Andrey Makarychev

Alexander Sergunin



Introduction to the topic:

   "Globalization" has become a popular word among both academics and journalists since the early 1980s. As Scholte notes, English-speakers began to use the adjective ‘global’ to designate ‘the whole world’ at the end of the nineteenth century.[1] According to the same source, the terms ‘globalize’ and ‘globalism’ were introduced by Reiser and Davies in their book Planetary Democracy: An Introduction to Scientific Humanism and Applied Semantics published in 1944. The noun ‘globalization’ was entered in a dictionary for the first time in 1961.[2]

   ”Globalization” still remains a rather vague notion. Some authors tend to equate it with cosmopolitanism. The term ”kosmopolites” was used in ancient Greece for ”citizens of the world”, to describe people who considered humankind as a whole to be more important than his or her own state or native land. Some globalist ideas can be traced back to the writings of Hugo Grotius and Immanuel Kant. The Marxist paradigm with its emphasis on the world system, modes of production, the cosmopolitan nature of capitalism and class struggle, as well as on universal historical laws, etc., also offered a globalist vision of international relations. In the current world, perhaps the most important manifestation of cosmopolitanism is the increasing acceptance of and concern for freedoms and individual rights irrespective of state or national boundaries. However, this topic also provokes heated debates, since states can invoke their claim to domestic jurisdiction and block outside interference with the freedoms and rights of its citizens.

   Some scholars understand globalization as a quantitative shift of several autonomous national economies to a global marketplace for production, distribution, and technology. For other theorists, globalization, in terms of open-border relations, is associated with liberalization, while in terms of transborder and cross-border relations, it is connected with internationalization.[3] For some authors, globalization is also consistent with a number of other phenomena such as the progress of liberal democracy, developments in the domain of information technology, and the world-wide impact of mass media. Some other authors prefer to use such notions as ”delocalization” and ”planetarization”.[4]

  To sum up existing definitions, globalization can be described as the world-wide spread of common patterns of production, technology, management, social structures, political organization, culture and values, a process that leads to the rise of supranational institutions and, ultimately, in a single global society.

We regard the this thesis as rather controversial and should rather not be used as a summary of existign definitions..  In essence, it involves the controversial thesis that globalization amounts to "a more homogeneous world" ("common patterns of production..., culture and values").


Furthermore, please distinguish more clearly between the substance, the causes and the effects of globalisation. As it is written here, the three aspects seem blended.

As mentioned above, some analysts use the terms ‘globalization’ and ‘internationalization’ interchangeably. Indeed, the two phenomena are complimentary rather than mutually exclusive. However, globalization should also be distinguished from internationalization. Internationalization implies a process of intensifying connections between nations whilst maintaining their distinct borders and sovereignty. Globalization on the other hand, creates a web of transborder and supranational networks, which acquire relatively borderless and distanceless qualities.[5] In other words, globalization encourages the rise of a more homogeneous world, which functions on the basis of common laws and principles.

As the module is dealing with both globalization and global governance, it should be developed in this part why it makes sense to integrate both issues, why it is particularly important to speak about governance when dealing with globalization etc. All key features appearing in text, cases and tasks should be covered by this introduction into the module.

Target of this module:

The aim of this module is to explain the phenomenon of globalization. The students will learn:

-         what globalization means from institutional, cultural, economic, social, ecological, geographical, security and historical perspectives;

-         how different IR paradigms view globalization;

-         what does the global governance, its agents, forms and implications mean for world democracy;

-         to identify the challenges which globalization poses as well as become familiar with the criticisms of the globalization process.

Obligatory Text: Globalization and Global Governance

Guiding questions


   While reading the obligatory text a student should pay attention to the following questions:

n    What are the similarities and differences between the processes of internationalization and globalization?

n    What are the possible approaches to the study of globalization? Why is the functional approach most helpful? What are the most important dimensions of globalization?

n    What are the similarities and differences between different IR schools in regards to globalization? Why do these schools differ in their views on globalization?

n    Does global governance really exist? How is global governance defined by various paradigms of IR? Who are the most significant agents of global governance?

n    What are the roots of the criticism of globalization? Who are the main critics? What are the principal arguments of the opponents of globalization? Having identified the major challenges globalization poses, how can they effectively be met?



   Globalization can be examined from different angles - civilizational, structuralist, anthropological and so on. Along with these perspectives, the functional approach can also be particularly helpful in understanding the roots, character and directions of the globalization process. Globalization might therefore be analyzed through the following perspectives. Could you expand what you mean by ‘functional’ – as this is a tool for an introductory course - , what is typical of a functional approach and why you find it particularly useful approaching globalization from this angle rather than from others?


The Economic perspective: according to our opinion, the empirical perspective upon globalizaton should begin with this economic perspective, as this is the most broadly known understanding of globalization.

As Tooze supposes, the world economy is both a reflection and a transmitter of globalization and is therefore central to the analysis of and debate on globalization and its impact on international relations.[6] Facets of globalization are: (a) international capital markets; (b) international product markets; (c) macroeconomic policy (budgetary issues); (d) industrial relations; (e) labor markets policies (job creation, international working places, etc.). It deals particularly with phenomena such as global competitiveness capabilities, cross-border job swaps and transfers, international rotation and assignments, multinational task forces and project teams, as well as borderless business.

   Scholte singles out three main indicators of a globalizing economy: (a) cross-border transactions; (b) open-border transactions (as a result of the progressive removal of border control and liberalization of world trade and finance); and (c) transborder transactions (patterns of production, exchange, and consumption become increasingly delinked from a geography of distances and borders).[7]

   Two quite distinct sets of fundamental forces are driving the transition in the international economy. The first set consists of basic changes in both the extent and the nature of international competition. The second is a set of cumulating innovations in the organization of production that is displacing mass production of goods with production of services, and transforms hierarchical assembly-line systems to flexible groups and organizations.

   Strategic alliances might be called one of the main instruments of economic globalization. In a globalizing economy, alliances are a means of expanding internationally more rapidly. Alliances (for example, Airbus consortium) make it possible to enter new markets using the distribution networks and the specific knowledge of local partners.

 New phase of the development of world capitalism could be characterized by the relocation of some industries to the Third World. This trend is called ”new international division of labor” and ”flexible specialization”. P.W. Preston presents it in the following way: ”The post-Fordist mode of production involves a new rapidity in technological innovation and patterns of production which are decentralized, multi-plant, multinational and which adopt a flexible specialization strategy such that a wide range of products can be made with designs quickly changed. The new pattern of production requires an educated, adaptable and complaisant workforce, coupled with government deregulation of the market, and the restructuring of production takes place on a global scale”.[8]


The Institutional perspective:

The institutional perspective concentrates on the institutional level where the global polity process operates by searching for new cooperative agreements, creating an institutional framework, and by adopting new rules.

   The idea of creating a political union of states and peoples in order to abolish wars may be traced back for centuries, back to Grotius, Immanuel Kant, William Penn, Woodrow Wilson, and so on. Nowadays different interpretations of the institutionalist ”school” are aimed at creating new structures (Commission on Global Governance, Universal House of Justice, Unified Planetary Assembly, and so forth) to install justice, order, law and government on a planet-wide scale. World Federalists, for example, advocate the need for stronger international institutions in the form of global federation, which would be able to prevent wars among nations. The bulk of proposals of this sort agree that without sacrificing the nation’s legitimate sovereignty, which is grounded in the will of the people, global institutions may still be able to balance diversity and uniformity, and meet the demands of peoples’ communities through association, creation, and agglomeration within institutions participated in by all nations.

   Currently, global governance is conducted by a number of institutions. The United Nations and its specialized bodies address important issues ranging from security to human rights, as well as sustainable development to environment protection (see UN web site at The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, GATT, etc., are also crucial for managing the economic, financial and commercial aspects of globalization.


The Cultural perspective:

We frequently use the term ”globalization” to define the phenomenon where the world is so deeply interconnected that even the action of just a few people can influence the lives of all the others. This seems more a general definition of “interdependence”, not only of the cultural perspective on globalization. Some analysts prefer to speak of the appearance of a ”global mindset” which ”rests on a foundation of openness”.[9] The philosophic concept of universalism is also important to this perspective on globalization since it recognizes the common origins of all the peoples on the Earth and fosters the cooperation among them, as justly as possible, in order to reach common global goals.

   The cultural understanding of globalization is based on various forms of cultural universalization, which entail an intensification of personal social contacts. Cultural interpretation of globalization also includes what is now often called transculturality or interculturality, the fusion of cultures into hybrid forms.

Please expand on the cultural perspective and make it even more cogent. It would be good to care for a more or less balanced development of all perspectives developed in this section of the paper.


The Social perspective:

The social dimension of globalization arises from three major changes globalization has brought in under its wing. Firstly, the advancement in high technology causes or requires deep alterations in the traditional organization of work. Secondly,  Thirdly, increases in the scope of poverty world-wide result from the incapacity of many countries to adopt structural reforms (in labor markets, welfare state deregulations, budgetary and monetary policy). .Could you please intgrate a ‚transition between the two thoughts of this section (social consequences of economic globalization and the social dynamics resulting from globalization.)

   Sociologists draw attention to several trends which penetrate all present-day societies, albeit to a different extent and with different levels of intensity. Those trends, according to Nikolai Genov, are:

   (a) the spread of instrumental activism, based on industrialization (”the mood of conquering nature and the social world”);

   (b) individualization as an evolutionary achievement;

   (c) the upgrading of organizational rationality (necessity to make organizational structures more transparent and efficient).[10] Please expand on these points by interpreting them.


The Geographical perspective:

In recent years there has been a clear growth of interest among geographers in global problems. The sphere of interest to geographers includes all objects characterized by spatial differentiation: countries, regions, areas, urban places, as well as large-scale migration flows of population.

   Increased attention of geographers to inter-city problems has coincided with the increase of their concern in globalization. That is why scholars tend to study what is global in the regional, and what is regional in the global. For example, the new spatial hierarchy of the science-intensive industries follows the chain: ”a world city – a central region – a peripheral region of a developing country”. If the spatial socio-economic disparities on the local/regional level surpass some ”threshold”, this threatens stability of the whole international system. Cases of overlapping of spatial and national-ethnic (regional) problems are also significant.[11]

Please expand this section and incorporate it stronger into the overall text. As such, the paragraph is not linked enough with the rest of the paper and particularly the preceding paragraph on the social perspective


The Evolutionary/historic perspective:

Last but not least, some authors prefer to analyze globalization from an evolutionary, or historic viewpoint. They view ”global politics as a complex system that evolves in specifiable conditions”.[12] Their main focus is on the rhythms associated with the construction and erosion of global political order (Immanuel Wallerstein, George Modelski, William Thompson). For Wallerstein, dates of the phases within the cycle of hegemony are based on the economic dominance of one state over others in terms of production, commerce, and finance. However, all writers of this stream share the idea that global economic expansion and the creation of systemic political order generates intense conflict among major powers.[13]


What is the conclusion that can be drawn from this functional view on globalization? Is there a synthesis?

Do you understand these perspectives as alternative views on g. without any connection, interlinkage, are these completely isolated visions?

What can students learn by using this approach,:that it depends entirely on the perspective from which they look at a topic?





   Globalization as a universal phenomenon has attracted much attention from both social scientists and practitioners in the 20th century. From the very beginning it found itself in the focus of the inter-paradigm debate within the IR discipline. According to James Rosenau, there are three alternative perspectives of international relations: thestate-centric (realist), the multi-centric (idealist/liberal/pluralist), and the global-centric (structuralist/radical) approaches to international politics.[14] This approach focuses on how different international relations theories (IRTs) define the basic unit of international relations. In the 1970-80s, a fourth paradigm, post-positivism, also emerged.

   Each school developed its own vision of globalization processes. Since realists paid little attention to this problem, the three other paradigms became particularly active in discussing the process of globalization. Realism should be developed here in more length, as it has something to say about globalization. Our external reviewer suggested to take Huntington (e.g. Foreign Affairs 2/99) as an example of the realist schools contribution to the topic.



   During the first half of the century, liberalism (the multi-centric approach) was more open or attentive to the concept of globalization than other schools. For example, in the United States, expansionism and internationalism have been the dominant political attitudes towards the outside world for many decades. The origins of their modern versions are to be found starting from the turn of the century and particularly during the Wilson era, when an internationalist conscience was gradually formed. Despite inertia, there was a gradual build-up of a globalist theoretical infrastructure, which would be important for the post-war world order according to Carlo M. Santoro[15].

Could you expand a bit on the liberalist view on globalization or make the following approaches a bit more concise in order to have a more balanced theoretical debate?



   Globalism emerged as an independent school with a methodology, principles and a set of central questions of its own after World War II. According to Viotti and Kauppi, there are four main assumptions, which are essential to the global-centric view. Firstly, globalists typically assume that to understand the foreign policy of states, one must look past just the internal factors shaping their external policies. One must first find out how the structure of the international relations system conditions certain actors to behave in certain ways. Secondly, globalists also believe that it is very important to view international relations from a historical perspective. It is only through the examination of history that the current international environment can be understood. For many globalists, the rise of capitalism, its development, changes, and expansion is the defining characteristic of the international system. A world capitalist system conditions the behavior and even the creation of all states and other international actors. Contrary to realists and pluralists, who see states as given and independent variables, globalists view states as dependent variables. Global-centric analysis focuses particularly on how some states, classes, or elites create and use mechanisms of domination to benefit from the capitalist system at the expense of others. Globalists are typically concerned with the development and functioning of dependency relations between industrialized states and poor, underdeveloped countries. Finally, globalists emphasize more than other schools the critical importance of economic factors in the functioning of the international system.[16]

   Globalists share certain commonalities with realists and pluralists (rather use “liberals”). Like realists, globalists consider states to be very important actors in world affairs, however, they also emphasize the conflicting interests of social classes. In their view, states are not unitary actors; classes from across national boundaries, like capitalists for example, may cooperate internationally to maintain a political and economic environment which invites investment and is thereby favorable to multinational corporations. Where realists see anarchy, globalists see a hierarchy of classes and states in which the weak are subordinated to the strong. Like realists, they see individuals acting from a kind of rationality, but one that is often distorted by a false consciousness of their own interests and through the acceptance by the weak of perspectives and values propagated by the strong.[17] Globalists and realists both place greater emphasis on the importance of the system level, or the world as a whole, in affecting actors’ behavior than do the pluralists. But they differ as to how they characterize the system level component. Globalists focus on the capitalist mode of production, whilst realists concentrate on the distribution of aggregate power. Furthermore, globalists, more than realists, emphasize the intimate connection between the international system and domestic politics.

   Globalists and liberals have in common at least three features. First, both stress an approach to international relations grounded in political economy. For the global-centric view, various manifestations of political and military power generally reflect the driving force of underlying economic factors. Politics depends on economics; it is not an autonomous realm. Secondly, both approaches pay great attention to events, processes, institutions, and actors operating both within and between states rather than perceiving the state as a unitary rational actor in and of itself (the realist view). However, the globalists place a much greater emphasis on the context (i.e. the capitalist world system) within which these actors operate than do the liberals. Thirdly, both the globalists and those liberals who tend towards the transnational tradition, emphasize socio-economic or welfare issues. A number of liberals have a normative commitment to peaceful change. Although the globalists are also concerned with the welfare of less developed countries (LDCs), they are not so optimistic about the possibility of peaceful change. The hierarchical nature of world politics with the economic dictate of the world capitalist system makes it unlikely that dominant countries will make any considerable concessions to the LDCs. Change, peaceful or revolutionary, is problematic in the globalists’ view.[18]


What about the interlinkage between the concept of interdependence and upcoming globalisation? This is the more relevant, as both approaches root in the assumption that state policy is increasinly dependent upon international/global economic activities.

 The Dependency view:


   There are several currents within the globalist paradigm. In the 1950s and 60s the dependency (dependencia) school originated in Latin American countries and within the UN bodies. The dependencia theorists (Dos Santos, Cardoso and Furtado) argued that development is not autonomous and depends on the ups and downs of the world’s advanced economies. Choices of LDCs are restricted as a result of the dictates of capitalism, which results in a structure of domination. Opportunities for LDCs are few and far between because LDCs are allocated a subordinate role in world capitalism. Economic exploitation of LDCs by the developed states is not an accident; rather, it is an integral part of the capitalist system and is required to keep it functioning.[19] The principal conclusion of the dependency approach is that the problems of the Third World arise from the form of growth pursued by the First World i.e. underdevelopment is the product of development.

   The later versions of the dependency theory - ‘center-periphery analysis’ (Frank,[20] Amin, Barnet and Muller, Emmanuel, Radice, and Rodney[21]) and ‘world system analysis’ (Wallerstein)[22] - are less radical in their critique of capitalism and concentrate more on studying what the implications of globalization for the world economy and the international relations system are.

Our reviewer commented the following: „The statement that the studies stemming from later dependency theory (Frank, Amin, Wallerstein) are less radical in their capitalism critique than, for instance, the analyses presented by Cardoso is not at all clear to the present reporter. For Frank and Amin, processes of underdevelopment result quasi directly from processes of the capitalist world economy. Cardoso, on the other hand, presented in the 1970s a very cautious analysis of internal and external factors determining development.

   Starting from the 1960s onwards, global issues such as the degradation of the environment, famine, mass diseases, and demography attracted the attention of scholars, decision-makers and the broad public alike. The term ”global problems” appeared and became frequent in academic literature.

   In the seventies, profound concerns about the state of ecological security gave rise to the ”global functionalism” school, which was particularly influential among environmentalists who believed that mankind was damaging the planet’s ecosystem. The functionalists were also committed to achieving safe and efficient global management.

   In the 1950s and 60s, the ”peace research” school emerged both in the USA and Europe (see web site of Copenhagen Peace Research Institute at Peace researchers drew heavily upon the principles of globalist schools such as Marxism, dependencia (and its derivatives) and environmentalism. For example, in his perspective on imperialism, Galtung, one of the founding fathers of peace research, develops the ‘center-periphery analysis’, defining imperialism as a structural relation of dominance with political, economic, military, cultural, and communication dimensions.[23] The entire structure of dominance has to be comprehended. In line with the ‘center-periphery’ analysis, Galtung argues that one must look inside societies to understand the effects of interactions among them.

Please make more explicit what the link between the preach research school and globalization is (apart from the fact that peace research can be understood as linked to the dependencia school.

   The later versions of globalism offer more systemic and comprehensive visions of world dynamics than the above schools, which preferred to emphasize particular aspects of globalization e.g. the economy, power distribution, violence, and the environment. Contemporary globalists perceive globalization as a challenge or even as an opportunity, rather than a threat as the above streams did. For example, for Rosenau, ”globalizing complexities and subtleties” ought actually to be perceived as the dynamic combination of three processes at work: a) the spread and growth of knowledge that diverse people have about each other; b) the weakening of boundaries as the world becomes more unified; c) the growing similarity of communities, societies and their institutions. ”The objects and activities that spread across boundaries can be identified in terms of six categories”, Rosenau continues, ”goods and services, people, ideas and information, money, normative institutions, and behavioral patterns”[24]. He stresses four interconnected and overlapping methods of globalization: (1) through the two-way dialogical interactions facilitated by new communications technologies, (2) through the one-way monological communications sustained by the mass media, (3) through emulation (including imitation and reproduction of behaviors and institutions), and (4) through institutional isomorphism - the tendency to become alike.

The Post-modernist view

    Another, non-traditional version of globalization can be found in the works of post-modernists. Having developed their assumptions within the general intellectual framework of post-structuralist theory, they suggest that the territorial principle of organizing statehood was appropriate for the era of Modernity, but is now obsolete. As Zdravko Mlinar claims, ”Territorial communities are losing their traditional identity due to both growing internal differentiation and individuation of their components (groups, individuals), as well as to an increase of mutual interdependence in the space across their borders. In developed societies, belongingness to a specific territorial unit is generally diminishing in importance as an explanatory factor of the characteristics of the individual or the group. The number of non-territorial actors is increasing. Their activity can best be understood in a framework of systems which are not primarily territorially defined”[25].

   Post-modernist theorists argue that ”borders are moving apart- as exemplified in the history of Europe over the centuries - and there is a consequent reduction in the number of political systems”[26]. ”Political and legal boundaries of the nation-state coincide less and less with the complex patterns of social life”, Barry Smart believes.

   They frame their ideas with notions such as ”transterritorial power”, ”emancipation of territoriality”, ”death of geography”, and so forth. According to them, a growing number of peoples’ communities are acting on the global scale, and state boundaries cannot bound or limit these new types of activities (in political, ecological, economic, religious, cultural, ethnic, professional domains). Hence, existing nation-states do not correspond to the new patterns of ”extraterritorial” organization of large groups of people world-wide. Post-modernist writers are certain that the world is undergoing a transition from territorial communities (including nation-states) to ”networks” that are independent of specifically defined territorial foundations and national identities.

   By the same token, the post-modernist doctrine does not extend to recognizing the legitimacy of a world authority to deal with these ”networks”. In fact, the post-modernists speak out against ”an incipient universalizing world empire”. The post-modernists strongly suspect that universalization in the form of a ”world government” would ensure that a ”hegemonic imposition of parochial values” would occur which would be ” merely a consecration of the will of the great powers” and which would culminate in ”Western domination”[27]. Post-modernists claim that the greatest dangers for humankind are the plans and ambitions of the main ”contenders for the source of universal principles (Enlightenment rationalism, free trade, Pax Britannica, Pax Americana, the Trilateral Commission, capitalism, socialism, and so on)” that are eager to model the structure of international institutions on those already characteristic of the dominant states[28]. That is why post-modernists are sharply against ”the universalist hopes of Western liberals” who try to project culturally their versions of ”reason, masculinity, and order” onto other civilizations. Thus post-modernism, as we have seen, supports the idea of globalization, but rebuffs the cultural and ideological homogenization with which it is associated.

   To sum up, all of these four paradigms recognize globalization as an important feature of the present-day epoch. However, there are differences of opinion among them regarding the nature, sources, significance and implications of globalization.


Global governance:


Many specialists deem that globalization entails not only the spread of common patterns of production, management, culture and values, but also the existence of global governance. The discussion below aims at explaining this phenomenon. Please go deeper into the discussion why both concepts are interlinked, and why a discussion of global governance when dealing with globalization might be particularly important for students of political science?


One could start with an analysis of the likely effects of globalization (loss of control/ state sovereignty, increasing multiplication of actors, loss of democratic legitimacy of political actors…) which make a discussion of global governance important.

What is global governance? All major IR paradigms differ in their views on the nature of global governance.


Realists are rather skeptical about the very existence of global governance, and prefer to speak of world power distribution, world leadership, the 'concert of powers', alliances, coalitions and so on. In their opinion, multilateral institutions are little more than vehicles by which powerful states establish the rules and norms of action. Realism claims that participation in an international institution does nothing to mitigate the anarchical nature of world politics; states are always interested in pursuing either power at best , or mere survival at worst.[29] Even those neo-realists who understand the need for managing global problems, believe that such governance is possible only when it is exercised by some superpower or coalition of the most powerful states.[30]

To what extent is global governance really in line with multilateralism or international regimes? Isn’t it more than this?


Among liberals/idealists, global governance is often seen as synonymous with multilateralism, i.e., a set of multilateral organizations and arrangements. Some of them even prefer to use the term "international governance" rather than "global governance" because they believe that international institutions (i.e. created by national governments), not global or supranational structures, play the crucial role in world politics.[31] In comparison with realists, liberals have a completely different view of the role of international institutions in exercising global governance. They argue that multilateral institutions cane bring about cooperative outcomes among states by resolving coordination problems. Difficulties in eliciting cooperation, in a liberal’s view, arise not from true conflicts of interest, but rather, from coordination problems which plague the actors in the system. Such coordination problems can be solved by establishing institutions facilitating cooperation. They do this by reducing transaction and information costs, providing enhanced transparency, promoting issue-linkage, enlarging the shadow of the future, and by reinforcing reciprocity.[32]

            According to liberal institutionalists, governance is the complex and highly varied process by which national or international actors reach a common understanding about the solutions of all the problems they need to resolve collectively to achieve their goals.[33] Organizing and sustaining the multilateral system of international cooperation are the important dimensions of global governance. The concept of global governance presupposes the existence of formal institutions, international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) or other regimes of cooperation. According to Gehring, successful international governance is reliant upon the existence and maintenance of three conditions, namely: (1) that collective decisions are actually adopted (procedural dimension); (2) that they are acceptable to the actors concerned and do not preclude implementation (substantive dimension); and (3) that they actually affect behavior (practical dimension). The first two conditions may be directly affected by the appropriate organization of the collective decision process, while the last one can only be indirectly influenced since ultimately only the single actors concerned can determine whether this condition is met or not.[34]

            Liberals single out six main features of global governance.[35] Firstly, the architecture of global governance is polycentric. That means that there is no single decision-making center since global governance is merely the end-result of collective decision-making processes based on mutual trust and shared sovereignty.


            Secondly, global governance is conducted both by governmental and non-governmental actors (NGOs, transnational corporations, international pressure groups, etc.). National governments play a central role in global governance but the significance of non-government actors' is steadily growing (see web site of Atlantic Council of the United States at

What about empirical examples for governance by NGOs?

            Thirdly, global governance is also grounded on public-private partnership and cooperation, as resources for dealing with global problems are scarce and scattered among different actors (both public and private). In this sense, global governance is seen as pooling resources and expertise with the aim to solve problems of common concern.

            The fourth feature of global governance is that it arises at the point where states realize the need for collective action and give up (at least partially) their national sovereignty to address global problems. The most powerful states tend to turn to global governance only when their fundamental interests are affected, while other important global issues (such as debts of the LDCs or environment protection) remain unsolved.[36]            The fifth aspect of global governance according to the liberals is that it is only a part of the multi-level system of governance, which exists in this world of sovereign states. Liberals maintain that the need for global governance, and for its improvement, is based on the existence of an international community of states and other actors having common problems and mutual interests in their resolution.[37]

            Finally, global governance results in a fundamental transformation of world politicsincluding institutional change. However, this change takes the form of horizontal and vertical networking, rather than the formation of hierarchical and formal institutions. For liberals, in the institutional sense, global governance is a web of national, international and supranational institutions, both formal and informal, which share common interests, goals and norms and address particular global issues.[38] The problem, however, is how to harmonize the approaches and coordinate the activities of these actors in order to make global governance more efficient.


This paradigm assumes that supranational structures are more important and influential than nation-states (not to mention that globalists question the very existence of nation-state in today’s world[39]). National governments are unable to resist or control global processes and must submit to universal laws dictated by the global dynamics. Unlike the liberals, globalists prefer to speak of global, rather than international, governance.


            Peace researchers, who have a different view of the globalist paradigm, believe that global governance is a product of the 'structural violence' which is inherent in human society at all its levels.[40] The goal of humankind, as peace researchers see it, is to replace 'structural violence' by a new, cooperative and non-violent, type of relationship. This could lead to the rise of a new type of global governance aimed at sustainable development            There are some theories that portray the emerging global society as an enlarged copy of a national society. In this framework, global governance has the same functions as national governments, only on a higher level.[41] This theory of globalism believes that effective global governance requires the existence of a concrete world government. Suggestions on how to establish a world government range from the "soft" option (the UN assumes the role of a quasi-world government) to extreme versions (a centralized governmental structure similar to how a national government is formed).[42] However, proponents of this view fail to explain how such a government could gain legitimacy and how it could proceed to govern so many countries, which have such totally different economic, social and political systems.

            In conclusion, the mainstream of IR theory interprets global governance as a system of rule at the world level that is constituted by the interaction of national, multilateral and supranational institutions in an attempt to address global challenges.

Our reviewer commented the following: „What is "mainstream" supposed to mean here? Prior to this passage we note substantial controversies, and now they are amalgamated into a "mainstream."


Global governance agents:

Analysts usually single out four main types of global governance and its agents.[43]

Suprastate global governance:

Suprastate (supranational) global governance is the result of the shift of numerous responsibilities and competencies from the sphere of national governments to that of supranational authorities. Intergovernmental regulatory activities are not new to the 20th century; however, their nature, number, scope and impact have greatly expanded with globalization. International organizations established as intergovernmental arrangements had to change their character and functions dramatically. For example, the European Community (now European Union) that was set up in 1957 as a purely economic intergovernmental organization, has now gradually turned into a powerful supranational institution which not only embraces industrial, agricultural, trade and labor issues, but also develops a single currency and a Common Foreign and Security Policy.[44] (see web site of the European Union at

            The United Nations is the core of the network formed by supranational organizations. The UN project started as an intergovernmental arrangement. However, its nature and functions have altered with time and the UN bodies have become much more involved within states, often without the immediate consent of the host governments. This development led to challenges to traditional views about intervention within states, and the way in which they justify their sovereignty.[45]

            Along with the UN, a number of other supranational agencies are responsible for the maintenance of peace and security in the world: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Organization of African Unity, etc. In particular, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the EU, five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5), the Wassenaar arrangement, the Australia Group and other institutions issue global regulations on nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons and dual technology export controls (see the web site of the International Security Network at

            Numerous agencies are also involved in global economic regulation. For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the group of eight most developed and powerful nations (G-8) regulate a number of macroeconomic issues on a global scale, such as industrial policies, energy supplies, information technologies, the welfare state’s activities, job creation schemes, and the code of conduct for multinational corporations. The World Trade Organization, the successor of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, issues guidelines on world commerce. The International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation are engaged in stabilization and structural adjustment programs in almost 100 countries. They often also supervise national financial policies and advise governments on long-term economic development (see the web site of the World Bank at

Marketized global governance (private sector):

Along with official actors at the substate, state and suprastate levels, the private sector has become an important player in the globalizing world. While there are less than 200 national governments in the international system, there are 38,500 major transnational companies (TNCs).[46] Globalization has altered the very nature of TNCs. Now the companies can be truly global - their headquarters are merely sites for strategic decision-making, while production can be located in different countries. There can also be a uniform brand image in all countries and management personnel may develop their careers across the whole geographic scope of the corporations.

            Due to the growth in the number of TNCs, it is no longer possible to view each country as having its own separate economy. In fact, governments have lost control over their currencies and their foreign trade - two of the most important aspects of sovereignty. The financial crises from 1970 through the 1990s demonstrated that governments are now virtually powerless against the influence of transnational banks and other speculators whose weekly turnover is equal to the entire annual GDP of the US.[47] The above processes weaken individual governments in relation to TNCs.

            The growing importance of TNCs has also had political impacts. TNCs were involved in coups in Iran as well as in some Latin American countries in the 1950s and 60s. TNCs also favored the deténte in relations with the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 80s in the hope it would gain them access to the huge Soviet market. For the same reason, they also lobbied the U.S. President and Congress to provide China with the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. Meanwhile, the Soros Foundation in and of itself, contributed a lot to the process of democratization in the former Communist countries.

            The private sector exercises global governance not only through TNCs but also via its multilateral organizations. For example, the International Federation of Stock Exchanges (founded in 1961), the International Securities Market Association (1969), and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (1984) issue codes of conduct on the global stock markets. A number of debt security rating institutions such as Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s monitor the global credit markets. The World Economic Forum (WEF), founded in 1971 when it united some 900 major companies, was instrumental in launching the Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations that resulted in the creation of the WTO. The WEF has also been involved in conflict resolution in various parts of the world, including the Arab-Israeli dispute, and it also played a role in monitoring domestic reforms in Russia and other post-Communist countries in the 1990s.

Global social movements and NGOs:

Non-profit organizations and social movements are global because they address transnational issues, pursue their causes by exploiting the results of globalization (international law and standards, Internet, air travel, etc.) and because some of them emphasize that their identity and concerns are global (cosmopolitan values, world citizenship, exterritoriality, and so on).

            Global social movements are extremely diverse. Some of them address a whole range of global problems from environmental issues and demography, to arms control and sustainable development; others can be considered single-issue organizations. Some groups act through global networks; others prefer to ‘think globally and act locally’. These movements are also diverse in terms of philosophy and ideology, they represent the whole spectrum of ideologies from peace research and liberal democracy to Communism and neo-fascism. They also develop different strategies: while some act in isolation, others aim at building coalitions. Some groups work with interest groups, political parties, national governments and international organizations, while others are very suspicious about any cooperation with ‘the establishment’. They differ also in their financial and administrative resources: while some organizations have considerable funds and staff, others are short of money and professionals (see web site of East West Institute at

            As a result of pressure, mainly from U.S. groups, the draft UN Charter was amended to add an article providing for the ECOSOC to consult with NGOs (Article 71). After five years the ECOSOC formally codified the practice in a resolution that was effectively a statute for NGOs. This document defines an NGO as an organization which follows the following principles:

            · An NGO should support the aims and the work of the United Nations.

            · An NGO should be a representative office, with identifiable headquarters and offices, responsible to a democratic policy-making office   

            · An NGO should be a non-profit body.

            · An NGO cannot use or advocate violence.

            · An NGO must respect the norm of ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of states’ and cannot be a political party, (this provision is often violated by NGOs such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International).

            · An international NGO is one that is not established by an intergovernmental agreement.[48]

            The ECOSOC recognizes three categories of NGOs: (1) a small number of high-status NGOs, concerned with most of the Council’s work; (2) specialist NGOs, concerned with a few fields of activity, and having a high reputation in those fields; and (3) a Roster of other NGOs that are expected to make occasional contributions to the ECOSOC. By adopting this statute, the ECOSOC provided NGOs with a legitimate and regulated place in international diplomacy.

            Despite their lack of finance and coordination, global social movements and NGOs contribute to global governance in numerous ways. They are particularly useful in areas such as human rights protection, ecology, demography, conflict resolution, cultural exchange, global networking, and so on. NGOs have been instrumental in providing global agencies such as Unesco, UNICEF, the UN Office of High Commissioner for Refugees, and the World Bank with advice and feedback.

Substate global governance:

            Substate global governance results from the growth of direct transboundary links between different substate authorities, which have all taken a substantial number of policy initiatives that bypass their central governments. For instance, in Europe some fifty regional governments in seventeen countries now maintain direct contacts through the Assembly of European Regions and the European Union's Committee of the Regions. Several Finnish, Norwegian, Russian and Swedish regional governments are represented on the Regional Council of the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council.[49] Many members of the Russian Federation now have their own 'diplomatic' missions abroad that operate relatively independently of their national embassies. At a municipal level, numerous transnational links have been established by local authorities in areas such as trade, transportation, communications, environmental protection, and in fighting organized crime and drug-trafficking. Globalization at the sub-national level has even led to the emergence of twin-cities and interdependent economic zones in border areas.

            Some supranational actors promote transnational cooperation at the sub-national level. For example, to foster cross- and trans-border economic cooperation between EU and non-EU countries of the region, Brussels allocated certain resources for appropriate investments and other projects, for example, in 1992-96, close to 90 million ECU of the EU grants were made available to the Russian north-west.[50] Another example of transnational cooperation at the sub-national level is one of the EU programs named Interreg. In this program Finland and Sweden are free to involve Norwegian and Russian regions, if this suits their own border regions, and if partners are able to contribute 50 per cent to the funding..[51]

            To summarize, global governance at the supranational and subnational levels are two faces of the same process, namely—globalization. It should also be noted that global governance agents and levels mutually complement and reinforce, rather than exclude, each other.



Challenges and Critique:

   The greatest fear associate with globalization is that it may mean that in the future countries will be unable to control their own development. In this sense, ”globalization means the denationalization of politics, markets, and law”.[52] Another fear emanates from low-skill workers who are afraid that growing international competition will deprive them of their jobs.

   In Western Europe, fear of globalization is primarily used as an argument for government aid to "national industries". Obviously it is in the interests of any business to present itself as worthy of state assistance. The claim is, that transnational/global corporations erode the ability of nation states to regulate their own economies, states may not be able to alleviate the effects of globalization on ”national industries” for long.

   The fact is that political parties of all ideologies now share the fear that increasing globalization will be detrimental to their countries. This attack – which Brookings Institution authors call ”Globaphobia”[53] – comes in different versions, but all of them are based on the fact that globalization entails serious costs and risks. In response, some analysts in the United States, have articulated, ”several alternatives to global leadership, including greater reliance on regional security organizations and the creation of spheres of influence or regional balance-of-power arrangements”.[54]

  The term ”globalization” is frequently utilized to define something fairly similar to a process of world-wide colonization. It refers to particular and widespread economic strategies that aim to draw the greatest immediate gain for their implementers, and that often result in the standardization of the affected economies and cultures.

   As far as the world economy is concerned, critics of globalization say that although competition is multinational, it is still very asymmetric and is not yet fully open. They claim that the world is not yet ”round” and that direct government policy plays a critical role in determining outcomes in international competition, perhaps now more than ever. These critics of globalisation believe that it is the legitimate concern of government to seek to increase high value activities and economically strategic activities performed on its own soil by its own nationals.

   We do not yet live in the age of the "global corporation" nor, in its logical concomitant, a world of politically undifferentiated economic spaces. For the moment, there are very few truly "global corporations" and there are relatively few economic spaces unconstrained by political considerations. The current system of international relations is problematized by its failure to address chronic trade problems with Asian nations, by the challenge of having to more fully integrate transitional economies into the world trade system, and by concern over how the developing countries should be woven into the system.

   Swedish scholar Hans Holmen still resumes that ”the so-called ‘globalization process’ is strongly geographically limited and that large parts of the world are not (yet) affected by it. He believes that the ‘world economy’ is tri-polar and almost totally dominated by North America, Western Europe and Japan. However, in close geographical proximity to these areas, are nations that are not, as of yet, integrated into the world economy. Therefore, one can hardly say that ‘globalization’ is all-encompassing when such large parts of the world are not part of the process”.[55] Thus, according to this argument, it would be more correct to speak of internationalization rather than globalization. ”Yet many fear that increased internationalization will result in regionalization, i.e. that different parts of the rich world will band together in rather closed (and, possibly, antagonistic) economic – political ‘fortresses’ like EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, etc., while the rest of the world is locked out”.[56]

   Various financial institutions in fact tend to cluster spatially in a few financial centers. As Arie Shachar argues, two uppermost levels of these financial institutions can be distinguished – First Order Supranational Centers (London and New York) and Second Order Financial Centers (Tokyo, Paris, Zurich, Frankfurt and Amsterdam). All of them might be defined as ”World Cities”. ”Their control functions are carried out by the joint operation of a cluster of activities: management at corporate headquarters, financing at the international capital markets, and communication and transport wherever the demand for them arises”.[57]

   Similar processes can be identified in security politics. Despite the end of the Cold War and strategic confrontation between the two social systems, some military-political blocs (such as NATO and Western European Union) have not disappeared and have even received new stimuli for their further development. New regional security arrangements have also emerged.

   There are, hence, several challenges which globalization poses. ”The foremost challenge is to ensure that its fruits extend to all countries. The second challenge posed by globalization is the fear that the growth it brings is inherently and dangerously destabilizing”.[58] Third, there is the concern in many Western countries that increased competition is driving down wages and siphoning off jobs. Fourth, globalization can also provoke counter-reactions i.e. the rise of extreme forms of nationalism and regionalism which may have dangerous implications for the entire world. Fifth, there is a worry that most of the emerging global actors (such as transnational institutions, corporations and social movements) are not accountable to democratic control.[59] Finally, some theorists fear that globalization can result in a sort of universalism which undermines healthy pluralism and cultural diversity.


Summary of key points:


· Globalization is the world-wide spread of common patterns of production, technology, management, social structures, political organization, culture and values; it is a process that can lead to the rise of supranational institutions and, ultimately, a single global society.

· Internationalization and globalization are complimentary rather than mutually exclusive concepts. Internationalization implies a process of intensifying connections between nations whilst retaining distinct borders and sovereignty. However, globalization creates a web of transborder and supranational networks, which acquire relatively borderless and distanceless qualities. In other words, globalization encourages the rise of a more homogeneous world which functions on the basis of common laws and principles.

· Institutional, cultural, economic, social, ecological, geographical, security and historical aspects of globalization can be distinguished.

· There is a difference of opinion among the main IR paradigms regarding globalization. Realists view globalization mostly as the militarization of the international system and the emergence of patterns of political control and domination which extend beyond borders; but they reject the idea that globalization is accompanied by a deepening sense of community. Liberals equate globalization with multilateralism and the growing interdependency of the world. Globalists view globalization as a natural result of the development of the world capitalist system and as a manifestation of universal social laws.

·  Global governance is a system of rule at the world level constituted by the interaction of national, multilateral and supranational institutions addressing global challenges.

· There are four main types of global governance: suprastate global governance (supranational organizations), marketized global governance (TNCs and multilateral business organizations), as well as global social movements and substate global governance (subnational units engaged in transboundary cooperation).

· Although the idea of global governance is supposed to be based on and enhance world democracy, there are also some potentially negative factors which can result from it: (a) the growth of separatism; (b) a lack of respect for human rights at the state level; (c) a lack of political activism and participation in developed countries; (d) the alienation of supranational organizations from their members, the spread of undemocratic procedures and the lack of public accountability; (e) economic and social disparities as a result of the policies of TNCs; a clash between TNCs’s and the interests of common people; (f) a lack of professionalism, public accountability and democratic control over NGOs; and the monopolization of certain areas of world politics by NGOs.

·  Many of the effects of globalization are interpreted as negative, and some ironically pose a challenge to globalization’s own continued progression: (a) the extreme unification and standardization of economic, social and cultural life which globalization produces has been at the expense of national values and traditions; (b) the rise of universalism with globalization now undermines healthy pluralism and cultural diversity; (c) the rise of nationalism and separatism as a counter-reaction to globalization poses a threat; (d) the uneven character of globalization means that there is now a widening gap between the developed and underdeveloped countries; and (e) the growing destabilization of the global economic, social, political, security and environmental systems in general has also been another result of globalization .

 Study-questions on the introductory text


1.      Define the term ”globalization”.

2.      Why are internationalization and globalization complimentary but not identical phenomena? Identify the characteristics of globalization that are different from those of internationalization.

3.      Why are realists skeptical about the very existence of globalization? In what sphere of international relations do they acknowledge globalization?

4.      What have the liberal and globalist visions of globalization in common, and what are the differences between them?

5.      Describe the main sub-schools of globalism.

6.      What is the specific character of the post-positivist perspective on globalization? What do the post-positivists approve of and disapprove of in globalization?

7.      What kind of institutional changes did globalization bring?

8.      How did globalization affect the world’s cultures?

9.      What are the economic and social implications of globalization?

10.  Explain how globalization relates to ecological problems?

11.  Is global governance already in existence? If yes, what are the indicators of its presence? Can the UN be considered to be an example of a global governance organization?

12.  On what basis do the realists deny the existence of global governance?

13.  Why do the liberals describe global governance as synonymous with multilateralism? Identify the main aspects of global governance as seen by the liberal school.

14.  Depict the peculiarities of each globalist sub-school. Why do some globalists equate global governance with the existence of a world government? How does global governance correlate to global society? What is the difference between global governance and global management?

15.  What are the major institutions of the suprastate global governance? Describe the UN structure and its main bodies. Why does the UN system need to be reformed?

16.  What is marketized global governance? Explain how TNCs facilitate globalization. Name the most important multilateral organizations of the private sector.

17.  What is an NGO? What is the role of NGOs in global governance?

18.  Why can substate units also be considered as global governance agents? Explain how cross- and transborder cooperation contribute to globalization. Name the most significant organization(s) where subnational units are represented at the international level.

19.  Do you agree with the statement that globalization and democratization are two sides of the same coin? If not, make an argument as to why not based on revealing what the undemocratic features of global governance are. What are the best solutions to these problems?

20.  Characterize the ”international” or ”global society” model. How can it be distinguished from the above concepts? How can the communitarian and cosmopolitan traditions be combined? What is the changing meaning of security? Why are intra-state conflicts and non-traditional threats the most important challenges to national and global security today? Is the ”global society” really homogeneous?

21.  Do you agree with the statement that globalization is a process of world-wide colonization? Develop arguments both in favor and against this thesis. Are there any grounds for concerns about the future inability of countries to control their own development? Enumerate the other arguments of the anti-globalists. Give examples of recent anti-globalist manifestations. Do you believe that anti-globalist forces will be able to prevent further globalization of the world?

22.  What are the basic arguments about globalization which have been developed by major US think tanks (Brookings Institution, Council on Foreign Relations, Institute for International Economy, etc.)?


Co-text on globalisation:

Kenneth N. Waltz, Columbia University, "Globalization and Governance ," PS Online, December 1999

We have found this text which might serve as a ‘co-text’ to yours, what do you think about including it?


Case study

Implications of the Kosovo crisis for global governance:


            As mentioned above, global governance has to address numerous global problems, including international security and conflict prevention and resolution. Local conflicts—particularly, those ones which could endanger the peace and security of an entire region or, indeed, of the planet—are of primary concern for global governance institutions. It should be noted that in the case of local conflicts, global governance is not only exercised by the UN, the leading organization in the sphere of international security, but also by many other agents on different levels. It is assumed that international organizations should act as a system of interlocking institutions that mutually reinforce each other in order to help resolve the conflict.

            When the international community faced the Kosovo problem, there were expectations that such a system could be created and work effectively. Besides the bilateral channels, different multilateral organizations and formats were available—the OSCE, EU, Western European Union, NATO, NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, Contact Group on Yugoslavia, G-8 and the UN. Since the Kosovo crisis posed a tangible threat,first and foremost to European security, it was assumed that European institutions such as the OSCE and EU should take the lead in the situation. Moreover, for various reasons, it was very important for both these organizations to prove their credibility as authoritative organizations in the field of regional security. The OSCE is the only pan-European security organization and there were expectations that it could become not only a forum for discussions and confidence-building, but also an effective instrument for conflict prevention and resolution. The EU had recently proclaimed a Common Foreign and Security Policy and was badly in need of proof of its credibility.

            However, the US, run by the liberal institutionalist: in what sense is this used here? Perhaps one should rather speak of “democratic” (?)Clinton administration, was against a purely European initiative and tried to persuade its European allies that only NATO has both the political will and military strength to solve the problem. The OSCE and EU were therefore side-lined and the UN Security Council limited itself to mere symbolic gestures: it condemned Yugoslavia for the atrocities in Kosovo and defined the situation in Kosovo as a threat to international peace and stability. It must be kept in mind, that the UN Security Council has never passed a resolution authorizing the use of force—and indeed, permanent members Russia and possibly China, would have vetoed such a proposal.

            From the very beginning of the conflict NATO threatened to use force against the Milosevic regime. The threat of bombing had been issued in June 1998, before the commencement of diplomatic negotiations, to end the insurgency and counter-insurgency campaigns between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Yugoslav security forces. The situation gained urgency, becoming a test of NATO credibility, as the violence intensified in September and the prospect of winter threatened a major humanitarian crisis for the 250,000 persons displaced during the previous eight months of fighting. Although most of those displaced later returned to their homes as a result of an October 1998 agreement between the US negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, and Slobodan Milosevic, fighting resumed and highly publicized massacres raised the stakes again. The number of dead and injured was estimated at 2,000 soldiers and civilians during the 13 months from February 1998 until March 1999.[60]

            Since Milosevic (supported by Moscow) was strongly against having foreign troops in Kosovo for peace-keeping purposes, the OSCE came into picture for a while. 2,000 OSCE ‘verifiers’ were sent to Kosovo. However, they were unable to stop inter-ethnic fighting in the region and NATO seized this opportunity to point to the OSCE’s ineffectiveness as a peace-keeper and a peace-enforcer.

            In February 1999, the Contact Group on Yugoslavia took a lead and brought the warring parties to Rambouillet (France) for negotiations. The conference was formally co-chaired by France, UK and Russia, but the draft of the agreement was proposed by the United States. Russia was side-lined and had no major say in the negotiating process. According to the document, which many observers compared with ultimatum, the Serbian security forces should be withdrawn from Kosovo, Kosovars should get autonomy, and security in the region should be guaranteed by an international military force led by NATO. At Rambouillet, Slobodan Milosevic agreed to all aspects of the agreement except having a NATO peace-keeping force in the region. This was in part based on him wanting to protect Serbian sovereignty, but it was also based on his hostility towards NATO and his suspicion of Western aims in general. There were some suggestions that the key aims of the Rambouillet agreement could be carried out by a force of primarily Russian peace-keepers, or a mixed force from Russia and other countries but these initiatives were not realized.[61] Given the lack of progress in the Rambouillet negotiations the US and NATO declared that all peaceful avenues have been exhausted.

            On 24 March 1999, NATO, acting without UN Security Council approval, unleashed a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia to ‘prevent a humanitarian catastrophe’. The stated goal was diplomatic and political: to force the Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic, to accept the terms of the plan presented to Serbian and Albanian delegations at Rambouillet in February.

            NATO bombing of Yugoslavia has gone on for quite a while and has produced, for the most part, exactly the opposite of what was desired. It has provoked resolve rather than surrender in Belgrade, it has apparently stimulated an accelerated campaign of terror and ethnic cleansing in the very territory it was designed to protect, it has made it more, not less, likely that neighboring countries will be drawn into the conflict, and, most alarmingly, it has led to calls for the use of ground troops inside Yugoslavia since bombing alone proved ineffective.[62] However, NATO member-states were reluctant to start an operation on the ground because of potential losses.

            Given the stalemate in Kosovo, Russia and Finland assumed the role of mediators and managed to persuade Milosevic to accept a peace agreement. The latter was worked out in the G-8 format and legitimized by the UN Security Council resolution no. 1244 in June 1999. Serbian troops have been withdrawn from Kosovo and 40,000-strong international peace-keeping forces (with a core from NATO countries as well as Russian participation) were sent to the area. The UNSC Res. 1244 puts the EU in charge of the economic reconstruction of Kosovo and gives the OSCE primary responsibility for establishing democratic institutions, organizing elections, and monitoring human rights. The UNHCR will take charge of the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo will administer the police, the justice system, schools, public transport, telecommunications, and power plants. An international police unit of up to 2,000 will oversee the establishment of a Kosovo police force. On 12 June, the UN Secretary-General Annan appointed UN Undersecretary-General Sergio Vieira de Mello of Brazil as the UN’s special representative during the interim period.

   Implications of the Kosovo crisis for the global governance system is a controversial question in the research literature on international relations and law. Proponents of the NATO action insist that NATO’s violation of the UN Charter must be judged in its specific context:

1.   · A humanitarian catastrophe was imminent

2.   · Yugoslavia had defied the UN for years

3.   · All peaceful avenues had been exhausted

4.   · The UN Security Council had already indirectly sanctioned the NATO operation by condemning Milosevic and evaluating the situation in Kosovo as a threat to international peace and stability

5.   · The majority of European countries supported or at least did not oppose the intervention

6.   · The work of the UN Security Council was blocked and attempts to obtain a mandate for the use of force had failed.

7.   · NATO made a consistent effort to keep Russia and the UN on board

   Moreover, adherents of this view believe that the actions of NATO were simply consistent with the current trends in international practice, i.e. that:

1.   · human rights are no longer an internal or domestic matter

2.   · it is now commonly accepted that obligations to respect human rights are ergaomnes and, correlatively, actors has the right to take steps (short of force) to attain such respect

3.   · the UN Security Council has authorized and legitimated military interventions in internal conflicts to protect human rights

4.   · both NGOs and governments had accepted that unauthorized military intervention is necessary under certain exceptional circumstances, where atrocities shock the conscience of mankind and jeopardize international stability.

   The proponents of this view conclude therefore, that the intervention was justified but that international law should be changed and precise rules guiding interventions without a UN mandate should be developed.[63]


   On the other hand, opponents of NATO intervention maintain that the Balkan war had catastrophic implications for the global governance system (particularly, in the sphere of international security) because it led to:[64]

1.   · a significant weakening of international law (only the UN Security Council decides on the use of force against a violator of human rights)

2.   · the marginalization of the UN which had to legitimize peace accords with Milosevic on the fait accompli basis

3.   · athe marginalization of the OSCE and the limiting of its functions to ‘soft’ security issues only

4.   · the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy being undermined since it proved to be irrelevant or impractical in conflict resolution

5.   · the impairment of NATO's credibility as a defensive alliance since it attacked a state which had not threatened any allied or other country

6.   · NATO more strongly than ever seeing itself as a global policeman, although in reality, it is supposedly a regional organization and lacks the representational legitimacy for global missions

7.   · the drawing of new divisive lines in Europe, since Russia was alienated from cooperation with the West (Russia increased its defense spending, decided to modernize its nuclear arsenal and is about to adopt a new, more anti-Western, military doctrine as a result of this alienation.)[65]

8.   · the aggravatiion of the world economic crisis due to the costs of the military operation itself, as well as the ensuing refugee problem and reconstruction program.

Despite their differences of opinion, both proponents and opponents of the NATO action tend to agree that on the threshold of the third millennium, the global governance system needs a radical reform— both institutionally and functionally.


Case study on Kosovo and global governance: fine, however it could be hyperlinked to relevant Kosovo-conflict web-material.


Questions for students from this case-study:

n    Can this intervention be interpreted as a case of ”supranational global governance”, what are arguments for/against this interpretation?

n    How did the Kosovo case change national and international security concepts?

n    What are the security perspectives on the involvement of international organizations in Kosovo?

n    Identify the roles the most influential NGOs of global character can play in solving international crises like the one of Kosovo.


     Students should work on these tasks via class discussions, writing essays, on-line discussions.


Suggested directions for further work:


Since globalization is the core issue of the modern international relations theories, it affects all the major areas of world politics. To understand the future of international relations a student should examine concrete manifestations of globalization in areas such as:

-                                 the international political economy;

-                                 communications;

-                                 social relations;

-                                 political structures;

-                                 international security;

-                                 culture; and

-                                 the environment.

Could you provide some indications how students should work on this final task?



Please provide a commented collection of links and tools like in the modules presented in Darss




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Scholte, Jan Aart (1997c), Global Trade and Fnance, in: Baylis, John; Smith, Steve (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 429-447

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Further suggestions for reading:

Aniol, Wlodzimierz (1988), Global Problems: An Ecological Paradigm, in: Coexistence 25, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers

Barry, Charles (ed.) (1996), Reforging the Trans-Atlantic Relationship, Washington: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies

Behrman, Jack N. (1974), Toward a New International Economic Order, Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs

Belis-Bergouignan, Marie-Claude; Bordenave, Gerard; Lung, Yannick (2000), Global Strategies in the Automobile Industry, in: Regional Studies, 34. 1, 41-54

Booth, Ken (1991), Security and Emancipation, in: Review of International Studies, 17, 313-326

Booth, Ken (1995), Dare not to Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future, in: Booth, Ken; Smith, Steve (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 328-350

Brown, Lester R. (1972), World Without Borders, New York: Random House

Bull, Hedley (1977), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, London: Macmillan

Butterfield, H.; Wight, Martin (ed.) (1966), Diplomatic Investigations, London: Allen and Unwin

Clemens, Walter C. (1998), Dynamics of International Relations. Conflict and Mutual Gain in an Era of Global Interdependence. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Cleveland, Harlan (1976), The Third Try at World Order. US Policy for an Interdependent World, Philadelphia: World Affairs Council of Philadelphia/Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies

Cooper, Robert (1993), Is There A New World Order?, in: Sato, Seizaburo; Taylor, Trevor (eds.), Security Challenges for Japan and Europe in a Post-Cold War World. Volume 2. Prospects for Global Order, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/International Institute for Global Peace, 8-24

Dawson, Lorne; Hennebry, Jenna (1999), New Religions and the Internet: Recruiting in a New Public Space, in: Journal of Contemporary Religion, 14. 1, 17-40

Devetak, Richard; Higgott, Richard (1999), Justice Unbound? Globalization, States and the Transformation of the Social Bond, in: International Affairs 75, 483-494

D’Orville, Hans; Najman, Dragoljub (1994), A New System to Finance the United Nations, in Security Dialogue, 25. 2, 135-144

Ernst, Dieter (1997), From Partial to Systemic Globalization: International Production Network in the Electronic Industry, Berkley: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, University of California (BRIE Working Paper No. 98)

Evans, Peter (1997), The Eclipse of State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization, in: World Politics 50. October, 61-72

Falk, R.A. (1987), The Promise of World Order, Philadelphia: Temple University Press

Fetzer, Joel (2000), Economic Self-Interest Or Cultural Marginality? Anti-Immigration Sentiment and Nativist Political Movements in France, Germany and the USA, in: Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies, 26. 1, 5-24

Fowler, Michael Ross; Bunck, Julie Marie (1996), What Constitutes the Sovereign State? in: Review of International Studies, 22, 389-402

Griffith-Jones, Stephany (2000), Towards a Better Financial Architecture, in: Journal of Human Development, 1. 1, 107-144

Gyohten, Toyoo (1992), Regionalism in a Converging World, New York: Trilateral Commission (Task Force Report 42)

Hale, Henry E. (1998), Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Applying Lessons from Soviet Disintegration to the Russian Federation. Cambridge, MA: Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University (PONARS Policy Memo Series, No. 54)

Halliday, Fred (1993), The Cold War and Its Conclusion: Consequences for International Relations Theory, in: Leaver, Richard; Richardson, James L. (eds.), The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses, Canberra: Allen & Unwin and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 11-28

Halliday, Fred (1995), The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretical Conclusions, in: Booth, Ken; Smith, Steve (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 38-61

Halliday, Fred (1996), The Future of International Relations: Fears and Hopes, in: Smith, Steve; Booth, Ken; Zalewski, Marysia (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 318-327

Henwood, D. (1997), Wall Street. How It Works and for Whom? New York

Hoffman, Stanley (1978), Primacy of World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, New York: McGraw - Hill Book Co.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1993), The Clash of Civilizations?, in: Foreign Affairs, 72. 3, 22-49

James, Paul (1997), Postdependency? The Third World in an era of Globalism and Late-Capitalism, in: Alternatives, 22. 2, 205-226

Kloskowska, Antonina (1994), National Identification and the Transgression of National Boundaries: The Steps Towards Universalization, in: Cultural Dilemmas of Post-Communist Societies, Warsaw: IFiS Publishers, 183-195

Kull, Steven (1993), Co-operation or Competition: the Battle of Ideas in Russia and the USA, Goodby, James E.; Morel, Benoit (eds.), The Limited Partnership: Building a Russian-US Security Community, New York: Oxford University Press, 209-223

Leatherman, Janie; Vayrynen, Raimo (1995), Conflict Theory and Conflict Resolution: Directions for Collaborative Research Policy, in: Cooperation and Conflict, 30. 1, 59-77

Leaver, Richard (1993), ‘Conclusion: How Certain is the Past?’, in: Leaver, Richard; Richardson, James L. (eds.), The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses, Canberra: Allen & Unwin and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 243-253

Lenzi, Guido (1995), Reforming the International System: Between Leadership and Power-Sharing, in The International Spectator, 30. 2, 49-69

Lettieri, Antonio (1966), The Social Dimension of Globalization, Amsterdam: Center for International Social Studies

Linklater, Andrew (1990a), Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, London: Macmillan

Linklater, Andrew (1990b), Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, London: Macmillan

Linklater, Andrew (1990c), The Problem of Community in International Relations, in: Alternatives, 15. 2, 135-153

Linklater, Andrew (1993), Liberal Democracy, Constitutionalism and the New World Order, in: Leaver, Richard; Richardson, James L. (eds.), The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses, Canberra: Allen & Unwin and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 29-38

Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (1992), Reconstructing World Politics: the Emergence of Global Civil Society, in Millennium, 21. 3, 392-419

Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (1997), From Place to Planet: Local Knowledge and Global Environmental Governance, in: Global Governance, 3. 1, 83-102

Lodgaard, Sverre (1996), The Crisis of Multilateralism, in Security Dialogue, 27. 3, 355-356

Lunn, Jon (1993), The Need for Regional Security Commissions Within the UN System, in Security Dialogue, 24. 4, 369-376

Mah, Jai; Tamulaitis, Donatas (2000), A Note on Investment Incentives in the WTO and Transition Economies, in: Post-Communist Economies, 12. 1, 119-130

Meyer, John W.; Boli, John; Thomas, George M.; Ramirez, Francisco O. (1997), World Society and the Nation-State, in: American Journal of Sociology, 103. 1, 139-148

Monshipouri, Mahmood; Zolty, Thaddeus C. (1993), Shaping the New World Order: America’s Post-Gulf War Agenda in the Middle East, in: Armed Forces and Society, 19. 4, 551-577

Ojala, Olli (1997), Environmental Actions in the Barents Region, in: Heininen, Lassi; Langlais, Richard (eds.), Europe's Northern Dimension: The BEAR Meets the South. Rovaniemi: University of Lapland Press, 153-158

(1955) The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, 2nd edn. London: Oxford University Press

Panayiotopoulos, Prodromos (2000), The Labor Regime Under Condition of Globalization in the Cypriot Garment Industry, in: Journal of Southern Europe & the Balkans, 2. 1, 75-88

Parekh, Bhikhu (1993), The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy, in: Held, D. (ed.), Prospects for Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 156-175

Ramberg, Bennet (eds.), Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations’ Third Debate, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1-7

Richardson, James L. (1993), The End of Geopolitics?, in: Leaver, Richard; Richardson, James L. (eds.), The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses, Canberra: Allen & Unwin and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 39-50

Rodney, Walter (1982), How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Washington, DC: Howard University Press

Rosenau, James N. (1990), Turbulence in World Politics, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf

Rosenau, James N. (1992), Governance, Order, and Change in World  Politics, in: Rosenau, James N.; Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds.), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Rosenau, James N. (1995), Security in a Turbulent World, in: Current History, 94, 592, 193-200

Stein, Arthur A. (1990), Why Nations Cooperate. Ithaca: Cornell University Press

Tanaka, Akihiko (1993), Is There a Realistic Foundation for a Liberal New World Order?, in: Sato, Seizaburo; Taylor, Trevor (eds.), Security Challenges for Japan and Europe in a Post-Cold War World. Volume 2. Prospects for Global Order, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/International Institute for Global Peace, 25-37

(1982), The Trilateral Countries in the International Economy of the 1980s. Three Essays, in: The Triangle Paper, 23

(1959), U.S. Foreign Policy: the Next Phase. Panel Report 1 of the Special Studies Report. September 4,1959. Box 9, f.117. Rockefeller Archive Center

Uzunova, Valentina; Vydrin, Valentin F. (1995), Violence as a Side Effect of the Shift of Values in Post-Totalitarian Society, in: Wiberg, Hakan (ed.), Peace and War: Social and Cultural Aspects, Warsaw: Bel Corp for UNESCO and Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 33-47

(1998) Vanishing borders: The New International Order of the 21st Century, Aldershot: Ashgate

Wade, Robert (2000), Out of the Box: Rethinking the Governance of International Financial Markets, in: Journal of Human Development, 1. 1, 145-158

White, N.D. (1998), UN Law at a Crossroads: An Analysis of the Charter in Practice, in Security Dialogue, 29. 4, 497-498

Wight, Martin (1977), Systems of States, Leicester: Leicester University Press

Yamanaka, Keiko (2000), Nepalese Labour Migration to Japan: From Global Warriors to Global Workers, in: Ethnic & Racial Studies, 23. 1, 62-93


Literature in Russian

Arakh, M. (1998), Evropeiskiy Souyz: Videnie Politicheskogo Obyedinenia [The European Union: Perspectives of a Political Alliance]. Moscow

Avdokushin, Y. F. (1996), Mezdunarodnye Ekonomicheskie Otnosheniya [International Economic Relations]. Moscow: Marketing

Buglai, Vadim; Liventsev, Nikolai (1998), Mezhdunarodnye Ekonomicheskie Otnoshenia [International Economic Relations]. Moscow: Finansy i Statistika

Bulatov, A.S. (ed.) (1999), Mirovaya Ekonomika [World Economy]. Moscow: Yurist

Dolgov, Sergei (1998), Globalizatsiya Ekonomiki: Novoye Slovo ili Yavlenie? [Economic Globalization: A New Word or Phenomenon?]. Moscow: Ekonomika

Fomichev, V.I. (1998), Mezhdunarodnaya Torgovlya [International Trade]. Moscow

Kireev, Alexei (1999), Mezhdunarodnaya Ekonomika [International Economy]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya

Krasavina, L.N. (ed.) (1994), Mezhdunarodnye Valyutno-Kreditnye i Finansovye Otnosheniya [International Monetary-Credit and Financial Relations]. Moscow: Financy i Kredit

Lebedeva, Marina (2000), Mirovaya Politika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya na Poroge Novogo Tysyacheletiya [World Politics and International Relations at the Edge of New Millenium]. Moscow: MONF

Lomakin, V.K. (ed.) (1995), Mirovaya Ekonomika [World Economy]. Moscow

Messner, Dirk (1998), Arkhitektura Mirovogo Poryadka [World Order Architecture], in: Internationale Politik, 11, 11-22

Miklashevskaya, N.A.; Kholopov, A.V. (1998), Mezhdunarodnaya Ekonomika [International Economy]. Moscow: Delo i Servis

Noskova, I.Y. (1995), Mezhdunarodnye Valyutno-Kreditnye Otnosheniya [International Monetary-Credit Relations]. Moscow: YUNITI

Noskova, I.Y.; Maksimova, L.M. (1995), Mezhdunarodnye Ekonomicheskie Otnosheniya [International Economic Relations]. Moscow: YUNITI

Nukhovich, E.S.; Smitienko, B.M.; Eskindarov, M.A. (1995), Mirovaya Ekonomika na Rubezhe 20-21h Vekov [World Economy on the Threshold of the 20th-21st Centuries]. Moscow

Rybalkin, V.E (ed.) (1996), Kratkiy Vneshekonomicheskiy Slovar-Spravochnik [Concise Dictionary-Manual on Foreign Economic Relations]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya

Rybalkin, V.E (ed.) (1997), Mezdunarodnye Ekonomicheskie Otnosheniya [International Economic Relations]. Moscow

Semenov, K.A. (1998), Mezdunarodnye Ekonomicheskie Otnosheniya [International Economic Relations]. Moscow

Semenov, K.A. (1999), Mezdunarodnye Valyutnye i Finansovye Otnosheniya [International Monetary and Financial Relations]. Moscow: TEIS

Shlikhter, S.B. (ed.) (1994), Mirovaya Ekonomika [World Economy]. Moscow

Shrepler, H-A. (1999), Mezdunarodnye Ekonomicheskie Organizatsii [International Economic Organizations]. Moscow: Mezdunarodnye Otnosheniya

Spiridonov, I.A. (1997), Mirovaya Ekonomika [World Economy]. Moscow

Torkunov, Anatoly (ed.) (1998) Sovremennye Mezdunarodnye Otnosheniya [Contemporary International Relations]. Moscow: MGIMO

Torkunov, Anatoly (ed.) (1999) Sovremennye Mezdunarodnye Otnosheniya [Contemporary International Relations]. Moscow: ROSPEN

Tsygankov, Pavel (1996), Mezdunarodnye Otnosheniya [International Relations]. Moscow: Mezdunarodnye Otnosheniya

Zagashvili, V.S. (1994), Aktualnye Problemy Vneshnekonomicheskoi Bezopasnosti Rossii [Topical Problems of Russian Economic Security]. Moscow

[1] Scholte 1997b, 14

[2] Webster 1961

[3] Scholte 1997a, 430

[4] Melucci 1996, 488-489

[5] Scholte 1997b, 14-15

[6] Tooze 1997, 217

[7] Scholte 1997c 430-435

[8] Preston 1997, 86

[9] Gupta and Govindarajan 1998

[10] Genov 1997, 409

[11] Artobolevsky 1991

[12] Modelski 1996, 331

[13] Pollins 1996, 105-106

[14] Rosenau 1982, 1-7

[15] Santoro 1992, 50

[16] Viotti and Kauppi 1993, 8-10, 449-451

[17] Russet and Starr 1992, 28

[18] Viotti and Kauppi 1993, 450-451

[19] Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978, 544

[20] Frank, 1969

[21] Amin 1978 and 1980; Barnet and Muller 1975; Emmanuel 1972; Radice 1979; and Rodney 1982

[22] Wallerstein 1974 and 1980

[23] Galtung 1971, 81-98

[24] Rosenau 1996, 256-257

[25] Mlinar 1992, 25

[26] Mlinar 1992, 26

[27] Walker 1984

[28] Walker 1984

[29] For review of this literature see Schneider and Weitsman 1997, 99

[30] Messner 1998, 13

[31] Gehring 1996, 235-243

[32] See, for example, Krasner 1983; and Stein 1990

[33] Simai 1997, 141; and Simai 1994

[34] Gehring 1996, 238-239

[35] See, for instance, Messner 1998, 14-17

[36] Messner 1998, 15-16

[37] Simai 1997, 141

[38] Messner 1998, 16

[39] Camilleri and Falk 1992, 242

[40] Galtung 1964 and 1969

[41] Finkelstein 1995, 369

[42] Uniting the Peoples and Nations 1993

[43] See, for example, Scholte 1997, 23-26

[44] Scholte 1997, 23

[45] On the evolution of the United Nations see Taylor 1997, 266-268

[46] Willetts 1997, 288.

[47] Willetts 1997, 293

[48] Willetts 1997, 299-300

[49] Goerter-Groenvik 1998, 96, 106; Ojala 1997, 154-155

[50] Summa 1997: 67

[51] Rawlingson 1997: 139; Wiberg 1998: 57-58

[52] Delbruck 1994

[53] Lawrence and Litan 1994, 2

[54] Conry 1997, 1

[55] Holmen 1997, 82

[56] Holmen 1997, 79

[57] Shachar 1990, 154-155

[58] Sutherland and Sewell 1998

[59] Baylis and Smith 1997, 10

[60] Woodward 1999, 278

[61] Linden 1999, 17

[62] Linden 1999, 17

[63] Jakobsen 1999

[64] For systemic review of anti-NATO arguments in case of the Balkan war see TFF Press Info, 30 April 1999, no. 65 (NATO's War—Boomerang Against the West); and TFF Press Info, 9 June 1999, no. 69 (The Horrendous Price of G-8 Peace)

[65] For the draft of the doctrine see Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 Oct. 1999 (in Russian)