EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF TATARSTAN:

NEITHER INSIDE NOR OUTSIDE, BUT ALONGSIDE WITH RUSSIA

Andrey S.Makarychev, Vasily N.Valuev

INTRODUCTION

No region of the Russian Federation had even been in the epicenter of heated debates and controversies as Tatarstan is. The polemics around Tatarstan is focused on core issues for Russia as a whole – those of its integrity, cohesiveness and the ability to speak with the single voice internationally. This region might also provide useful insights on the limits of Putin’s recentralization project.

The case of Tatarstan clearly demonstrates how slim is the line dividing Russia’s domestic and foreign policies. Indeed, one of major challenges to Russia is to learn to live with the revitalized world of Islam both on Russia’s southern periphery and within its own boundaries[i]. Tatarstan is a good illustration of the “intermestic” nature of today’s political process and close interrelatedness of its different segments.

The aim of this paper is to clarify what was peculiar in Tatarstani strategy of joining the global world, what are the main advantages and impediments of this republic’s international integration, and how the future of Tatarstan might look like. We shall start with appraising the nature of Tatarstan political regime as seen from the viewpoint of globalization paradigm. Then we shall turn to discussing the issue of sovereignty as views from different angles. This will lead us to the problem of Tatarstan’s identity policies. Finally, the paper will offer analysis of Tatarstan’s economic performance in the international arena.

1. TATARSTANI POLITICAL REGIME: AUTHORITARIANISM “GOING GLOBAL”?

We think the analysis of Tatarstan’s international stand has to be started with domestic political institutions, since they will tell us a lot about who are the most important political actors in the regions and what their interests are.

1.1. Regime Assessment: “The Winner Takes All”

Political assessments of Tatarstani political regime significantly vary. Some experts treat Tatarstani political system as a model for all Russia since it provides badly needed stability and governability. In fact, there are no open intra-elite conflicts in the republic[ii]. Those praising Tatarstani authorities for their independent stance deem that the more insistently this republic deals with the federal center, the more chances are to constrain the federal bureaucracy and to get rid of the legacy of empire. “Tatarstan has always regarded the decentralization and federalization of Russia as a way to eliminate the imperial structures and progress to a genuinely democratic society”[iii], Rafael Khakim, the leading historian and political counselor to President Shaimiev, argues.

Others argue that Tatarstan is ruled by old-fashioned, Soviet-style conservative elite which is overtly non-democratic[iv]. Sergei Markov, Director of Moscow-based Institute for Political Studies, calls Tatarstani political regime “authoritarian” and “ethnocratic”[v], since political careers in the republic are predetermined by personal loyalties. Mary McAuley describes Tatarstan ruling elite in terms of “patronage politics” and “clan-thinking”. Tatarstani authorities, in her view, were “almost entirely concerned with gaining resources for themselves”, controlling prices, distributing the profits from regional enterprises, and deciding over the ownership of major industrial units[vi]. Oleg Belgorodskii, the head of the local office of the “We Are the Citizens” Coalition describes the electoral process in Tatarstan as the competition between Shaimiev’s subordinates for artificially inflating his vote results[vii].

Journalists have uncovered that these are Shaimiev’s closest relatives that hold the most profitable jobs in the region, controlling up to 70% of the republic’s economic potential[viii]. The overwhelming majority of public offices are occupied by ethnic Tatars (though 43,3% of republic’s population are ethnic Russians). The regional media is dependent on the government in Kazan’ and reports exclusively official viewpoints[ix]. Much had been written that the powers of Shaimiev are unchecked because there are no political opposition, and the parliament is overwhelmingly composed of administrators dependable on chief executive’s benevolence[x]. Thus, the principle of separation of powers, the cornerstone of democracy, does not work in Tatarstan. Corruption is presumably also a meaningful regional problem.

In clear conflict with the Russian legislation, municipal authorities in Tatarstan are appointed by the President. Tatarstani legislation does not forbid non-alternative elections, does not limit the number of terms in office for chief executive[xi], and does not require inclusion of parties’ representatives to the local electoral committees supervising the elections and counting the votes[xii]. As a result, there were many testimonies of electoral fraud and other forms of falsification of the vote[xiii]. In 2001 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has confirmed that manipulations with the boundaries of electoral districts were taking place in December 1999 election to the State Council of Tatarstan, which unleashed discussions around legitimacy of this body[xiv]. All these facts gave reason to Professor Valentin Bazhanov, the head of Political Science Department at Ulianovsk State University, to describe Tatarstan as the factor of political instability in Russia that would generate separatist trends in the future[xv].

Despite this divergence in appraisals, it is hard to disagree that President Shaimiev of Tatarstan is one of the most authoritative of all regional leaders in Russia. He was the main lobbyist of the all-Russia legislation of 2001 to allow the regional chief executives to run for reelection after two terms in office[xvi].

1.2. Globalization Paradigm as Seen From Tatarstan

On the one hand, President Shaimiev repeatedly underlines that the federal authorities ought to be primarily busy with taking strategic positions and defending globally the Russian national interests, presuming that the stronger are international engagements of the central authorities, the lesser would be their involvement in the plethora of regional issues.

On the other hand, Shaimiev himself strongly adheres to globalization approaches and is in no mood to give up the sphere of international relations to the Kremlin. In his words, the world consists not of governments but primarily of nations and ethnic groups whose interests ought to overweight the interests of states. The concepts of “nations beyond states” and “global federalism” are rather popular in Tatarstani ruling circles. Some local scholars deem that “national sovereignty of Tatars is more important than the state sovereignty of the republic”, since the territory of Tatarstan was fixed arbitrarily, while the Tatar nation is well integrated phenomenon[xvii] (which is not exactly the case since the bulk of Tatars reside outside Tatarstan).

As viewed from Tatarstan, globalization gives it direct access to international cultural and social milieus. Global norms and institutions are important for Tatarstan since they might internationally justify its strategic aspirations for autonomy and self-rule[xviii]. International community, in Shaimiev’s words, is committed to preserving cultural diversity of the humankind and defending the rights of each of the ethnic groups. As Rafael Khakim admits, without such internationally accepted values as human rights, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and democratic governance, the very survival of Tatarstan could have been put under question[xix].

Yet the current state of international law does not satisfy completely Tatarstani leaders. Thus, according to Rafael Khakim, “pleading the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, the international community prefers to leave the solution of self-determination problems to the discretion of the states involved… The most radical step towards a renewal of international relations would be to establish a second chamber of the United Nations, one which would represent peoples and not states. This would change the structure of many international organizations, including the International Court of Justice”[xx].

In his foreign policy President Shaimiev tries to maintain a balance between “West” and “East”. Authorities of Tatarstan keep ‘special relations’ with the Muslim countries that focus basically on cultural and political issues, while relations with non-Muslim countries are mainly aimed at improving economic ties. A good continuation of Tatarstan’s policy of balance was the project of restoring the “Great Volga Road” that historically has proven its efficacy in connecting the northern and western parts of Russia with Caspian and Black Sea ports[xxi].

President Shaimiev has pointed out that “Western Europe is the landmark for Tatarstan”. Tatarstani leaders have expressed their dissatisfaction with incremental anti-Western attitudes among Russian policymakers. At the same time, political and intellectual leaders of Tatarstan have repeatedly expressed their disappointment with the Western countries policies. Thus, Western-style reforms as implemented by Yegor Gaidar government in early 1990s and the shock therapy modeled after American advises were rebuffed in Kazan’. In view of local experts, the West sticks to selective support to the human rights by ignoring the bloodshed in Chechnia and refusing to recognize politically the separatists[xxii]. In spite of the Western policy of economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein regime, Tatarstan is intensively cooperating with Iraq in oil extraction and reprocessing[xxiii].

Opinion polls in the city of Naberezhnie Chelny had shown that only 10,9% of its population would applaud fostering market reforms on the basis of political rapprochement with the West. In minds of many Tatars, pro-Western policy attitudes might lead to strengthening of Christian influence in the republic[xxiv].

Inside Tatarstan there are more radical foreign policy attitudes (of course, we should not exaggerate the political importance of those radical viewpoints for Tatarstan, since the governing elite is much more moderate and pragmatic). For example, activists of the “Tatar Public Center” (one of nationalist groups) call for boycotting the federal ministries in Tatarstan as “institutions of foreign state”[xxv]. The Kurultai (Convention) of the Tatar People appealed to international community claiming that Tatarstan is Russia’s colony (local nationalists commemorate October 15, the day when the army of Ivan the Terrible militarily subdued Kazan’ in 1552, as national mourning), and has to be allowed full-fledged international participation. Among the most radical proposals of the Kurultai delegates were stigmatizing inter-ethnic marriages, establishing contacts with national liberation movements all across the globe and application for Tatarstan’s membership in NATO[xxvi]. Some radical extremists (frequently called “non-traditional Islam groups” backed by likely-minded sponsors from Pakistan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon and other countries) are practically implementing some of those theories – recruiting volunteers for Chechen rebels and preparing terrorist attacks[xxvii].

The table below illustrates some of those divergent assessments.

TABLE 1.

Issues	Radical Nationalists	Republic of Tatarstan government	Russian federal center authorities
Sovereignty	Transition from “colonial dependency” to full-fledged independence which was interrupted by Russia’s military interference in 1552	Sovereignty is flexible and divisible (it might be shared between Tatarstan and Russian Federation)	Sovereignty belongs to Russia as a whole
Territorial integrity of Russia	The principle of territorial integrity might strain ethnic and regional development	Tatarstan does not seek full separation from Russia	Territorial integrity is unconditional political principle
Foreign policy	Completely independent foreign policy (up to application for NATO membership)	Republic of Tatarstan is the state associated with Russia (and is equal to Russia), and in this capacity is the subject of international relations	Tatarstan’s “foreign connections” (as different from the “foreign relations” of the federal center) are based on the treaty of division of powers between the regional and the federal authorities
Legal collisions	Tatarstan ought to have its own legal system	Laws of Tatarstan have priority over Russian federal legislation (as ruled by Tatarstan’s Constitutional Court)	Coherency and indivisibility of the legal foundations of the Russian Federation
Citizenship	Independent of Russia citizenship	Gradual acceptance of double (Russian and Tatarstani) citizenship	Single Russian citizenship (Tatarstan is allowed to issue additional inset for its residents)
War in Chechnia	Tatarstan ought to follow the Chechnia drive for independence, yet be better prepared	Appeal to stop the violence and military actions in the Caucasus, and start negotiations with the Chechen leaders	Massive use of military force to suppress rebels and terrorists
Identity	Islamic identity	Double identity (European and Islamic); Tatarstan as a bridge between West and East	Common multi-national identity of the whole Russian people
Diaspora	Forming global Tatar community	Diaspora as a factor legitimizing Tatarstan’s global bid	Diaspora is basically cultural phenomenon
Methods of settling center-periphery disputes	All possible methods up to military insurgence	Negotiations	Negotiations
Ethnicity and democracy	Defending ethnic interests is more important than democracy	Strengthening ethnic factor is a precondition for democratic development	Democracy has to be built up upon non-ethnic background

2. CONSTRUCTING AND INTERPRETING THE MEANINGS OF SOVEREIGNTY

The problem of sovereignty is the core issue to understand the ways in which the foreign relations of Tatarstan are organized. This chapter will start with the chronological account of the legal relations between Tatarstan and the federal center. The second part of the chapter will be more issue oriented and will compare basic approaches to sovereignty from both sides involved.

2.1. History of Tatarstan’s Relations with the Federal Center

From the very beginning of the demise of the USSR, Tatarstan insisted on its special status within the Russian Federation. In this sections we shall see how Moscow and Kazan’ tried to find the way out of the debacle which was the result of striking gaps that have divided them on a plethora of issues related to sovereignty and independence.

2.1.1. Tatarstan’s Moves

As early as in August 1990 the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan had declared the state sovereignty of the republic, without mentioning ist association with Russia[xxviii]. Yet the first attempt to take advantage of it had failed: on December 26, 1991 the Supreme Soviet of the republic has issues the statement declaring the entry of Tatarstan into the Commonwealth of Independent States as one of its co-founder, yet this act did not invoke of course any political consequences[xxix].

On March 21, 1992 the referendum held in the republic confirmed Tatarstan’s sovereignty and its intention to build relations with Russia and other countries on the basis of equality and reciprocity. However, the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan had officially stated beforehand that the results of the referendum should not be interpreted in terms of secession or non-secession, since Tatarstan does not encroach upon national integrity of the Russian Federation and wishes to stay in common with Russia “economic and geopolitical space”.[xxx] The core issue of the referendum, according to this declaration, was to restructure the relations with the Russian Federation. At the same, in a separate statement of March 16, 1992 the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan had ruled that the republic is supposed to provide “double citizenship” for its residents[xxxi].

According to the Constitution of Tatarstan adopted in 1992 (prior to the current Constitution of the Russian Federation), it is the subject of international law, the sovereign state, associated with Russia, and has full-fledged powers to conduct foreign policy. Laws of Tatarstan are superior on its territory, and Tatarstan is in a position to suspend Russian federal laws. The Constitution of Tatarstan allows it to have diplomatic and consular missions in foreign countries[xxxii]. Also important is no keep in mind that Tatarstan - along with Chechnya - refused to sign the Federal Treaty of 1992.

2.1.2. Federal Center Responses

Initial reactions of the federal center to these ambitions were rather soft and compromise-driven. The Agreement between the governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan of January 1992 has fixed that the land and the natural resources of the republic are in full possession of its people. The document says that the two parts are in a position to conduct their own foreign economic activities, except for the production which requires licensing and quoting[xxxiii]. For example, the volumes of oil extraction and oil delivery, according to the Agreement between Russian and Tatarstani governments of June 5, 1993, have to be specified each year in bilateral negotiations. This documents gives the Tatarstani government the right to conclude separate treaties with foreign countries on transportation of locally extracted oil[xxxiv]. Another agreement, signed on June 22, 1993 has confirmed that the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan form the integrated customs area[xxxv].

The Communique of July 2, 1992 signed between the governments of Russia and Tatarstan has stated that the two sides stem from Tatarstan’s sovereignty and international actorship[xxxvi]. Yet the most important document shaping the bilateral relations was the “Treaty on Power-Sharing” between the two parts of February 15, 1994. Tatarstan treats it as a document regulating relations between two states. It invokes that “as a state, Tatarstan is united with the Russian Federation”[xxxvii], and therefore has a number of rights (to establish its citizenship, to conduct foreign economic activities, to set up the rules of alternative military service for Tatarstani residents, etc.). Joint jurisdiction issues include defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity (supposedly of each other), implementation of mobilization plans in emergency situations, coordination of international contacts, conduct of monetary policy, management of transportation networks, ecological monitoring in accordance with international norms and procedures, courts system, land use, etc. It was stipulated that the Russian Federation has under its jurisdiction such issues as human rights and minorities policy, state property, legal foundation of common market, federal budget, energy systems, communication infrastructure, war and peace issues, defense and security, border control[xxxviii]. As a result of compromise, the power-sharing Treaty had no mentions of “sovereignty” and “subject of international law”. Only after signing this Treaty Tatarstan had sent its representatives to Russia’s Federal Assembly.

A number of inter-governmental agreements were based on the power-sharing Treaty. On February 15, 1994 it was officially stated that the National Bank of Tatarstan is a part of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation[xxxix]. Yet another document - signed the same day - leaves for Tatarstan’s budget excises of alcohol, oil and gas, land rent, revenues from privatization[xl]. Power-sharing agreement in economic sphere of February 15, 1994 left at Tatarstan’s own discretion such issues as signing economic cooperation agreements with foreign regions and states, taking state and commercial credits, forming its own monetary fund, participating in international organizations, crediting foreign partners, and creating free economic zones in Tatarstan[xli].

Special agreement regulates military industry issues. The federal center has delegated to Tatarstani government the right to control and oversight the defense industry within the framework of special programs, provided that they correspond to the Russian standards. No special provisions concerning arms sales were agreed upon. Appointment of directors of military enterprises felt into joint sphere of jurisdiction[xlii].

The two governments have agreed that this is the prerogative of the Russian Federation authorities to regulate the issues of conscript and military personnel training. In exchange, the Tatarstani government received concurrent powers in defense mobilization matters in its territory, as well as recruitment of servicemen from the republic to the Armed Forces. Military service of Tatarstani residents beyond the territory of the Russian Federation became possible only with their consent. With the approval of the Tatarstani government, parts of Tatarstani territories might be transferred at the disposal of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, provided that no tests of mass destruction weapons are effectuated. Russian military command has to notify the government of Tatarstan about all planned military exercises, as well as get its approval for relocation of military bases and military equipment, transportation through the republic of nuclear and chemical weapons. The agreement stipulates that all the ecological and industrial damage incurred as the result of actions of military installations in Tatarstan, will be compensated at the expense of the budget of the Russian Federation[xliii].

What we have seen above is that Tatarstan’s sovereignty is of limited nature, and in 1990s Moscow seems to be generally quite satisfied with this state of affairs. At least, the federal center had no intentions to sharpen the differences and widen the gaps. Hypothetically, both parties could apply different strategies to each other. The federal center could theoretically opt for blocking participation of Tatarstan in Russia’s missions abroad, applying economic pressure (trade embargo, tariffs, border control, etc.), banning or complicating transport communication with Tatarstan, creating business-unfriendly climate in Tatarstan. In its turn, Tatarstan could slow down production of much needed military equipment for Russian Armed Forces, and play “ethnic card” and provoke tensions between Russians and Tatars[xliv]. Fortunately, these options were discarded both in the federal center and Tatarstan as leading to growing confrontation and dangerous destabilization of mutual relations.

2.2. The Verbal Battle for Sovereignty: Ambiguity as the Political Strength

The notion of sovereignty - as used by Tatarstan leaders - is however rather vague. “Contradictory”, “complicated”, “clouded”, “unsettled”, “murky”, “amorphous”, “confused” – these characteristics could be given to Tatarstani-Russian legal collisions. Three blocks of controversies might be distinguished in this domain. First, according to the Tatar Constitution, this republic is a sovereign state and a subject of international law associated with the Russian Federation. By contrast, the Russian Constitution asserts that Tatarstan is a subject of the federation and a part of its territory. Secondly, although Tatarstan claims the independent right to determine its legal status, Russia contends that the republic’s status is defined according to a joint reading of both federal and republican constitutions. Third, each constitution provides for the supremacy of its own provisions[xlv].

It was President Yeltsin who first offered self-rule and self-management for Tatarstan. Since that time, different interpretations of sovereignty have appeared: “taxation sovereignty”, “economic sovereignty”, “double sovereignty”, “shared sovereignty”, “distributed sovereignty”, “divided sovereignty”, etc. Most of these intellectual inventions are subjects to different interpretations and open for further discussions. None of them should be taken for granted, because these are not legal, but basically political issues.

2.2.1. Tatarstan’s Approaches

From the very beginning there was always a great deal of uncertainty with regard to Tatarstani sovereignty. Mikhail Stoliarov, the first deputy of the representative of Tatarstan Republic in the Russian Federation, assumes that in the federal state there is no single and indivisible sovereignty in the traditional sense, since under federalism there might be “cohabitation” of multiple sovereignties, as determined by the voluntary transfers of powers between the central and the regional governments[xlvi]. Farid Mukhametshin, the chairman of the State Council of Tatarstan, insists that the relations between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation are those between two states[xlvii]. President Shaimiev himself interprets sovereignty as “the right to act autonomously within the framework of proper prerogatives”[xlviii]. In his view, since “it would be too short-sighted to claim for full independence”, Tatarstan is ready to accept that it voluntarily becomes a member of the Russian Federation and transfers to the federal center the right to decide on such issues as the federal foreign policy, war and peace issues, international treaties of the Russian Federation [xlix]. This is what is baptized by Shaimiev himself as “moderate sovereignty”, that one which has neither anti-Russian nor secessionist background, and which even recognizes the functions of the federal authorities as “strategic planning”[l].

What we see here is clear mix of legal and political approaches. Legal purity had never been the highest priority for Tatarstan[li]. What was most important is to maintain certain level of controversy and even conflictuality with the federal center in order to strengthen its bargaining power and find excuses for eventual failures in its own policies.

The durability of all legal irregularities and imperfections mentioned above might be explained by the fact that neither of two parts – the federal center and the republic of Tatarstan – was interested in establishing clear and transparent mechanism of relationship. Both parts were wishing to leave as much room for “under-the-carpet” bargaining and personal deals as possible[lii].

It is true that Tatarstan quite succeeded in informally lobbying its interests using a variety of political arguments. Not all of them however are in good tune with each other, and almost all are open to multiple interpretations. Thus, Shakir Yagudin, the Law Department Chairman in the State Council of Tatarstan interprets the legal uncertainties in such a way that this republic is “the state within the state”[liii]. Describing its nature, President Shaimiev defines it as “the state of all peoples living in our territory”, and simultaneously as “the state of Tatars”[liv]. He wants independent powers but pledges not to undermine the unity of Russia. Presenting himself as a federalist, Shaimiev opts in fact for the “union state with the elements of confederation”[lv]. He is in favor of raising the status of Russian oblasts within the federation, but opposes granting the oblasts the same rights as the republics enjoy[lvi]. In our view, all these statements are based on political symbolism rather than on targeting the real issues Tatarstan has to face.

2.2.2. Federal Policies

Not less controversial is the federal center stand. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had ruled that the recognition of the Tatarstani statehood does not necessarily imply the recognition of its sovereignty. The statehood, in the Constitutional Court interpretation, only reflects certain peculiarities of Tatartan’s legal status, as related to historical, ethnic and other legacies. In reference to 1992 referendum, the Constitutional Court argued that it was illegitimate to formulate that Tatarstan is the subject of international law.

Sergey Shakhray, one of Boris Yeltsin’s top political advisers, uses different explanatory markers assuming that having elected their representatives to the State Duma and voted in all-Russian presidential elections, the people of Tatarstan de facto recognizes the sovereignty of the Russian Federation over the territory of Tatarstan[lvii]. Shakhray, one of key political figures in charge of drafting Moscow - Kazan’ agreement of 1994, reinterpreted “associated status” of Tatarstan not in terms of state-to-state relations (as authorities in Kazan’ did) but rather as a kind of “natural association” going back to the middle ages. Associated relations are treated as those of historical alliance of Tatars and Russians, united organically by the very nature of vicinity and multiple communications[lviii].

As to legal part of the story, according to the Federal Law of January 1999 “On coordination of international and foreign economic activity of Russian Federation’s constituent parts“, Russian regions can’t sign agreements with foreign central authorities unless Russia’s government approves them. This provision formally runs against the power-sharing treaty between Russian Federation and Tatarstan. The Constitutional Court of Russia has issued two statements on Tatarstan: that ones of 13 March 1992 and 17 June 2000, which indicated – in defiance of multiple documents signed between Moscow and Kazan’ - that laws proclaiming Tatarstan’s sovereign status were unconstitutional.

Despite all these inconsistencies from both parties involved, it is important that from the very beginning of 1990s sovereignty was seen in Kazan’ as a process to be developed on ad-hoc basis. In Shaimiev’s words, “we don’t think the sovereignty is an absolute, neither we push it forcefully in those directions where there is no way to come – for example, in defense or financial matters. Should the circumstances change, we shall react”[lix]. Again, this is a good example of purely political approach to solving the legal controversy. Rafael Khakim has explicitly acknowledged that „we were independent only one day we have proclaimed the sovereignty, yet next morning we have started the process of self-restriction”[lx]. Here is the core difference between Tatarstan and Chechnia: the former is eager to achieve the “free hands policy” within the federation, while the latter was aimed at “running away” from Russia.

Tatarstan’s strategy might be called a piecemeal sovereignty. What Tatarstan proposes – and the federal center might easily accept - is the set of key points:

- recognition of its partial (limited) sovereignty;

- further delineation of responsibilities between the republic and the federal center;

- in case of legal conflicts between the republic and the federal center, priority should be given to the legal norms of that party which is in charge of the question under consideration[lxi].

This is exactly the agenda for negotiations between Tatarstan and the federal center under President Putin presidency. We are turning to this issue in the next section.

2.3. Sovereignty Under Question: Tatarstan within the Context of Putin’s Reforms

Putin’s centralization policy had directly affected Tatarstan in many ways. On June 27, 2000 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had questioned the sovereign status of the republic. On June 2001, the Supreme Qualification College of the Judges of Russia has issued a warning statement to the Chairman of the Supreme Court of Tatarstan Gennady Baranov for his failure to fulfill the Russian legislation[lxii]. Sergey Kirienko, the presidential envoy in the Volga Federal District, has questioned Shaimiev’s ambition to represent the interests of all Tatars of Russia (alluding that the majority of Tatars live beyond the republic)[lxiii]. The Customs Board of Tatarstan was rearranged and subordinated to the Volga Customs authorities[lxiv]. Vladimir Zorin, deputy presidential representative in VFD, has challenged the abilities of Tatarstani ethnic policies positing that “there are a number of problems that the confessions are unable to solve by themselves”[lxv], without interference of the central government.

In May 2000 with the start of the territorial reform Vladimir Putin has announced that the first task of Presidential envoys in the federal districts would be to bring local laws into line with the federal ones. The Commission on revising the Tatarstani legislation had started its work on September 11, 2000. Initially the deadline was set for December 31, 2000, yet for Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, the two republics with the greatest number of laws which didn’t conform to federal ones, this period was prolonged up to March 9, 2001.

The process of legal equalizing turned out to be an uneasy enterprise. Thus, both Constitutional and Supreme Courts of Tatarstan had harshly criticized the appeal of the deputy prosecutor general in VFD Alexander Zviagintsev who urged to cancel 40 articles of the Constitution of Tatarstan which, in his opinion, contradict the Russian legislation. Yet the Russian Supreme Court insists that its Tatarstani counterpart has to take decision on this issue[lxvi]. Moreover, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation had stated that the most recent election to the State Council of Tatarstan were held with violations of the national laws, which in fact questions the legitimacy of the Tatarstani parliament[lxvii].

To counter-react, Tatarstani leaders had issued a number of statements. The first reaction to Putin’s initiatives was rather furious. For example, Marat Galeev, the member of the State Council of Tatarstan, has called the whole federal reform unfeasible and conducive to violations of current legislation[lxviii].

Yet President Shaimiev has shown more moderation. He expressed his strong support of keeping intact the power sharing agreement, alluding that there are no other documents that legally frame Tatarstan’s association with Russia. His thesis is that without the treaties between the federal center and the regions Russia would be a unitary state[lxix].

Later on, Shaimiev came up with proposal to amend the Russian Constitution in a way that would change the rules regulating the formation of electoral districts. The most important thing is that Tatarstani authorities are eager to do away with the clause which disallows more than 10% difference in terms of population between the electoral districts. The speaker of the State Council of Tatarstan Farid Mukhametshin looks for support from other ethnic republic (in particular, Adygeya and Dagestan) that are not satisfied with “ten-per-cent” clause because it makes impossible to form electoral districts based on ethnic background[lxx]. Ethnic electoral districts, as many in Tatarstan deem, might avoid turning political campaigning into inter-ethnic clashes, and keep the voters’ choice in the framework of one ethnic group. Understanding that this arrangement is a clear departure from democratic procedures, Tatarstani political experts concede that this is a precondition for ethnic peace in the republic[lxxi]. In exchange for acceptance of its legislative proposal, Tatarstan is ready to negotiate further removing from its Constitution articles on republic’s sovereignty and international actorship.

A number of other concessions to the federal center have been made as well. Politically, Shaimiev has agreed to introduce bicameral model of the State Council, thus allowing opposition forces to get their seats in its lower house[lxxii]. In fall 2000 he also supported Putin in reintroducing the Soviet-era anthem. In the economic area, for the first time in the whole decade, 2001 budget of Tatarstan was drafted in accordance to the national tax legislation, which led to abolishing of certain local taxes and channeling 60 percent of its revenues to the federal budget, as all other regions of Russia. In exchange, the federal government has agreed to co-fund some projects that used to be funded out of republican means[lxxiii].

These facts clearly testify that the political elite basically shows a great deal of soberness and moderation, and strategically looks for political settlement of their disagreements with the federal center. Starting from fall 2000, Shaimiev prefers to speak about “self-sufficient” (not “sovereign”) Tatarstan. “The offices of federal agencies have begun to open in Kazan’, and Moscow has reimposed control over tax collection and spending. The introduction of teaching using the Latin alphabet has been postponed, with existing projects labeled experimental”[lxxiv]. The Communication Board of Tatarstan was rearranged as the federal unit[lxxv]. Some local experts have started discussing conditions of Tatarstan’s entry into an enlarged region, should the federal center take this decision[lxxvi]. In Shaimiev’s view, there was sufficient space for bargaining with the federal authorities. This strategy of accommodation was reinforced by political messages he was receiving from Moscow, basically signalizing that President Putin is not intended to unseat Shaimiev.

Tatarstani authorities are looking for political compromises based on assumption that all changes in the Constitutions of republics (including Tatarstan) have to be complemented by adequate revisions of the federal Constitution[lxxvii]. Yet Tatarstan seems to be unwilling to give up its conviction that Russia has to remain asymmetrical federation and needs the Chamber of Nationalities as a part of its parliament [lxxviii]. Shaimiev remain strong supporter of keeping the heads of the subjects of federations popularly elected, while in his view the heads of the municipal units have to be appointed[lxxix].

Also Tatarstan does not want to give up its reservations concerning the territorial reform. Shaimiev is one of the most vociferous critics of the withdrawal of the regional leaders from the Council of Federation[lxxx]. In an attempt to start publicly debating the effectiveness of new regional division of Russia, Mentimir Shaimiev had announced the idea of dividing each of the federal districts into several territorial entities each comprising 2 or 3 subjects of federation. In his opinion, 15 “small regions” within one federal district (the case of VDF) is too many. To develop further these ideas, in April 2001 Farid Mukhametshin came up with the proposal to officially allow the “donor” regions (those giving to the federal budget more that they receive) to have under their financial patronage a number of adjacent weaker provinces. These regional groupings centered around several leaders (including Tatarstan itself) could be nuclei of future new regional agglomerations in Russia[lxxxi].

Mintimir Shaimiev is still the political figure the federal authorities have to take probably more seriously than most other regional chieftains (President Putin has publicly confessed that it was Shaimiev to whom he first offered the post of the head of the VFD[lxxxii]). In opinion of Professor Vladimir Razuvaev, “in the light of Taliban successes in Afghanistan and possible ‘domino reaction’ all across Central Asia, Moscow treats Shaimiev as a much needed leader that could have been used as a barrier to religious extremism and political destabilization”[lxxxiii]. As a symbol of easing tensions between Tatarstan and Russia[lxxxiv], president Shaimiev was appointed the member of the 7-governor presidency of the newly created State Council. In the State Council Mr. Shaimiev chaired the ad-hoc group on elaboration of power-sharing in the joint-jurisdiction issues of the Russian Federation and the regions. On the whole, the main aim of his project was to further redistribute concurrent powers between federal and regional authorities. Yet the Kremlin’s reaction to Shaimiev Report to the State Council was quite revealing: it was withdrawn from the agenda on a short notice and substituted by another issue[lxxxv], which was an indication that the federal center is still unready to discuss these issues in depth.

The good news for Tatarstan was that the federal center found out that there were regional laws (like he Tatarstan’s Land Code[lxxxvi]) that were either better than the federal ones or unique. Sergei Kirienko, the representative of the Russian President in the Volga Federal District (VFD), has consented that it’s necessary to use regional experience and make amendments or adopt new laws on the federal level. This is a good example of the regions’ ability to influence the federal policy and law making.

On several occasions, Kirienko has given high appraisals to Tatarstani authorities. In his words, one day there will be a monument of Shaimiev built up[lxxxvii]. In a conciliatory manner he admitted that the tax privileges obtained by Tatarstan from the federal center, were properly used for the sake of republic’s economy[lxxxviii]. Kirienko praised Tatarstani authorities for their understanding of the need to build up “integration chains” with other regions in order to be competitive abroad[lxxxix]. He compared Tatarstan with the corporation based on strict vertical subordination inside, but competing rather effectively with other political and economic actors, using a variety of legitimate means. “I am not saying this was the right thing to do; what I am saying is that it worked”, Kirienko has stated[xc]. At the same time, Kirienko was quite explicit in terming the Tatarstani demand for introducing “nationality” rubric in the new passports as “violation of human rights”[xci]: in his view, in a democratic society people are not supposed to indicate their ethnic affiliation on a mandatory basis.

Nevertheless, the intellectuals in Tatarstan expressed great concerns regarding President Putin’s intentions to subdue the regions[xcii]. The very establishment of the federal districts was put under question mark, since local experts argued that the federal government always possessed of adequate instruments to oversight the regions (courts, Ministry of Justice, etc.), and there is no guarantee that Putin’s system would work much better.

2.4. Sovereignty and Foreign Policy Issues

Aspiring for free and autonomous foreign policy Tatarstan refers to a number of arguments. First, the power-sharing agreement signed with the federal center stipulates that Tatarstan is an associated state. This provision distinguishes Tatarstan from all other subjects of the Russian Federation.

Second, international practices of trans-regionalism are a strong source of international self-assertion. Thus, Vladimir Pustogarov, the senior scholar at the Institute of the State and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences, assumes that it very hard to legally define what exactly is meant by “the subject of the international law”. In his opinion, should the member of the federation wish to participate in international exchanges, no additional recognition or confirmation is needed at all. What is most important is that the powers of the region in international issues ought to correspond to the national constitution and international obligations of Russia[xciii]. These are the most customary limitations imposed on the sovereignty of the federal units in other federations.

Tatarstan aspires to conduct foreign policy in its capacity as the state rather than one of Russian regions. It develops external relations with a wide range of different international actors with different weight and status. Among them are not only nation-states, but also other actors, like Quebec province, Saxony land, Buhara region of Uzbekistan, Madrid Autonomous Community, the state of South Australia, Carroll Foundation (Great Britain), “Open Society Institute”, Export- Import Bank of the USA, etc.

Quite symptomatically, debates about Tatarstani international participation were extended to raising the citizenship issues. Formally, agreements between the Russian Federation and several ethnic republics (including Tatarstan) had stipulated that citizenship issues ought to be tackled by those republics themselves. The conflict unfolded as soon as the implementation of those provisions has started. The federal center is fearful that introduction of Tatarstani citizenship would signify the appearance of the double citizenship unacceptable for Moscow. The head of Legal Department of the administration of the President of Tatarstan Raisa Sakhieva has assured nevertheless that her government still sticks to the principle of common citizenship but reserve the right to set their special rules related to the citizenship, as well as grant Tatarstani citizenship to those individuals who don’t hold Russian citizenship[xciv].

President Shaimiev underlines that Tatarstan does not encroach upon federal powers in defense issues, border demarcation, customs and financial policies. Yet in 1994 Tatarstan had signed the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with Abkhazia, Georgian region seeking full independence. This act provoked protest from both Georgia and Russia since it was interpreted as encroachment upon territorial integrity of Georgia[xcv].

Tatarstan had demonstrated that its foreign and security policy approaches are very much different from that ones of Russia. The table below might help visualize these differences.

TABLE 2. Russo-Tatarstani differences over foreign policy issues

Issues	Russian standpoints	Tatarstani official standpoints[xcvi]
1.Balkans	Yugoslavia is the victim of NATO aggression	Serbs are responsible for ethnic cleansings and should not be supported
2. Chechnia	Conflict in Chechnia is Russia’s domestic issue	War in Northern Caucasus has global consequences since Chechnia was de facto independent
3. Belarus	Unification with Belarus is the top priority issue to be solved by Moscow and Minsk	Unification with Belarus is the top priority issue to be solved by Moscow and Minsk
4. CIS integration	Alliance with former Soviet republics is the highest long-term priority	CIS integration is the pretext for restoring imperial ambitions of Russia[xcvii]
5. NATO	NATO is the threat to Russian national interests	No threat is expected from NATO in the forthcoming future
6. China	Strategic partnership with China based on military cooperation is of utmost importance	Sino-Russian relations will remain strained and chilly
7. Western religious missions	“Non-traditional” confessions should have limited rights in Russia	All Christian confessions (Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant) should have equal status and opportunities in Russia[xcviii]
8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) functions	MID is the chief coordinator of international activities of the subjects of federation	MID fails to fulfill its coordination function because of lack of political powers

The top four issues could be identified as the most pronounced and thus fueling much of debate between Moscow and Kazan’:

1. Military conflict in Kosovo in spring 1999 has drawn a line between the federal policy and that one of Tatarstan. In the aftermath of NATO military action the State Council of Tatarstan has issues special statement pledging to defend the rights of ethnic minorities world wide and contribute to halting “aggressive nationalism”. Tatarstani legislators have condemned the ideas of “ethnic linkages” and “confessional solidarity” with the Serbs, as well as attempts to form voluntary military brigades in Russia for direct participation in the Kosovo fights. Those projects were said to divide Russia along ethnic lines and leave the volunteers without adequate legal and social protection[xcix]. In another statement on the Balkans crisis the State Council of Tatarstan called the decision to send Russian peace keeping troops to Kosovo as “senseless”, “immoral”, and “unacceptable”, since it diverts scarce financial resources from domestic needs[c]. Later on, president Shaimiev has said that the federal-level politicians should give up the illusion that “Europe would not survive without Russia” backing Russia’s “free hands policy” in Kosovo and Chechnia. “Europe will undoubtedly survive, while this is Russia who is to suffer from the isolation from the civilized world”, Shaimiev argued[ci].

2. In 1997 Tatarstan provoked harsh reaction from Moscow by concluding Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with Chechnia. This was the first document signed by Chechen government after the end of the first Chechen war. Moscow has interpreted this treaty as indirect support of Chechnia’s search for full independence, moreover Dzhokhar Dudaev, former president of Chechnia, was willing to have Mentimir Shaimiev as a mediator between the break-away republic and the federal center. When the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan had passed the law forbidding participation of its residents in Russia’s military campaign in Chechnia, it was again interpreted as another manifestation of defiance to the federal government.

3. Official Kazan’ is also unhappy with Russian-Belorussian integration. In Russia there were debates whether this would be a compound of two states or Belorussian constituent entities would become the units of the Russian Federation. The second option was perceived as the decrease in the status of Russian regions. Starting from 1997 President Shaimiev has been criticizing Russia-Belarus rapprochement indicating that it might boost asymmetry of Russian federalism. In this situation Tatarstan and some other republics stated that they would insist on having powers similar to that ones of Belarus in the new entity. Experts predict that implementation of Russia-Belarus unification might be used by Tatarstan as a pretext for increasing its own autonomy within the new federation or confederation.

4. Kazan’ perceives with suspicion CIS integration and treats it as a continuation of century-long “Big Brother” policy. Apart from political reasons, skeptical attitudes to deepening partnership with newly independent states might also be explained by scarce scale of trade and commerce with them: data of 2000 show that CIS countries account for only USD 307,6 mln out of USD 3165,6 mln of overall volume of foreign economic operations[cii].

Issues from 5 to 8 were less vocal, but they also contained a good deal of discussions between Moscow and Kazan’. What was of primordial importance is that theoretical discussions gave rise to some practical moves from Tatarstan’s side. In 1995 the President Shaimiev has temporarily introduced the post of Tatarstan’s representative on humanitarian issues in the Republic of Ingushetia to coordinate establishing and maintaining relations with the Tatar communities in the Northern Caucasus, provide the refuges with medical assistance and food supply, assist the families from Tatarstan in search of hostages and prisoners[ciii]. Tatarstan officials tried to mediate between the Russians and the Chechens, proposing the principle of “delayed solution” which was partly implemented in “Khasaviurt agreements” of 1996 and subsequent negotiations with the guerillas. In 1999 the State Council of Tatarstan banned the practice of sending junior conscripts from this republic to the North Caucasus, ordering that the residents of Tatarstan might be recruited as soldiers to be located in the battle areas only on voluntary basis[civ]. It is known as well that the Tatar delegation joined UN representatives to negotiate with the leaders of Taliban over the release of a captured airliner crew and discussed prospects for Russian policy in the Afghan civil war[cv].

The Russian government, however, in fact ignored Tatarstan’s international potential, including for example interesting and unusual attempt to convene international forum to discuss ethno-political conflicts in post-Soviet republics. This idea was implemented in the form of the “Hague Initiative” to bring together leaders from Tatarstan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, as well as a group of eminent international experts in conflict resolution[cvi].

3. IDENTITY GAPS

The issue of identity has special importance for analyzing Tatarstan’s international involvement since cultural factors, in conjunction with interests and institutions, are power resource for group creation, political mobilization and setting political agenda[cvii]. In Arbakhan Magomedov’s description, regional elites in Tatarstan could be treated not only as policy makers but also as generators and communicators of political ideas. In trying to find the deep meanings of regional political discourses in the marketplace of ideas, one has to refer to cultural and civilizational foundations of regional identity policy[cviii].

3.1. Identity through the Prism of Globalization

Ethnic and religious identities might provide a focus for people’s affiliation and allegiance, and give them stronger sense of belonging to specific cultural and territorial environment[cix]. It is widely presumed that culture and identity are varied, flexible and fluid. The case of Tatarstan demonstrates that identities can be reconstructed as social and political opportunities change. Tatarstan quite successfully asserted its cultural specificity and autonomy. In fact, it is one of few Russia’s regions having consistent and coherent vision of its identity, as distinctive from that one of Russia. Construction of Tatarstan’s identity is to a significant extent fueled by the fact that in Tatarstan, in comparison with other republics, the intellectual elite is very strong and influential[cx]. This are the intellectuals (scholars, journalists, writers) that generate ideas and make them circulate among the top policy makers.

Seemingly, sometimes under the guise of “regional ideologies”, “doctrines” or “models” we found peculiar mix of myths, symbols, slogans and rituals (often irrational), born either as the instrument of region’s self-assertion vis-à-vis the federal center, or as reaction to presumable lose of ethnic or religious distinctiveness in the era of globalization.

In a globalizing world, Tatarstan is concerned about preserving its ethnic identity wrapped in religious colors[cxi]. That is why some seemingly technical issues – like introduction of new Russian passports with no mention of “nationality” of the holder – provoke harsh reactions in this region. The republican State Council ordered not to issue the new passports which did not mention the bearer’s nationality, and were printed only in Russian. Tatarstani elite felt that these omissions robbed Tatarstan of its status as an ethnic republic with two official languages[cxii]. To a certain extent, this reaction shown that ethnic identity for Tatarstan is a sort of “collective therapy for social trauma of Soviet totalitarianism”[cxiii].

The decision to switch from Cyrillic to Latin graphic was one of the most telling examples of Tatarstan’s identity policy in the era of globalization. The idea was articulated in the World Congress of Tatars convened in 1997. In the view of Tatarstani elite, transition to Latin spelling was modeled after the experience of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan[cxiv]. The main argument of the proponents of Latin letters is that the usage of Cyrillic is less convenient in global information networks. Latin graphic, as viewed by its defenders, will help Tatarstan to become one of the leaders in information technologies for the whole Turk community of nations[cxv]. Computer program which transforms the Cyrillic text into a Latin one is already created in Kazan’.

Though the transition period was extended to 12 years, forthcoming latinization of Tatar alphabet was interpreted in Moscow as another effort to get out of the Russian cultural sphere and come closer to the Euro-Atlantic civilization. Valery Tishkov, the Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, forecasts that the swing to Latin letters will provoke social and political alienation in the regional society, widen cultural gaps and sharpen the latent societal conflicts[cxvi].

3.2. History as a “Speech Act”

Basically, Tatarstan’s identity policy is very much centered around symbolically constructing and reinventing the feelings of historical peculiarities of Tatarstan and its specific mentality. Professor Mikhail Guboglo, Deputy Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, treats Tatarstani identity policy as that one ascribing ethnic meanings to political events and phenomena, and those imposing ethnically overloaded markers to the regional society[cxvii].

In Tatarstan’s struggle for autonomy and self-rule, historical arguments are of tremendous importance. The majority of local historians tend to treat Tatarstan’s history as opposed to Russian. It is widely assumed that in the past the Tatar’s tradition of statehood were as rich as those of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and other newly independent states. Rafael Khakim assumes that legacy of the Russian statehood ought to be derived from the times of Golden Horde whose successor was Muscovite Russia. He argues that the Mongol system was an advantage for Russian states since they got political and military protection vis-a-vis the West[cxviii]. In Indus Tagirov’s assessment, the 10% taxation practiced by the Golden Horde is miniscule in comparison to what the federal center nowadays takes away from the regions. Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church under Golden Horde domination was the only social institution that enjoyed meaningful privileges, including financial ones[cxix].

It is quite symptomatic that Tatarstan tried to persuade the federal authorities to cancel the official celebration of the anniversary of the famous Kulikovo Pole battle in which the Russian prince Dmitry Donskoy has defeated the army of Mamai, which marked the beginning of Russia’s liberation from Tatar-Mongol yoke. Two letters – one from President Shaimiev and another one from “Vatan” party – were addressed to the administration of the Russian President in 2001, both arguing that honoring this historical event might offend the feelings of the bulk of soldiers and officers of Tatar origin[cxx].

Yet this is only one part of the story. The second group of indigenous historians reinterpret the history of Tatar-Russian in basically mutually complimentary terms, avoiding counter-positioning of two peoples. Tatars are treated as an organic, integral part of the Russian nation. Certain times – like the reign of Katherine the Second who allowed to build up mosques, and the first years of the Soviet regime where the Tatar’s autonomy was first appeared and the new opportunities for cultural revival were opened – are praised in Tatarstan more than others (like the seizure of Kazan’ by Ivan the Terrible), but even the hard times in the history are usually referred to in rather conciliatory way.

3.3. Islam Rediscovered

Historically, starting from 922 Tatarstan was the Northern outpost of Islam – more than half-a-century earlier than Russia accepted Orthodox Christianity. With the centuries Tatarstani Islam evolved to “Euroislam”, religious ideology adaptable to modernization and economic innovations. Probably, the Turkey secularized model would best match the “Euroislam” political ideal. “Euroislam” is one of the most influential – both politically and intellectually – school of thought in Tatarstan, whose importance might be compared with “Euroasianism” in Russia which is on the rise.

“Euroislam” tried to integrate – as the “Eurasian” ideology in Russia does - the adherence to Asian historical legacy with acceptance of modern European thinking, yet it challenges basic assumptions of “Euroasianism” in many ways. Many in Tatarstan think that “Euroasian” model was formed under heavy influence of Orthodox religion and hence leaves no space for Tatarstani peculiar identity. Orthodox culture, as interpreted in Tatarstan, is anti-democratic, illiberal and impractical, unable to meet the challenges of modernity and not suitable for Tatarstan[cxxi]. Russia, according to these views, is unable to efficiently play the role of the bridge between the Europe and Asia: being dominated by Orthodoxy it is opposed by the East, and being ostensibly illiberal it is not welcome in the West[cxxii]. In trying to rebuff the vision of Russia as the Orthodox nation build up exclusively by ethnically Russian population, President Shaimiev sided up with the heads of two other republics – Murtaza Rakhimov of Bashkortostan and Mikhail Nikolaev of Yakutia – to issue in 1995 a joint open letter to President Yeltsin demanding more rights for ethnic regions[cxxiii].

The core differences between the two approaches are illustrated in the table below.

TABLE 3: “Euroislam” Compared with “Eurasianism”

Euroasianism	Euroislam (Jadidism)
Russia is overwhelmingly Orthodox nation	Tatarstan is a part of non-Orthodox world
There is the Russian civilization which incarnates a single, indivisible destiny for all peoples of the country	There is no civilizational uniformity in Russia; the Russian state is able to unite different people only by force
Historically Europe was a threat to Russia	Europe does not represent any menace to Tatarstan
Collectivity and communitarian solidarity are the most important dominants of the society in Russia	Individualism and entrepreneurship would open up Tatarstan to the world
Military force is a prerequisite for national pride and glory	Russia is overmilitarized and prone to solve conflicts by force which might turn into catastrophe (like that one in Chechnia)
Messianism, the ambition to assimilate ethnically non-Russian groups	Region-oriented approaches, concerns about survival of Tatar ethnicity
“The Russian world” embeds all countries of the former Soviet Union	Russia has to recognize the independence of its former satellites and let them live their own lives
Russia might expect to be a strong country only on the basis of centralization	Russia’s decentralization would help solving the most acute issues (crime, border security, etc.)

In view of local activists of Tatar revival, Islam traditionally was a means of keeping cultural autonomy of local residents suppressed by Russians. At the same time, thanks to Islam, Tatars are able to expect deeper participation and involvement in the world community of nations. This is why “Euroislam” is very much supportive of intensive contacts between religious groups of Tatarstan and that ones of the West.

Shaimiev’s endeavor is to unite all Muslims of Tatarstan, and later to turn Kazan’ into Russia’s Islamic capital[cxxiv]. This concept is based upon dubious presumption of internal coherence of Tatar ethnic community, and its ability to act as a single political actor. However, this ambitious strategy encounters essential obstacles that stem from multi-confessional nature of Tatarstani socio-political space.

First of all, Tatarstani religious elite is very fragmented and lacks cohesion[cxxv]. It is divided among adherents of different versions of Islam (Turkish, Iranian, Saudi Arabian, etc.). Competition and tensions between different Islamic groups are not rare. Experts testify that the alumni of foreign Islamic institutions (including ethnic Tatars) that come to Tatarstan for missionary activities, are very much politically indoctrinated with anti-Russian feelings, and due to that face opposition from local Islamic believers[cxxvi].

Secondly, three fourth of all Tatars reside outside of Tatarstan (all across Russia and CIS countries, as well as in Turkey, China, Poland, Finland, USA, Afghanistan, Canada, Australia). John Coakley characterizes Tatars as the locally weak, territorially dispersed group.[cxxvii] Their predominance in Tatarstan isn’t overwhelming since they constitute only 47,7% of its population. The republic accounts for only 26 percent of the overall total Tatar world population.

Moreover, Tatars, as shown in Susan Goodrich Lehmann’s study, along with Bashkirs display the lowest level of both religious belief and practice among all the Islamic people of Russia[cxxviii]. Rafik Mukhametshin, Deputy Director of “Tatar Encyclopedia” Institute, admits that “the comeback of the Islam values to the Tatarstani society is neither steady nor stable”[cxxix]. Shaimiev himself recognized that he does not practice Islam[cxxx]. Farid Mukhametshin, the chairman of the State Council, had just recently started learning Tatar language[cxxxi].

Thirdly, there is a wide spread feeling among Tatarstani political and intellectual elites that excessive influence of religious institutions might endanger the internal stability and the modernization drive[cxxxii]. The government is not among the most lavish sponsors of restoring the mosques – the funds for this purpose are basically taken from abroad.

Fourthly, living for centuries in closest ties with the Russians makes Tatarstani Islam adjusted to the Russian culture and the Russian nationhood. In fact, Tatarstani Islam is a “border phenomenon” in a sense that it unfolds at the edges of two civilizations – Orthodox and Islamic.

All these facts offer plausible explanation why Tatarstan elite had opted for relatively liberal and civilized form of nationalism. Tatarstani authorities are in no way eager to open the doors to its radical versions as it was the case of Chechnia[cxxxiii]. This is Shaimiev’s intentional policy to marginalize – in one way or another – extremist religious groups. On numerous occasions officials in Kazan’ have explicitly stated that there is no room for vahhabism in Tatarstan[cxxxiv]. One of the strongest arguments against pan-Islamism is that it rejects ethnic and cultural specificity of each individual ethnic group.

Tatarstan’s search for identity begs another important question – to what extent the ethnic nationalism is compatible with the liberal values. It is still under discussion whether Tatarstan is heading for establishing a civic or ethnocentric identity[cxxxv]. Up to now, religion issues in Tatarstan were not conducive to deep cleavages between the Russians and the Tatars. There are some sociological grounds for expecting that the concept of civic identity is to prevail in the long run. The civic identity trend might be reinforced by widely spread assumptions of psychological proximity of the Russians and the Tatars, and inter-ethnic loyalty[cxxxvi].

4. FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: AUTHORITARIAN ENTRY INTO THE CAPITALISM?

After having analyzed Tatarstan’s identity policies, which have been heavily biased towards symbolic interpretations, we have to turn to economic aspects of Tatarstan’s search for its place in the world.

4.1. The General Picture

The federal legislation makes distinction between “foreign economic relations” (the function of the federal government) and “foreign economic contacts” (the function of the Tatarstani authorities). Whatever they are officially called, foreign economic policy of Tatarstan is one of the most important elements of its bid for worldwide recognition and international performance.

Tatarstan is one of key economic regions in the Volga Federal District taking the lead in car building, aircraft and petrochemical industries. The creation of manufacturing and productive networks within VFD is considered to foster development of all three of them.

Attraction of foreign investments is considered one of the major incentives for Tatarstan, ranked second on foreign investments per capita in 1998 among all Russia’ regions[cxxxvii]. It is acknowledged by foreign experts as the region with medium level of investment potential and low level of risk.[cxxxviii] It was one of the first Russian regions to start developing local legal base for foreign economic activities. Its legislation on investment stipulates various incentives and preferences for companies that were created in cooperation with foreign partners[cxxxix].

In January 1999 the Law “On Investment Activities in the Republic of Tatarstan” came into force. During the first year enterprises get a temporary exemption from the profit tax to the regional budget. Moreover, the property is levied with only 50% tax. The Law of March 1996 “On the Status of Approved Investment Projects with Foreign Investor Participation” extends the period of benefits for investors. They are in a position to take exemptions on various taxes for the time span from one to five years with subsequent prolongation. The Decree of President of Tatarstan of October 1994 “On Encouragement of Attraction of Foreign Investments into the Republic of Tatarstan” grants additional tax privileges to enterprises where the participation of foreign investors is not less than 30% or not less than $ 1 million. In 1998 Tatarstan’s parliament created two free economic zones - “Alabuga” and “Kamskie Poliany” with the time span of 25 years[cxl].

In 1998 Tatarstan had introduced its Land Code providing the foreigners with access to region’s land market. Sales to foreigners, however, were restricted to purchases from the state, and therefore foreigners were unable to buy land held in common by rural residents. In January 2001 President Shaimiev became the chief proponent of introducing the private property on land all across Russia, referring to the need of bettering general investment climate.

Tatarstan is one of the regions to establish working contacts with the Foreign Investment Promotion Center of Russia (FIPC). This institution was set up in 1995 under the auspices of the Economy Ministry and has established the network of offices abroad. The FIPC facilitates in shaping relationships between Russian regions and foreign investors. This enables Tatarstan to utilize the services of the FIPC in search for investment projects proposals. Simultaneously, Tatarstan as most Russia’s regions develops its own business promotion centers. Thus, the Tatarstan Center for Investments Promotion coordinates activities of governmental, financial and non-financial institutions in the investment process, and facilitates adopting and realization of investment projects.

According to Committee on Statistics of Tatarstan, the 1997-1998 period was the most successful in the attraction of foreign investments. Only in 2000 the Republic has managed to smooth out the negative consequences of the August 1998 financial crash. The inflow of foreign investments in the first half of 2000 totaled $ 46 million.

Tatarstan proliferates its contacts beyond national borders. In January 1999 the Tatarstan Chamber of Commerce concluded an agreement with the Swiss Organization for Facilitating Investment (SOFI) to pave the way for the investment cooperation, information exchange, marketing research.

About 90% of Tatarstan’s export is related to oil industry[cxli]. “Tatneft’”, region’s leading oil company, was among the first Russian firms to start trading its shares in New York Stock Exchange. It received the highest rate among all VFD enterprises in 2001 “Financial Times” rating of Eastern European companies in terms of market capitalization[cxlii]. In March 2001 the “Fitch” international agency has raised “Tatneft’”’s rating from CC to B, which indicates to company’s stability[cxliii]. “Tatneft’” has also rather ambitious international plans, basically related to Iraq. The contract signed with Iraqi authorities and approved by UN in spring 2001, stipulates delivery to Iraq of oil processing equipment and joint exploitation of oil deposits[cxliv]. Similar negotiations with Iran, Jordan, Mongolia, Lybia and Vietnam are underway as well[cxlv].

One can’t expect that intensive contacts with Iraqi regime would be applauded in the West. Except for “Tatneft’”, other local economic actors – “KamAZ” car producer, Kazan Helicopter Factory and “Nizhnekamskshina” plant – are cooperating with Bagdad[cxlvi]. Yet what might be quite in tune with the Western policies is demilitarizing the economy and reducing the military production, to which many regional policy makers in Tatarstan are very much in favour. In Marat Galeev’s view, excessive military buildup impedes economic restructuring[cxlvii].

4.2. Economic Protectionism and Its Critics

At a quick glance, Tatarstan seems to be one of few isles of relative stability and prosperity in the sea of Russian shaky economy. Yet the “Tatarstani economic miracle” has still a long way to go. In spite of significant privileges for developing its own external relations, Tatarstan de facto is far from be called a “gate-region” to the international economy.

In the late 1990s, 65% of all sales transactions in the republic were barter operations. Tatarstan has one of the worst records for wage and pension arrears in the country. In 1998 authorities of Tatarstan have imposed price control on food. In November 1998 Tatarstan became the first Russian region to default on its foreign financial obligations[cxlviii].

One of basic challenges for Tatarstani economy is that “agriculture is the unconditional priority in Tatarstan”[cxlix], according to the chairman of the permanent commission on economic development and reforms at the State Council of Tatarstan Marat Galeev. Yet others think that “the agrarian sector as it exists nowadays is doomed to disappear”[cl].

In other areas, too, the criticism is being heard. Viktor Mal’guin, Professor of Kazan’ Institute for Finances and Economy, describes the export structure of Tatarstan as irrational, since it is dominated by crude oil sales (Tatarstan lacks its own refineries). In his assessments, two thirds of the Tatarstan’s industry has to be either closed or radically upgraded[cli]. Specialists doubt whether the defense industry might be considered as the engine of Tatarstani economic progress[clii], since none of the region’s defense enterprises is licensed to sell abroad.

Rinas Kashbraziev, Professor of Kazan’ State University, claims that the investment process in Tatarstan is in crisis, since the bulk of enterprises are either insolvent or economically weak[cliii]. In 1997 this region was a destination for $ 697,9 million foreign investments, while FDIs made up only $17,1 million, or 2,5%. Absorbing 0,44 % of FDIs inflow in Russia that year, Tatarstan ranks only sixth among Russian regions on cumulative FDIs.[cliv] According to FIPC review, based on Goskomstat data of July 1999, Tatarstan was the host for $ 1135,9 million, whereas FDIs totaled only $ 87,7 million. “KamAZ”, the leading car-building factory, in the late 1990s not only has accumulated an enormous debt, but also failed to take advantage of the partnership with the American company “Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts”.[clv]

Tatarstan is known for a unique combination of liberal and protectionist economic policies. Thus, this is the official policy of Shaimiev to stimulate the small business development, which undoubtedly is an important part of the liberal economic agenda. At the same time, however, Tatarstani small and medium enterprises are forced to sell the agreed share of their production to the local economic operators, regardless of better offers from outside of the republic[clvi].

There are several components of Tatarstani practice of economic protectionism. First, President Shaimiev was one of the most ardent opponents of the “shock therapy” and the liberal reforms as exemplified by Gaidar government in 1991-1992. In Shaimiev’s words, “we have chosen the soft-entry path onto the market”[clvii], which brought palpable results for regional high-ups. Those, privatization didn’t allow the most viable industries (oil company “Tatneft’”, “KamAZ” car-building plant and other major enterprises) to get out of control of Tatarstani authorities. Regional elites fend off the local enterprises of the competitors from other regions and apply a variety of administrative measures to oversight the activities of export-oriented enterprises.

The sphere where the state control is especially tight is oil and gas industry. For example, all oil export of Tatarstan goes through “Suvar” company which is empowered to conduct a single economic and financial policy in foreign markets. The government of Tatarstan is empowered to create the “republic’s fund for oil and gas reserves”[clviii]. According to the Presidential decree of March 4, 2000, all oil companies registered in Tatarstan are supposed to sell to the state 25,1% of their shares, the measure that is needed to secure economic interests of the republic. In exchange, the Tatarstani government pledged to render support to the regional oil and gas companies and defend their interests[clix].

Local economist Ilias Ilaldinov argues that economic policies of Tatarstani leaders are modeled after old-style apparatchiks, and are motivated merely by the “instinct of survival”. Should the economic reforms proceed more successfully in Russia, Tatarstan would be economically marginalized due to lack of demarcation line between the property and the power, and heavy reliance on “regional capital”. In fact, Ilaldinov assumes, Tatarstan is building the “Asian-style” economy prone to stagnation[clx].

Among other troubling matters observers have extensively commented on failure of “Tatneft’” to service its international debts, which overwhelmingly was explained by excessive dependence of this oil company on the government policies[clxi]. Foreign investors claimed that the government of Tatarstan misused funds of “Tatneft’”[clxii]. In 1998 Tatarstan failed to return the credit of $ 100 million to ING Barrings, Dutch bank that had credited Tatarstan’s eurobonds project. “The Round Table of Tatarstan”, an association of different political blocks and movements (from communists and social democrats to pro-liberal “Democratic Choice of Russia”), has accused “the clan of Shaimiev” in economic inefficiency and personal enrichment[clxiii]. The on-line Free Lance Bureau agency accuses the “Shaimiev clan” – which includes numerous relatives of the head of republic - in practicing shadow business operations, basically with oil exportation[clxiv]. It also has reported numerous cases of mismanagement of public funds and economic paternalism in the region[clxv].

Second, the economic strategy of Tatarstan is aimed at reliance upon its indigenous resources. Thus, building its own oil refinery was considered as the foremost economic priority[clxvi]. Some experts propose that Tatarstan has to invest resources for producing “peculiar types of goods” (like “Muslim-style” accessories with special design), creating “Tatar-oriented” economic institutions (like Tatar national bank to accumulate the funds of Diaspora) and the “Muslim infrastructure” (including special food stores and medical institutions, etc.)[clxvii]. Presidential decree of March 20, 2001 ruled that the Tatartani Ministry of Mass Communications has to run PR campaign intended to advertise local products and stimulate positive public perceptions of local producers[clxviii]. Some experts deem that Tatarstan’s economic strategy is that one of differentiating from its Russian competitors (Nizhny Novgorod, Ekaterinburg, etc.)[clxix] and basically corresponds to the global “Islam finances” concept[clxx].

Third, another element of Tatarstani economic policy is lobbying in Moscow in favour of tax privileges for those companies that trade in foreign markets[clxxi]. The economic sovereignty of Tatarstan was very much based upon the preferences it obtained from the central government. As far as in 1994 Tatarstan received the right to have at its disposal all excises for alcoholic beverages, 50% of all VAT collected in the republic, and the revenues from oil export to “far abroad” countries (5 million of tons per year)[clxxii].

Fourth, despite widely publicized “economic openness”, Tatarstani legislation contains a number of rather restrictive clauses. Thus, the “Law on Foreign Investments in the Republic of Tatarstan” does not guarantee private investors from nationalization of their properties. The law does not secure investors’ interests in cases of changing the legislation in such areas as defense and national security, public order, export and import of strategically important items, ecology, and anti-trust measures. The State Council is empowered to establish restrictions for foreign capital “in those industries having vital interest for the republic”[clxxiii].

Yet some good changes are nevertheless underway. The first year of Tatarstan’s inclusion to the VFD gave rise to much more liberal approaches in economy. In 2001 address to the State Council President Shaimiev acknowledged that the state regulation of economic activities, with the exception of some monopolies, became obsolete, and in Tatarstan the conditions are ripe for diminishing the state control over economy[clxxiv]. Tatarstan was the home to the first “single window” center for business registration – that one which integrates numerous agencies in charge of issuing business licenses. This “right-on-the-spot” unit is aimed at relieving entrepreneurs from multiple applications to different bureaucratic entities in order to start the business, and diminishing corruption[clxxv].

CONCLUSIONS

Summarizing our research findings, four conclusions have to be drawn. First, Tatarstani aspirations for sovereignty are developed in three basic directions: a) sovereignty is perceived in cultural and spiritual terms, with ethnic identity as a core factor; b) the bid for sovereignty has clear economic and financial background; c) sovereignty is a political strategy based on historical legacies of medieval nationhood of Tatars and its aspirations to build up relations with the federal center on reciprocity and the balance of interests.

Second, the example of Tatarstan shows that there is a positive correlation between internal autonomy and external capacities of the region. Simultaneously it might be assumed that the extent to which an entity is a subject of international political and legal relations is a matter of degree and a function of the totality of region’s international rights, responsibilities, resources, and abilities[clxxvi].

Third, due to Tatarstan policies the new understanding of sovereignty may be born in Russia, that one that recognizes that each sovereignty – be it republic or the federation - has its limitations. Unfortunately, the federal policy in regard to Tatarstan was and still is rather indistinct and ambivalent. Basically what is called “policy” is a set of improvisations and random measures lacking systemic vision of the problem. If the federal center however refuses to stick to self-constraining approach, republics like Tatarstan in the long run would be forced to look for their greater independence[clxxvii].

Fourth, we may conclude that globalization bring not only new opportunities, but also new challenges for Tatarstan. In political terms, Russia’s integration to the international legal system (joining the Council of Europe, for example) has to make obsolete and outdated a variety of procedural norms existing in the republic. Thus, the widely used practice of restricting open political discussions under the guise of “defending the honor and dignity of the President” is in clear conflict with the most recent European Court regulations aimed to prevent any kind of political censorship. Registration restrictions applied to non-Tatarstani media wishing to operate in the republic also contradict to the European Convention on Human Rights and Basic Liberties[clxxviii].

In cultural terms, globalization – with its unification of basic social practices, norms and rules - is also a challenge to ethnic and religious identity, which always claims its exclusive rights, specific needs and peculiar status. This is a contradiction many other multiethnic countries have already experienced[clxxix]. Now it’s Russia’s – and its republics’ - turn to rediscover and adequately react to these challenges.

---

[i] Trenin, Dmitri. The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization. Carnegie Moscow Center, 2001. P. 288.

[ii] Gel’man, Vladimir. Regional Regime Transitions in Russia: Actors, Institutions, and Uncertainty, at <http://geog.arizona.edu/~web/rrwg/democracy.html

[iii] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/publications/khakimov4.htm

[iv] Osobaya zona: vybory v Tatarstane (Special Zone: Elections in Tatarstan). International Human Rights Assembly, Kazan’ branch. Ulianovsk, 2000. P.3-5.

[v] “Strana” Online Information Agency, at http://www.strana.ru/print/989579151.html

[vi] MacAuley, Mary. Russia’s Politics of Uncertainty. Cambridge University Press, 1997. P.83.

[vii] “We Are the Citizens” Online Project, at http://www.citizens.ru/news/archive/2000349-1.html

[viii] „Regiony Rossii“. Information bulletin. Inter-regional Foundation for Presidential Programs. N 7 (27), February 26, 2001. P.9.

[ix] Vasiliev, Alexander. Tatarstan: tretiy srok dlia Shaimieva (Tatarstan: the Third Term for Shaimiev). Rossia i musul’manskiy mir (Russia and the Muslim World). Bulletin N 1 (103), 2001. Moscow: INION. P.15-18.

[x] “Lenta” Online Information Agency, at http://www.lenta.ru, March 23, 2001.

[xi] “Elections in Russia” Web site, at http://www.vybory.ru/journal/journ9/j9arta5.html

[xii] Moscow Public Science Foundation Web site, at http://www.mpsf.org/Pub/Sbornik2/Zaznaev.html

[xiii] “Elections in Russia” Web site, at http://www.vybory.ru/journal/journ9/j9arta7.html

[xiv] Free Lance Bureau Web site, at http://www.flb.ru/pfo/dj24040102.html

[xv] Samara State University Web site, at http://www.ssu.samara.ru/research/philosophy/journal2/8.html

[xvi] Obshiaya gazeta, N 7 (393), February 15-21, 2001. P.3.

[xvii] Amirkhanov, Rashad. “Tatarskaya natsional’naya ideologia: istoria i sovremennost’” (Tatar national ideology: history and modernity). Panorama-Forum, N 1 (4), 1996. P.37.

[xviii] Tuzmukhamedov, Bakhtiar. Territorial’naya avtonomia i prava natsional’nykh men’shinstv: mezhdunarodno-pravovye parametry (Territorial Autonomy and National Minorities Rights as Seen From International Law Perspectives). Panorama-Forum, N 4, 1996. Pp. 32-37.

[xix] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/publications/khakimov3.htm

[xx] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/Publications/khakimov2.htm

[xxi] “Nezavisimaya gazeta“ Web site, at http://regions.ng.ru/printed/far/2000-06-16/2_volga_way.html

[xxii] Amirkhanov, Rashad. Op.cit. P.32.

[xxiii] Pershin, Viktor. Vitse-prezident Iraka posetil Tatarstan (Iraqi Vice President Has Visited Tatarstan). Russian Regional Report. Moscow. East-West Institute, N 9, 2001.

[xxiv] Makarychev, Andrey (ed.). Hard and Soft Security Challenges in the Volga Federal District. Analytical Report. Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University & IREX/Professionals for Cooperation, 2001.

[xxv] “Provintsia” Online Information Agency, at http://www.province.ru/news1.html?454

[xxvi] Zaznaev, Oleg. “Dinamika politicheskogo protsessa v Respublike Tatarstan” (Dynamics of Political Process in Republic of Tatarstan). Vostochnoevropeiskoe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, N 1 (22), 1998. P.81.

[xxvii] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://regions.ng.ru/printed/gubern/2000-06-27/1_guerillas.html

[xxviii] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/append47.html

[xxix] Belaia kniga Tatarstana. Put’ k suverenitetu, 1990-1995 (The White Book of Tatarstan. The Road to Sovereignty, 1990-1995). Panorama-Forum, N 5 (8), 1996. Special Issue. P.12.

[xxx] Ibid. P.15.

[xxxi] Ibid. P.19.

[xxxii] Ibid. P.23.

[xxxiii] Ibid. P.36.

[xxxiv] Ibid. P.61.

[xxxv] Ibid. P.72.

[xxxvi] Ibid. P.39.

[xxxvii] The Constitution of Tatarstan (article 61) identifies this republic as “associated with the Russian Federation” (no mention of being “united”).

[xxxviii] Ibid. Pp.86-90.

[xxxix] Ibid. P.76.

[xl] Ibid. P.78.

[xli] Ibid. P.74.

[xlii] Ibid. P.68.

[xliii] Ibid. Pp.82-84.

[xliv] Walker, Edward. “Sobaka kotoraya ne layala: Tatarstan i asymmetrichniy federalism v Rossii” (The Dog Which Never Barked: Tatarstan and Asymmetrical Federalism in Russia). Panorama-Forum, N 18, 1997-98. P.85-88.

[xlv] Nikravesh, Babak. Quebec and Tatarstan in International Law. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol. 23:1. Winter-Spring 1999. P. 237.

[xlvi] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/konfer1/stoljarov.htm

[xlvii] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://ng.ru/regions/2000-02-15/4_kazan-bral.html

[xlviii] NG - Osobaya papka. N 1, February 27, 2001. P.2.

[xlix] http://www.nns.ru/interv/int1002.html

[l] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://ng.ru/printed/specfile/2001-02-27/10_suverenitet.html

[li] Mukhariamov, Nayl’. “Respublika Tatarstan. Khronika politicheskogo protsessa” (Republic of Tatarstan: Chronicle of Political Process). Occasional Papers on the Elite of the Mid-Volga Ethnic Republics, N 3. Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2000. P.49.

[lii] Human Rights Association Web site, at http://www.hrights.ru/text/b12/Chapter9.htm

[liii] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/seminar1/jagudin.htm

[liv] “Spiritual Heritage” think tank Web site, at http://www.nasledie.ru/oboz/N23_93/23_01.htm

[lv] Ibid.

[lvi] Ibid.

[lvii] Shakhray, Sergey. “Federalism po-kazanski” (Federalism, Kazan’s Way). NG - Osobaya papka, N 1, February 27, 2001. P. 12.

[lviii] Shakhrai, Sergey. Op. cit.

[lix] Ibid.

[lx] Ot konfrontatsii k navedeniu mostov (From confrontation to bridging the gaps). Panorama Forum, 1997, N 15. Special Issue. P.83.

[lxi] Stoliarov, Mikhail. Mezhdunarodnaya deiatel’nost subiektov federatsii: interesy, prava, vozmozhnosti (International activities of the subjects of federation: interests, rights, opportunities). Panorama-Forum, Summer 1997. P.79.

[lxii] Vremia MN”, June 6, 2001.

[lxiii] Volga Federal District Web site, at http://www.pfo.ru/main/news.phtml?id=2743

[lxiv] “Strana” Online Information Agency, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/979550319.html

[lxv] NG-Religii, March 28, 2001. Pp. 1,3.

[lxvi] Nizhny Novgorod Online Information Agency, at http://www.infonet.nnov.ru, May 25, 2001.

[lxvii] “Strana” Online Information Agency, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/991240845.html

[lxviii] Galeev, Marat. Sovremennie tendentsii razvitia federalizma i reformy gosudarstvennoi vlasti v Rossii (Current Trends in Development of Federalism and State Power Reform in Russia), at http://federalmcart.ksu.ru/conference/konfer2/galeev.htm.

[lxix] Yagudin, Shakir. Problemy subsidiarnosti rossiiskogo federalisma na primere Respubliki Tatarstan (The problems of subsidiarity of the Russian federalism: the case of Tatarstan), at <http://federalmcart.ksu.ru/conference/konfer3/jagudin.htm>

[lxx] Ibid, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/990817539.html

[lxxi] Abdrakhmanov, Rafik; Pugachova, Gulsum. Perspektivy federalisma v Rossii (Perspectives of federalism in Russia), at <http://federalmcart.ksu.ru/publications/pugach1.htm>

[lxxii] Ibid, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/976774156.html

[lxxiii] Ibid, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/976303610.html

[lxxiv] Jack, Andrew. Republic brought back into line with Moscow. Financial Times, April 9, 2001. P.VI.

[lxxv] “Strana” Online Information Agency, at http://www.strana.ru/print/989352492.html

[lxxvi] Iskhakov, Damir. Perspektivy federalizma v Rossii: vzgliad iz Tatarstana (Perspectives for Federalism in Russia: an Outlook from Tatarstan), at http://federalmcart.ksu.ru/conference/konfer2/iskhakov.htm.

[lxxvii] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/00001080_c.html

[lxxviii] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/append114.html

[lxxix] „Strana“ Online Information Agency, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/976356253.html

[lxxx] “Regiony Rossii”. Information bulletin. Inter-regional Foundation for Presidential Programs. N 5 (25), February 12, 2001. P.24.

[lxxxi] Russian Regional Report. Moscow: East-West Institute. Vol.3, N 10, May 21, 2001.

[lxxxii] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://regions.ng.ru/printed/gubern/2001-04-24/1_governor.html

[lxxxiii] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://regions.ng.ru/printed/far/2000-10-17/1_tatarstan.html

[lxxxiv] Shaimiev was one of the leading members of “Fatherland - All Russia”, the political alliance shaped in summer 1999 prior to Russia’s parliamentary election. This grouping consisted of other powerful politicians including former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, governor of St. Petersburg Alexander Yakovlev. “Fatherland - All Russia”, in distinctive opposition to Kremlin, had been in the lead till pro-Putin “Unity” party was formed. Yet anti-Kremlin opposition of Mintimir Shaimiev was left with no repercussions from the federal center.

[lxxxv] “Political Comments” Web site, at http://www.politcom.ru/p_pr.html

[lxxxvi] Commission on Spatial Development of the Volga Federal District Web site, at http://okrug.metod.ru/books/ppp/Arhiv/1year/Kir28.02.2001/getindex

[lxxxvii] Volga Federal District Web site, at http://www.pfo.ru/main/news.phtml?id=2749

[lxxxviii] “Regiony Rossii”. N 11 (31), March 26, 2001. P.37.

[lxxxix] “Regiony Rossii”. N 8 (28), March 5, 2001. P.30.

[xc] “Regiony Rossii”. N 12 (32), April 2, 2001. P.28.

[xci] Volga Federal District Official Web site, at http://www.pfo.ru/main/news.phtml?id=2605

[xcii] “Regions.ru” Online Information Agency, at http://www.regions.ru/news/176552.html

[xciii] Pustogarov, Vladimir. Gosudarstvenniy suverenitet i mezhdunarodnoe pravo (State Sovereignty and International Law). Panorama – Forum, N 1 (14), 1996. Pp. 45-47.

[xciv] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/seminar1/sakhieva.htm

[xcv] “Dogovor o druzhbe i sotrudnichestve mezhdu Respublikoi Tatarstan i Respublikoi Abkhazia” (Treaty on Friendship & Cooperation between Tatarstan and Abkhazia). Panorama-Forum, N 1 (4), 1996. Pp.116-119.

[xcvi] As presented in: Rafael Khakim. Rossia i Tatarstan u istoricheskogo perekriostka (Russia and Tatarstan at the Historical Crossroads). Panorama Forum, 1997, N 1.

[xcvii] Khakim, Rafael. Rossia i Tatarstan: u istoricheskogo perekriostka (Russia and Tatarstan at the historical crossroads). Panorama-Forum, Summer 1997. P.43.

[xcviii] Iskhakov, Damir. Model’ Tatarstana: za i protiv (Tatarstan’s Model: Pros and Cons). Panorama-Forum, N 2, 1995. P.66.

[xcix] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/00001062.html

[c] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/00001071.html

[ci] “Regiony Rossii”. N 23 (3), January 29, 2001. P.35.

[cii] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/00000058.html

[ciii] Bulatov, Rashid. Gumanitarnaya deiatel’nost Respubliki Tatarstan v Severo-Kavkazskom regione (Humanitarian Activities of Tatarstan in the Northern Caucasus). Panorama-Forum, Summer 1997. Pp. 116-120.

[civ] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/00001075.html

[cv] Nikravesh, op.cit. P.247

[cvi] Mezhdunarodniy opyt uregulirovania etno-politicheskikh konfliktov (International Experience of Resolving Ethno-Political Conflicts). Kazan, 1996.

[cvii] Petro, Nicolai, and Robertson, Lawrence. Issues of Culture and Identity: “Cultural Entrepreneurship” in Russia’s Regions. At http://climate.geor.arizona.edu%7Eweb/rrwg/culture.html.

[cviii] Magomedov, Arbakhan. Regional Ideologies in the Context of International Relations. Paper presented at the Conference on “Russian Regions in International Security Environment”. Zurich: Center for Security Studies & Conflict Research, July 6-7, 2001.

[cix] Kassianova, Alla. Identity in International Relations. Available at http://www.ir-online.org.

[cx] Drobizheva, Leokadia. “Comparison of Elite Groups in Tatarstan, Sakha, Magadan and Orenburg”. Post-Soviet Affairs, N 15, 1999. P.393.

[cxi] According to 2001 data, there are 804 mosques and only 144 Orthodox churches in Tatarstan.

[cxii] The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation. A Guide to Politics, Policies, and Leaders. Ed. by Robert W. Orttung, East-West Institute. M.E.Sharpe: Armonk, New York, and London, England, 2000. P.541.

[cxiii] Omsk State University Web site, at http://www.ic.omskreg.ru/~cultsib/reg/tishkov.htm

[cxiv] Akhmirova, Rimma. “Tvoya moya ne ponimay” (I Don’t Understand You). Komsomol’skaya pravda, October 19, 2000. P.7.

[cxv] Khasanova, Gulnara. “Latinskiy alfavit - tataram” (Latin Alphabet for Tatars). NG - Osobaya papka, N 1, February 27, 2001. P.6.

[cxvi] Commission on Spatial Development of the Volga Federal District Web site, at http://ekg.metod.ru/pub/inoe-2001-tishkov-prn.html

[cxvii] Ibid, at http://ekg.metod.ru/pub/inoe-2001-gub-prn.html

[cxviii] Khakim, Rafael. “Istoria tatar i Tatarstana” (The History of Tatars and Tatarstan). Panorama Forum, N 19, 1999. Special Issue.

[cxix] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://ng.ru/printed/specfile/2001-02-27/9_people.html

[cxx] “Gazeta.ru” Online Information Agency Web site, at http://www.gazeta.ru/print/2001/06/05/tatarytrebuu.shtml

[cxxi] Magomedov, Arbakhan. Misteria regionalizma (Mistery of Regionalism). Moscow: MONF Scholarly Papers N 114, 2000.

[cxxii] Khakim, Rafael. Rossia i Tatarstan: u istoricheskogo perekriostka (Russia and Tatarstan at the Historical Crossroads). Panorama Forum, Spring 1997. N 11. P.35.

[cxxiii] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/seminar3/drobizheva.htn

[cxxiv] Safronov, Sergei. “Islam: poiski organizatsionnykh form i mesta v politicheskoi zhizni” (Islam in Search of Organizational Forms and Its Place in Political Life), in Russian Regions in 1998: An Annual Supplement to Russia’s Political Almanac. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999. P.131.

[cxxv] Carnegie Endowment Web site, at http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1999/08np/11.asp

[cxxvi] Islamskiy faktor (Islamic factor). Vmeste, N 1, 2000. P.10.

[cxxvii] The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict, ed. By John Coakley. Frank Cass, London, 1993, p.8

[cxxviii] Lehmann, Susan Goodrich. “Islam and Ethnicity in the Republics of Russia”. Post-Soviet Affairs, 1997, N 13. P.100.

[cxxix] Mukhametshin, Rafik. Islam v obshestvenno-politicheskoi zhizni Tatarstana (Islam in social and political life of Tatarstan), in Etnichnost’ i konfessional’naya traditsia v Volgo-Ural’skom regione Rossii (Ethnicity and confessional tradition in Volga & Urals region of Russia). Moscow Carnegie Center, 1998. P.26.

[cxxx] NG - Osobaya papka, N 1, February 27, 2001. P.10.

[cxxxi] “Nezavisimaya gazeta” Web site, at http://www. ng.ru/printed/specfile/2001-01-27/10_fenomen.html

[cxxxii] “Druzhba narodov” Journal, at http://my.infoart.ru/magazine/druzhba/n8-98/voron.htm

[cxxxiii] Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz. “Chechnya Versus Tatarstan. Understanding Ethnopolitics in Post-Communist Russia”. Problems of Post-Communism. Vol. 47, N 2, March - April 2000. P. 13-22.

[cxxxiv] Socio-Economic Background of Ethno-Political Processes in the Russian Federation. Conflict - Dialogue - Cooperation. Bulletin N 5, September - November 2000. Moscow, International Center for Strategic & Political Studies. P.66.

[cxxxv] Carnegie Endowment Web site, at http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/2000/10am/04ld.asp

[cxxxvi] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/seminar3/musina.htm

[cxxxvii] Karush, Sarah. The Road Less Traveled . The Russia Business Review, November 1999

[cxxxviii] Expert, № 39, October 19, 1998

[cxxxix] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/append24.html

[cxl] Ibid, at http://www.tatar.ru/append110.html

[cxli] “Respublika Tatarstan glazami zarubezhnogo investora” (Republic of Tatarstan as Viewed by Foreign Investor). Panorama Forum, N 2 (50), 1996. P.53.

[cxlii] „Birzha“ Weekly Web site, at http://www.birzhaplus.sandy.ru/birzha/2.htm

[cxliii] „Strana“ Online Information Agency, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/985090520.html

[cxliv] „Strana“ Online Information Agency, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/984997290.html

[cxlv] Ibid, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/993625932.html

[cxlvi] Ibid, at http://volga.strana.ru/print/990517733.html

[cxlvii] Galeev, Marat. K osnovam razvitia vneshneekonomicheskikh i vneshnepoliticheskikh sviazei Tatarstana (On the foundations of foreign economic and political relations of Tatarstan). Panorama Forum, 1996. N 2. P.19.

[cxlviii] The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation. A Guide to Politics, Policies, and Leaders. Ed. by Robert W. Orttung, East-West Institute. M.E.Sharpe, Armonk, New York, and London, England, 2000. Pp.540-546.

[cxlix] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/seminar1/galeev.htm

[cl] Iskhakov, Damir. Op.cit. P.62.

[cli] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/seminar2/malgin.htm

[clii] Respublika Tatarstan glazami zarubezhnogo investora (Republic of Tatarstan in the Eyes of Foreign Investor). Panorama Forum, Summer 1997. P.91.

[cliii] “Future of Federalism in Russia”. Research Project Web site, at http://federalism.soros.ksu.ru/conference/seminar2/kashbraziev.htm

[cliv] Ibid.

[clv] The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation…

[clvi] “Strana” Online Information Agency, at http://www.volga.strana.ru/print/991907994.html

[clvii] Shchedrin, Vladimir. Tatarstan Waits for Real Federalism. Business in Russia, N 81, September 1997. P.18.

[clviii] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/append26.html

[clix] Ibid, at http://www.tatar.ru/append140_i.html

[clx] Ilildinov, Ilias. Ekonomicheskaya reforma v Tatarstane: tretiy put’? (Economic reform in Tatarstan: the Third Way?). Panorama-Forum, Summer 1997. Pp. 102-108.

[clxi] Carnegie Endowment Web site, at http://pubs.cargegie.ru/books/1999/08np/21.asp

[clxii] Susarov, Andrei. “Tatarstan v 1998”, in Russian Regions in 1998: An Annual Supplement to Russia’s Political Almanac. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999. P.253.

[clxiii] “Political Information Agency” Web site, at http://www.apn.ru/documents/2000/02/15/20000215191132.htm

[clxiv] Free Lance Bureau Web site, at http://www.flb.ru/rs0053.html

[clxv] Ibid, at http://www.flb.ru/pfo/dj240440104.html

[clxvi] Akhmadulina, Alena. Zhelezniy Babai (Babai the Iron). Profil’, March 19, 2001. Pp.58-61.

[clxvii] Iskhakov, Damir. Op.cit. P.62.

[clxviii] Tatarstan government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/append140_c.html

[clxix] Respublika Tatarstan glazami zarubezhnogo investora (Republic of Tatarstan in the Eyes of Foreign Investor). Panorama Forum, 1996, N 4. P.62.

[clxx] Commission on the Spatial Development of the Volga Federal District Web site, at http://okrug.metod.ru/books/islam/IslFin/getindex

[clxxi] National News Service Web site, at http://www.nns.ru/regiony/tatarst2.html

[clxxii] Akhmetov, R.G. KamAZ – uzel protivorechiy mezhdu Moskvoi i Kazaniu (KamAZ, the knot of contraversies between Moscow and Kazan’), in Asimmetrichnaya federatsia: vzgliad iz tsentra, respublik i oblastei (Asymmetrical federation: outlook from the center, republics and oblasts). Edited by L.M.Drobizheva. Moscow: Institute of Sociology, 1998. P.91.

[clxxiii] Tatarstan Government Web site, at http://www.tatar.ru/append22.html

[clxxiv] Koval’skaya, Galina. Slabost’ sil’noi vlasti (The weakness of strong power). Itogi, March 27, 2001. Pp.18-19.

[clxxv] Center for Strategic Research Web site, at http://www.csr.ru/about-publications/14.04.2001-segg.html

[clxxvi] Nikravesh, op.cit. Pp. 250-251.

[clxxvii] Ot konfrontatsii k navedeniu mostov (From confrontation to bridging the gaps). Panorama-Forum, Special Issue. 1997, N 15. Pp.21-22.

[clxxviii] Faculty of Journalism, Moscow State University, Web site, at http://www.medialaw.ru/publications/books/voinov/03.html

[clxxix] Dakhin, Andrey. Regional’naya stratifikatsia i territorial’naya tselostnost: poisk formuly novogo mirovogo poriadka (Regional Stratification and Territorial Integrity: In Search of the Formulae for New World Order), in Comparative Regionalism: Russia – CIS – the West. Proceedings of International Research Project. Edited by Andrey Makarychev. INTAS, Nizhny Novgorod State University, 1997. Pp.209-225.