GLOBALIZATION AS INTELLECTUAL PUZZLE:

RUSSIAN ELITES’ DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES

Andrey S.Makarychev

Professor, Department of International Relations and Politics,

Linguistic University of Nizhny Novgorod

Introduction

The general confusion over globalization challenges which Russia has to face was best expressed by Sergey Karaganov’s confession that it is very much unclear what Russia has to do about globalization[i]. Russian elites’ perception of globalization is a mix of resistance and adaptation, archaic phobias and newly emerging utilitarian approaches. The whole issue of dealing with the global world is the battlefield between different domestic platforms which are to be analyzed in this paper. This uncertainty and conflictuality brings us to studying intellectual dimension of globalization. What matter under this viewpoint are different ideas, concepts, approaches, worldviews – all what forms country’s intellectual capital.

Yet the space of Russian political discourse is very much fragmented. On the one hand, it still bears the legacy of great power heritage. Very frequently, as soon as Moscow elites start to speak about globalization, the main issues to arise are NATO enlargement, US-Russian relations, geopolitics, disarmament and other security matters being traditionally parts of diplomatic and “high” foreign policy discourse. This trend – obviously inherited from the Soviet past - was clearly discernable in major projects aimed at analyzing the globalization paradigm for Russia and implemented by two Moscow-based think tanks – Gorbachov Foundation and the Council on Foreign & Defense Policy. Clearly missing in those and other endeavors were domestic dimensions of Russia’s transformation which are usually discussed separately of globalization paradigm.

On the other hand, there is another tendency – significant part of Russian political discourse in 1990s became ostensibly inward-oriented, focusing on domestic actors and their intrinsic interests at sub-national level. This gave birth to mushrooming regionalist studies all across Russia.

What is obviously missing is analysis of global changes through the prism of major domestic opinion makers. In our view, globalization in Russia has to be primarily discussed among its own home actors, both federal and regional. “Mediascapes” and “ideascapes” are among those notions that identify the loci and foci of the process of intellectual thinking about globalization, including changing attitudes to information, appearance of new lifestyles, cultural codes and meanings, etc. Global themes – unfamiliar to most of Russian intelligentsia only a decade ago - are being emerging in domestic political discourse, and new forms of communication among writers and students of world politics have unfold[ii]. All these new phenomena in Russia’s intellectual life might eventually pave the way to creation of new set of rules, norms and principles that might constitute the institutional foundation for country’s acceptance of basic logic of globalization.

1. Globalization as Russia’s Domestic Problem: Federal Perspectives

1.1. Globalizers

There is a fertile ground for pro-globalist discourse in Russian academic milieu, since the biggest part of major think tanks and public policy research institutions are either sponsored by Western grant making institutions, or participate in international research projects based on distance networking, sharing of ideas and intellectual capital throughout the borders.

Universities and Academia possess their own resource base for going global. Firstly, many Universities are islands of free political discourse and agents of liberal thinking. “Even in a republic where an authoritarian situation flourishes, where in essence a regime of dictatorial power has been established, we speak openly about those things that are happening in the republic as well”, says Dr. Midhat Faroukshin from Tatarstan[iii]. This makes Universities very important actors in Russian politico-academic complex. As Raymond Struyk pointed out, their goals extend well beyond those of a conventional educational institute; “these organizations often wish to become actively involved in policy prescription and in program implementation and evaluation”[iv].

Second, Universities are gateways to the cyberworld. The Open Society Institute paid for establishing 33 Internet centers in non-central Universities all across Russia.

Third, cooperation with foreign partners makes Russian Universities and research centers more independent – from Ministries and public authorities – in financial terms owing to grants and technical resources. From 1999 the Soros Foundation runs “Megaproject” which lays the basis for networking liaisons between leading Moscow Universities and their regional partners. In 2000 the Carnegie Corporation of New York launched a similar program for establishing Centers for Advanced Study & Education in several non-central universities (Tomsk, Voronezh and Ekaterinburg) to develop a network of scholars beyond the main academic hubs of Moscow and St Petersburg[v].

All these efforts are undoubtedly geared towards integration of Russian Universities and think tanks into the international academic community, and forming a new generation of Russian political and intellectual leaders with a sense of strategy for global development. Raymond Struyk reported that Russian public policy research institutions are the largest in Eastern Europe and are growing the most in terms of staff size and budgets[vi].

No wonder that Russian globalists in general are very much in favor of Western version of globalization, with networking relations and changing roles of the state in its core. Globalists argue that globalization undermines the “island conscience” (Viktor Kuvaldin’s wording) which is one of preconditions for Russia’s abandonment of the Communist legacies.

Sergey Markov, Executive Director of Moscow-based Association of Centers for Political Consulting, shares the idea of impetuously unfolding “common humankind”, and even “world government” consisting of the web of international financial institutions, supra-national organizations and some national governments[vii]. Hence, if Russia wants to plug into the global world, it has to start with making the internationally dominant norms a part of its internal development. Dmitri Trenin suggests that globalization for Russia means “building Europe” within its own border. There is no longer an option of withdrawing into “Eurasia”, he suggests[viii]. The same approach is shared by Alexei Podberiozkin, the head of left-oriented “Spiritual Heritage” think tank, who suggested that Russia has to learn how to gradually incorporate the core elements of globalization into the everyday life of people[ix].

Amongst globalists, economic arguments are widely used as well. Ernest Kochetov deems that globalization has to be perceived in terms of growing geoeconomic and geofinancial interdependencies. “Infatuation with geopolitics”, in his opinion, has to be terminated for the sake of future development. Thus, Russia has to learn how to use geoeconomic instruments to find its appropriate place in the world increasingly shaped by emerging “ethno-economic systems” each based on specific set of values, cultural norms and principles of existence (Euro-Atlantic, Islamic, Slavic, Finno-Ugrian and other “systems”)[x]. In this sense, building the global world is very competitive and demanding enterprise, with economic, cultural and administrative borders being increasingly distancing from each other. In search for its geoeconomic niche, Russia has to be ready to repulse its opponents and rivals. To strengthen country’s geoeconomic potential, the government has to give special treatment to Russian trans-national companies, which are considered to be Russia’s vehicles to the global world. At the same time, many experts suggest that these are the non-state (intellectual and human capital) resources which are the main Russian assets for survival in the era of globalization[xi].

Thus, Russian supporters of globalization – unlike many of their counter-parts in the West – treat it basically as a “promise”, not as a definite result. They deem that the world is still very much fragmented (socially, culturally, politically, and economically), and world-scale factors are not prevailing over local ones. Partitions between world actors (both states and non-state agents) are not being destroyed but modified. Globalization and its economic foundation - post-industrialism - are explained by Mikhail Ilyin and Vladislav Inozemtsev as a culmination of modernity, and not as its negation[xii].

At the same time, there is a recognition that globalization might be reversed. In this sense, it is not an automatic, “objective” and politically neutral movement. Rather it is man-made and dependent on people’s interests and resources to be invested in it. The pro-globalization elites in many countries (including Russia) have to face the challenge of “inimical to progress majority”[xiii].

Yet there is a deep perceptional split among globalists in Russia. One part of them, the optimists, do believe – like Ernest Kochetov does – that Russia has all prerequisites and chances to become one of the pivotal centers of global world and even offer a new civilizational and developmental model. Russian globalists are not inclined to equate globalization with Westernization, and do not seem to believe that the West has at its disposal the most adequate answers to the most acute developmental challenges. They overwhelmingly are in favor of further democratization of international relations to include a greater variety of decision makers.

Others are much more skeptical about Russia’s might and power. Globalists do admit that Russian economy is not ready to meet the competition challenges, except for several industrial sectors (armaments, food and mineral resources). Hopes for large-scale foreign investments in Russia in 1990s have also eventually faded[xiv], which undermined some of initial illusions about the fruits of globalization. Yet even harsher appraisals are being heard. Vladislav Inozemtsev, for example, argues that “Russia has definitely missed its chance to join the group of post-industrial leaders”[xv]. The same view is shared by Valentina Fedotova who deems that Russia keeps staying beyond the global world, and lacks any chances to enter post-industrial phase[xvi]. Interestingly enough, such gloomy perspectives do not push these intellectuals to the camp of anti-globalists – they still are very much positive about globalization although if it does not bring palpable fruits for Russia in particular, at least not for the current generation.

1.2. Alarmists

Opponents of globalization stick to quite different approaches. As Professor Valentin Bazhanov depicts their convictions, “the belief in uniqueness of Russia pushes the country to the periphery of the world process. The idols of the past tend to revive and block the boundary between Russia and outer world”[xvii]. Lack of conceptual clarity leads to futile attempts to “achieve unachievable”: both “protect Russian producers” and “attract foreign capital”.

The strongest group among Russia’s anti-globalist/alarmist coalition is intellectual stream called “Euroasianism”. This agglomeration politically teams up with a wide range of Russian patriots and nationalists (from Alexander Barkashov to Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady Ziuganov). All of them take it for granted that globalization is widely used by foreign countries to impose their domination over Russia. For instance, Sergey Romanov, Moscow diplomatic officer, argues that countries bordering with Russia are a potential threat to Russia’s “national interests”, eager to apply propaganda tools, increase their “unproportional presence in certain spheres”, skip the federal and local regulations, and even change the ethno-demographic balance in Russia’s border regions[xviii]. Sergei Kortunov, Rustem Nureev and others posit that Russia is the opponent of the West in global development matters, and is not supposed to copy Western developmental standards[xix].

Alarmists usually start with pointing to the deficiencies of the current world order. As a rule, among their strongest arguments are:

¨ inefficiency of global financial organizations in dealing with developing and underdeveloped nations. Some are convinced that international financial architecture is obsolete and inadequate, if not corrupted, and is doomed to failure;

¨ lack of due transparency in IMF and World Bank dealings with Russia;

¨ fruitlessness of the Western policies in Iraq, the Balkans and Afghanistan[xx].

By the same token, the Russian version of anti-globalism contains a number of other highly dubious assumptions as well:

v Partly, anti-globalization pathos stems from misunderstanding and misreading of the basic world trends. Thus, left-minded economist Sergey Glaziev builds his concept on presumption that all over the world the state is becoming economically stronger and more dominating. Based on this highly disputable point, he denies in principle the feasibility of such ideas as economic freedom, liberalism, and deregulation. In his opinion, these are basically the criminals who want the state to give up some of its functions[xxi]. Another misperception is that globalization is conducive to “complete disarmament”, as suggested by economist Nikolay Shmeliov[xxii].

v Another widely used point is that globalization is exclusively elite-driven process (Alexander Panarin). For the elites of post-industrial countries, globalization is a means of getting out of the control of national constituencies and forming its trans-national “exclusive club” of top-level decision makers[xxiii]. Others use much tougher wording to characterize the globalization agents – like “clan-like system”, intrinsically aggressive and alien to Russia[xxiv]. Hence, the critics presume, globalization undermines the foundations for people’s sovereignty and democracy – the thesis which is also very popular among Western anti-globalists[xxv]. In their circles, globalization is equated with growing concentration of the world power and increasing possibilities to control the human lives[xxvi]. Many Russian policy analysts believe that globalization inhibits grass roots activity through “implantation” of certain political choices into mass conscience. One of them, Stepan Sulakshin, assures that because of globalization Russia is being ruled by international organizations through sophisticated financial machinery[xxvii].

v Russian anti-global isolationists – basically those standing on cultural positions – deem that globalization brings moral and mental slavery, and has to be fended off. Thus, Boris Erasov, senior researcher at the Institute for Oriental Studies, argues that the general impact of the Western civilization’s standards upon non-Western countries is detrimental[xxviii]. Most of Russian Orthodox church thinkers tend to believe that globalization is incompatible with Russia’s traditional religious mentality.

v A number of authors of the so called national patriotic stream (for example, Alexander Zinoviev, Vadim Kozhinov and some others) equate globalization with “information totalitarianism”[xxix]. Those adhered to “Eurasianist” ideology think that the globalization is inevitably conducive to the appearance of the “world government” to establish complete control over the citizens (as a confirmation of these intents, the introduction of individual taxpayer number is frequently referred to)[xxx]. This reaction reveals Russian “fundamentalists”’ deep fear of new external influences that lead to greater accountability and transparency[xxxi]. Nevertheless, their positions are rather strong not only in religious circles but in the academic community as well[xxxii]. An important part of alarmist discourse posits that globalization leads to growing religious solidarity which might be detrimental for Russia (alleged “Afghanistan – Chechnia – Kosovo” linkage[xxxiii]).

v Some thinkers suppose that globalization will open up Russian industries and regions to the foreign capital which is eager to establish its protectorate or economic dominance over the country[xxxiv]. Seen through this angle, globalization is associated not with interdependency, but mainly with growing social and economic differentiation of the regions (both sub-national and supra-national). “Open society” ideas, according to this logic, is a tool for opening up domestic markets for much stronger and more experienced international competitors[xxxv]. There is a wide spread fear – overwhelmingly unsubstantiated – that Russia’s entry into WTO might lead to further discrimination of Russian producers and speed up bankruptcies of Russian enterprises due to foreign capital accession to the Russian market. The verdict is that globalization is an impediment for Russian economic recovery[xxxvi]. As an alternative to globalization, which offers no perspectives for Russia, Mikhail Deliagin proposes to foster regional integration (probably within CIS framework)[xxxvii].

The general idea of all alarmists is that Russia needs a strong protection against globalization[xxxviii]. What is common for alarmists and isolationists is their deeply rooted disbelieve in adaptive possibilities of Russia as a perspective part of the global world. Alarmists share unjustified and even dangerous idea of Russia’s perennial “peculiarity” (usually an euphemism for backwardness and inability to openly compete internationally)[xxxix]. In fact, what they propose is the conservation of weakness under the multiple guises of “stability”, “national security imperatives”, or “defense of national producers”. For example, the adaptation of the international accounting standards, the precondition to Russia’s entry into WTO, is absolutely indispensable for fighting the corruption. Those arguing against this measure, in fact impede anti-corruption initiatives[xl].

What is also peculiar for all anti-globalists is that they feel comfortable to believe that the process of globalization is well designed and manageable, which of course is far from being true. Russia’s resistance to globalization is treated as a battle against “new totalitarianism” exemplified by Western bankers, media barons, and the world oligarchy. In order to resist to these “evils”, Russia, according to these views, needs to be a well integrated state (may be even a unitary one), based on economic self-sufficiency, protectionism, tremendous military power and indigenous state ideology.

One of the weakest points in anti-globalists argumentation is their thesis that the real centers of decision making for Russia are to be found not within Russian ruling circles but mainly abroad. This misperception becomes even more obvious in the light of the failure of Western powers’ attempts to secure Russian transition and assist with building up workable and transparent democratic institutions. Seen through the prism of the wars in Chechnia and former Yugoslavia, it is hard to disagree that the Western countries have only a partial influence over Russia’s foreign and security policies, and even a more limited impact over Russian domestic policies.

To sum up, Russian anti-globalization is fueled by anti-Western sentiments, yet it does not produce a counter-version of globalization (as Islam, for example, does). Anti-globalists in Russia also lack organizational coherency and international networking relations.

1.3. Alarmists vs Globalists

The tug-of-war between globalists and alarmists could be well scrutinized not only in the ideological area, but also in the field of federal policies. For example, “The Concept of Information Society Formation in Russia” adopted by the State Informatization Commission in May 1999, contains a number of outdated statements matching very much with the alarmist ideology[xli], while the “Electronic Russia” 2002-2010 Federal Targeted Program proposed by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (chaired by German Gref) in 2001 is based on much more liberal background[xlii].

*“The Concept of Information Society Formation in Russia”*	*“Electronic Russia” 2002-2010 Federal targeted program*
Information society building is a political task which has to be solved by political means (consolidation of the nation and countering destructive influences from abroad)	Information society building is a technical project that has to be implemented by programmic means
The state keeps the leading role in information society building, and is financially in charge of it	The state is unready to apply effective technologies of information management, and has to share responsibilities with non-state operators
The greatest challenge for emerging Russian information society is “English-speaking cultural expansion” animated by US	The greatest challenge is restrictive and repressive approach to information society agents from the part of the government bureaucracy
Information society is a tool to boost the search for “strong national identity”, which necessitates “wide propaganda efforts” and concerted efforts to “shape the image of the information society citizen”	The state has to liberalize the information distribution legislation to guarantee free access to unclassified information and get rid of unjustified barriers in creation and usage of data
Russia has to focus on “pure Russian criteria” of information society, and primarily take care of its moral and spiritual dimensions	The main task is to make Russia’s information actors and products competitive in the world markets
The state has to explain the necessity of information management to the civil society institutions.	The government has to rediscover and apply those information society techniques that are being successfully implemented by non-state economic and social units
Russia has enough well qualified specialists for constructing the information society	Russia has to invest greater resources in training professionals in information technologies

Thus, “Electronic Russia” program seems to be much more adequate response to the challenges of globalization than the Information Security Concept. The problem is however that several ministries and governmental agencies might start fighting for supervising its implementation, which elevates the issue of coordination at the very top of the government agenda[xliii].

1.4. Accommodation to Globalization: Russian Way

Globalization, according to those sharing the compromising (“middle-of-the-road”) positions, is objective process Russia has to live with. In Andronik Migranian’s words, there are no pure isolationists nowadays in Russia, except for political marginals. The problem is in which capacity Russia is going to joint the global drive – either as a mere territory, or as global actor/subject capable to influence the whole process[xliv].

It is well understood in Russia that the world is far from being integrated, and that globalization makes the nations to group around the strongest economic and political actors[xlv]. As in case of any complex process, some countries are eager to take the lead and pioneer in global development. Yet globalization actors, according to the group of “accommodationists” (“pragmatics”), should take into account non-Western forms of political regimes and should not be equated exclusively with the Western-style liberalism[xlvi].

“Pragmatics” are certain that tragic events in USA of September 11, 2001 and in its aftermath manifest the crisis of current model of globalization as exemplified by Western countries leadership. This is both conceptual and managerial crisis which necessitates more efficient institutional tools for global development and better dealing with deep value cleavages existing in the world.

Russian “pragmatics” community offers two ways out of this debacle. The first option is reforming and reshaping the current model of globalization. This scenario is manifested in Russia’s project of multi-polar globalization which has to be based on equality of civilizations, negation of the linear (Fukuyama-style) approach to the social progress, support of those international institutions that defend local interests, etc.[xlvii] An important part of this reasoning is that Russia has to work hard for recreate its own “pole” of geopolitical gravitation and its zone of world influence[xlviii]. There is a wide spread conviction in Russia that being a part of the global world, Russia should insist on keeping highest respect to the national sovereignties and interests which have to remain the cornerstones of the global system of international relations. An awful alternative to state-dominated system is the world of “emancipated social chaos, unfreezing of the world underground and its confluence with ‘failed states’ and ‘pirate republics’”[xlix].

The second variant which is widely debated is that Russia has to advance its own, alternative to the West, model of globalization. It has to be based on spirituality and culture[l], and thus needs to rediscover its “national idea”. Socialists and social democrats (including Mikhail Gorbachov) are trying to conceptually elaborate on the project of “socialist”, “left-oriented” globalization, that one to challenge neoliberal assumptions of modern capitalism[li].

However the problem is that all ideological alternatives to the “Western globalization” which are advanced by Russian protagonists are very uncertain and highly questionable. It is hard to expect, taking into account deep value crisis in Russian society and widely spread feelings of social anomia and frustration, that Russia might in the foreseeable future offer new cultural and moral patterns of global scope. The same goes for Russia’s doubtful chances to become a leader in what is called “post-material” and “post-economic” developmental models: both of them are conceptually based on prioritizing human capital, which has never been Russia’s strong asset due to its collectivist mentality and long traditions of paternalism.

2. Globalization and Regional Discourses

At the regional level, reaction to globalization is also a mix of old-style protectionist approaches and new “market instincts”. Regions’ reactions to globalization are overwhelmingly issue-oriented, leaving much less room for ideologies and much more space for pragmatism in tackling the global scope matters.

2.1. Regions’ gains of introducing the global practices

The general trend is that sub-national institutions are actively looking for some kind of adaptation to the forthcoming epoch of globalization. In some cities (like St.Petersburg) strong positions hold adherents of rediscovering and boosting the intellectual and cultural potential for becoming a full-fledged part of what could metaphorically be called the global village[lii].

In economic terms, the regional elites are overwhelmingly, at the one hand, rather cautious to perspectives of opening up the domestic market for international competition. But at the other hand, the bulk of them do understand that isolationism offers no solution. In Kakha Bendukizde’s indicative words, the Russian car making industry that has managed to defend their market by high tariffs is one of the least reformed industrial sectors in Russia, with high corruption and low productivity[liii]. To attract foreign business, many regional authorities welcome international participation in investment policies research (St.Petersburg and Leningrad oblast)[liv], fostering inter-cultural and inter-ethnic communication (Buriatia[lv], Tatarstan), and other projects.

The good news is that the regions seem to understand – unlike some of the federal center institutions – that the super-power ambitions might easily spoil investment climate[lvi]. There are many success stories of the regional enterprises taking advantages of the globalization opportunities. For example, this were foreign consultancy companies that have managed to drastically raise the quality standards in “Shatura” furniture company at Moscow oblast[lvii]. For Gorky railway company, cooperation with the Western partners has opened new markets for its state-of-the-art models of providing trains’ technical security[lviii].

Regions are usually pragmatically oriented to solve their specific economic problems through internationalization[lix]. What the regions propose is to use contacts with IMF, WTO and other global institutions for the sake of Russian economy. They recognize that in order to be competitive in the global world, Russian business projects have to become more efficient and dynamic[lx]. Alexei Likhachov from Nizhny Novgorod, the deputy chairman of the State Duma’s Expert Committee on WTO, treats WTO issue as a purely economic one, which might strengthen Russia’s international credentials in finances, industry and business matters[lxi]. Among the issues to be negotiated between the federal government and WTO four are most sensitive for the regions: import taxes, financing of agriculture, share of foreign companies in Russian transportation market, and harmonizing trade legislation[lxii].

2.2. What impedes globalization in the regions

What might be more important is to take a look at the problems and try to explain resistance to globalization at sub-national levels. The first problem for the regions is mismanagement of Western technical assistance programs. Thus, the regional parliament in Novosibirsk oblast had accused the region’s government in misuse of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loan, and suggested to stop taking such loans in the future[lxiii].

Secondly, some of the regional economic actors treat globalization as a means of extracting additional funds from foreign partners. This was the case of Gus’-Khrustal’nii glass factory in Vladimir oblast which has arbitrarily revised the agreement with the US investors to increase the leasing fees[lxiv].

Thirdly, many Russian enterprises are unable to get access to foreign markets because their products are not adequately certified or because they fail to provide adequate information about their operations and finances. This creates a false impression of “isolation” from the world mainstream, and provokes anti-globalization reactions. In Sergey Kirienko’s words, “free market competition is good for domestic operations”, not for international ones[lxv]. For example, the local car makers (GAZ, AvtoVAZ, UAZ) in alliance with some of the governors (that ones of Nizhny Novgorod and Samara oblasts) and the federal district authorities (Sergei Kirienko) have managed to make the federal government to raise the customs tariffs for second hand foreign cars[lxvi]. This decision was taken in defiance to public opinion polls that clearly demonstrate that 80 per cent of “Volga” cars consumers are unsatisfied with its quality[lxvii]. Another controversy is that creating exceptional conditions for a specific industry did not make WTO authorities happier, since other sectors might wish to extend this practice, which would certainly make the whole economic policy of Russia less compatible with the international standards. This case is a good illustration of the fact that ideas do matter and change the policy making milieu.

Fourthly, some parts of the regional business communities are afraid that entry of the foreign companies into the Russian markets will disadvantage and marginalize local producers. Alexander Kuznetsov, the owner of “Elektronika” chain of department stores in Nizhny Novgorod, has complained that foreign competitors are able to sell their merchandise with 5-10% discount, which damages local business[lxviii]. In the insurance business as well there are fears of “intrusion” of foreign competitors into regional markets[lxix].

The fifth problem is relations with the federal authorities. The regional actors try to make their voices heard in the federal center – with mixed results however. Regional metal makers, for example, have complained that the central government does not take into account their interests to get better trade agreement with the United States to provide better access to the steel producers to the American market[lxx].

The governors repeatedly complain that the federal center impedes region’s international projects. Thus, Igor Farkhutdinov, chief executive of Sakhalin, has confessed that “Sakhalin-1” and “”Sakhailn-2” projects were not applauded in Moscow. In his words, for Far East provinces to become an integral part of Asia Pacific economic milieu, the national foreign economic legislation has to be eventually liberalized[lxxi].

By the same token, Nikolay Fiodorov, the President of Chuvashia, has accused the federal bodies (in particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in impeding Russian regions’ contacts with the Council of Europe. The regional authorities, which in his opinion are placed under stronger public control and hence are more trustful than the federal institutions, have to be allowed to play more decisive roles in implementing social and humanitarian projects with European partners[lxxii].

Sixth, old misperceptions die hard. Thus, Leonid Polezhaev, the governor of Omsk oblast, launched a campaign for “spiritual security” which was meant to do away with foreign religious missionaries and “foreign propaganda” in the media and educational institutions[lxxiii]. Kamchatka governor Mikhail Mashkovtsev and the mayor of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii Yurii Golenischev (both Communists) have commented on September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York and Washington as justifiable “punishment” of US government for its foreign policy conduct[lxxiv].

Conclusions. Do Ideas Matter?

The focus of domestic political debates in Russia is gradually changing. While old lines of ideological opposition (between “communists” and “democrats”, or “left” and “right”) fade away and blur, new antagonisms unfold, including that one dividing “globalists” and “anti-globalists”. Though globalization debate is rather new element in Russia’s discourse, it already has started drawing new demarcation lines in political and intellectual circles.

Despite all peculiarities of Russian domestic reactions to the challenges of globalization, it is feasible nevertheless to try to identify those international relations theories originated in the West that would roughly correspond to each of the groups described above.

Globalists in Russia basically stick to post-positivist way of thinking. Many of them are constructivists in a sense that they accept extraordinary role of intellectual (ideas), human (know how and technical expertise) and symbolic (reputation, image) capitals in building overseas communications. Globalists are also in a significant degree inspired by “complex interdependency” approach.

Anti-globalists overwhelmingly adhere to traditional state-centric (Realpolitik) paradigm, with special emphasis on national security and balance-of-power issues. Nationalist rhetoric reveals strong impact of geopolitical and neorealist worldviews. This makes Russian anti-globalists very much different from their Western counter-parts that are under strong influence of anarchic ideas and anti-state slogans of leftist background. The Russian anti-globalism is shaped by strongly conservative political identity, while Western anti-globalism is an ideology of social revolt and revolutionary protest.

Perhaps, the most varied theoretical base underpins the ideas of those taking compromising (middle-of-the-road) positions. This is a broad coalition that includes sympathizers of neofunctionalism (focusing on “technical” trans-border cooperation), “English school” (recognizing the gradual emergence of “international society” with its norms and principles), neoliberal institutionalism, and moderate versions of trans-nationalism (in terms of at least understanding the role of non-state actors in the global world).

In the regional discourses it is much harder to find any certain connections with existing world politics theories. Regional intellectual communities are still in the process of discovering of pluses and minuses of globalization, and need some more time to form their own coherent visions of being parts of the “global village”.

LITERATURE

AK&M Press Conference 1999, February 18, <http://www.akm.ru/rus/press-club/990218report.stm>

AK&M Press Conference 1999, July 30, at http://www.akm.ru/rus/press-club/990730report.stm

Apletin, Pavel (2001): Peredovoi krai bol’shogo biznesa (The vanguard of big business), in Birzha, N 12, April 5, p.6.

Bazhanov, Valentin (2001): Vozrozhdenie arkhetipov? (The revival of archetypes? Anti-globalization trends and factors in Russia), at <http://scenario.ng.ru/printed/problem/2001-06-10/1_revival.html>

Birzha 2001, N 9, March 15, p.8.

The Challenge: Academic Freedom in the Former Soviet Union (2000), in Carnegie Reporter, Summer, pp. 13-14.

Deliagin, Mikhail (2001): Puti Rossii v odnopoliarnom mire (Russia’s Ways in Unipolar World). In: Megatrendy mirovogo razvitia (Mega-trends of the World Development), Moscow: Ekonomika, p.97.

Federal’naia tselevaia programma “Elektronnaia Rossia” na 2002-2010 gody (2001). Project. Moscow: Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Fedotova, Valentina (2001): Modernizatsia i globalizatsia (Modernization and Globalization), in: Megatrendy mirovogo razvitia (Mega-trends of the World Development), Moscow: Ekonomika, pp. 92-93.

Globalizatsia: varianty dlia Rossii (2001) (Globalization: Options for Russia), Round table proceedings, St.Petersburg: “Rosbalt” Information Agency and “Club 2015”, September 28.

Gorod i gorozhane 2001, N 34, August 21, p. 12.

Gubernia 2001, N 36, August 31, p. 2.

Gubernskaya Rossia 2001, N 12 (32), April 2, p.2.

Human Development Report 2000. Russian Federation (2001). Edited by Bobyliov S.N., Moscow: Human Rights Program.

Ignatov, Alexander (2000): A Strategy of Globalization Leadership for Russia, at <http://www.ripnet.org/strategies/religions/globalization.htm>

Ilyin, Mikhail/Inozemtsev, Vladislav (2001): Vvedenie (Introduction), in: Megatrendy mirovogo razvitia (Mega-trends of the World Development), Moscow: Ekonomika, pp. 9-12.

Inozemtsev, Vladislav (2001): Neizbezhnost monopoliusnoi tsivilizatsii (Inevitability of Unipolar Civilization), in: Megatrendy mirovogo… p.58.

Itogi 2001, March 27.

Ivanov, N. (2000): Globalizatsia i problemy optimal’noi strategii upravlenia (Globalization and the problems of optimal management strategy), in Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnoshenia, N 3, pp. 12-18.

Karaganov, Sergey (2000): Mezhdunarodnie otnoshenia v usloviakh globalizatsii (International Relations Under Conditions of Globalization), at http://www.svop.ru.

Kishkovsky, Sophia (2000): A Bright Future for Russian Higher Education, in Carnegie Reporter, Summer, p. 4.

Kochetov, Ernest (1999): Geoekonomika, Moscow: Vek, pp. 200-242, 278.

Kommersant Daily 2001, N 166, September 13, p.3.

Kortunov, Sergei (1997): Kakaya Rossia nuzhna miru? (Which Russia is needed for the world?), in Pro et contra, winter, pp. 34-35

Markov, Sergey (2000): Yugoslavskiy krizis i noviy morovoi poriadok (Crisis in Yugoslavia and New World Order), in Kulik, Anatoly (ed.): World Order After The Balkan Crisis. New Realities of the Changing World. Conference Proceedings, November 1-2, 1999, Moscow: Russian-American Academic Exchange Alumni Association “Professionals for Cooperation”, pp.43-46.

Miasnikova, L. (2000): Globalizatsia, ekonomicheskie prostranstva i setevaia nesvoboda (Globalization, economic spaces and networking non-freedom), in Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnie otnoshenia, N 11, pp. 3-8.

Migranian, Andronik (2001): Rossia: ot khaosa k poriadku, 1995-2000 (Russia: from chaos to order, 1995-2000), Moscow Public Science Foundation, Research Paper N 128, pp. 405-407.

Minutes of IX Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defense Politics (2001), March 3, at http://www.svop.ru.

MK v Nizhnem 2001, April 26 – May 3, p. 21.

National News Service Web site (2001), at http://www.nns.ru/interv/int4026.html

Neklessa, Alexander (2001): Ordo quadro: prishestvie postsovremennogo mira (The Coming of Post-modern World), in: Megatrendy mirovogo razvitia (Mega-trends of the World Development), Moscow: Ekonomika, p.151.

Novoe Vremia Journal Web site (2001), at http://www.newtimes.ru/newtimes/artical.asp?n=28&art_id=1255

Nureev, Rustem (2001): Iskat’ svoi osobyi put’ (In Search for Our Own Path), in: Megatrendy mirovogo… pp.111-117.

Primakov, Yevgenii (2000): Statement at the working group of the Council on Foreign and Security Policy, December 19, at http://www.svop.ru.

Remchukov, Konstantin (2001): Sleduet li prislushivat’sa k sovetam MVF (Shall We Heed the IMF Advices), in Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 16.

Romanov, Sergey (2001): Paradiplomatia evropeiskikh granits i Rossia (Paradiplomacy of European borders and Russia), Moscow: Nauchnaya kniga, p.110.

Rossia i vyzovy na rubezhe vekov (1998) (Russia and its challenges between two centuries), Moscow: IMEMO RAN, p.14.

Russian Regional Report (2000), Vol. 1, N 16, September 6.

Segbers, Klaus (2001): Institutional Change in Russia, in: Explaining Post-Soviet Patchworks. Volume 2: Pathways from the past to the global. Edited by Klaus Segbers. Ashgate: Aldershot, Burlington, Singapore, Sydney, pp. 4-24.

Struyk, Raymond (1999): Reconstructive Critics. Think Tanks in Post-Soviet Block Democracies, Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, p.77.

Sulakshin, Stepan (1998): Izmena (Treason), Moscow: Political Centrism Development Foundation, pp. 64-68.

Trenin, Dmitri (2001): The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization. Carnegie Moscow Center, p. 320.

Valuev, Vasily (2001): Internatsionalizatsia rossiiskikh regionov i globalizatsia kak vzaimno obuslovlennie protsesy (Internationalization of Russia’s Regions and Globalization as Mutually Dependent Processes), in Vestnik RAMI, N 1, pp.21-23.

Vesti Online (2001), at http://www.vesti.ru/printed/994846456.html

Yuriev, Alexander (2001): Summary of presentation at the conference “St.Petersburg: From Future to Present”, St.Petersburg State University, May 22-24.