SECURITY AGENDA
IN RUSSIA’S REGIONAL
POLITICS: INSTITUTIONAL
ACTORSHIP IN THE
GLOBAL ERA
Andrey Makarychev
Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University
Introduction
Globalization has prompted
a far-reaching and profound reconceptualisation of security relations. At the
theoretical level there has been an intensification of the debate between
various perspectives on security
According to traditional vision, power
is the key in the national security perspective, and security comes only from
the power that each country can mobilize. In this interpretation security was
almost synonymous with military power.
Starting from 1970s the new moderate
alternatives have started to erode the previous assumptions embedded in
“realpolitik” and/or neorealist logics. Security discourse has experienced a shift in focus to a stress on culture, civilization, and identity
matters; the role of ideas, norms, and values which is to be secured.
Today it is generally
accepted in the West that the concept of security, apart from military
dimension, has also an economic, a political, a socio-cultural and potentially an
ecological agendas. Security policy cannot be limited to issues directly linked
to the threat and/or the use of military force by state actors. Today’s
conflicts are often identity-driven and are marked by a large degree of emotion
and irrationality. The successful prevention and resolution of such conflicts
depends less on interstate action and more on local conditions, such as
problems relating to minority rights, human rights, environmental hazards, drug
trafficking and organized crime. The changing nature of conflict demands more
emphasis on the societal underpinnings of security[1].
Hence, the concept of security has changed over time to include dimensions
other than military strength and conflicts between states.
Thus, globalization has put under
question the relevance of the old understanding of security as being related to
purely military issues. Nowadays security is determined mostly by the scale of
integration of the country into international institutions and processes, which
is the challenge for Russian federal and regional elites.
The core problem is that Russia has
adopted a neo-realist approach to international relations and their security
components, which is clearly reflected by the Military Doctrine of 21 April
2000, and the Foreign Policy Concept of 10 July 2000. The state is currently
perceived to be the key actor in security issues, which means that sub-federal
units are not treated as instruments of security-building. There is yet no comprehensive concept of
subnational security in Russia’s regions. Security analysis at the regional
level is not widely used in Russia at all, yet there is growing understanding
that security could be tackled regionally. This is a clear evidence of
the federal center’s neglect of the importance of regional actors in the
security making process.
Meanwhile, in a globalized world new
non-traditional sources of insecurity need to be addressed, and Russia has yet
to adopt the extended concept of security to include regions as important
elements of pan-Russian security architecture in order to combat and ameliorate
current threats.
In intellectual terms,
security building is rarely analyzed through the prism of interest groups
politics. My approach in this paper is that security making is a process of
creating those conditions that are conducive to implementation of basic
interests of security actors[2].
Regional branches of federal security services (FSB), individual enterprises of
military industrial complex, regional governments, and federal districts have
good perspectives to play a larger role in Russia’s security institutional
infrastructure, which makes them institutional actors.
1. FEDERAL SECURITY
INSTITUTIONS IN RUSSIA’S REGIONS
1.1.The role and mission of FSB in the regions
There is a number of
federal actors in charge of building regional security infrastructure. The most
important of them are regional branches of FSB (Federal Security Service).
Usually they work in close touch with regional branches of the Ministry of
Emergency Situations (rescue operations, natural disasters and man-made
catastrophes, etc.), Interior Ministry, and other federal agencies. FSB
functions in the regions are rather broad and include:
-
Counter-intelligence. The scale of counter-intelligence activity is
remarkable: thus, according to the head of Nizhny Novgorod oblast FSB branch
Vladimir Bulavin, each year his agency files to the courts about 30 cases of
espionage and anti-constitutional crimes[3].
In one of most publicized cases of espionage, Voronezh FSB office has charged
the US citizen John Edward Tobbin with drug trafficking and recruiting Russian
citizens to work for US intelligence[4].
Omsk FSB office has issued a warning statement to US lecturer Elizabeth
Smith accusing her in collecting
classified information about defense industry in this Siberian region[5].
In 2001 in Cheliabinsk oblast FSB authorities have arrested the citizen of
Turkey who is known for his close relations with the Turkish intelligence MIT[6].
-
Counter-terrorism. According to FSB headquarters, “Brothers Muslims”
extremist organization has established its hidden structures in 49 regions of
Russia[7].
Of course, FSB pays special attention to the southern regions bordering with
Chechnia (Stavropol krai, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and other
regions)[8].
In Dagestan, local FSB office in cooperation with Interpol and Russia’s public
prosecutor’s office has initiated a number of legal actions aimed at
identification and seizure of most dangerous terrorists charged with committing
war crimes in territories adjacent to Chechnia[9].
Volgograd oblast is believed to be one of the most vulnerable regions because
of its hydro-electric and heat power stations, gas reservoirs, and chemical
industry[10].
In Rostov oblast FSB officers had detained a group of mercenaries affiliated
with “Tiger of Liberation of Tamil Ilama” terrorist organization from Sri Lanka[11].
In Perm’ oblast a junior camp was discovered which was used by wahhabits to
train their adepts[12].
In Novosibirsk local FSB office has arrested two citizens of neighboring
Kazakhstan who were trying to sell a radioactive substance[13].
A similar case was registered in Nizhny Tagil (Sverdlovsk oblast)[14].
In Voronezh oblast, local FSB board along with other security units (Ministry
of Interior, Ministry of Atomic Energy, and Ministry of Emergency Situations)
regularly conduct training exercises to prevent diversions and sabotage in the
territory of local atomic station[15].
-
Licensing of operations with classified information. In 1999 FSB has
frozen the Saratov State University license for working with top-secret data in
retaliation for improper state of security clearance. It also has issued
several warning statements to the regional government[16].
-
Supervising military industry production. FSB regional offices keep an
eye on property protection in the military industrial complex. The Federal Law
on Bankruptcy of January 8, 1998 has lessened the possibilities of the state to
control the procedure of bankruptcies of the industrial enterprises, including
military ones. Not surprisingly, under the pressure of commercial interests
(like selling out industrial assets), the growing number of military
enterprises became bankrupts. In violation of the legislation, those cases were
frequently taken to the open court sessions, and arbitration management functions
were given to persons with no security clearance and due training[17].
In some cases, the new owners of military enterprises have neglected security
regime regulations. According to FSB data, the most serious damage to national
security interests was caused by attempts to bankrupt Construction Bureau of
Chemical Automatics in Voronezh, “Impuls” in St.Petersburg, “Avangard” and Mil
Helicopter Plant in Moscow, and other strategically important enterprises[18].
In all cases FSB has effectively interfered to protect the national security
interests.
-
Export control. For example, in 2000 Voronezh office of FSB has charged
the state-owned Construction Bureau of Chemical Automatics with illegal
transfer to US “Aeroject” company of documents containing classified data on
SSME missile engine[19].
-
Overviewing and monitoring computer crimes. These include illegal
broadcasting, illicit use of databases, etc[20].
-
Defending the constitutional order. This is a political function that
implies identifying those candidates running in the local elections that use
illegal funding and are in close relations with the criminal groups[21].
1.2. Federal districts
and their security profiles
The division of Russia in seven administrative districts
created a new framework for security relations. The
new “super-regions” coincide closely with pre-existing military districts, and
five of the seven appointees hold the rank of general. This makes one assume
that security matters will be given a high priority in each of the newly
created “fiefdoms”[22].
All presidential
representatives – being members of the Security Council of the Russian
Federation – are heavily involved in resolving a plethora of security-related
issues like protecting external borders, reviving military industries,
undertaking counter-terrorist measures, upgrading transportation and
communication networks, etc. Yet three of the district heads pay special
attention to security matters.
In North West Federal District, Viktor Cherkesov was
the first Presidential representative to create Coordination Board for Security
Management to include all regional chiefs in charge of military planning and
emergency management. Its functions extend beyond purely defense issues to
encompass also social and economic forecasts, law enforcement, etc.[23]
He also stays in close touch with directors of military plants and factories
located in the district.
Southern Federal District (SoFD) is marked by clear
domination of security issues with Chechia in its core. Viktor Kazantsev,
presidential representative in SoFD, has to perform important security policy
functions. In particular, he was in charge of convincing the PACE delegation visiting
Chechnia in January 2001 that there are no human right abuses in this
break-away region. To effectively tackle security challenges, Kazantsev
advocates the necessity of strengthening his apparatus.
In Volga Federal District (VFD) the main security
impetus is made on dismantling chemical weaponry. 5 out of 7 Russian chemical
weapon producers and 80% of all chemical weapon stocks are located in VFD,
mainly in Udmutria, Kirov and Saratov oblasts[24].
In 2001 Sergei Kirienko, President’s envoy in VFD, has received the post of the
chairman of the State Commission on Chemical Disarmament.
Russia has world largest depositories of chemical weapons,
totaling about 40 thousand tons. In 1997, having introduced the law on chemical
disarmament and joined the international convention on chemical
non-proliferation, Russia pledged to get rid of all its chemical arsenals
within 10 years. In exchange the Western countries had agreed to finance some
of the facilities related to practical implementation of chemical disarmament
program. To honor its international obligations, Russia had to raise RUR 9
billion by 2002, which is far beyond expenses that were stipulated in the
federal budget[25]. The
problem was exacerbated by the United States which had frozen their financial
assistance referring to Russia’s inability to raise matching funds.
Sergei Kirienko was quick to elevate chemical disarmament
issues to the very top of the operational agenda of the presidential
representative office in VFD. It is still too early to speculate whether this
problem will be solved more effectively by sub-national (district- and
region-level) authorities than on federal level.
One of the main constrains is money. On the one hand,
Kirienko has promised to rely exclusively upon Russian technologies in
dismantling chemical weapons production. On the other hand, international
cooperation is critical for duly implementing the whole program. Kirienko has
to use every opportunity for fundraising. Thus, he had to address directly the
Queen of the Netherlands asking her for making financial contribution to
chemical weapons destruction[26].
However, Russia has to rely basically on those limited
resources that are currently available. In June 2001 in Shchuchie (Kurgan
oblast) a new complex for chemical disarmament was inaugurated, co-sponsored in
equal shares by the federal targeted program on “Destroying chemical arms in
Russia” run by Russian Ammunition Agency, and 11 Western countries[27].
The first facility to reprocess the chemical is to be opened
in Gorny (Saratov Oblast)[28].
Again, international contribution plays an important role here. EU TACIS
Program has funded ecological monitoring project[29],
and all works are being done under permanent control of foreign observers[30].
Another important challenge is the issue of transporting
the chemical materials. According to the Russian law, chemical stuff has to be
destroyed “on spot”, i.e. at the place where is was preserved. Kirienko insists
that the chemical weapons might be transported either within subjects of
federation, or from one subject of federation to another where the technical
facilities are more adequate[31].
Since this approach is a departure from the law, Kirienko deems that the law
has to be amended or altered in as open way as possible[32].
The third challenge is safety. In Gorny, for example,
there were cases of chemical leakage that immediately raised fears among local
population[33].
The last but not the least, timing is an
important issue. Kirienko is certain that Russia will be unable to meet the
deadline in 2007, and needs an extension to 2012.
1.3. Regions’ contribution to the federal security
It is
only by integrating regions into the security system that Federation can be
stabilised. There are several reasons explaining why regions have a greater
role to play in stabilising the Federation and addressing security threats:
-
regions can be sources of insecurity (border areas, specifically in the
Caucasus);
-
security structures can be regionalised;
-
security issues can be transregional in character, which stresses
increasing the strategic importance of regional integration into a security
system that addresses the new threats.
Regions’
persistence in implementing their security agendas is explained by the fact
that very often regional elites are forced to solve themselves - with no
sufficient aid from Moscow - problems of illegal immigration, fortification of
borders, soft security issues, customs regulations, anti-criminal measures.
An important set of regional problems
related directly to the defence and security domain is the installation of the
Russian troops evacuated from the "Near Abroad". As a rule, the
newcomers in military uniform are an additional burden for regional
authorities, which might create obstacles for carrying out Russian
international obligations. The capabilities of regions to accommodate the
troops pulled out from abroad were directly influencing the schedule of
evacuation and, hence, the state of Russian relations with the countries under
consideration.
The war in Chechnia brings another example. It is however quite symptomatic that some
regional chief executives
refused to send to battlefield soldiers recruited from their provinces or pledged
to pick them out. Taking into account accelerating pressure of the Defence
Ministry to increase the number of draftees, one can predict the resistance to
these plans from the part of some regions.
In many respects regions and cities might perform important
federal level security functions. Thus, according to the “Law on Bordering
Territory in the Orenburg oblast” adopted by the regional legislature, the
organs of local self-government (i.e., cities), along with enterprises, public
organizations and institutions have their share of responsibility in guarding
the border regime[34]. The mayor
of Kaliningrad, Yurii Savenko, is one of most internationally oriented
municipal leaders in Russia. He is a
permanent participant of debates concerning relations between Russia and the
EU, Russian security policy in the Baltic Sea, etc.[35]
In the ethnically divided regions (Dagestan), as well as in those where the
power on the regional level is either paralyzed (Chechnia) or unstable
(Karachaevo-Cherkessia), traditional institutions of local self-government play
important security functions in terms of preventing civil wars and atrocities.
The governors
complain that they have no sufficient influence upon the security actors operated in their territories.
Alexander Rutskoi, former chief executive of Kursk oblast, has expressed his
dissatisfaction with the fact that local FSB office is subordinated directly to
Moscow. In his opinion, the governors have to be consulted at least in operational situations[36].
In practice, the governors and the
federal security institutes have to deal with each other in solving a plethora
of practical security issues.
The regions’ resources could be mustered for implementing
Russian foreign policy and security objectives. First, regional administrations
patronize security infrastructure located in their territories. In particular,
they:
-
Decide on transferring the property of former military installations
that were either moved from the regions or transformed. Thus, these were Nizhny
Novgorod oblast authorities that took under their supervision the property of
Airborne Division located in Istomino and High Artillery School[37].
-
Initiate upgrading the military institutions. For example, it was the
Saratov oblast governor Dmitry Aiatskov who càme up with the idea of
establishing – under the auspices of Defense Ministry - the Military University
in this region[38].
-
Patronize military installations and bases. Thus, Byisk city authorities
(Altai krai) on the regular basis render financial help to the neighboring
border guard unit[39]. Kursk
oblast administration was in charge of providing some material assistance to
“Kursk” submarine[40]. The
municipal authorities of Ekaterinburg financially help the submarine bearing
the name of the city[41].
The same type of relationship links Nizhny Novgorod oblast with nine warships.
In response, the naval authorities accept the draftees from the regions they
are linked with. Of course, securing due financing is a problem. To upgrade of
one of warships – “Ochakov” – the Nizhny Novgorod oblast administration has
come up with the idea of using the funds that the federal budget owed to the
region[42]. Even regional
enterprises – like GAZ car-building factory - patronize military ships and
provide training facilities and courses for future draftees that are willing to
serve in the Black Sea. The city districts as well have their say in security
issues. In July 2000 the administration of Sovetsky city district of Nizhny
Novgorod signed an agreement on cooperation with the Submarine Division of the
Black Sea Fleet Headquarters providing the marines with medicaments, food,
technical equipment and literature.
-
Grant tax privileges to military enterprises (as implemented in
Territorial and Industrial Zones in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast)[43];
-
Are in charge of providing due social and financial assistance to the
families of the dead soldiers and officers, and commemorating their memories[44].
This is the governors’ responsibility to take care of a plethora of social
issues like medical treatment, housing, summer recreation, and others. These were
regional and municipal administration that took care of providing the families
of crew members of the “Kursk” submarine that sank in August 2000 in the
Barents Sea[45].
Second, certain regional leaders might be useful as
mediators or negotiators (formal or informal) in those cases when the Russian
government either lacks official instruments or wishes to stay behind the
scene. It is very much telling that Vladimir Putin’s aide Sergey Yastrzhembsky
recognized that the leaders of certain subjects of the federation with the consent of the federal government kept
up relations with the president of Chechnia, Alan Maskhadov[46].
Most likely he meant the leaders of North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Tatarstan who
on numerous occasions raised their voices in favor of negotiating with
Maskhadov. Tatarstan was particularly active in internationally advertising its
peace-keeping initiatives. Rafael Khakim, political advisor to the President of
Tatarstan, propagated the idea that Tatarstan might represent the interests of
the Russian Federation in international Islamic organizations[47]
and thus foster security dialogue. The President of Tatarstan in 1995 (along
with the Dutch Foreign Ministry, Harvard University, Carnegie Endowment, and
IREX) initiated a series of round table discussions called “The Hague
Initiative” aimed at finding non-violent political solutions to regional
conflicts in Abkhazia (Georgia), Trans-Dniestria (Moldova), Crimea (Ukraine),
and Chechnia[48]. In
particular, the principle of “delayed decision” in Chechnia was proposed by the
“Hague Initiative” and later implemented in the Khasaviurt Agreements signed by
Alexander Lebed with the rebels in 1996. To maintain politically its presence
in the turbulent North Caucasus area and act in parallel with foreign NGOs, the
President of Tatarstan in February 1995 established the office of Tatarstan’s representative
in Ingushetia on humanitarian issues (medical care, food supplies, etc.).
Third, region-based
industrial projects might have an impact on the national security as a whole.
For example, Kakha Bendukidze, an owner of “United Machine Building Plants”
corporation, pledged to create technological complex of enterprises located in
Nizhny Novgorod, St.Petersburg, Ekaterinburg and Astrakhan’ strategically aimed
at providing infrastructure for exploiting and processing oil resources in the
Caspian sea. In case of implementation this project might give important
competitive advantages for Russian business and security interests in this
area.
Fourth, border regions are of
special importance for federal security. Lack of full-blooded borders converted
many of these regions to paradise for illegal immigrants from the Southern
republics. This was a matter of insistent concern from the part of Russian
security services claiming that the lack of adequate law enforcement mechanisms
entails all-Russian security problems (illegal border-crossing, smuggling,
etc.).
In
the “new frontier” regions (like for example in Cheliabinsk oblast bordering
with Kazakhstan) it is the practice to contract local people for servicing the
border-control units[49]. Similarly, according to the agreement signed
between the Federal Border-control Service and the administration of the
Yamal-Nenets autonomous district, local conscripts are to be recruited for
military stations located in this area[50].
In its turn, the administration of the district provides financial support to
the frontier-guards.
It was the Karelian government which introduced the regional
program of modifying and developing customs units across the border with
Finland to help the federal security agencies[51].
The administration of St. Petersburg signed agreements with two Russian
military units located in Tajikistan pledging to provide them with food and
medical supplies[52]. In a
similar endeavor the administration of the Dudinka sea port took responsibility
for the Taimyr border-control unit[53].
In the Kurgan oblast the “Corps of Frontier-guards” was created to help
soldiers stationed in the region and retired officers[54].
The governors of the Volgograd and Briansk oblasts launched regional programs
to financially assist military servicemen, who participated in anti-terrorist
campaigns and military conflicts[55].
In the territories neighboring Chechnia
(mainly in the Stavropol krai and Dagestan[56])
local authorities had to begin passport control in order to deal with migrant
influx. 23 regional computer networks were established recently in order to
monitor foreigners residing in specific areas and ban the entrance of religious
extremists, criminals, etc. In March 2000 the government of Karelia created a
commission to regulate the inflow of foreign workers to this republic[57].
Similar measures were introduced in the Belgorod oblast[58].
Authorities in the border regions have
to tackle, on a regular basis, the “dark side” of internationalisation – crime,
illegal fishing, hunting, border-crossing or smuggling (drugs, guns, undeclared
cash, etc.). In the Far East, for example, numerous cases of murders among
Chinese entrepreneurs – the bulk of them executed by Chinese gangs – are
registered each year[59].
As a result, security services in border regions have to perform protective
functions and shield off those threats stemming from their frontier location.
In Sakhalin, for instance, a special military command unit was created in March
2000 to prevent illegal fishing. According to the regional customs office, more
than 75% of all local seafood products are each year illegally transported to
Japan[60].
Valentin Stepankov, deputy representative of the President
in the Volga Federal District, was quite explicit in saying that non-protected
border is the cause of illegal migration and religious extremists. In the
meanwhile, because of weak border protection Russia loses raw materials, food,
stolen cars and other contraband items[61].
There is a number of most acute border security problems:
n Lack of federal
resources for adequately protecting the border. In practice, as it was shown
earlier, these are regional administrations that provide frontier troops with
housing, transportation, energy supply, and building or overhauling frontier
posts.
n Substantial
increase of the geographical area to be covered by frontier guards. According
to Vladimir Egorov, Volga Customs director, one of the problems is that customs
offices are located far away from border-crossing stations. The second
troubling issue he addressed is the practice of recruiting customs officers
among local population which increases possibilities for corruption.
n Weak coordination
between customs service, border-guards and railway authorities in preventing
smuggling and other illegal actions.
n Ethnic and
religious extremism. For instance, in Kalmykia security is challenged by
violent ethnic clashes between local residents and natives of neighboring
Dagestan[62].
2. REGIONAL SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE
My assumption in this paper is that
security might be achieved on a regional (sub-national) level, and there is
necessity to integrate regions into Russia’s security system. In this sense
security and regionality are pretty much compatible, and conceptually reinforce
each other.
2. 1.
Defense industry as a part of regional security system
After the
demise of the USSR the military industry went through a very uneasy and
difficult period. Many experts
believe that there are serious negative implications of Russian regionalization for existing export control
arrangements, since leaders in Tatarstan and some other republics have achieved
some powers over export and raised anxiety among Russian and foreign diplomats.
"Much of Russia's military-industrial complex are located in republics and
oblasts inclined towards a more independent status...If the republics and
oblasts gain greater autonomy, one suspects that controlling exports would
become increasingly difficult"[63].
Another report states that "regional R&D activities will grow
increasingly independent of the centre. In this case, the regions might become
autonomous arms exporters, with other countries as their central client rather
than Moscow"[64]. However,
it is dubious that independent-minded regions like Tatarstan might gain indeed
the direct access to the international arms market. All major weapon-producing
factories are still dependent on Moscow in terms of orders and money supply.
The Centre, by the same token, is increasingly reluctant to place substantial
orders to the enterprises located in potentially explosive regions if there is
a plausible alternative.
Nevertheless, a number of regions with
strong presence of local military-industrial complex are developing their own
projects related to military and security domain. The much discussed problem of
reconversion is the point. The Defence Ministry is forced to co-ordinate the
plans and programs of military reconversion with the regional authorities,
heeding their needs and possibilities. For highly militarised regions, such as
Udmurtia, for example, where 80 percent of overall production used to come
formerly from defence plants, the lock-out of the bulk of military enterprises
might trigger mass-scale unemployment and entail undesirable social upheavals.
Position taken by the arm-producing regions was one of the factors determining
the standpoint of the Russian authorities in favour of increasing arms sales
abroad. Simultaneously, faced with drastic cuts in military orders and the
absence of a viable state conversion program, certain regions took some steps
in developing their own initiatives, trying to rely on "self-financing of
conversion", i.e. through the sale of oil and locally produced weaponry.
The first deputy chairman of the Udmurtia Council of Ministers, Vitaly
Soloviov, in 1993 accused the state export company in misadvising the local
authorities on which of their weapons were exportable - while Moscow told them there
were no world market for Kalashnikov guns, local manufacturers knew better the
subject.
Many enterprises in 1990s were privatized, but it didn’t help
much since the Soviet style managers have kept the plants and factories under
their control. As soon as the state contracts drastically decreased, they
became unable to introduce new marketing practices and make the enterprises
work effectively. That is why the military enterprises meet such severe
difficulties in restructuring and changing their priorities. As Sergey
Nedoroslev, the President of “Kaskol”
corporation, has put it, Russian defense industry lacks high quality
management and strategic planning, which strongly impedes its modernization and
effective international cooperation[65].
The restructuring of numerous research institutions
and military equipment producers in Russia’s regions is hindered by the lack of starting capital,
“brain drain”, poor marketing services, ignorance of international technical
standards and safety norms, insufficient awareness about consumer regulations
and registration norms in the West. Direct commercial contacts between regional enterprises and their foreign
partners are being developed mostly with non-Western countries (China, India,
Middle East countries)[66]. Many defense enterprises have
huge debts[67].
Many regional experts assume that state funding for innovative scientific research is missing. They call for concentration of financial and material resources in top-priority areas of applied science and industry. Kakha Bendukidze, Russian tycoon with financial interests in many Russian regions, assumes that the bulk of military enterprises would be unable to build a few submarines because of the lack of well trained personnel technical backwardness.
Quite telling is the situation with those enterprises forming
the core of regional military-industrial complex in Nizhny Novgorod oblast -
“Lazurit” and “Krasnoe Sormovo” which produced diverse defence equipment,
including much-needed - in the aftermath of the accident with “Kursk” submarine
- rescue submarines “Bester” and “Priz”. Due to lack of proper funds, this
equipment was not upgraded since mid-1980s and nowadays is not used properly[68].
According to “Lazurit” Director Nikolay Kvasha, the current technical
possibilities of this enterprise are rather scarce: it will take about 15 years
to build the new atomic submarine, and from 20 to 22 years to produce from 5 to
7 of them, provided - quite hypothetically - that there will be no deficit of
federal funding[69]. “Lenok”
rescue submarine which was designed by “Lazurit”, constructed in “Krasnoe
Sormovo” and sent to the North Sea Fleet in 1980s, is out of order because of
financial constrains, and can’t be recovered[70].
Other examples are more promising. OKBM, major producer of
atomic reactors located in Nizhny Novgorod as well, according to its director
Alexander Kiriushin, was able to secure sizeable funds due to its contracts
with India, China and Iran and create thousands of new jobs in Nizhny Novgorod[71].
Sarov nuclear center had managed to diversify its civic output processing
diamonds and producing wine[72].
The state policy is that the military contracts will be
distributed among the most effective enterprises, regardless of who their
owners are, the state itself or Russian private financial groups. There are
strong evidences that President Putin adequately understands the need for
partnership with those FIGs that financially control defense enterprises.
“Interros” corporation led by one of Russian tycoons Vladimir Potanin is a good
example of state – business positive interaction in defense industry.
“Interros” is known for effective management of several defense enterprises –
“Baltiisky zavod”, LOMO and “Severnaya verf” in St.Petersburg, Sukhoy
Construction Bureau, Kovrov Mechanical Plant, Moscow Radiotechnical Plant.
Another example is “Kaskol” corporation headed by Sergey Nedoroslev which owns
significant shares of “Rosvertol” company in Moscow, “Gidromash” and ‘Sokol”
plants (Nizhny Novgorod). “Uralmash”, “Izhorskie zavody” and “Krasnoe Sormovo”
plants – all with strong defense industry affiliation - are controlled by Kakha
Bendukidze financial group[73]. Resources of FIGs might be instrumental in
upgrading marketing and management of major defense enterprises.
By 2000 it became clear that in order to survive, the
military industrial complex enterprises have to become better integrated. For
example, in 2000 “Rybinskie motory” (Yaroslavl oblast) has merged with “Liulka
Saturn” (Moscow city) in order to finalize together the project of creating
Al-41 engine for fighter aircraft. According to estimates, $ 300 million has to
be raised for this purpose, with only 25% of state funding, which of course is
a great relieve for Russia’s federal budget.
In
Volga
Federal District the
pioneers of defense industry enlargement were radio-electronic enterprises that
in summer 2001 have formed three corporations (“Radar”, “Radiopribor” and “ATC”[74]).
Each of them is supposed to get preferential treatment from the federal
government (their debts will be restructured, and the federal contracts will be
secured)[75].
Another form of defense industry integration is “2015 Club”
(the year of presumably Russia’s breakthrough in the world hi-tech market)
whose President is Sergei Nedoroslev, the head of “Kaskol” corporation[76].
The Club’s mission is to promote Russian projects in electronics, aircraft
industry and machine building to the international markets.
2.2. Military and
security officers as regional politicians
As a result of performing
their security functions, the heads of local FSB branches and other security
units have become influential public figures in their respective regions.
Usually they are in the very top of regional ratings of the most influential
actors. They have to play their roles in shaping information and industrial
policies.
Using military and security structures for civilian
governance do not correspond to classic democratic standards, yet several
high-ranking military officers have made civil political careers under Yeltsin
- Ruslan Aushev in Ingushetia, Alexander Lebed’ in Krasnoyarsk krai, Alexei
Lebed’ in Khakassia, Alexander Rutskoi in Kursk oblast, and Aslan Maskhadov in
Chechnia.
Choosing the “men in uniform” as the governors, the regions
have experimented with a peculiar type of response to the security challenges.
As Steven Main puts it, the generals “know how to obey orders and understand
the importance of working with a clearly defined hierarchy and, where one does
not already exist, they will create it… You cannot find more manageable
governors than generals”[77].
This assessment seems to exaggerate the ability of the
federal center to politically control the governors with military background.
In many cases they became overt opponents of Moscow. Ruslan Aushev, for
example, not only refused to subordinate to the Presidential representative in
the Southern Federal District, but also openly accused the 58th Army
in committing an outrage upon the monuments of historical and cultural
significance in Dagestan[78].
Alexander Lebed’
seems to be the most internationally reputed of all generals turned into
governors. Before being elected as the head of Krasnoyarsk krai, he was known
for his peace keeping efforts in Trans-Dniestr region and Chechnia (he signed
famous Khasaviurt agreements for Russian government that stopped the bloodshed
in 1996). His political views were a mix of patriotic traditionalism,
pragmatism and moderate liberalism. Lebed’ is widely known in the West -
sufficient is to recall that prior to his victorious campaign in Krasnoyarsk
krai he went to USA discussing there for ten days the perspectives of
investments[79]. Foreign
observers have ascribed to him “enormous political strength... Only Lebed’ ...
can blame the new suffering on old policies, remove old officials en masse and
institute a new policy that gives people some hope that the new suffering will
pay out”[80].
Yet those hopes - both international and domestic - proved to
be exaggerated and misleading. Neither of the regional military of the “first
wave” became a nation-wide leader. The ex-military in their capacity of
regional politicians got involved into harsh economic and political collisions.
Alexander Rutskoi, the governor of Kursk oblast, had enormous tensions with
local elites and the federal law-enforcement agencies in the region, which
finally had led to the end of his political career in the region[81].
Alexander Lebed’ got a very controversial reputation by calling for a
dictatorship in Russia[82]
and relying on forceful methods in solving political disputes[83].
It is believed that
under President Putin the military received a new impulse to go into politics.
In fall 2000 several of them won the governorship - Vladimir Egorov in
Kaliningrad, Vladimir Shamanov in Ulyanovsk, Vladimir Kulakov in Voronezh. In
Mari El, Kursk and Cheliabinsk oblasts the military candidates finished rather
close to the winners[84].
It is hard to unequivocally ascertain however that penetration
of the military into regional politics is a deliberate strategy of the federal
government. Nonetheless, increasing number of generals in Russian political
life speak for a new formula of governance Putin is about to introduce. The
case of Vladimir Egorov, the Baltic Fleet commander, supported by Vladimir
Putin in his bid for a governor’s seat in Kaliningrad oblast, reflects the
presidential approach to tighten methods of governance over military and
strategically important centers and border regions having complicated
geopolitical surrounding.
The eventual militarization of Russian politics is a
matter of major concern in the civil society. On the other hand, the paradox is
that the military governors might foster liberal reforms in the regions. Thus,
the new governor of Voronezh oblast pledged to take this region away from
stagnating “red belt”[85],
while the administration of the Kaliningrad governor has signed the contract
with pro-Western Yegor Gaidar’s think tank to draft the strategic program for
regional development.
3. NON-STATE
ACTORS OF REGIONAL SECURITY
There are a number of non-state security actors operating in
the regions. First, these are Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers. They are helpful
in providing legal assistance to the draftees[86],
sponsoring mothers’ visits to Chechnia, organizing anti-war actions, and helping
the families of those soldiers who were dead or incapacitated during their
military service.
Cossacks
are another type of important non-state security actors, especially in border
regions. Before the 1917
Revolution Cossack units were quite instrumental in keeping order in the most
dangerous and permeable zones of the state border. The current Russian
government is not inimical to the revival of Cossack settlements, but they can
hardly be considered as a substitute to the regular troops. The fears are that
regional Cossack regiments could become out of control and side up with
nationalist forces.
In Krasnodar and Altai krais, as well as in some other
border provinces, Cossack units are in charge of pre-service training exercises
of young men, and providing them with material
allowance[87]. In recent
years Cossacks have started elaborating projects in education, environment,
culture, trade and investments, and combating organized crime which might destabilise
regions[88].
Cossacks of Stavropol krai had pledged to block proliferation of religious
Islamic extremism among ethnic minorities in Northern Caucasus[89].
Ramil Mullaiamov, chief of South-Eastern regional department
of the Federal Border Service, have said that this agency conducted an
experiment with changing regular border-guarding troops to non-military units,
yet it failed to bring positive results[90].
Generally speaking, activities of Cossack units in border territories claiming
to play more significant role in defending the border is a highly controversial
issue. From one hand, the whole set of border-related matters can’t be solved
without involving local population, including Cossacks as its most organized
force. The Cossacks have their own - inherited from the past centuries - system
of inspecting the borderland, which could compliment other security appliances
(barbed wire, electronic alarm system, etc.). Yet on the other hand, by law Cossacks (as well as other self-ruled
groups) are not supposed to participate in protecting the state border. Among
factors that complicate interaction between the Cossack units and frontier-guards
are widely spread among Cossacks nationalist and jingoist feelings, numerous
complains from the local population accusing the Cossacks in extortion, and
internal conflicts in the Cossack communities[91].
Business institutions
are also among contributors to regional security build up. “Partniorstvo”
Association from Nizhny Novgorod has initiated the fundraising for Volga &
Viatka Anti-Criminal Militia Unit temporarily located in Chechnia. As a result,
an armored carrier was purchased and sent to Chechnia[92].
A good evidence of changes in Russia’s security policies is
given by the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), formerly one of the closest
and least transparent security institutions in Russia. Minatom is known for its
intolerance to the public opinion and activities of NGOs[93].
Yet the perspectives of importing used nuclear fuel to Russia have forced
Minatom, the key decision maker in this area, go public with its arguments. The
debates on reprocessing nuclear fuel
became a high-profile issue all across Russia, but specifically in those
regions which were supposed to storage nuclear waste imported from abroad.
Minatom had to take the lead in the coalition to lobby for importing used
nuclear fuel, to include administrations of those plants which will be assigned
to reprocess the irradiated waste (Rostov Atomic Station[94],
Zheleznogorsk Mining and Chemical Plant[95],
“Mayak” Factory in Cheliabinsk oblast[96],
OKBM in Nizhny Novgorod[97],
and others), “Kurchatov Institute” Director Evegeny Velikhov[98],
the Noble Prize Winner Zhores Alfiorov[99],
and other influential figures. The “pro-waste” coalition worked hard to
convince the regional communities that the issue has to be tackled primarily by
professionals. They blamed their opponents in spreading unsubstantiated nuclear
alarmism and reportedly helping other countries – mainly France and Great
Britain - to push Russia out of the world nuclear market.
For many enterprises the importation of nuclear waste is the
sole sources of stable income – for example, “Mayak” factory might earn as much
as USD 60 million for thorough conversion of nuclear fuel – basically coming
from Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, and Ukraine - into
safe stuff subject to inter[100].
For Russia as a whole the net revenue for utilization of nuclear waste is
assessed as much as USD 600 million per year[101].
Alexander Rumiantsev, the head of Minatom, has pledged to spend one fourth of
the funds earned for improving environmental programs in those regions where
the state of ecology is most deplorable (including the territories of Northern
and Black Sea Fleets)[102].
Another 25 per cent will go to the administrations of those regions where the
nuclear waste will be dealt with[103].
Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of Russian people (about
80 per cent, according to June 2001 polls) are strongly against having in
country nuclear materials taken from other countries[104].
Reacting to high public sensitivity to this issue, the bulk of regional
politicians has declared their disagreements with Minatom plans to host and
deposit in Russia foreign nuclear waste. Nizhny Novgorod Regional Legislature,
for example, in June 2001 has voted for banning the importation of nuclear
waste to the region[105].
Grigory Yavlinsky, the head of “Yabloko” party, has proclaimed the initiative
to conduct the referendum on this matter in 49 subjects of Russian Federation[106].
The whole story of used nuclear waste has explicitly
demonstrated that security building in Russia is a very complex process which
includes constant interaction and communication between state and non-state
actors, parliamentary and legislative work, public relations and media
campaigns[107]. For
example, the governor of Krasnoyarsk krai Alexander Lebed’ has succeeded in
convincing Minatom to conclude a number of legally binding documents with this
region, including a declaration on intentions with clear indication of the
benefits the regions is to get from its participation in nuclear waste
reprocessing, the budget and the business plan. In Lebed’s words, only after
considering Minatom papers the regional administration will take the final
decision on its participation in the whole project[108].
Cheliabinsk oblast also gives a good illustration of changing
nature of sub-national security building. In 2001 Cheliabinsk Regional
Legislature has instituted an ad-hoc Commission to ponder the nuclear waste
issue and weight all pros and cons[109].
Local environmental NGOs (“Movement for Nuclear Security”, “Ekofront”, “Techa”,
“Legal Awareness”) were instrumental in drawing public attention to the problem
by arranging pickets and demonstrations in protest against Minatom policies[110].
Anti-nuclear activists argue that their region won’t get enough funds out of
what Russia will get from nuclear waster exporters, referring to wide spread
corruption in the government and lack of due financial control from the part of
the state[111].
Environmentalists repeatedly remind that it was “Mayak” plant in Cheliabinsk
oblast where the major nuclear accident has happened in 1957[112].
In Kurgan oblast similar public actions were organized by
“Yabloko” party and the Union of Right-Wing Forces[113].
In Novorossiisk, the city which by decree of its legislature as early as in the
beginning of 1990s was proclaimed nuclear free zone, a group of anti-nuclear
activists in 2001 has started to collect signatures against Minatom projects[114].
In Nizhny Novgorod oblast environmentalists from “Dront” association have
publicly complained that the authorities refused to release information
concerning the perspectives of nuclear waster reprocessing in Sarov Federal
Nuclear Center, and have promised to bring the issue to the courts in due time[115].
Raising public awareness of nuclear issues is of course a good
sign of opening up the whole set of issues related to security imperatives. Yet
the negative side of the story is that security issues have become a part of PR
negative campaigning in regional elections. Nizhny Novgorod oblast gives a
signal of this trend. Vadim Bulavinov who was running for Nizhny Novgorod
governorship in July 2001 was falsely accused in “nuclear wrecking”, namely
covertly assisting the transportation of dangerous substances to the nuclear
depository in Semionov, and allegedly being sponsored by foreign countries that
would like to see Russia ecologically degradating[116]. A few months later Sergei Trofimov, the
mayor of Dzerzhinsk – the city dominated by chemical industry - was challenged
by unfounded accusations from the part of his political rivals in supervising
the production of new synthetic drugs and exporting them to terrorists in
Pakistan and Afghanistan[117].
These examples show that security concerns might be easily exploited in sordid
political projects and turn into powerful political instrument.
4.
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
OF REGIONAL SECURITY
ACTORSHIP
Many of security problems
have clear international dimensions since they are closely related to the
processes developed beyond Russia’s borders.
Foreign NGOs were important actors
during the regional conflicts in Chechnia and Dagestan. “Non-violence
International”, “Forum on Early Warning and Early Response”, “The Caucasus
Forum”, “Search for Common Ground”, “Berghoff Center”, “International Alert”,
and the NGO Working Group on Conflict Management and Prevention organized by
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees were involved in monitoring
human rights abuses and helping to deal with humanitarian issues in the whole
area of Northern Caucasus[118].
Even in clashing with Russia over the war in Chechnia the Western experts and
journalists recognize that “the Chechens’ warlike qualities are linked to their
new success in organized crime”[119],
and that the whole rebel region is based on illegal and criminal activities[120].
Regions themselves might become
important international security actors. They have their say in implementing
international disarmament and security control programs. For example, one of
military installations in charge of destroying SS-18 nuclear missiles is
located in Surovatikha (Nizhny Novgorod oblast). Yet destroying missiles is not
purely military affair. The military base is a home to about 5 thousand
persons, including officers, soldiers, contract employees and dependents, which
inevitably raises a number of social issues for regional authorities. Ecological
concerns are also being heard from the part of the regional administration.
Commercial issues are important as well, since the metal stuff released from
the missiles has to be sold to commercial firms from Moscow and Nizhny
Novgorod, and the revenues used for buying houses for the officers[121].
The international changes have touched the so called “closed
cities”. US Department of Energy in 1998 launched a Nuclear Cities Initiative
(NCI) with the goal of creating commercial job and economic diversification in
the ten closed cities that form the core of Russia’s nuclear weapons complex to
accommodate the loss of employment in this sector of military industry. These cities
(like Sarov in Nizhny Novgorod oblast, Snezhinsk in Cheliabinsk oblast,
Zheleznogorsk in Krasnoyarsk krai) are critical to the design, construction,
testing, and production of Russia’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Their basic
problem is that their authorities are stuck in isolated communities and do not
understand the basics of market economy. NCI is serving as a bridge between
these cities and industry, and facilitating the creation of commercial
enterprises by engaging private industry to help develop partnership[122].
There are some security related projects funded by EU TACIS
programs (NIIIS Institute, Nizhny Novgorod), European Bank for Reconstruction
& Development (Kola atomic station, Karelia)[123].
Bretagne province of France has launched cooperation program with Nizhny
Novgorod oblast enterprises in military reconversion field[124].
Three military enterprises – “Nerpa” in Snezhnogorsk, “Zviozdochka” in
Severodvinsk and “Zvezda” in Vladivostok – are recipients of US technical
assistance in inculcating new technologies for purification and temporary
storage of low-active hard and liquid radioactive waste[125].
Yet many foreign assistance to reconversion focuses on
training programs for former military officers to include: a) firm-based
retraining as part of larger projects, and b) retraining programs provided by
Westerners to teach general business skills. The problem here is that,
according to the study of Ksenia Gonchar, “Russian industry managers have grown
suspicious of generic market economy courses, which they find as dull and
useless for their professional advancement”[126].
Regions might take advantage of their commercial relations
with those countries that internationally are considered as a threat to
security. Thus, Chuvashia is expecting to gain about $ 6 million from its
contracts with Iraq[127].
OKBM Enterprise (Nizhny Novgorod) was contracted by Iran to rebuild and upgrade
the equipment for atomic electric stations[128].
By the same token, in the aftermath of the end of NATO air strikes
against Yugoslavia former governor of Nizhny Novgorod oblast Ivan Skliarov
signed decree stipulating creation of the task force on participation of NNO
enterprises in rebuilding of destroyed oil refineries in Novy Sad and Panchevo.
Ivan Skliarov had also raised this issue at his talks with the head of Russia’s
delegation at the European Union Dmitry Likhachov in Brussels[129].
Russian regional enterprises might
become strong international competitors of foreign military producers. Thus,
“GAZ” car building factory (Nizhny Novgorod) has designed military jeep “Tiger”
for United Arab Emirates Army, which is an alternative to US “Hummer” land
rover earlier purchased by UAE Defense Ministry.
Regional law-enforcement agencies are
also going global. In a number of regions (Nizhny Novgorod, Tiumen and some
others) new security units were established to investigate and prevent
high-tech crime, including the misuse of Internet logins and accounts[130].
Governors are more and more active in
interfering into international security domains that were recently closed for them. It is interesting
for example that Moscow municipality rendered a great deal of assistance to the
Russian Black Sea headquarters located in Sebastopol. Quite illustrative is Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov’s political campaign in favour of reimposing
the Russian control over Sebastopol. Luzhkov’s numerous demarches could be
interpreted as direct discord with the way the foreign affairs are managed by
the former President Boris Yeltsin.
Former Nizhny Novgorod oblast governor
Boris Nemtsov had also touched this topic. “As regards rigid declarations (an
allusion to Luzhkov’s position. – A.M.), I suppose that despite superficial
gloss and patriotic background, we’ll be unable to change unilaterally the
status of Sebastopol”[131].
On another occasion he was slightly less pessimistic: “If I would have been
occupying a top position in the government, I would bring together large
Russian business people and give them a recommendation - to purchase property
in Sebastopol under the guarantees of the government. In this case Black Sea
Fleet negotiations would take quite another forms ... I am confident that this
way is more secure than shaking an air by mere declarations ... Historical
justice ought to be restored by capitalist methods ... And note - the Ukrainian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs will find no fault with this”[132]. In the same interview Boris Nemtsov has
explained his viewpoint with regard to NATO enlargement. It will “worsen
Russian economic performance and ... will mean the closure of market, gradual
and silent, in the form of discriminatory taxes imposed on our goods,
anti-damping laws, etc.”[133].
One of the most evident
examples of regional interference into national security domain was the stand
taken by the authorities of Primorsky kray with regard to China. Former kray's
chief executive Evgeny Nazdratenko refused to recognise the agreement reached
between Russia and China with regard to delineation of common border. The point
of bickering is protracted dispute over islands in the Argun and Amur rivers
and some other segments totalling to 21 kilometres. The governor has repeatedly
declared that territorial concessions to China will inevitably damage the
Russian ports and dislodge Russia out of the Far East. Since Nazdratenko's
appeals on this subject have led to significant complication of bilateral
relations, President Boris Yeltsin instructed him to co-ordinate all his future
public pronouncements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However,
Nazdratenko didn’t hurry up to obey. Created under his patronage the so called
“Maritime Party” launched the campaign aimed at collecting signatures for
organising the referendum about the transfer of the territories to China[134].
CONCLUSION
The debate between proponents of a broad concept of security
and supporters of its narrow interpretation goes on. Russia is currently wedded
to neo-realist security conceptions and fails in important respects to
integrate the regions into a security system. This occurs despite the fact that
regions have a growing potential and actual role in addressing sources of
insecurity and thus stabilising the statehood.
Today’s conflicts are more complicated than ever before. Security as a concept has been extended to
include environmental, economic and societal actors. This extension was a
result of proliferation of sources of insecurity.
In clear
departure from state-centric and regime-centric versions of security, the
concept of sub-national security has include dimensions other than military
strength and conflicts between states. Human collectives (social groups within nation states and cross-border communities)
could also be security actors, to deal with religious, ethnic, environmental and other challenges. These
communities are characterised by common
security expectations and compatibility of norms and values regulating security
behaviour.
This paper has shown that security in Russia has to be debated
among its sub-national actors. The
regional authorities have their strong – though non-institutionalised - say in
tackling the problems of troops
stationing, military exercises, logistics, food supply, border regime
maintenance. Since the degree of regional leaders’ support has clear bearing on
the state of the country’s defense capacity, they are consulted – in informal
way - on a wide range of military issues. These facts show that some signs of a
change in thinking are underway, but not fast enough and not far enough. In the
meantime, the challenge of globalisation makes such new thinking imperative.
International community in general and specific foreign
countries in particular have their impact on Russia’s internal security
developments as well. In Chechnia President Putin had to take into account
international pressure recognising the need to investigate the war crimes
committed by both sides. The case of Kaliningrad shows that there is a concern
in Russia about new dividing lines in integrated Europe. Thus, the future
security architecture in Russia will hopefully be determined by complex
interplay of regional, federal and international actors.
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[118] Open Society Institute Web site, at http://www.osi.hu/ifp/fellows/kamenshikov
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[129] Ivan Skliarov’s Web site, at http://www.sklyarov.ru/library/5august.htm
[130] http://www.tmn.ru/rufsb/Text/221199.htm
[131] Nizhnegorodskye Novosti, December 18, 1996
[132] Kommersant-daily, n13, February 18, 1997
[133] Ibid.
[134] Kommersant-daily, n35, March 21, 1997.