions. For the regions, the only reliable partner is
the federal center and the “administrative market” under its control.
The
perspectives of loosing the competition make regional authorities invent new
models of spatial development. The regional elites (at least the most advanced
of them) make their efforts to diminish their territorial predetermination, to
soften the burden of territorial immobility. To survive in increasingly
competitive environment, the regional administrations have to invest more
resources into networking and horizontal communication[135].
Some of them seriously think about creating their own communication milieu[136].
To increase their adaptive and transformative capacity, the regions have to be
in motion, incorporating and accommodating both human and institutional demands[137].
The regions try to reorder and reshape their operations, to make disappear the
demarcators of territorial compartmentalization and fixation[138].
The impossibility of creating “regional banking systems” or “regional
production cycles” becomes more and more obvious.
The theory of regional governance as a type of corporate
governance has appeared. Interestingly enough that even physical residence in
the region is not any longer an imperative for the regional chief executives:
thus, the Taimyr governor Alexander Khloponin has assumed that his place of residence – Moscow or Noril’sk - will
be determined by its effectiveness[139].
What is peculiar is that those challenges, closely associated with the spread
of globalization, came up from inside Russia, and are being developed as
domestic phenomena.
3.2. New “Spatial Mutability”
There are several options of “spatial mutability” tried by the
regions. First, these are inter-regional associations of economic
cooperation. Eight of them function nowadays, each uniting neighboring regions
with shared problems and demands (North-West, Central Russia, Greater Volga,
Black Earth, North Caucasus, Greater Urals, Siberian Accord, Far East and
Trans-Baikal[140]). Another
type of associations brings together the regions sharing common economic
concerns. This is the case of the Union of Grain Producing Regions formed in
1998 to foster creation of inter-regional markets and conditions for free
movement of products within Russia, regardless of administrative constrains[141].
During 1990s interregional associations had rather moderate political
ambitions, and only attempts of charismatic governors to use them as tools in
strengthening their political careers (as in cases of Sverdlovsk Oblast
governor Eduard Rossel or Krasnoyarsk Krai governor Alexander Lebed’)
contributed to political credentials of these associations. Having been
established to promote interregional cooperation and increase positions of
regions towards the federal center, interregional associations succeeded in
finding ways to better present their interests against the center and their
economic potentials abroad. Associations were also one of the instruments for
the federal government in its search for making Russian foreign policy more
coherent - Kremlin insisted that each subject of federation should voluntarily
give up some of its powers, including in foreign economic policy area, in favor
of the associations. For example, in one of the most sensitive foreign policy
issues, the Russian government wants Belarus to deal with the association
instead of dealing with separate regions.
However,
associations failed to achieve a necessary cohesion between their members that
could transform them into influential entities in Russian politics. Having
reached the high point under Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov in 1998 (who
invited some of the leaders of interregional association to participate in his
government) the “big eight group” exhausted its lobbying potential and now
stands in the periphery of Russian politics. In the field of external economic
relations associations faced difficulties stemming from individualistic
policies pursued by governors of prosperous regions that preferred to establish
personal ties to foreign countries rather than to promote joint interests.
Moreover, the member-regions present different stages of industrial performance
(from agrarian till post-industrial). Under Putin’s presidency the
inter-regional associations are trying to keep their residual influence
(“Siberian Agreement”, for example)[142].
The second group
of arrangements were bilateral cooperation agreements:
- between Russian
regions, including those geographically remote ones. These agreements help the
regions to expand the markets for their industries and find new regional
partnerships as a response to heightened economic competition.
-
region-to-region cooperation (“twinning relations”) with foreign
provinces and territories. This form of communication plugs the regions to the
international networks and favors humanitarian and information exchanges.
-
city-to-city cooperation is one of still underestimated resources for
the regional policies in Russia. One of most recent examples was the “Club of
the Six” created by most populated
cities of the Volga Federal District. The statement issued by the “Club”
explicitly indicated that in the globalizing world these are the biggest cities
that are the focal points for innovations, new managerial culture, developing
information resources and elaborating strategic approaches to tackle with the
future[143]. The urban
potential – still undiscovered for many of regional leaders – lays in diversity
of resources (business and intellectual activities, human and cultural capital,
information and management, transportation and communications networks, media,
banking and insurance services)[144].
Cities are important because they possess of highest social and professional
mobility of its residents, developed milieu of consumers services, high
educational standards, and innovation abilities[145].
This vision of the new roles of the major cities is completely in tune with those
approaches being developed in the West that treat “city-regions” as the spatial
foundations of the new world system, with essential autonomy of action on the
national and international stages[146].
The third way of widening the
regions’ horizons was fostering trans-border cooperation and forming
trans-border regions (modeled after “Euroregions”, like “Saule” and “Karelia”).
As Yurii Deriabin underlines, these collaborative endeavors might plug some of
the Russian regions into the system of EU-sponsored funds, projects, and
contracts[147].
Another example is the Council of the
Leaders of Border Regions of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus institutionalized in
1996. However “apart from the trade, there is very little evidence that true
subregional processes are taking root in this area. It is also not apparent
that Russian regions and their CIS neighbors try to address the kind of issues
that usually make up the agendas of more developed subregional organizations.
Many rhetorical and official declarations of intent for subregional and
‘bottom-up’ initiatives have mostly remained purely declaratory”[148].
Transport corridors (Via Hanseatica,
“North – South” corridor spanning from Europe to Iran and India, Trans European
corridors, etc.) had also their roles to play. Usually all these projects are
directly supported by the regional authorities since they are expected to open
new markets and widen geographical horizons.
The fourth tool was found in
specific economic and financial arrangements for certain territories that go
beyond the traditional practice of business localization. These were numerous
experiments all introducing new forms of spatial and territorial regulations in
order to strengthen region’s competitive advantages on the global scale:
-
off-shore zones (“Ingushetia”, “Kalmykia”, “Kabardino-Balkaria”, “Altai”);
-
free economic zones (“Nakhodka” in Primorsky Krai, “Yantar’” in
Kaliningrad Oblast, “Dauria” in Chita Oblast);
-
free entrepreneurship zones (in Vyborg, Nakhodka, Novgorod);
-
free customs zones (in Moscow, St.Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don, Ulyanovsk,
Nakhodka). In this category we can also place “port & customs” sub-zones
(Oranienbaum and Kronstadt in Leningrad Oblast);
-
export production zone, exemplified by Russian-Korean industrial
complex, which is a part of free economic zone “Nakhodka”[149];
-
special economic zones (in Magadan Oblast);
-
economically friendly zone (in Mari El republic, Ingushetia);
-
special economic region (southern Kuzbass in Kemerovo Oblast);
-
territorial productive zones, created – basically in Nizhny Novgorod
Oblast – on the basis of individual enterprises eager to develop reconversion
projects;
-
technopoles (International technopark in St.Petersburg, Scientific &
Technological Park in Tomsk). The idea of technoecopoles (in
Komsomol’sk-on-Amur, Noril’sk, Arkhangel’sk and Apatity) and agropoles
(Leningrad Oblast) are being disccused[150].
Some experts are inclined to think that
those zones should not overlap with the boundaries of the subjects of
federation, since it might be treated by others as unfair competition. That is
why the federal center gave priority to smaller zones which are expected to be
more efficient.
Of course, not all of the zones were
success stories. Many of them were mismanaged due to lack of experience and
corruption. Scarce support from the federal government and incoherent federal
policy in this issue have also had negative bearing. Yet the cumulative effect
of all these arrangements is erosion of hard hierarchical structures, and new
openings for associating with the global world.
The fifth way was networking
along ethnic lines. Establishing relations with ethnic groups abroad is an
important part of expanding the borders of cooperation, communication and
influence for Tatarstan, Karelia, Komi, Dagestan and other ethnic republics.
Thus, there is an ambitious project of information integration of Finno-Urgian
people living in Russia (Karelia, Mari El, Mordovia, Udmurtia, Khanty-Mansy),
Hungary, Finland and Estonia[151].
All these new phenomena create multilevel hierarchy of
different political, economic, and social arrangements. Ever-increasing amounts
of activities now occur in the form of long-distance, cross-regional
relationships[152]. The
regions thus learn how to survive in the “network society” that is one of
off-springs of globalization practices. The networking practices are very much
deregulated – as Kenneth Waltz put it, “there is no one to complain to or to
petition for relies… No one is in charge”[153].
This deregulation brings the new sense of uncertainty for the regional
high-ups: for example, the head of Nizhny Novgorod Oblast government Sergey
Obozov has claimed that he is very unsure about the strategic goals of major
investors that became the owners of biggest local enterprises[154].
Challenged by resourceful and mighty trans-territorial actors,
the regions seek to strengthen themselves by means of acquiring some advantages
of their rivals. Like the financial and industrial groups, the regions are
eager to diversify their resources. Like the
media organizations, the regions are eager to develop their own
information strategies – the authorities of St.Petersburg, Ekaterinburg[155],
Yaroslavl’[156], Perm’[157],
Kanty-Mansi autonomous Okrug[158]
and Volga Federal District[159]
were the first sub-national units to introduce their own concepts of
telecommunication and digitalization.
The regions’ new “multidimensionality” (they are involved in
different projects simultaneously) augments the number of alternatives
available, accumulates their resources and helps to keep the number of options
open. Of course, the possibilities of adapting to “network society” vary from
region to region. It has to be kept in mind that in terms of export volumes and
concentration of foreign investments the regions differ in hundreds times.
Seemingly, the North West regions of Russia are very much privileged to be
located in close proximity to the EU, and especially to the “Northern
Dimension” and Baltic Sea areas which are being build upon horizontal,
multisectoral set of cooperative networks[160].
There is a clear understanding in this part of Europe that “in a world
dominated by global markets local, regional or national competitiveness is no
longer only a question of natural resources or inheritance in any way, but
primarily a question of whether or not a location is capable of facilitating
dynamism, innovation and competition”[161].
The concept of “roaming economic regions”, advanced for that
purpose by Sergei Kirienko’s think tank in the Volga Federal District, is one
of possible theoretical responses to the challenged met by regions in late
1990s. These are supposed to be the regions with no clear geographic boundaries
that would depend on economic rationale and technological considerations[162].
Being a part of different hierarchies of regionalism, the region might take
advantage of each of them, pretty much in the same way as the financial and
industrial groups profit from having their businesses in a number of regions
and industries simultaneously.
To sum up, the logic of new actorship of
regions contains intrinsic duality. On the one hand, the regions are entities
that are defined by territorial context and location-dependent. On the other
hand, regions make their efforts to remove the barriers (and burdens) of
territory by networking, and bring different patterns of economic, social and
political development into ever closer contacts. Regionalization might
therefore be conceptualized in terms of ‘complexes’, ‘flows’, ‘mosaics’,
‘synergies’, ‘transactions’[163].
3.3. Challengers Becoming
Partners: Politics and Business Forming Alliances
New competitive and demanding environment is essential
challenge for regional elites, yet their roles as facilitators and arbiters
between competing groups are even increasing in importance[164].
The regions still have unexplored potential for surviving in the rivalry with
its challengers. Territorial rooting is a power factor since close proximity
brings together the representatives and interests of members of different
organizations. The regions have to be the places of technical, productive and
organizational integration, not mere replicas of large firms’ industrial
strategies.
There is certainly
some room for positive interaction between the regions and major
non-administrative, trans-territorial actors. Region’s actions are embedded in
concrete, ongoing systems of social relations, and these relations might
facilitate the regions’ profit and rent seeking strategies. Only cooperating
with other new actors as equals, the regions might strengthen their social
capital, which could be defined in terms of structural embeddedness (the
structure of overall assets based on relations), cognitive embeddedness (the
degree to which the actors share common code and system of meaning and
information), and resource embeddedness (the degree to which the network ties
contain valuable and instrumental resource potential)[165].
Interaction between
regions and financial-industrial groups emerges as a rule on the crossing of
respective interests and potential of both actors. Some regions seek to make
use of financial-industrial groups’ potentialities to widen their resource
capability. Several trade union organizations supported by regional authorities
of Ulyanovsk, Perm’, Kazan’, Kursk, and Ufa took the lead in All-Russian action
in defense of the interests of home aircraft industry.[166]
The media of course
could also be a strategic partner for the regions to use the public coverage of
events as an important tool of advertising the regional potential. Apart from
that, regions try to actively explore the possibilities of Internet to create
their own regional images and provide potential investors with necessary
information. This was the case of the “Local Democratic Network” project in
which the administration of Nizhny Novgorod has participated along with
partners from Tampere and Bologna. As a result of the project, the municipal
authorities have created computer and communication network accessible for
ordinary users and containing a plethora of information concerning the
legislation, database of municipal authorities, press releases, etc.[167]
Some regions
regularly and systematically use media publicity for strengthening their
international credentials. Thus, Nikolay Petrov and Alexey Titkov deem that a
number of Russia’s regions might be called newsmakers - they chiefly refer to
Moscow, St.Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kalmikya and
Sverdlovsk Oblast. Among the most important newsmaking factors they call widely
known reputation of the head of the region (Boris Nemtsov in Nizhny Novgorod
prior to 1997, Alexander Lebed’ in Krasnoyarsk Krai, Alexander Rutskoi in Kursk
Oblast, etc.).[168]
Region-NGOs
cooperative relations are also of increasing importance. Perhaps, the best
examples are multiple forms of partnership between the Soros Foundation and
Russian regional authorities in such varied fields like fostering employment
programs (the project run with the “Siberian Accord” inter-regional
association), creating distant learning studios (in St.Petersburg), reforming
penitentiary system (in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast), upgrading schooling teaching
(in Samara Oblast), etc.[169]
In St.Petersburg, the “Leontieff Center” was the chief contractor for 1997
city’s strategic development plan.
Hence, what we see is that the regions are becoming more systematic in
their networking strategies and pay much attention to recruit resource rich and
powerful actors in their networks. These new relations are more turbulent and
dynamic in comparison to what we have in more stable economic and social milieu
in the West. Of course, not all networks are to be success stories. Wealthy,
powerful and prestigious actors are likely to form their cluster of successful
power brokers and protect their domains[170].
3.4. Uncertainties for the
Regions
Our basic point was that the regions will survive provided
that they will be willing and able to redefine themselves as simultaneous
members of territorial family of actors and the partners for those
non-territorial actors that were described above. It is neither sufficient nor
effective any longer to rely exclusively upon administrative mechanisms of
regional governance. The regions have to admit – sooner or later – that these
are financial, industrial and information actors that give birth to Russia’s
new corporate and managerial culture. These actors might become a new resource
of Russia’s regional governance[171].
Yet the future of the regions is also complicated and
obscured by the general crisis of territoriality in Russia. The end of 1990s has sharpened the whole set
of territorial issues all across Russia. According to the Ministry on Federal
Affairs, there are 32 territorial disputes in the country.
The first pattern of territorial uncertainty comprises
attempts to integrate regions. V.Pozgalev, the governor of Vologda Oblast, is a
proponent of enlarging the subjects of the federation. In his view, “we do not
need toy kingdoms. All subjects are supposed to be more or less equal in terms
of their possibilities”. He suggests that it would be economically rational to
leave not more than 50 subjects of federation instead of 89[172].
Saratov Oblast governor Dmitrii Aiatskov deems that instead of seven federal
district the President ought to create from 30 to 50 ‘big regions” each of them
to include several subjects of federation or even some other post-Soviet
republics[173]. Gennady
Osipov, the Director of the Institute for Socio-Political Studies, Russian
Academy of Sciences, has forecasted that 11 enlarged subjects will compose the
Russian Federation over time[174].
Eduard Rossel, the governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast, and the chairman of the State
Duma Gennady Selezniov stick to the same opinion[175].
Some steps were undertaken for practically implementing those
ideas. Yurii Trutnev, the governor of Perm Oblast, has launched the process of
its integration with the Komi-Permyak autonomous Okrug[176].
Mikhail Prussak, the governor of Novgorod Oblast, has suggested that eventually
this region might merge with Pskov Oblast. Arkhangelsk Oblast and Nenets
autonomous Okrug could also form a single region, along with St.Petersburg and
Leningrad Oblast[177].
Eventual mergers are expected between Kamchatka and Koryak autonomous Okrug, as
well as between Buriat autonomous Okrug and Irkutsk Oblast[178].
Interestingly enough that the chain of mergers might be extended to the
military districts: it is expected that Volga military district might be united
with the Volga military district[179].
What are the stimuli for those regional leaders that foster
the integration of the regions? Some of them expect to stay at the head of
enlarged provinces, others want to assimilate weaker neighbors. As regards their
opponents, these are basically chief executives of autonomous Okrugs that are
parts of larger Krais, and thus could become the first candidates for loosing
the status of the subject of federation. Leaders of the ethnic republic also
oppose this idea since they are fearful of loosing their identities and
privileges[180].
The second type of uncertainty is related to the
redrafting the boundaries of existing units. Thus, Murtaza Rakhimov, the
President of Bashkortostan, has applied for membership in the Urals Federal
District (instead of the Volga Federal District in which this republic was
placed by the decree of Vladimir Putin)[181].
Though Nizhny Novgorod won the bid for being the center of the Volga Federal
District, its governor Ivan Sklyarov nevertheless complained that two Oblasts –
Volgograd and Astrakhan’ – stayed outside it.
A number of politicians from Kaliningrad are eager to make the
federal government to convert this Oblast into a special federal unit, thus
separating it from North West Federal District[182].
In a similar way, Boris Nemtsov, the leader of the Union of Right-Wing Forces,
had proposed to form a special federal district for Chechnya.
On a lower level, too, the perspectives of altering the
current state of affairs are voiced. Two districts of underdeveloped Kurgan
Oblast have openly expressed their intention to become the parts of the
neighboring Sverdlovsk Oblast because of economic proximity to the large
industrial city of Ekaterinbourg[183].
Similarly, Ivanovo residents have appealed for joining the neighboring
Yaroslavl’ oblast.
Of course, the plans for reshuffling the territories are not
free of conflicts of interests. As soon as Krasnoyarsk Krai authorities have
started publicly debating the perspectives of absorbing Taimyr autonomous Okrug
(TAO), Alexander Khloponin, the TAO governor, has proposed to include
Krasnoyarsk Krai into TAO[184].
The situation is complicated since TAO – where “Norilsk nickel”, major world
producer of nickel, is located - is the subject of the federation and
simultaneously the part of Krasnoyarsk Krai[185].
Other conflicts pop up as well. There are fears in Perm’
oblast to find itself a victim of hypothetical division between Samara and
Saratov Oblasts[186].
Even more acute are relations between the Altai Krai and Altai republic in the
aftermath of declared intentions of the former to incorporate the later[187].
Sharp territorial conflict divides neighboring Astrakhan’ oblast and Kalmykia
each fighting for its jurisdiction over a piece of land[188].
As we have shown, Putin’s reform didn’t offer a satisfactory
response to all confusions of Russian territorial construction. Neither
regional nor federal elites treat the current federal arrangements as
finite.
Some preliminary conclusions might be drawn from the current
state of relations between the regions and other new actors. First,
today’s regionalism in Russia is extroverted rather that introverted phenomena.
The federal districts established basically for solving domestic matters quite
soon have started the process of positioning themselves in wider international
ambit. Federal districts are “regions-in-the-making”. They move from passive
objects of Kremlin’s policy to active actorship capable of articulating their
interests and policies.
Secondly, regionalism constitutes an open-ended
phenomenon. Federal districts are social and political entities that might be
constructed and deconstructed. Discussing regionalism - assessing its strength
and weakness and drafting its perspectives - means participating intellectually
in its construction or deconstruction[189].
Thirdly, we may discern certain levels of regionality.
Federal districts were created as “regional spaces” (initially they were purely
geographic units existing only in presidential decree). Next they were transformed
into administrative units each marked by exceptional loyalty to the federal
center. Those administrative structures gave birth to “regional complexes” as
political units, cemented by common interests and solidarity. Actually some of
these political units are on their ways to “regional societies” (looking for
stronger social integration and cohesiveness). Some districts are in search for
their international identities (Sergey Kirienko, for instance, adheres to the
concept of cultural integration within federal districts).
Presumable formation of “regional societies” in the federal
districts is an important landmark because if Putin’s reform is to develop
basically within administrative and political elite boundaries, it is doomed to
failure (and subsequent deconstruction). Trying to assess the state of the
progress of new territorial division of the country, one should keep an eye on
the advancement of civic society institutions.
Putin’s territorial reform had augmented the number of subnational
actors and options for each of them, including those related to coalition
building. Three of them could be distinguished (restoration of unitarism as the
least feasible option is discarded in this analysis).
Option 1: increased importance of the federal
districts. Keeping strategic touch with explicitly liberal economic policy (as
exemplified by German Gref, Andrey Illarionov, Alexei Kudrin, Viktor
Khristenko, Sergey Kirienko and other pro-market reformers), the federal
districts have a chance to take advantage of concentration of resources,
rationalization of economic management, and greater compatibility between
national and subnational legislation. Another beneficiary of this scenario
might be municipal authorities, one of few potential allies of the presidential
representatives in their tug-of-war with the governors. At the same time, the
influence of the subjects of federation and inter-regional associations will go
down under this pattern of development.
Option 2: regain of influence by the subjects of
federation. This might be the case should the federal center decide that the
federal districts had accomplished their missions and therefore could be put
aside. This variant might be accompanied by mounting activism of inter-regional
associations as the most feasible instrument available for the governors in
their opposition to the powers of presidential representatives.
Option 3: gradual process of enlarging the subjects of
federation through merging the neighboring provinces. In this case the regional
elites will split up along political lines: the most loyal regional leaders
will undoubtedly support Putin, while others will disagree. Enlarged regions
might challenge both inter-regional associations and federal districts.
CONCLUSION
As we have said before, the regions have to be identified as
the actors belonging to both vertical and horizontal types of communication.
The difference between the two is summarized in the table below.
|
Vertical communication |
Horizontal communication |
|
Administrative market of state institutions |
Networking between equal actors, including non-state ones |
|
Patronage politics |
Interest groups politics |
|
“Hard hierarchy” based on administrative connections and personal
loyalties |
“Soft hierarchies” based on resource potential (chiefly economic and
informational) |
|
Existence of the single center of strategic decision making |
No single decision making center exists; the rules are plurality and
diffusion of authority, rivalry between competing poles of gravitation |
|
Subordination of political relations |
Coordination of political relations |
|
Strict and highly formalized rules of officialdom |
Flexible and adaptable frameworks of relations based on emerging
agendas (often informal ones)[190] |
|
Strict borders of the institutional influences |
No strict borders – all influences are of trans-regional and
trans-national reach |
|
Bureaucratic rivalries of different institutions each eager to augment
its influence at the expense of others (zero-sum-game) |
Self-restraining is indispensable condition for effective functioning
of the system[191]
|
|
Inward-oriented relationship aimed at mustering domestic resources |
Outward-oriented relationship fostering internationalization and
globalization |
Russian regional
institutions share a sort of “double identity” – they function in two spheres
(the administrative and networking ones) simultaneously[192].
In this sense we may assume that the future model of federalism in Russia could
be described by the formula “administrative strategies plus networking”.
The federal factors –
like tug-of-war between the “Yeltsinite” and “St.Petersburg” groupings – have
direct impact over the regional developments (as exemplified by the election
campaign in Tomsk Oblast[193]
in 2001 and other regions). Regions are also very sensitive to business
conflicts – like that one dividing RAO “EES” and “Russian Aluminum”, which is
the high profile issue for Krasnoyarsk Krai[194].
The regions try to get
used to the new network reality, and even to catch up the initiative. This is
conducive to more positive changes in Russian economic and political
performance. Thus, the alliance of three major metal producers – “Severstal’”,
Margitogorsk and Novolipetsk enterprises, supported by the governors of
Cheliabinsk and Belgorod oblast and Udmurtia - has undertaken concerted efforts
to get “market status” for Russian metal makers in the US, and thus increase
country’s exportation potential[195].
It is very telling that gathering information and adapting to the international
standards in legislation, accounting, and ecology were perceived as having
primordial importance for success of their networking.
Of course, actor-to-actor horizontal
cooperation is a very vulnerable process. For example, two metal producers –
Cherepovets and Magnitka plants – refused to lobby against US-Russian trade
agreement of 1999, and were harshly criticized for that by other regional
enterprises[196]. At the
same time, networking between different actors (basically FIGs and regional
administrations) do not necessarily foster pro-globalization agenda: for
example, the decision to close the Russian domestic market for second hand
foreign vehicles was based on alliance between the governors (Konstantin Titov
of Samara oblast), the presidential representatives (Sergei Kirienko), and
obviously the car-producers themselves (Oleg Derispaska[197]).
A number of Russian FIGs tycoons (like Kakha Bendukidze of “Uralmsh-Izhora”
group and Andrei Petrosian of Novolipetsk metallurgical plant) are very
doubtful about Russia’s entry in WTO due to fear of more demanding competition[198].
Yet what is most
important is that on the threshold of the 21st century Russian regionalism is
increasingly getting exposed to global influences. The growing role of
information poses a serious challenge to regional autarky and stimulates the
development of democracy and open society. In its turn, capital largely
determines the interplay between the regions and new actors; being the
challenger of regionalism, it shapes new forms of spatial development. Yet it
would be misleading to negate the vitality of the Russian regionalism. As shown
above, the interrelationship between the regions and new emerging actors is
getting more and more complex. The actors discussed above are not static ones.
They are evolving entities, and their evolution is predetermined very much by
constant interactions between them. Due to this interaction, in the regional
societies “the local, the national and the global have become intimately
related”[199]. Russia is
about to take a new turn in its political transformation, challenging the
present forms of institutional and non-institutional interaction between
regions and other policy actors.
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