IN SEARCH FOR INTERNATIONAL ROLES: VOLGA FEDERAL DISTRICT

THE CASE STUDIES OF NIZHNY NOVGOROD, TATARSTAN AND ORENBURG REGIONS

Andrey S.Makarychev

Linguistic University of Nizhny Novgorod

Introduction

The basic challenge of modernization for Russia is that of the country’s structural integration into the world, both politically and economically. Russia’s adaptation to and accommodation with the globally dominant norms, rules and institutions will take a long time, experience ebbs and flows and cannot be expected to produce quick results. Russia’s search for her place in the world community will take the form of gradual and evidently controversial adjustment to a rapidly changing external environment. These changes stem from the much-discussed globalization

Why is it so important to raise the issue of globalization for Russia and her regions? Despite the underdevelopment of Russia’s version of globalization, the international community in general and specific foreign countries in particular do have their impact on internal developments in Russia. Sometimes the effects of globalization are not visible enough, but they cannot be disregarded. In spite of his inward-oriented rhetoric, President Putin’s federal reform launched in May 2000 to some extent was inspired by developments outside Russia. These were the foreign investors who were confused by the tug-of-war between the federal center and the regions, and who called for a reshuffle of the federal system in Russia to avoid conflicts between federal and regional laws and get rid of regional autarchy. What is also telling is that Putin intends to implement his federal reform in accordance with formal democratic procedures, keeping in mind Western sensitivity to these issues.

The shift of power from the center to the regional actors was the major development in Russian politics in the beginning of the 1990s. Yet the Russian regions are not equal players on the international scene. Not all of them are capable of playing meaningful roles internationally, and these roles can be quite different for each one.

Three groups of constituent parts of the Federation ought to be considered as the most important Russian subnational actors in the international arena. The first group comprises those regions with a strong export potential (industrial regions or those rich in mineral resources[1]). The second group is composed of ethnically non-Russian republics. The third group includes borderland regions.

Only regions belonging to either of these groups: a) might have sufficient resources for challenging the federal foreign policy and designing its own long-term strategic routes in the world; and b) demand more powers in foreign-related issues. Their strategies contrast with those of inward-oriented (“introvert”[2]) regions seeking more protectionism from the central government and more state control over import and export operations.

The purpose of this paper is to show that globalization in Russia develops in a peculiar environment, which is different from that in the West. In this paper the discourse about Russia’s way to globalization will be placed into the Russian domestic context. The aim will be to demonstrate that:

- first, subnational territorial units in Russia are gradually becoming international actors;

- second, globalization of Russia’s regions is a very uneven and competitive process;

- third, this unevenness and competitiveness might bring both new opportunities and challenges for Russia.

More specifically, the ambition of this paper is to analyze those different models of trans-border cooperation in which Volga Federal District (VFD) is engaged. These patterns largely coincide with the search for international profiles of three subjects of federation that are located in the VFD: a) Nizhny Novgorod oblast, which is a good example of industrial region located in Russia’s heartland; b) Tatarstan whose international capital is very much related to ethnicity and cultural and religious revival; c) Orenburg oblast which is an illustrative example of border region located at the edges of civilizations.

1. FEDERAL DISTRICTS AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL CREDENTIALS

In May 2000, with Putin as the new Russian President, the old idea of reshuffling the whole system of Russian regionalism obtained a more concrete design: according to the Presidential decree seven federal districts were created, each one to be run by a Presidential envoy. Though Putin himself calls these measures an administrative reform within the Presidential apparatus, it is quite clear that the consequences of these steps ought to have a major impact on the state of the Russian federation[3]. In case the new “viceroys” will eventually use the existing resources to control the districts, they might strengthen their political weight and become even more important actors than the states of the federation, both domestically and internationally.

There were several goals of creating federal districts:

n greater centralization and unification;

n undermining regional clan systems based on partonage and patrimonialism;

n elimination of inter-regional conflicts.

Presidential representatives were given good chances to restructure the territorial fabric of the society, but the hurdles are here as well. One of the problems is that the area of their responsibilities seems to be too broad - from supervision of the parties in the regions to “inventory” of specific industries. Vladimir Putin however has ostensibly stated that his representatives are supposed not to administer the federal organs in the regions but only to coordinate their activities.

The division of Russia in seven administrative districts created a new framework for international cooperation. However, engaging newly created federal districts into the web of international cooperation is an uneasy task since they are not yet well established political institutions. Their future is still ill defined. Districts are still in search for their international identities.

In spite of this uncertainty, Presidential representatives have already undertaken certain steps to obtain some international credentials. All presidential representatives – being members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation – are heavily involved in resolving a plethora of international and security-related issues like protecting external borders, reviving military industries, undertaking counter-terrorist measures, upgrading transportation and communication networks, etc. The most telling example is Sergey Kirienko, the head of the Volga Federal District, who established a network of connections with international institutions to foster investments, credits and chemical disarmament programs.

The impact of the federal districts on Russia’s external relations might be traced in the following ways. First, it is hoped that presidential representatives would have to make heads of the subjects of federation more law-obedient in a whole spectrum of issues related to foreign economic relations. Secondly, since the concept of the federal districts is aimed at concentration of resources, the weakest subjects of the federation will be marginalized and will have to leave the sphere of active international relations. Thirdly, there might be more interdependency between the subjects of the federation constituting a single federal district in a number of specific areas like transportation networks, border security, migration policy, etc. In some cases “the larger regions” seek to contribute to peace enforcing and soothe the whole bunch of security-related matters. Fourtly, the concept of cultural integration is being put forward. Sergey Kirienko, for example, noted that the territorial area of responsibility of Russia’s leaders, both national and subnational, is defined not by administrative borders but rather by cultural factors (he refers to the “area within which people think and speak Russian”[4]).

Volga Federal District, like six other districts established in May 2000, is a part of peculiar “administrative market” being formed in Russia. On the one hand, the federal district is an instrument for conducting coherent federal policies at sub-national level. For example, Sergey Kirienko has suggested that mechanisms comparable to enterprises’ bankruptcy and introducing crisis managers have to be applied to the subjects of federation in case of their financial insolvency and mismanagement[5].

On the other hand, the district-building process is a mix of administrative (vertical) and networking (horizontal) strategies. This might be illustrated, for example, by the changing roles of the Volga Customs Board, one of key institutions in charge of VFD regions’ foreign economic contacts. On the one hand, like all other district-level institutions, the Board is an instrument for achieving greater centralization and unification of customs operations. On the other hand, it has to find out the ways to cooperate with individual exporters and importers, customs brokers, and other actors which stay beyond administrative market. The same goes for transportation upgrading projects in VFD: apart from mobilizing administrative resources, they clearly require regular horizontal interaction with a wide range of actors relatively independent of the regional governments like car producers, catering services, media, etc[6].

Three regions chosen as case studies for this paper are differently positioned within VFD in economic and social terms. This could be visualized in the table beneath[7]:

	Territory, hundred thousands square km	Population, thousands	Housing, square meters per capita	Number of cars per 100 families	Number of ambulances and hospitals, per 10000 inhabitants	Crimes committed per 100000 inhabitants	Energy consumption per capita, kiloWatt/hour
Volga Federal District	1038	31839,5	18,7	113,4	223,2	1828	5437
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast	76,9	3632,9	19,9	105	226,3	2057	5727
Tatarstan	68	3776,8	18,6	108,2	220,9	1860	6208
Orenburg Oblast	124	2212,7	18,1	132,6	234	1863	6486

In the next three chapters we shall see how differently these three regions try to position themselves internationally.

2. N1ZHNY NOVGOROD OBLAST

Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (NNO) belongs to the group of industrial regions with significant export potential. This is the region with well-developed armaments and heavy industries, and significant commercial and trade potential[8]. Its administration relies on cooperation with foreign partners seeing this as the most profitable way of earning money for replenishing the region’s budget.

NNO was a closed area till 1991 due to heavy militarization of its industry in the Soviet times. The whole decade of 1990s was the period of gradual adjustment of the regional elites and institutions to the international environment. NNO started to reclaim its historical reputation as the commercial “pocket of Russia”.

2.1. Bridging the gap between administrative and networking strategies

NNO has always had far-reaching international ambitions (Nizhny Novgorod Fair historically was an important international trade point; nowadays the NNO government has launched a project of turning the region into one of leading Eastern European cultural centers[9]). This case study is to show that it is impossible to achieve international goals and reach world standards by relying on purely administrative measures. Globalization is basically about networking between equal partners horizontally associated by mutual interests.

Administrative strategies sometimes lack due transparency and competitiveness. For example, there were many alarming signs that Moscow – Nizhny Novgorod highway is mismanaged by NNO authorities, which represents a threat to implementation of international transport corridor project[10]. Also important is that there is much room for non-state actors’ contribution to the success of each of the projects (investors, providers of retail services, travel agencies, communication companies, etc.). Hence, the basic challenge for project implementation is due coordination – basically non-administrative, interest-driven - between multiple actors each having their stakes in upgrading transportation facilities.

Financial and business institutions are pioneers of horizontal networking in the region. These are basically networking actors that foster liberal agenda and institutional pluralism in NNO, and thus are in the vanguard of region’s global moves. Foreign investments predominantly go to those sectors which are based on networking principles and are relatively free of excessive administrative regulations. To foster domestic cooperative links between small and medium enterprises, “Partniorstvo” (“Partnership”) association was established[11]. Internationally, NBD Bank is a part of a number of cooperative projects to include overseas partners such as World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development[12]. Nizhny Novgorod Commodities & Currency Exchange has initiated “Investment in Russia” project with special focus on Volga Federal District territories[13]. Insurance companies (both local and Moscow-based) also develop business networks in NNO using a variety of means like e-trade, Internet advertising, etc[14].

Yet in such industrially resourceful regions as NNO horizontal networking has to be coupled with effective administrative strategies. Close interconnectedness of administrative and non-administrative tools might be well illustrated by the project of establishing Free Customs Zone (FCZ) “Russia’s Pocket” in the region. It pop up in summer 2001, when the government of NNO has drafted FCZ concept and applied for federal center support in issues of taxation and passing appropriate legislation[15]. However, purely administrative channels are not sufficient for effective management of this ambitious project. Apparently, it is not enough to invest budget funds to those sectors that have to take the lead in region’s development. What is necessary is to find appropriate business partners that might be interested in upgrading communication and transportation infrastructure, environment, urban architecture, tourist facilities, and other components of business friendly climate[16].

The same goes for extending to NNO the trans-European transport corridor running from Berlin through Minsk to Moscow and further eastward. Closely related is the federal program “Roads of 21^st Century” in which NNO – due to its location at the crossroads of “North-South” and “East-West” transportation axes - plays one of key roles. Basically, these projects are based on administrative background, since these are public authorities that are in charge of investing into upgrading the transport infrastructure, including airports, highways and river ports[17]. This is responsibility of the regional authorities to find adequate solutions to those critical problems that might undermine the project – for example, restructuring huge debts of Gorky Railroad, or finding the most appropriate areas of industrial cooperation with failing economies of Belarus (within the framework of trans-European transport corridor) and Central Asia countries (keeping an eye on potential “North-South” transportation project which is still under consideration).

There are other proves of potential linkage between administrative (vertical) and non-administrative (horizontal) strategies. As soon as Nizhny Novgorod became the main city of VFD, regional authorities came up with the idea of “exploiting the resource of the capital city”. The point is however that Sergey Obozov, the former head of NNO government, treated this resource in predominantly administrative ways: with its new political role as the “capital” of the district, Nizhny Novgorod attracts more attention from the part of the President, and more ministers come here with official visits[18]. Meanwhile, there is a competing concept of Nizhny Novgorod development – that one of turning it from the administrative “district capital” to the “business capital” with market friendly climate, entrepreneural culture and business sensitive policy making.

Basically these were Russian investors – major financial industrial groups like “Sibal”, “Interros”, “Severstal”, “LUKOil” – that became major networking partners of NNO administration[19]. Each of these FIGs has purchased major industrial enterprises like GAZ, Pavlovo Bus plant, “Krasnoe Sormovo” shipyards, and other industrially meaningful plants. In petrochemical industry the new holding is being formed with a far reaching strategy of competing with leading international producers. As a precondition for entering the world markets, the holding is oriented to keep high world standards in accounting, consulting, and share holders rights[20]. Inevitably, creation of such companies will make the regional authorities to rethink much of its old-fashioned strategies of industrial development. NNO administration has introduced the practice of signing cooperation agreements with major investors (“Sibur-Neftekhim” and others[21]), which is a good testimony of emerging horizontal cooperation strategies in the region.

To boost NNO investment potential, NNO government led by Sergey Obozov had to horizontally cooperate with a number of autonomous partners to include such NGOs as “Transformation Technologies”, “Institute of Commodities Market and Management”, “Expert Institute”, “Institute of Urban and Regional Development”, “Institute of Direct Investments”. In Obozov’s words, the role of the regional administrative structures is to accumulate resources of private sector for launching major cost-sharing projects co-sponsored by foreign and domestic investors. This is one of results of the strategy of foreign financial institutions to incite regional administrations to raise matching funds for collaborative projects[22].

2.2. Scope of the Problems of International Cooperation at the Regional Level

International contacts is one of those spheres where the NNO administration is being severely criticized. Thus, Boris Nemtsov, the vice speaker of the State Duma and former NNO governor, in February 2000 said that 2 million UDS of foreign investments – which constitute only 0,38% of all foreign monies invested in Russia – is a “shame” for regional administration.

There are still multiple reasons for critique.

2.2.1. The first set of problems is due to the gaps between local and foreign business and commercial standards. For example, there is only one law firm in Nizhny Novgorod specializing in international law[23]. The same goes for facilities: there is only one hotel (strangely enough located far away from the down town) which corresponds to highest international standards.

2.2.2. The second problem deals with marketing and selling the merchandise produced by NNO enterprises in cooperation with foreign partners. The trouble here is that the use of foreign technologies and material raises the production price (especially after August 1998 financial crisis in Russia). Thus, Pavlovo bus plant (being one of beneficiaries of the European bonds) experiences dramatic difficulties with selling the buses assembled with “Volvo” parts.

Similarly, “Nizhegorod Motors” had to raise up to 70% the proportion of the assembling parts for new cars to be produced jointly with FIAT which means the lowering of prices up to 6 thousand USD, in comparison to initially planned 17 thousand USD[24]. Relatively low prices already attributed to GAZ cars informal nickname “the death of Volkswagen”. Nonetheless GAZ problems are multiple: there is still 65 million USD debt to the EBRD, the dealers’ network is both corrupted and insolvent, and the license for duty-free customs storage was revoked as a retaliation for huge (USD 12 million and RUR 80 million) debts for the customs operations. Some predict “inevitable financial and technological collapse” of GAZ[25].

To lower expenditures and production costs, some enterprises with foreign capital have to reconsider its personnel policy. There were not yet mass scale lockouts or labour cuts, yet the issue of possible unemployment is being discussed in Nizhny Novgorod[26].

Dutch scholar Andre Mommen notes the lack of confidence of foreign investors in Russian production facilities and outlets and finds inadequate the tempo of modernization of Nizhny Novgorod industrial enterprises. In his view, dragging on with launching new GAZ – FIAT joint venture is a problem, because in the meantime Western firms already developed new models with lower emission norms, lower fuel consumption, etc. That cars will compete on price, not on quality. This proves that Russian regions trusting on this kind of outlets will live stormy weather again[27].

GAZ problems is a good illustration of close interdependence of domestic and international issues. To compete internationally, GAZ needs restructuring. Profitableness of “GAZ” is about 4%, which is a disaster in international terms[28]. It was estimated that for the sake of efficiency from 20 to 30 thousand from 110 thousand of GAZ employees have to be dismissed[29]. GAZ is also financially in charge of huge housing area and supporting facilities, which has to be transferred to the municipal budget. Both problems are of obvious social background.

Another problem is low quality standards of local production. For example, GAZ minibuses lack emergency exits and reinforced frame between the floor and the roof, which is a serious shortcoming for international markets[30]. In result, “GAZ” is loosing competition and market. “GAZ”’s failure to become strong international actor have led to increasing expansion to NNO car-building market of major Russian companies - “Sibal”, “Alfa”, “Severstal”[31].

2.2.3. The third problem lays in the sphere of politization of financial and economic projects. This was the case in Autumn 1999 when former governor Ivan Skliarov trying to escape from accusations in mismanaging the Eurobonds presented this issue as a political one blaming his predecessor Boris Nemtsov and his colleague (also of Nizhny Novgorod origin) Sergey Kirienko who was the prime minister at the time of August 1998 financial crash.

Another, and even more telling example, was Ivan Skliarov’s decision to block the construction of four-star hotel in Nizhny Novgorod downtown arguing that archaeologists discovered at this site remnants of medieval tombs. The head of Russian Orthodox Church in NNO, as well as different nationalist groups, supported the governor’s demands, and the issue received high-profile coverage in the local media. Foreign investors were dissatisfied and insisted on continuing the construction under initially negotiated conditions, threatening to take the issue to the courts. Finally the governor failed to prove that the “force major” clause might be applicable to the issue, yet the contract was terminated and foreign investors left the region.

2.2.4. The fourth - and related - problem is foreign policy perceptions of the regional elites. Attitudes to the whole set of globalization issues are quite diverse among policy makers in NNO. On the one hand, NNO has already positioned itself (mainly due to Boris Nemtsov’s governorship in 1991-1997) as an international actor. Besides, the economic rationale pushes regional decision makers to get adjusted to the challenges of globalization by searching for foreign investments, offering new opportunities for international business and advertising the region’s possibilities internationally.

On the other hand, as local policy analyst Ivan Yudintsev suggests, NNO “is still surrounded by a kind of ideological barrier, a sort of psychological iron curtain”[32]. Some foreign visitors concede that NNO “looks more isolated from the outside world than Moscow and St.Petersburg”[33].

A number of reasons might explain these troubles. First, in public speeches of NNO high administrators one can easily find lots of inadequate, outdated and sometimes messy perceptions of the realities of international relations. For example, in former vice governor Alexander Batyrev’s words, “Lithuania is leaning towards Russia and is ready to come back to Russia”[34].

Second, communist conservatism, nationalist feelings and reservations about the West are deeply rooted in the mentality of certain groups regional elites. This is how the current NNO governor Gennady Khodyrev exposed his attitudes to the United States: “Yes, we are much more clever than they are. We know ourselves what to do. Americans are miserable. They have a couple of bucks instead of eyes, and a piece of gold instead of the heart. What should we discuss together?”[35].

One can also see multiple misperceptions among the directors of state-owned enterprises with regard to the West. According to one of major Russia’s businessmen Kakha Bendukidze, “many industrialists here naively believe that they are going to compete with each other. Nowadays, in the era of proliferation of global companies, it is funny listen people speaking about exceptionality of a certain territory. I am always told here in Nizhny that the oblast administration needs to rule and control everything, but this is unreasonable”[36].

The same idea was shared by Russian economist Igor Lipsit lecturing in Nizhny Novgorod. In his words, from 60 to 65 percent of the directors of state-owned plants and factories treat investments as mere funding or as a credit. “These directors are eager to get these monies without changing the structure of the property, since they are reluctant to share their powers within their enterprises. This is the source of all conflicts emerging immediately when the investors try to participate in managing the property”[37].

Suspiciousness towards foreign business became evident in June 2000 in the aftermath of NTV Channel comments on deteriorating ecological problems in Dzerzhinsk, the second city of NNO in terms of population and the home to major chemistry producers[38]. The mayor of Dzerzhinsk Sergey Trofimov explained negative TV coverage by the desire of foreign competitors to spoil the image of the city and to block further investments to its chemical industry. NNO administration has supported this interpretation and denounced “the information attack” sponsored from abroad[39]. NNO media has also reproduced this reasoning to accuse foreign countries in industrial espionage and stealing secrets from Dzerzhinsk enterprises.

All this questions the assumption that regional elite operates as rational actor in building overseas communications with the international community. There is still much room for unjustified fears and isolationist sentiments in policy making circles of NNO, the fact that hampers region’s switch-over to globalization.

2.2.5. The fifth problem is crime. Among high-profile stories were the murder in 1996 of the director of Bor glass factory Vladimir Maximov and scandalous arrest in 2000 of the president of Nizhny Novgorod Association of Unesco clubs Olga Chechulina. Andrey Klimentiev, one of Nizhny Novgorod tycoons with business interests in Norway, was jailed in 1998 for fraud and extortion. GAZ dealers network is also highly criminalized, according to law enforcement reports of 1999-2000.

2.3. Implementation Issues

Despite multiple obstacles and impediments, globalization does change a lot in the region: the way the political relations are organized, the structure of business enterprises, as well as the social milieu. Without international cooperation it would be impossible to introduce new advanced standards for production, run ecological management programs, develop charity initiatives, advance new banking technologies, and so forth.

Yet globalization had double-faced effect on the region. At one hand, it weakened the capacity of administrative and bureaucratic institutions in the regions to supervise economic development. Interestingly enough, these were private Russian companies - trans-regional and trans-national in fact - that took control over “industrial giants” of NNO (“GAZ” and “Red Sormovo” factories purchased by major Russian tycoons Oleg Deripaska and Kakha Bendukidze). This is a good indication that in domestic market those financial and industrial groups owned by Russians might win the competition with foreign capital.

Not accidentally, these are the largest enterprises that were acquired by “outsiders” and face drastic restructuring in increasingly competitive business environment. The advent of “outsiders” signals “partial liberation of capital from the concerns” of administrative bodies[40]. The capital has more room to make its own decisions in its own interests.

On another hand, the challenges of globalization provoked an administrative response from the federal center in the form of seven federal districts. There are good chances that NNO will gain certain economic advantages from its political centrality within VFD.

3. TATARSTAN

Tatarstan belongs to a different group of ethnically non-Russian republics. Ethnicity is a powerful factor that almost automatically pushes those republics into a wider system of international and transnational relations[41]. A search for ethnic identity is a factor of international socialization of Tatarstan, giving a new quality to their international standing. Transnational identity based on cultural heritage, religion, and language can provide a network of opportunities for the region’s population or for certain segments of the population[42]. For example, some Islamic countries (Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others) assist Tatarstan in spiritual and educational affairs, as well as by rendering moral and political support[43]. Establishing links with their ethnic diasporas also plays an important role in the foreign affairs of this republic.

What is more, ethnic republics usually are eager to position themselves internationally by placing special impetus on international legal norms defending ethnic minorities. At the same time all of them count on international solidarity in case of encroachment from the federal government on their autonomy, since they have both moral and material support abroad among like-minded ethnic groups and organizations[44].

Tatarstan’s ethnic regionalism is geared by the adaptation of international economic experience and its projection to specific ethnic backgrounds. Its elites try to thread ethnic identity through economic rationality. Ethnicity in this case is used as a resource to foster autonomy from the federal center and provide societal consolidation.

In the meantime, the polemics around Tatarstan is focused on core issues for Russia as a whole – those of its integrity, cohesiveness and the ability to speak with the single voice internationally. This region might also provide useful insights on the limits of Putin’s recentralization project.

The case of Tatarstan clearly demonstrates how slim is the line dividing Russia’s domestic and foreign policies. Indeed, one of major challenges to Russia is to learn to live with the revitalized world of Islam both on Russia’s southern periphery and within its own boundaries[45]. Tatarstan is a good illustration of the “intermestic” nature of today’s political process and close interrelatedness of its different segments.

3.1. Globalization Paradigm as Seen From Tatarstan

On the one hand, President Shaimiev repeatedly underlines that the federal authorities ought to be primarily busy with taking strategic positions and defending globally the Russian national interests, presuming that the stronger are international engagements of the central authorities, the lesser would be their involvement in the plethora of regional issues.

On the other hand, Shaimiev himself strongly adheres to globalization approaches and is in no mood to give up the sphere of international relations to the Kremlin. In his words, the world consists not of governments but primarily of nations and ethnic groups whose interests ought to overweight the interests of states. The concepts of “nations beyond states” and “global federalism” are rather popular in Tatarstani ruling circles. Some local scholars deem that “national sovereignty of Tatars is more important than the state sovereignty of the republic”, since the territory of Tatarstan was fixed arbitrarily, while the Tatar nation is well integrated phenomenon[46] (which is not exactly the case since the bulk of Tatars reside outside Tatarstan).

As viewed from Tatarstan, globalization gives it direct access to international cultural and social milieus. Global norms and institutions are important for Tatarstan since they might internationally justify its strategic aspirations for autonomy and self-rule[47]. International community, in Shaimiev’s words, is committed to preserving cultural diversity of the humankind and defending the rights of each of the ethnic groups. As Rafael Khakim (policy aide to Shaimiev) admits, without such internationally accepted values as human rights, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and democratic governance, the very survival of Tatarstan could have been put under question[48].

Yet the current state of international law does not satisfy completely Tatarstani leaders. Thus, according to Khakim, “pleading the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, the international community prefers to leave the solution of self-determination problems to the discretion of the states involved… The most radical step towards a renewal of international relations would be to establish a second chamber of the United Nations, one which would represent peoples and not states. This would change the structure of many international organizations, including the International Court of Justice”[49].

In his foreign policy President Shaimiev tries to maintain a balance between “West” and “East”. Authorities of Tatarstan keep ‘special relations’ with the Muslim countries that focus basically on cultural and political issues, while relations with non-Muslim countries are mainly aimed at improving economic ties. A good continuation of Tatarstan’s policy of balance was the project of restoring the “Great Volga Road” that historically has proven its efficacy in connecting the northern and western parts of Russia with Caspian and Black Sea ports[50].

President Shaimiev has pointed out that “Western Europe is the landmark for Tatarstan”. Tatarstani leaders have expressed their dissatisfaction with incremental anti-Western attitudes among Russian policymakers. At the same time, political and intellectual leaders of Tatarstan have repeatedly expressed their disappointment with the Western countries policies. Thus, Western-style reforms as implemented by Yegor Gaidar government in early 1990s and the shock therapy modeled after American advises were rebuffed in Kazan’. In view of local experts, the West sticks to selective support to the human rights by ignoring the bloodshed in Chechnia and refusing to recognize politically the separatists[51]. In spite of the Western policy of economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein regime, Tatarstan is intensively cooperating with Iraq in oil extraction and reprocessing[52].

Opinion polls in the city of Naberezhnie Chelny had shown that only 10,9% of its population would applaud fostering market reforms on the basis of political rapprochement with the West. In minds of many Tatars, pro-Western policy attitudes might lead to strengthening of Christian influence in the republic[53].

Inside Tatarstan there are more radical foreign policy attitudes (of course, we should not exaggerate the political importance of those radical viewpoints for Tatarstan, since the governing elite is much more moderate and pragmatic). For example, activists of the “Tatar Public Center” (one of nationalist groups) call for boycotting the federal ministries in Tatarstan as “institutions of foreign state”[54]. The Kurultai (Convention) of the Tatar People appealed to international community claiming that Tatarstan is Russia’s colony (local nationalists commemorate October 15, the day when the army of Ivan the Terrible militarily subdued Kazan’ in 1552, as national mourning), and has to be allowed full-fledged international participation. Among the most radical proposals of the Kurultai delegates were stigmatizing inter-ethnic marriages, establishing contacts with national liberation movements all across the globe and application for Tatarstan’s membership in NATO[55]. Some radical extremists (frequently called “non-traditional Islam groups” backed by likely-minded sponsors from Pakistan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon and other countries) are practically implementing some of those theories – recruiting volunteers for Chechen rebels and preparing terrorist attacks[56].

The table below illustrates some of those divergent assessments.

Table 1.

Issues	Radical Nationalists	Republic of Tatarstan government	Russian federal center authorities
Sovereignty	Transition from “colonial dependency” to full-fledged independence which was interrupted by Russia’s military interference in 1552	Sovereignty is flexible and divisible (it might be shared between Tatarstan and Russian Federation)	Sovereignty belongs to Russia as a whole
Territorial integrity of Russia	The principle of territorial integrity might strain ethnic and regional development	Tatarstan does not seek full separation from Russia	Territorial integrity is unconditional political principle
Foreign policy	Completely independent foreign policy (up to application for NATO membership)	Republic of Tatarstan is the state associated with Russia (and is equal to Russia), and in this capacity is the subject of international relations	Tatarstan’s “foreign connections” (as different from the “foreign relations” of the federal center) are based on the treaty of division of powers between the regional and the federal authorities
Legal collisions	Tatarstan ought to have its own legal system	Laws of Tatarstan have priority over Russian federal legislation (as ruled by Tatarstan’s Constitutional Court)	Coherency and indivisibility of the legal foundations of the Russian Federation
Citizenship	Independent of Russia citizenship	Gradual acceptance of double (Russian and Tatarstani) citizenship	Single Russian citizenship (Tatarstan is allowed to issue additional inset for its residents)
War in Chechnia	Tatarstan ought to follow the Chechnia drive for independence, yet be better prepared	Appeal to stop the violence and military actions in the Caucasus, and start negotiations with the Chechen leaders	Massive use of military force to suppress rebels and terrorists
Identity	Islamic identity	Double identity (European and Islamic); Tatarstan as a bridge between West and East	Common multi-national identity of the whole Russian people
Diaspora	Forming global Tatar community	Diaspora as a factor legitimizing Tatarstan’s global bid	Diaspora is basically cultural phenomenon
Methods of settling center-periphery disputes	All possible methods up to military insurgence	Negotiations	Negotiations
Ethnicity and democracy	Defending ethnic interests is more important than democracy	Strengthening ethnic factor is a precondition for democratic development	Democracy has to be built up upon non-ethnic background

3.2. Constructing and interpreting the meanings of sovereignty

The problem of sovereignty is the core issue to understand the ways in which the foreign relations of Tatarstan are organized.

The notion of sovereignty - as used by Tatarstan leaders - is however rather vague. “Contradictory”, “complicated”, “clouded”, “unsettled”, “murky”, “amorphous”, “confused” – these characteristics could be given to Tatarstani-Russian legal collisions. Three blocks of controversies might be distinguished in this domain. First, according to the Tatar Constitution, this republic is a sovereign state and a subject of international law associated with the Russian Federation. By contrast, the Russian Constitution asserts that Tatarstan is a subject of the federation and a part of its territory. Secondly, although Tatarstan claims the independent right to determine its legal status, Russia contends that the republic’s status is defined according to a joint reading of both federal and republican constitutions. Third, each constitution provides for the supremacy of its own provisions[57].

It was former President Yeltsin who first offered self-rule and self-management for Tatarstan. Since that time, different interpretations of sovereignty have appeared: “taxation sovereignty”, “economic sovereignty”, “double sovereignty”, “shared sovereignty”, “distributed sovereignty”, “divided sovereignty”, etc. Most of these intellectual inventions are subjects to different interpretations and open for further discussions. None of them should be taken for granted, because these are not legal, but basically political issues.

3.2.1. Tatarstan’s Approaches

From the very beginning there was always a great deal of uncertainty with regard to Tatarstani sovereignty. Mikhail Stoliarov, the first deputy of the representative of Tatarstan Republic in the Russian Federation, assumes that in the federal state there is no single and indivisible sovereignty in the traditional sense, since under federalism there might be “cohabitation” of multiple sovereignties, as determined by the voluntary transfers of powers between the central and the regional governments[58]. Farid Mukhametshin, the chairman of the State Council of Tatarstan, insists that the relations between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation are those between two states[59]. President Shaimiev himself interprets sovereignty as “the right to act autonomously within the framework of proper prerogatives”[60]. In his view, since “it would be too short-sighted to claim for full independence”, Tatarstan is ready to accept that it voluntarily becomes a member of the Russian Federation and transfers to the federal center the right to decide on such issues as the federal foreign policy, war and peace issues, international treaties of the Russian Federation [61]. This is what is baptized by Shaimiev himself as “moderate sovereignty”, that one which has neither anti-Russian nor secessionist background, and which even recognizes the functions of the federal authorities as “strategic planning”[62].

What we see here is clear mix of legal and political approaches. Legal purity had never been the highest priority for Tatarstan[63]. What was most important is to maintain certain level of controversy and even conflictuality with the federal center in order to strengthen its bargaining power and find excuses for eventual failures in its own policies.

The durability of all legal irregularities and imperfections mentioned above might be explained by the fact that neither of two parts – the federal center and the republic of Tatarstan – was interested in establishing clear and transparent mechanism of relationship. Both parts were wishing to leave as much room for “under-the-carpet” bargaining and personal deals as possible[64].

It is true that Tatarstan quite succeeded in informally lobbying its interests using a variety of political arguments. Not all of them however are in good tune with each other, and almost all are open to multiple interpretations. Thus, Shakir Yagudin, the Law Department Chairman in the State Council of Tatarstan interprets the legal uncertainties in such a way that this republic is “the state within the state”[65]. Describing its nature, President Shaimiev defines it as “the state of all peoples living in our territory”, and simultaneously as “the state of Tatars”[66]. He wants independent powers but pledges not to undermine the unity of Russia. Presenting himself as a federalist, Shaimiev opts in fact for the “union state with the elements of confederation”[67]. He is in favor of raising the status of Russian oblasts within the federation, but opposes granting the oblasts the same rights as the republics enjoy[68]. In our view, all these statements are based on political symbolism rather than on targeting the real issues Tatarstan has to face.

3.2.2. Federal Policies

Not less controversial is the federal center stand. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had ruled that the recognition of the Tatarstani statehood does not necessarily imply the recognition of its sovereignty. The statehood, in the Constitutional Court interpretation, only reflects certain peculiarities of Tatartan’s legal status, as related to historical, ethnic and other legacies. In reference to 1992 referendum, the Constitutional Court argued that it was illegitimate to formulate that Tatarstan is the subject of international law.

Sergey Shakhray, one of Boris Yeltsin’s top political advisers, uses different explanatory markers assuming that having elected their representatives to the State Duma and voted in all-Russian presidential elections, the people of Tatarstan de facto recognizes the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over the territory of Tatarstan[69]. Shakhray, one of key political figures in charge of drafting Moscow - Kazan’ agreement of 1994, reinterpreted “associated status” of Tatarstan not in terms of state-to-state relations (as authorities in Kazan’ did) but rather as a kind of “natural association” going back to the middle ages. Associated relations are treated as those of historical alliance of Tatars and Russians, united organically by the very nature of vicinity and multiple communications[70].

As to legal part of the story, according to the Federal Law of January 1999 “On coordination of international and foreign economic activity of Russian Federation’s constituent parts“, Russian regions can’t sign agreements with foreign central authorities unless Russia’s government approves them. This provision formally runs against the power-sharing treaty between Russian Federation and Tatarstan. The Constitutional Court of Russia has issued two statements on Tatarstan: that ones of 13 March 1992 and 17 June 2000, which indicated – in defiance of multiple documents signed between Moscow and Kazan’ - that laws proclaiming Tatarstan’s sovereign status were unconstitutional.

Despite all these inconsistencies from both parties involved, it is important that from the very beginning of 1990s sovereignty was seen in Kazan’ as a process to be developed on ad-hoc basis. In Shaimiev’s words, “we don’t think the sovereignty is an absolute, neither we push it forcefully in those directions where there is no way to come – for example, in defense or financial matters. Should the circumstances change, we shall react”[71]. Again, this is a good example of purely political approach to solving the legal controversy. Rafael Khakim has explicitly acknowledged that „we were independent only one day we have proclaimed the sovereignty, yet next morning we have started the process of self-restriction”[72]. Here is the core difference between Tatarstan and Chechnia: the former is eager to achieve the “free hands policy” within the federation, while the latter was aimed at “running away” from Russia.

Tatarstan’s strategy might be called a piecemeal sovereignty. What Tatarstan proposes – and the federal center might easily accept - is the set of key points:

- recognition of its partial (limited) sovereignty;

- further delineation of responsibilities between the republic and the federal center;

- in case of legal conflicts between the republic and the federal center, priority should be given to the legal norms of that party which is in charge of the question under consideration[73].

This is exactly the agenda for negotiations between Tatarstan and the federal center under President Putin presidency. We are turning to this issue in the next section.

3.3. Sovereignty Under Question: Tatarstan within the Context of Putin’s Reforms

Putin’s centralization policy had directly affected Tatarstan in many ways. On June 27, 2000 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had questioned the sovereign status of the republic. On June 2001, the Supreme Qualification College of the Judges of Russia has issued a warning statement to the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Tatarstan Gennady Baranov for his failure to fulfill the Russian legislation[74]. Sergey Kirienko, the presidential envoy in the Volga Federal District, has questioned Shaimiev’s ambition to represent the interests of all Tatars of Russia (alluding that the majority of Tatars live beyond the republic)[75]. The Customs Board of Tatarstan was rearranged and subordinated to the Volga Customs authorities[76]. Vladimir Zorin, deputy presidential representative in VFD, has challenged the abilities of Tatarstani ethnic policies positing that “there are a number of problems that the confessions are unable to solve by themselves”[77], without interference of the central government.

In May 2000 with the start of the territorial reform Vladimir Putin has announced that the first task of Presidential envoys in the federal districts would be to bring local laws into line with the federal ones. The Commission on revising the Tatarstani legislation had started its work on September 11, 2000. Initially the deadline was set for December 31, 2000, yet for Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, the two republics with the greatest number of laws which didn’t conform to federal ones, this period was prolonged up to March 9, 2001.

The process of legal equalizing turned out to be an uneasy enterprise. Thus, both Constitutional and Supreme Courts of Tatarstan had harshly criticized the appeal of the deputy prosecutor general in VFD Alexander Zviagintsev who urged to cancel 40 articles of the Constitution of Tatarstan which, in his opinion, contradict the Russian legislation. Yet the Russian Supreme Court insists that its Tatarstani counterpart has to take decision on this issue[78]. Moreover, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had stated that the most recent election to the State Council of Tatarstan were held with violations of the national laws, which in fact questions the legitimacy of the Tatarstani parliament[79].

To counter-react, Tatarstani leaders have issued a number of statements. The first reaction to Putin’s initiatives was rather furious. For example, Marat Galeev, the member of the State Council of Tatarstan, has called the whole federal reform unfeasible and conducive to violations of current legislation[80].

Yet President Shaimiev has shown more moderation. He expressed his strong support of keeping intact the power sharing agreement, alluding that there are no other documents that legally frame Tatarstan’s association with Russia. His thesis is that without the treaties between the federal center and the regions Russia would be a unitary state[81].

Later on, Shaimiev came up with proposal to amend the Russian Constitution in a way that would change the rules regulating the formation of electoral districts. The most important thing is that Tatarstani authorities are eager to do away with the clause which disallows more than 10% difference in terms of population between the electoral districts. The speaker of the State Council of Tatarstan Farid Mukhametshin looks for support from other ethnic republic (in particular, Adygeia and Dagestan) that are not satisfied with “ten-per-cent” clause because it makes impossible to form electoral districts based on ethnic background[82]. Ethnic electoral districts, as many in Tatarstan deem, might avoid turning political campaigning into inter-ethnic clashes, and keep the voters’ choice in the framework of one ethnic group. Understanding that this arrangement is a clear departure from democratic procedures, Tatarstani political experts concede that this is a precondition for ethnic peace in the republic[83]. In exchange for acceptance of its legislative proposal, Tatarstan is ready to negotiate further removing from its Constitution articles on republic’s sovereignty and international actorship.

A number of other concessions to the federal center have been made as well. Politically, Shaimiev has agreed to introduce bicameral model of the State Council, thus allowing opposition forces to get their seats in its lower house[84]. In fall 2000 he also supported Putin in reintroducing the Soviet-era anthem. In the economic area, for the first time in the whole decade, 2001 budget of Tatarstan was drafted in accordance to the national tax legislation, which led to abolishing of certain local taxes and channeling 60 percent of its revenues to the federal budget, as all other regions of Russia. In exchange, the federal government has agreed to co-fund some projects that used to be funded out of republican means[85].

These facts clearly testify that the political elite basically shows a great deal of soberness and moderation, and strategically looks for political settlement of their disagreements with the federal center. Starting from fall 2000, Shaimiev prefers to speak about “self-sufficient” (not “sovereign”) Tatarstan. “The offices of federal agencies have begun to open in Kazan’, and Moscow has reimposed control over tax collection and spending. The introduction of teaching using the Latin alphabet has been postponed, with existing projects labeled experimental”[86]. The Communication Board of Tatarstan was rearranged as the federal unit[87]. Some local experts have started discussing conditions of Tatarstan’s entry into an enlarged region, should the federal center take this decision[88]. In Shaimiev’s view, there was sufficient space for bargaining with the federal authorities. This strategy of accommodation was reinforced by political messages he was receiving from Moscow, basically signalizing that President Putin is not intended to unseat Shaimiev.

Tatarstani authorities are looking for political compromises based on assumption that all changes in the Constitutions of republics (including Tatarstan) have to be complemented by adequate revisions of the federal Constitution[89]. Yet Tatarstan seems to be unwilling to give up its conviction that Russia has to remain asymmetrical federation and needs the Chamber of Nationalities as a part of its parliament [90]. Shaimiev remain strong supporter of keeping the heads of the subjects of federations popularly elected, while in his view the heads of the municipal units have to be appointed[91].

Also Tatarstan does not want to give up its reservations concerning the territorial reform. Shaimiev is one of the most vociferous critics of the withdrawal of the regional leaders from the Council of Federation[92]. In an attempt to start publicly debating the effectiveness of new regional division of Russia, Mentimir Shaimiev had announced the idea of dividing each of the federal districts into several territorial entities each comprising 2 or 3 subjects of federation. In his opinion, 15 “small regions” within one federal district (the case of VDF) is too many. To develop further these ideas, in April 2001 Farid Mukhametshin came up with the proposal to officially allow the “donor” regions (those giving to the federal budget more that they receive) to have under their financial patronage a number of adjacent weaker provinces. These regional groupings centered around several leaders (including Tatarstan itself) could be nuclei of future new regional agglomerations in Russia[93].

Mintimir Shaimiev is still the political figure the federal authorities have to take probably more seriously than most other regional chieftains (President Putin has publicly confessed that it was Shaimiev to whom he first offered the post of the head of the VFD[94]). In opinion of Professor Vladimir Razuvaev, “in the light of Taliban successes in Afghanistan and possible ‘domino reaction’ all across Central Asia, Moscow treats Shaimiev as a much needed leader that could have been used as a barrier to religious extremism and political destabilization”[95]. As a symbol of easing tensions between Tatarstan and Russia[96], president Shaimiev was appointed the member of the 7-governor presidency of the newly created State Council. In the State Council Mr. Shaimiev chaired the ad-hoc group on elaboration of power-sharing in the joint-jurisdiction issues of the Russian Federation and the regions. On the whole, the main aim of his project was to further redistribute concurrent powers between federal and regional authorities. Yet the Kremlin’s reaction to Shaimiev Report to the State Council was quite revealing: it was withdrawn from the agenda on a short notice and substituted by another issue[97], which was an indication that the federal center is still unready to discuss these issues in depth.

The good news for Tatarstan was that the federal center found out that there were regional laws (like he Tatarstan’s Land Code[98]) that were either better than the federal ones or unique. Sergei Kirienko, the representative of the Russian President in the Volga Federal District, has consented that it’s necessary to use regional experience and make amendments or adopt new laws on the federal level. This is a good example of the regions’ ability to influence the federal policy and law making.

On several occasions, Kirienko has given high appraisals to Tatarstani authorities. In his words, one day there will be a monument of Shaimiev built up[99]. In a conciliatory manner he admitted that the tax privileges obtained by Tatarstan from the federal center, were properly used for the sake of republic’s economy[100]. Kirienko praised Tatarstani authorities for their understanding of the need to build up “integration chains” with other regions in order to be competitive abroad[101]. He compared Tatarstan with the corporation based on strict vertical subordination inside, but competing rather effectively with other political and economic actors, using a variety of legitimate means. “I am not saying this was the right thing to do; what I am saying is that it worked”, Kirienko has stated[102]. At the same time, Kirienko was quite explicit in terming the Tatarstani demand for introducing “nationality” rubric in the new passports as “violation of human rights”[103]: in his view, in a democratic society people are not supposed to indicate their ethnic affiliation on a mandatory basis.

Nevertheless, the intellectuals in Tatarstan expressed great concerns regarding President Putin’s intentions to subdue the regions[104]. The very establishment of the federal districts was put under question mark, since local experts argued that the federal government always possessed of adequate instruments to oversight the regions (courts, Ministry of Justice, etc.), and there is no guarantee that Putin’s system would work much better.

4. ORENBURG OBLAST

Orenburg oblast is the case of Russia’s border regions. Hence, its main international capital is that of trans-border interactions.

Trans-border cooperation is treated by the Council of Europe Convention of 1980 as any joint activity undertaken in order to enforce neighbor contacts between communities and territorial authorities of two or more parties. In a narrow sense, trans-border cooperation implies mutually fruitful linkages between immediate neighbors and is widely viewed internationally as the key step toward the integration process.

On the one hand, it performs the role of frontier guards, or barriers that defend Russian military, economic and political security. An exclusive neighborhood “marks the limit of the milieu, the beginning of an alien area, often conceived as strange and full of perils”[105] which results very often in practical conflicts over the delineation of land claimed by two parties. Lack of full-blooded borders converted Orenburg oblast into a paradise for illegal immigrants from the neighboring areas. This was a matter of insistent concern from the part of Russian security services claiming that the lack of adequate law enforcement mechanisms entails all-Russian security problems (illegal border crossing, smuggling, etc.). Regional elites are usually forced to solve themselves - with no sufficient aid from Moscow - problems of illegal immigration, fortification of borders, security issues, customs regulations, anti-crime measures.

Yet, as we have said earlier, Orenburg oblast may also play the role of “contact region”, as opposed to “border barriers”. Vladimir Zorin, deputy representative of the President in VFD, has called Orenburg „Russia‘s bridge between West and East“[106]. It might be depicted as “open border” region, where the function of contact with foreign territories, and not that of separation from them, is predominant. This is one of the messages that are quite legible in the Foreign Policy Doctrines of the Russian Federation that underlines the importance of trans-border relations with former USSR republics, including Kazakhstan.

All mentioned above brings us to analysing the case of Orenburg Oblast‘ internationalization as a peculiar mix of challenges and oportunities.

4.1. Opportunities

The first is that frontier location and geographical vicinity to foreign countries increase the possibilities of bargaining with the federal center: requesting additional financial resources in compensation for border control, demanding direct access to revenues from customs duties, etc.

Second, Orenburg oblast, as other border regions, has a special legislative status on the federal level for developing overseas contacts, apart from bilateral agreements. These legal acts include trans-border cooperation agreements signed between the government of Russia and Kazakhstan (January 1995), Intergovernmental Agreement between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kirgizia on basic principles of transborder cooperation, signed in February 1999, as well as Recommendations of the 8^th Session of the Advisory Council of the Subjects of the Federation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the area of trans-border cooperation, issued in June 1998[107].

Third, trans-border economic interaction encourages trade and investment relations (e.g., “investment corridors”), and (unlike GATT and WTO) does not require the reciprocity[108]. What is also important is that the border regions are subjects of international transit business, still underestimated (experts of President Putin’s think tank assume that the transportation networks might raise seven or eight times more revenues than at present)[109].

Trans-border regionalism in Orenburg oblast gives a good illustration of the changing nature of the contemporary borders that stems from two basic processes: one is domestic (the self-determination of regions in a new international ambit), and the second is external (global reshaping of the world geopolitical scene). Both developments lead to growing mobility, flexibility and transparency of traditional frontiers. As Chris Brown put it, “the possibility of a genuinely global economy clearly raises the issue of ‘borders’ to the top of the agenda – hence the notion of a ‘borderless world’ and ‘de-bordering’”[110].

4.2. Challenges

Yet cross-border cooperation is a very fragile phenomenon in Orenburg oblast. Its vulnerability stems from a number of factors.

First, this region is located on the fringes of civilized areas. Kazakhstan considers itself culturally different from Russia, which fuels isolationist attitudes from them. Trans-border interface is overwhelmed with ethnic, religious and cultural gaps.

Second, Orenburg oblast – to a greater extent than inland territories of VFD – has to deal with immigration. Experts deem that migrants inflow to Orenburg oblast will persist in the forthcoming future, and direct contacts with the outside world will further sharpen the problem of regional cultural identity, since negative perceptions of migration are also mainly cultural.

Third, authorities in the Orenburg oblast have to tackle, on a regular basis, the “dark side” of internationalisation – crime, illegal hunting, border-crossing or smuggling (drugs, guns, undeclared cash, etc.). As a result, security services in border regions have to perform protective functions and shield off those threats stemming from their frontier location.

Fourth, one of the vulnerabilities of the Orenburg oblast stems from its heavy dependence on policies of the federal government. Valentin Stepankov, deputy representative of the President in VFD, was quite explicit in saying that non-protected border is the cause of illegal migration and religious extremists. In the meanwhile, because of weak border protection Russia loses raw materials, food, stolen cars and other contraband items[111].

There is a number of most acute border security problems:

n Lack of federal resources for adequately protecting the border. In practice, this is the regional administration who provide frontier troops with housing, transportation, energy supply, and building or overhauling frontier posts.

n Substantial increase of the geographical area to be covered by frontier guards. According to Vladimir Egorov, Volga Customs director, one of the problems is that customs offices are located far away from border-crossing stations. The second troubling issue he addressed is the practice of recruiting customs officers among local population which increases possibilities for corruption.

n Weak coordination between customs service, border-guards and railway authorities in preventing smuggling and other illegal actions.

n Ethnic and religious extremism.

n Uncertainty of Cossacks’ role in regional security arrangements. Before the 1917 Revolution Cossack units were quite instrumental in keeping order in the most dangerous and permeable zones of the state border. The current Russian government is not inimical to the revival of Cossack settlements, but they can hardly be considered as a substitute to the regular troops. The fears are that regional Cossack regiments could become out of control and side up with nationalist forces.

In Orenburg oblast Cossack units are in charge of pre-service training exercises of young men, and providing them with material allowance. In recent years Cossacks have started elaborating projects in education, environment, culture, trade and investments.

Ramil Mullaiamov, chief of South-Eastern regional department of the Federal Border Service, have said that this agency conducted an experiment with changing regular border-guarding troops to non-military units, yet it failed to bring positive results[112]. Generally speaking, activities of Cossack units in border territories claiming to play more significant role in defending the border is a highly controversial issue. From one hand, the whole set of border-related matters can’t be solved without involving local population, including Cossacks as its most organized force. The Cossacks have their own - inherited from the past centuries - system of inspecting the borderland, which could compliment other security appliances (barbed wire, electronic alarm system, etc.). Yet on the other hand, by law Cossacks (as well as other self-ruled groups) are not supposed to participate in protecting the state border. Among factors that complicate interaction between the Cossack units and frontier-guards are widely spread among Cossacks nationalist and jingoist feelings, numerous complains from the local population accusing the Cossacks in extortion, and internal conflicts in the Cossack communities[113].

Because of all these problems the Orenburg oblast still failed to benefit from the opportunities that it has, and get rid of the “periphery complex”, inherited from the past[114]. Foreign investments are still in a deficit in this border region. There is no conceptual clarity whether regional authorities should further strengthen immigration control or open up regional markets for foreigners[115].

Orenburg case also shows the deficiencies of the federal level policies. As Mikhail Alexseev rightly put it, the Russian government has failed to develop a coherent strategy for taking advantage of its border territories’ newly found potential for integration into the world economy. In its foreign policy concept, Kremlin did not emulate the strategies of devolution, subsidiarity, and trans-border regionalism that underwrote successful economic and political integration in Europe. Transit corridors and tourism projects have not become strategic priority in such potentially gateway regions as Orenburg oblast.

What is more, while discounting the economic benefits of internationalizing Russian economy through the “gateway regions”, Moscow amplified concerns over security matters[116]. Thus, A.Scherbakov, deputy director of the Federal Border Service, gives an overextended interpretation of border security paradigm in Russia, referring to topicality and urgency of such challenged as “destruction of core political values”, “widening of social groups involved in illicit trans-border operations”, uncontrollable outflow of intellectual and cultural resources abroad”, and “loss of community solidarity”[117]. Some commentators think that neighboring Kazakhstan is a “translator” of nationalistic feelings to the neighboring Russian territories[118].

To sum up, Orenburg oblast exemplifies two types of trans-border regionalism, and two different versions of neighborhoods: an exclusive and an inclusive one.

5. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

Apart from Russian domestic troubles, the big problem is that the West lacks a clear strategy towards Russia in general and its regions in particular. Many foreign donors seem to have “more money than ideas”[119]. Some experts claim that in many fields of technical assistance there is no serious and comprehensive analysis of the work done by foreign institutions and its effectiveness. No comprehensive account of failures was accomplished so far, mainly because of the fear that such a report might provoke harsh criticism in the West and question the basic political and ideological assumptions of Western engagement. Legal reform is a telling case in point. Referring to Steven Holmes, “thus far, foreign legal advice to Russia has not done that country much good… The assistance community has failed to come to grips with the obstacles inhibiting the rule of law in Russia… Ironically, assistance programs have been undermining trust building. Typically, donor aid has the effect of peeling elites away from serving society by pressuring them to act in the interests of the donor in order to secure future funds”[120].

As there is no clear strategy, it comes to no surprise that there is also a lack of coordination between Western agencies and centers. In the opinion of Marten van Heuven, “intergovernmental organizations are poor cousins to bilateral contacts in implementing engagement with Russia. The West will continue to face the challenge of having to coordinate bilateral and intergovernmental channels to fashion an effective pattern of engagement with Russia… Without that, the array of presently available intergovernmental venues will only aggravate the lack of clarity as to Western means and objectives”[121].

Based on our analysis, some recommendations could be made.

1. Foreign institutions should not treat regions (especially as pivotal as those studied in this discussion paper) as unitary actors - which is usually the case when it comes to analysis of relationship between the center and regions, or between regions themselves. Deeper comprehension of region’s international actorship is needed, to include more profound look at different intra-regional “agents of globalization” such as industrial enterprises, banks, NGOs, media, municipal authorities, and so forth. Each of them pursue individual strategies of switching to the global world and therefore should be tackled differently.

2. Most of the foreign business, financial and commercial institutions operated in VFD face the problem of expanding their social horizons. It seems that their sphere of interest is overwhelmingly circumscribed by rather narrow professionally oriented circles of entrepreneurs, bankers, traders, etc. Unfortunately there are too few examples of effective and thoughtful public relations and media strategies implemented by foreign firms and companies in VFD. Lack of due publicity and clarity in articulating their strategic goals in the region worsens the public perceptions and attitudes towards foreign institutions and forms misperceptions of these institutions as exclusive clubs of self-interest, elite-driven and reluctant to make social commitments. Foreign actors have to be more explicit about their possibilities, explaining their methods, resources and tools as applicable to the region. This pro-active PR strategy might help in overcoming negative myths and stereotypes about globalization in the region. Foreign journalists and policy analysts could more frequently come to VFD and publicly discuss the issues of globalization in wider audiences (students, teachers, artists, writers, parties activists, social workers, NGO leaders, etc.).

3. Many of international institutions in VFD do not still use their potential and advantages to the full scale. In Nizhny Novgorod, for example, Soros Foundation office, the British Council, the American Center in the Linguistic University, Unesco-funded structures, Peace Corps branch could switch from merely information units to region-wide cultural and social institutions integrating different social and professional interests in various fields of regional life (education, environment, volunteering, gender issues, fundraising, campaigning, etc.) Potentials of local alumni of numerous international exchange programs and the Association of Foreign Residents in Nizhny Novgorod are still underestimated and need to be recalled for the sake of bringing new expertise in regional reforms.

4. The road to globalization should not be paved exclusively by regional or municipal administrators. To activate the involvement of wider social and professional layers in international exchanges and networks, it would be helpful if foreign governments insist on including different non-governmental groups in VFD regions’ delegations coming to various international forums (presentations, seminars, exhibitions, etc.). This will contribute to the process of opening new international perspectives for local NGOs.

5. Sergey Kirienko as the most liberal and pro-democratic of all heads of the federal districts merits international support and special treatment. He is undoubtedly committed to reforms aimed at creating business-friendly environment in VFD. Kirienko’s efforts to integrate the VFD regions on market principles are worth of all possible intellectual, technical, organizational and other forms of international assistance. It is politically important to get positive feedback from international community in the initial period of creating new institutional structures in the federal district. Such issues as spatial development, subnational integration, inter-ethnic relations, borders and security, and others might be debated and tackled together by ad-hoc task forces of both local and international specialists.

Conclusions

As we have seen, there are several different models of sub-national interaction between regions of Volga Federal District (VFD) and foreign countries. To sum up the analysis, several points have to be made.

- Today’s regionalism in Russia is extroverted rather that introverted phenomena. Subnational units (both subjects of federation and the federal districts) move from passive objects of Kremlin’s policy to an active subject capable of articulating their interests and policies, including in the area of foreign relations.

- Regionalism constitutes an open-ended phenomenon. Federal districts are social and political constructions. They might be constructed and deconstructed, depending on both domestic and international factors.

- We may discern certain levels of regionality. Federal districts were created as “regional spaces” (initially they were purely geographic units existing only in presidential decree). Next they were transformed into administrative units each of them marked by exceptional loyalty to the federal center. Those administrative structures might give birth to “regional complexes” as political units, cemented by common interests and solidarity. Actually some of these political units are on their ways to “regional societies” (looking for stronger social integration and cohesiveness based on networking strategies).

- The federal districts’ search for new international roles will be very much influenced by their geographic location and those opportunities and constrains that stem from the nature of their international strategies.

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[19] http://www.hotcom.ru/main/?id=10449

[20] “Versia Digest”, Nizhny Novgorod edition. May 7-13, 2001. P.5.

[21] “Monitor” Weekly Web site, at http://www.monitor.nnov.ru/2001/number27/art25.phtml

[22] “Investment Opportunities of Russia” Web site, at http://www.ivr.ru/conference/06_09_00/material_1.shtml

[23] Birzha plus finansy, N 4, February 1, 2001. P.3.

[24] http://www.regions.ru/news/245893.html

[25] Khromov, Ilia. “Est’ li perspektivy u GAZa?” (Are There Any Perspectives for GAZ?). Vek, N 39 (404), 2000. P.6.

[26] Anisimov, Sergei. “Day grosh – tak budesh khorosh” (Give a penny, and you’ll be a nice pal). Gorod i gorozhane, N 20, May 18, 2000. P.7.

[27] Author’s interview with Andre Mommen, May 3, 2000.

[28] Gorod i gorozhane, N 35, August 31, 2000. P.4.

[29] Nizhegorodskie tovary, N 3, 2000. P.7.

[30] Musatov, Andrey. “City Puts Marshrutki Under the Gun”. The St.Petersburg Times, October 27, 2000. P.5.

[31] Vedomosti, October 25, 2000. P.A2.

[32] Monitor, N 15 (190), April 24-30, 2000. P.10.

[33] Vse 24 chasa. N 17 (37), April 25 – May 3, 2000. P.2.

[34] MK v Nizhnem Novgorode, April 24 – May 11, 2000. P.12.

[35] Delo, December 10-16, 1999. P.5.

[36] Monitor, N 15 (190), April 24 – 30, 2000. P.10.

[37] Birzha plus financy, N 18, May 11, 2000. P.8.

[38] Fiodorov, Lev. “Teper’ vlastiam Dzerzhinska ne nuzhna dazhe polupravda” (Now Dzerzhinsk Authorities Do Not Need Even Half-Truth). Ekologia i Prava Cheloveka, N 89, June 7, 2000.

[39] Filimonov, Sergey. “Voyna v Nizhnem ili zachem zakazali Dzerzhinsk” (War in Nizhny, or Why Dzerzhinsk is Targeted). June 18, 2000. Available at <http://www.smi.ru/top>

[40] Lockwood, David. The Destruction of the Soviet Union. A Study in Globalization. Macmillan Press Ltd. & St.Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000. P.31.

[41] Coakley, John, ed. The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflicts. London: Frank Cass, 1993.

[42] Breton, Raymond. “Identification in Transnational Political Communities”. In Rethinking Federalism. Citizens, Markets, and Government in a Changing World. Ed. By Karen Knop, Sylvia Ostry, Richard Simeon, and Katherin Swinton. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press: 1995: 40-41.

[43] Abdullaev, Nabi. Dagestan’s Foreign Policy: Caught Between Islam and Moscow. IEWS Russian Regional Report, Vol.3, N20, 21 May 1998.

[44] Chervonnaya, Svetlana. Etnicheskie vyzovy i tupiki federal’noi politiki na Severnom Kavkaze (Ethnic Challenges and Debacles of the Federal Policy in Northern Caucasus), available at <http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/seminar3/chervonnaja.htm>

[45] Trenin, Dmitri. The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization. Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001. P. 288.

[46] Amirkhanov, Rashad. “Tatarskaya natsional’naya ideologia: istoria i sovremennost’” (Tatar national ideology: history and modernity). Panorama-Forum, N 1 (4), 1996. P.37.

[47] Tuzmukhamedov, Bakhtiar. Territorial’naya avtonomia i prava natsional’nykh men’shinstv: mezhdunarodno-pravovye parametry (Territorial Autonomy and National Minorities Rights as Seen From International Law Perspectives). Panorama-Forum, N 4, 1996. Pp. 32-37.

[48] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/publications/khakimov3.htm

[49] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/Publications/khakimov2.htm

[50] “Nezavisimaya gazeta“ Web site, at http://regions.ng.ru/printed/far/2000-06-16/2_volga_way.html

[51] Amirkhanov, Rashad. Op.cit. P.32.

[52] Pershin, Viktor. Vitse-prezident Iraka posetil Tatarstan (Iraqi Vice President Has Visited Tatarstan). Russian Regional Report. Moscow. East-West Institute, N 9, 2001.

[53] Makarychev, Andrey (ed.). Hard and Soft Security Challenges in the Volga Federal District. Analytical Report. Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University & IREX/Professionals for Cooperation, 2001.

[54] “Provintsia” Online Information Agency, at http://www.province.ru/news1.html?454

[55] Zaznaev, Oleg. “Dinamika politicheskogo protsessa v Respublike Tatarstan” (Dynamics of Political Process in Republic of Tatarstan). Vostochnoevropeiskoe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, N 1 (22), 1998. P.81.

[56] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://regions.ng.ru/printed/gubern/2000-06-27/1_guerillas.html

[57] Nikravesh, Babak. Quebec and Tatarstan in International Law. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol. 23:1. Winter-Spring 1999. P. 237.

[58] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/konfer1/stoljarov.htm

[59] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://ng.ru/regions/2000-02-15/4_kazan-bral.html

[60] NG - Osobaya papka. N 1, February 27, 2001. P.2.

[61] http://www.nns.ru/interv/int1002.html

[62] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://ng.ru/printed/specfile/2001-02-27/10_suverenitet.html

[63] Mukhariamov, Nayl’. “Respublika Tatarstan. Khronika politicheskogo protsessa” (Republic of Tatarstan: Chronicle of Political Process). Occasional Papers on the Elite of the Mid-Volga Ethnic Republics, N 3. Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2000. P.49.

[64] Human Rights Association Web site, at http://www.hrights.ru/text/b12/Chapter9.htm

[65] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/seminar1/jagudin.htm

[66] “Spiritual Heritage” think tank Web site, at http://www.nasledie.ru/oboz/N23_93/23_01.htm

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Shakhray, Sergey. “Federalism po-kazanski” (Federalism, Kazan’s Way). NG - Osobaya papka, N 1, February 27, 2001. P. 12.

[70] Shakhrai, Sergey. Op. cit.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ot konfrontatsii k navedeniu mostov (From confrontation to bridging the gaps). Panorama Forum, 1997, N 15. Special Issue. P.83.

[73] Stoliarov, Mikhail. Mezhdunarodnaya deiatel’nost subiektov federatsii: interesy, prava, vozmozhnosti (International activities of the subjects of federation: interests, rights, opportunities). Panorama-Forum, Summer 1997. P.79.

[74] Vremia MN”, June 6, 2001.

[75] Volga Federal District Web site, at http://www.pfo.ru/main/news.phtml?id=2743

[76] “Strana” Online Information Agency, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/979550319.html

[77] NG-Religii, March 28, 2001. Pp. 1,3.

[78] Nizhny Novgorod Online Information Agency, at http://www.infonet.nnov.ru, May 25, 2001.

[79] “Strana” Online Information Agency, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/991240845.html

[80] Galeev, Marat. Sovremennie tendentsii razvitia federalizma i reformy gosudarstvennoi vlasti v Rossii (Current Trends in Development of Federalism and State Power Reform in Russia), at http://federalmcart.ksu.ru/conference/konfer2/galeev.htm.

[81] Yagudin, Shakir. Problemy subsidiarnosti rossiiskogo federalisma na primere Respubliki Tatarstan (The problems of subsidiarity of the Russian federalism: the case of Tatarstan), at <http://federalmcart.ksu.ru/conference/konfer3/jagudin.htm>

[82] Ibid, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/990817539.html

[83] Abdrakhmanov, Rafik; Pugachova, Gulsum. Perspektivy federalisma v Rossii (Perspectives of federalism in Russia), at <http://federalmcart.ksu.ru/publications/pugach1.htm>

[84] Ibid, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/976774156.html

[85] Ibid, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/976303610.html

[86] Jack, Andrew. Republic brought back into line with Moscow. Financial Times, April 9, 2001. P.VI.

[87] “Strana” Online Information Agency, at http://www.strana.ru/print/989352492.html

[88] Iskhakov, Damir. Perspektivy federalizma v Rossii: vzgliad iz Tatarstana (Perspectives for Federalism in Russia: an Outlook from Tatarstan), at http://federalmcart.ksu.ru/conference/konfer2/iskhakov.htm.

[89] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/00001080_c.html

[90] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/append114.html

[91] „Strana“ Online Information Agency, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/976356253.html

[92] “Regiony Rossii”. Information bulletin. Inter-regional Foundation for Presidential Programs. N 5 (25), February 12, 2001. P.24.

[93] Russian Regional Report. Moscow: East-West Institute. Vol.3, N 10, May 21, 2001.

[94] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://regions.ng.ru/printed/gubern/2001-04-24/1_governor.html

[95] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://regions.ng.ru/printed/far/2000-10-17/1_tatarstan.html

[96] Shaimiev was one of the leading members of “Fatherland - All Russia”, the political alliance shaped in summer 1999 prior to Russia’s parliamentary election. This grouping consisted of other powerful politicians including former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, governor of St. Petersburg Alexander Yakovlev. “Fatherland - All Russia”, in distinctive opposition to Kremlin, had been in the lead till pro-Putin “Unity” party was formed. Yet anti-Kremlin opposition of Mintimir Shaimiev was left with no repercussions from the federal center.

[97] “Political Comments” Web site, at http://www.politcom.ru/p_pr.html

[98] Commission on Spatial Development of the Volga Federal District Web site, at http://okrug.metod.ru/books/ppp/Arhiv/1year/Kir28.02.2001/getindex

[99] Volga Federal District Web site, at http://www.pfo.ru/main/news.phtml?id=2749

[100] “Regiony Rossii”. N 11 (31), March 26, 2001. P.37.

[101] “Regiony Rossii”. N 8 (28), March 5, 2001. P.30.

[102] “Regiony Rossii”. N 12 (32), April 2, 2001. P.28.

[103] Volga Federal District Official Web site, at http://www.pfo.ru/main/news.phtml?id=2605

[104] “Regions.ru” Online Information Agency, at http://www.regions.ru/news/176552.html

[105] Kloskowska 1994, 186

[106] http://www.volga.strana.ru/print/991838082.html

[107] Stoliarov, Mikhail. Prigranichnoe sotrudnichestvo kak oblast’ razvitia mezhdunarodnykh i vneshneekonomicheskikh sviazei subiektov federatsii (Transborder Cooperation as the Area for Developing International and Foreign Economic Relations of the Subjects of Federation). Kazan, 2000. Available at <http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/seminar2/stoljarov.htm>

[108] Medvedev, Sergei. Peripheral spaces, global players: Russia’s regions in a world of networks. Draft paper presented at the AAASS Annual Meeting, Boca Raton Club and Resort, Fla., 24-27 September 1998. p.9.

[109] Transitniy potenttsial kak faktor modernizatsii ekonomiki i novogo geopoliticheskogo positsionirovania Rossii (Transit Potential as a Factor of Modernization for the Russian Economy and the New Geopolitical Positioning of Russia). Seminar. Moscow: Center for Strategic Research, 14 March 2000. Available at <http://www.csr.ru/conferences/sem.14.03.00-tranz.html>

[110] Brown, Chris. “Borders and Identity in (International) Political Theory”. CEU Working Paper IRES No.98/3. Central European University, 1998. p.4.

[111] Volga Federal District Web site, at http://www.pfo.ru/main/news.phtml?id=1310

[112] NTR News Service, September 22, 2000.

[113] http://www.regions.ru/news/252308.html

[114] Vardomsky, Leonid. Problemy regional’nogo razvitia v kontekste rossiiskogo federalisma (Problems of Regional Development in the Context of Russian Federalism). Kazan, 2000. Available at <http://federalism. Soros.ksu.ru/conference/konfer1/vardomskii.htm>

[115] Zaionchkovskaya, Zh.A. Politika v oblasti migratsii (Migration Policy). Moscow: Center for Strategic Research, 2000. Available at <http://www.csr.ru/conference/zayin13.04.00.html>

[116] Alexseev, Mikhail. Globalization at the Edges of Insecurity: Migration, Interethnic Relations, Market Incentives and International Economic Interactions in post-Soviet Russia’s Border Regions. Research Paper prepared for the project of the Russia Study Group at the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Zurich, Switzerland, 2001. P.2.

[117] “Spiritual Heritage” Web site, at http://www.nasledie.ru/oboz/N03_01/3_14.HTM

[118] Carnegie Moscow Center Web site, at http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/2000/10am/03gk.asp

[119] Holmes, Steven. “Can Foreign Aid Foster the Development of the State of Law?” Eastern European Constitutional Review (http://www.mpsf.org/pub/kpvoonl/Etazi/Holms.htm).

[120] Dresen, Joseph. “Expert Calls for New Approach to Funding Russian Legal Reform.” Washington Quarterly, 1999 (http://wwics.si.edu).

[121] Van Heuven, Marten H.A. Engaging Russia: Can International Organizations Help? The Atlantic Council of the United States. Occasional Paper, March 2000, p. 9.