INSTITUTION BUILDING IN RUSSIA'S REGIONS: THE
CHALLENGE OF TRANSFORMATION AND THE ROLE OF GLOBALIZATION FORCES
Andrei Makarychev
The
question of whether, how and to what extent emerging institutions are
influenced by or are to be seen as the result of globalization forces is very
important with regard to Russia’s democratic development.
In
the political science literature available – both Western and Russian – one can
easily find broad interpretations of institutions as guiding principles, norms
and rules that determine the character of political activity, set the patterns
of interaction between political actors, shape their strategies and structure
political regimes. According to this view, by institutions one can mean both
formal, official organizations and informal bodies.[1]
In our paper we are talking mainly about formal, legitimate institutions, since
they form the foundation of democratic governance.
Institution
building in post-Soviet countries is a part of the Western “liberal grand
strategy” of transition from communism to democracy. As seen from a Western
perspective, the strengthening of institutions is important for democratic
development for several reasons. As John Ikenberry writes, “institutions can
help to overcome and integrate diverse and competing interests of states,
regions, classes, and religious and ethnic groups.”[2]
Institutions are critically important to strengthen stability: the more rules
are revised the less stable institutional procedures become. Subsequently, more
political losers appear and fill the ranks of radical opposition[3].
Institutions help to rationalize domestic politics where a large number of
regional actors compete with each other and are also important means for
assessing feedback and measuring the effectiveness of assisting Russia in its
transition to democracy.
If
we suppose that interaction with the international system has an impact on the
way institutions are being formed, and if we also assume that the more globally
integrated a region the more democratic its institutions, then we have to ask
first, which of the Russian regions are most involved in globalization; and
secondly, are these regions more democratic than others. One can notice almost
immediately that these regions are different in terms of their democratic
institutional setting. In this relatively small group of regions we’ll see a
highly uneven picture with regard to democratic standards. A rather democratic
situation can be found at this moment in the Sverdlovsk, Kaliningrad, Samara
and Moscow oblasts. Characteristically in these regions there is intensive
competition between several actors, power is shared among dominant and
subdominant actors within a formal institutional network, and elections are the
method of sorting out political collisions.
We
find a somehow “hybrid” situation in regions such as Nizhny Novgorod, St
Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk and Primorskii krais (as well as other regions like the
Kursk and Saratov oblasts). In these regions, we find competition between
different actors, but the outcomes of political rivalries are to a significant
degree shaped by the so-called “administrative resources”. It means that either
the federal center interferes into the sphere of regional politics using administrative
tools, and supporting in one way or another some political actors and
marginalizing others, or regional leaders apply their administrative capital
for achieving their political goals.
Kemerovo
Oblast (as well as other regions like Pskov and Novgorod) would, to our
understanding, best fit into the category of regions described politically as
hegemony of one single actor. This is not necessarily authoritarian governance,
since the advent of dominating political leaders might be the result of the natural
weakness of alternative groups, or charismatic leadership. The dominant actor
might use both existing institutions and informal networks set up by him.
A
group of economically and internationally important regions have political
regimes that can be classified as “authoritarian” (to this category belong
regions like the Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Sakha republkics as well as
Krasnodar Krai). Some of their leaders came to power with procedural violations
(Bashkortostan). Yet what is most important is that all of them use a variety
of means to get rid of even the slightest opposition (for example, Tatarstan
authorities have canceled the system of local self-governance). Elections in
these regions are not competitive and usually not fair at all.
We
can agree with other experts that the correlation between economic development
(including the level of economic openness and intensity of foreign economic
links) and the progress in democratic institution building is very much
uncertain. For example, we see authoritarian inclinations both in regions,
which are industrially and technologically highly developed (such as Moscow
with a political regime firmly controlled through the personalized network
established by Moscow’s mayor Yurii Luzhkov) and in regions, which are
overwhelmingly rural and rather poor (such as Kalmykia with Kirsan Ilyumzhinov
in charge).[4]
At
the same time, there are some regions that are considered to be fairly
democratic but are only marginally touched by economic international processes
and therefore not mentioned in a single group listed above. These are the
republics of Udmurtia and the Chuvashia and the Ryazan or Tver oblasts.[5]
A
comparative approach of the kind applied does not give us a thorough picture of
the correlation between economic globalization and the building of democratic
institutions. How could this be explained?
One
reason is that the cycles of global economic and financial changes do not
coincide with the cycles of regional political development. Politics in the
regions is much more conservative and does not have the time to catch or
adequately react to the challenges of globalization. In other words,
innovations are adapted much faster in the sphere of economic and financial
management than in politics. That is why we should not expect that forces of
economic globalization would immediately challenge regional patterns of
political life.
Secondly,
to get a more comprehensive picture we should take note of other dimensions
relevant to globalization. What we could measure theoretically would be the
spread of information and telecommunication technology. The problem is,
however, that most factors cannot be assessed in quantitative terms. Into this
category falls, for instance, the analysis of the regional legislation with
regard to the laws on foreign direct investment and cooperation with foreign
companies (this is also done by the various rating efforts of different institutions
such as the Bank of Austria or the Expert-Institute in Moscow).
Thirdly,
there are a number of external factors that are important for understanding a
region’s potential to act internationally. In this category we would
place geographic proximity to economically important neighbors, the region’s
possibility of being integrated into transportation systems that would connect
them to the outside world, the development of the scientific community and
international scientific network (exchange of scholarly information and
expertise, student exchange, etc.), ethnic, historic or cultural relations
among Russian regions and foreign regions and states, etc. For example,
Kaliningrad Oblast should be included in this list of globalized regions mainly
because of its important geographical location and intensive political debates
around its future within the context of European integration.
Fourthly,
the case of the city of Moscow (perhaps as well as of Tatarstan) shows that
non-democratic regimes possess certain potentials for integration to the global
world based on accumulating and concentrating political and financial
resources. As mentioned before, the political regime of the city of Moscow,
surely one of the most “globalized” places not only in economic but also in
societal and political terms (spread of information technology, international
contacts among business, universities and various governmental and
non-governmental organizations, etc.) is still considered to be rather
“non-democratic”. In investigating the roots of this phenomenon, we may
hypothesize that the more resources are available for redistribution and the
higher their diversification, the more autonomous and self-sufficient regional
political actors feel themselves vis-à-vis external actors and
institutions[6]. At the same
time, Russian regional “caudillos” do not face international repercussions: as
Vladimir Slapentokh has observed, “Western governments remain indifferent to
the dictatorial behavior of rulers in the national republics, where honest
elections are completely out of the question”[7].
It
is too early yet to analyze in exactly which forms and at which stage(s)
globalization forces will foster more pluralism and transparency inside the
regional regimes, and how exactly this process will look. In very general terms
we consent with Natalia Zubarevich who argues that the inflow of foreign
capital eventually ought to lead to economic openness of the region and
increase the possibilities of political modernization, since the subnational
elites have to share their power with the growing number of business
institutions[8].
Speaking
about regional authoritarianism and democracy we generally mean tendencies, not
well-established political models. Transitions from liberal and pro-Western to
“patrimonial” and protectionist regimes were relatively easy (from Gavriil
Popov to Yurii Luzhkov in the city of Moscow, from Anatoly Sobchak to Vladimir
Yakovlev in St. Petersburg, from Yurii Matochkin to Leonid Gorbenko in
Kaliningrad oblast, from Boris Nemtsov to Ivan Skliarov in Nizhny Novgorod
oblast). Elections as one of universal democratic instrument is not a panacea:
“in nascent democracies… there is a danger that the winners in early elections
will structure institutions to their own advantages, or subvert democracy
altogether”[9].
At
the same time, there are some institutional limitations for regional autocracy:
thus, Mentimer Shaimiev (Tatarstan), Yurii Luzhkov (Moscow), Murtaza Rakhimov
(Bashkortostan) and Vladimir Yakovlev (St Petersburg), who are usually referred
to as regional autocrats, had to play by democratic (at least procedurally)
rules in the parliamentary election of December 1999 as the core of “Fatherland
– All Russia” block. As regards those regional leaders overwhelmingly described
as democrats, some of them were propagating ideas hardly compatible with
traditional liberal values. For example, governor Mikhail Prusak of Novgorod
known as a reformer was the most vociferous supporter of stopping general
elections of the heads of subjects of federation in 1999, arguing that
nomination of regional leaders from Moscow would be preferable. Another liberal
reformer, the ex-governor of Nizhny Novgorod Boris Nemtsov not only actively
used administrative tools to neutralize his political opponents, but also
initiated a public campaign for protecting local industries from international
competition.
Also
important to note that in both cases (Novgorod under Prusak abd Nizhny Novgorod
under Nemtsov) the region’s economic advancement was very much linked to
regional administration. As soon as the governor steps down, “the mechanisms
that have brought the region to its point could go with him”[10].
In
order to better understand the perspectives of non-democratic political practices
in Russia’s regions, we also have to take into consideration the overall state
of federal relations within Russia. Should the federal state go ahead with
strengthening of the “vertical of power”, regional regimes would gradually
become more homogenous and less important politically (regional chief
executives and heads of regional legislatures have already lost their seats in
the Council of Federation, the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly). On the
contrary, should the federal government restrain from direct intervention in
political affairs of the regions (in exchange for political loyalty and fiscal
discipline), the non-democratic regional regimes might easily survive. A lack
of reaction from the federal center to Mentimer Shaimiev’s reelection for the
third term as Tatarstan’s president suggests that this is a highly probable
scenario.
In
the following chapter, I will have to identify actors and institutions relevant
for globalization and democratization processes. In order to do so, I will treat
regions not as uniform units, but will look for groups of actors within
regional administrations and governments, differentiate between local and
regional structures (regional administration and city administration), look for
specific sectors of the regional economy and track down social groups (state
and non-state actors) that are involved in globalization processes. I have to
trace these “agents” of globalization and explain their political role and
weight in the institutional setting.
Subnational Governments
Official
regional authorities, and above all the heads of administrations and regional
governments, i.e., governors and presidents of the republics, are the most
important players in the institutional setting of the region. They decide on
the structure of the regional administration or government; they set the rules
for the functioning of the regional economy and they are responsible for
providing social welfare and stability. Although the legislative assemblies
draw up the regional budget, the chief executive is in charge of managing and distributing
the bulk of the region’s financial resources. The same is true with regard to
the introduction of local taxes or the allocation of money for subvention of
regional economic programs. The regional parliaments pass the respective
regulations, but the governors’ apparatus is responsible for implementation.
Moreover, in the economic sphere, regional authorities have the right to
regulate prices, provide enterprises with licenses and special privileges and
decide on privatization.[11]
The
stand these officials take towards globalization is, therefore, most important.
A majority of the political leaders approves the creation of an
investment-friendly climate in their regions. Regional leaders understand that
foreign investment can be crucial for economic and social recovery. Rostov
Oblast governor Vladimir Chub, for example, once confessed that “without
support of the Soros foundation we were unable to implement many of our plans”
in social, cultural, and educational matters.[12]
Regional
leaders also recognize that in the forefront of elections, contacts of the
candidates to foreign resources might play an important role. Even the governor
of Pskov Oblast Yevgenii Mikhailov, the only regional leader to belong to the
Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovskii, approved the opening up of
the region and stronger economic orientation towards the neighboring border
states, despite his national-patriotic rhetoric.
Most
regions have reacted to the new international challenges by creating special
departments of external relations. These bureaucratic structures are
responsible for development of international economic cooperation, the
realization of practical measures for promotion of local export and attraction
of foreign investment. Regional associations of exporters were founded and the
activity of territorial chambers of commerce and industry intensified, which
assist tens of thousands of enterprises in their external economic operations.[13]
A
number of regions have even have set up their own “paradiplomatic” contacts
with foreign partners in order to foster international cooperation. There were
rather radical initiatives of the regional elites geared towards greater
international integration. For example, at the Baikal Economic Forum in 2000
some regional leaders proposed to tie the Russian Ruble to the Japanese Yen[14].
Yet
despite efforts to foster international cooperation, regional authorities often
fail to develop strategies that would effectively attract foreign investment.
For example, in order to make their regions more attractive to foreign
investment, a number of regional authorities created free economic zones
(FEZ), each of them with its own administration and run by a top regional
official. However, out of two dozen zones of free enterprise only a few were
successful in attracting foreign and domestic capital. Most of them failed
mainly because of mismanagement on the part of the regional official
responsible. What has also contributed to the failure of FEZ is that federal
authorities do not actively support such projects. Moreover, in search of new
sources of finance the federal authorities are even eager to cancel all
advantages to certain FEZ territories.[15]
Up until now, enthusiastic supporters of these projects who predicted that the
establishment of FEZ would foster regional development and turn many regions
(like Kaliningrad Oblast) into Russia’s gateways to the global world[16],
proved to be wrong in their predictions.
Sergey
Barzilov points out that there are clan-like “party-states”[17]
in all the regional governments of the subjects of the federation, which do not
correspond to Western democratic standards. He describes provincial politics in
terms of the advent of “village guys” with their rural mentality, which runs
against modernization[18].
Other experts also point out that these are the provinces – not the federal
center - that predominantly nourish the totalitarian potential of Russian
politics. Accordingly, implementation of the law is often arbitrary and follows
personal interests.
One
major reason for this lies in the way power is organized in the regions.
Regional officials may be different in their political orientation and
attitudes,[19] but most of
them were quick to establish their own “patronage networks” based on personal
connections, rather than on a formal institutional setting. Regional
administrations also have to defend the interests of local business
vis-à-vis foreign competitors. An example of such “patrimonialism” is
the administration of Khabarovsk Krai’s involvement in legal investigations
into the alleged wrongdoings of a Japanese company “Kiama Sedzi”.[20]
Sakhalin governor Igor Farkhutdinov spoke out against the draft law on
“Fish-breeding and Water Resources” claiming that it gives too many privileges
to foreign fishing companies with the tacit consent of the federal center[21].
Another
reason is that regional administrations and governments perform lobbying functions
for important economic interest groups in their region. Other regional leaders
are not devoted to pro-market reforms at all. The regional authorities in
Voronezh[22], Tula[23]
or Ulianovsk are widely referred to as the most inimical and less capable of
cooperation with the West. In Tatarstan some high-ranking policy makers were
against market reforms as proposed by American economic experts.[24]
In
this respect, the relationship between power and business can constitute a
major obstacle for Russia’s drive towards structural changes and cooperation
with international institutions. In many regions we find politics influencing
or even controlling the economy. We find these practices in ethnic republics
with strong presidential power (Tatarstan and Bashkortostan), in regions with
pronounced communist or nationalist oriented leadership (Voronezh and Ulianovsk
Oblasts or Krasnodar Krai) as well as in certain economically powerful regions
such as in the city of Moscow or Kemerovo Oblast. While in some regions, such
as the Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara or Leningrad oblasts, the situation is
marked by a rather equal partnership between power and business structures, in
Tiumen Oblast or the Republic of Khakassiya we see powerful economic actors who
have a decisive influence on political life.[25]
There
are other hurdles for regional authorities cooperating with international
institutions. Often there is not only a lack of understanding of existing
legislation by many regional bureaucrats and judges, but also a lack of
experience and appropriate expertise in foreign affairs in general. Referring
to the case of Karelia, Oleg Reut has observed that the “government didn’t have
any well-managed concept of how to use the money of the Fund for Reconstruction
& Development. Even worse, apparently, nobody was in fact responsible for
the day-to-day administration and management, which is shown as well by poor
documentation of the use of means, so that result was misuse”.[26]
As Christian Wellmann and Hanne-Margret Birckenbach have noted, in many
projects involving regional authorities some portions of funds are spent for
unrelated purposes or are given to politically motivated structures.[27]
Municipal authorities
Foreign
and international institutions eager to cooperate with non-central Russia turn
their eyes to other non-central institutions. Municipal administrations are in
the “menu” as well. It is not rare that municipal authorities are even more
prone to go international than oblast/krai-level authorities. One example is
Krasnodar mayor Valery Samoilenko who is one of the proponents of multiple
geoeconomic initiatives with strong emphasis on outward-oriented roles of South
Russian cities in Black Sea economic cooperation[28].
City-level
international institutions might be important tools for improving the situation
in certain fields. Thus, “European Cities Against Drugs” which encompasses,
among other member cities, Novgorod and St.Petersburg, might become
increasingly instrumental in preventing drug use in Russian cities[29].
Mayors
have their say in coping with security issues too. For example, authorities of
the city of Biysk invest municipal funds in assisting frontier post detachment
in Altay Krai (including renovations of buildings, food supplies, etc.)[30].
The city administration of Ekaterinburg renders material assistance to the
submarine bearing the name of this city[31].
The
truth is that international undertakings of municipal authorities might bring
very controversial results. Thus, in 1994 the mayor of Baltiisk (a city in the
Kaliningrad Oblast) was accused of signing an agreement which stipulated that a
German entrepreneur had a lease on the Baltic spit, including the lands of the
military airport, hydronavigation harbor of the Baltic Fleet and other
strategically important objects, which was a violation of the Law on State
Border[32].
As
regards the political dimension of the problem, owing to Vladimir Putin’s
administrative reform of May 2000 the municipal chief executives have lost
their importance as the only reliable source of politically checking and
balancing the powers of the leaders of the federal subjects. The presidential
representatives in each of the seven federal districts are currently considered
the most effective figures to withstand and restrain the heads of regional
governments. Moreover, according to the new law, even popularly elected mayors
may be ousted by a governor’s intercession (this rule is not applicable to the
mayor of the main city of each region).
An example of political
domination of the federal center is the refusal of Kaliningrad mayor Yurii
Savenko to run for governorship in November 2000 election due to heavy pressure
from the Kremlin who had its own candidate for oblast’s chief executive[33].
Other official structures
There
is less room for regional legislative structures in the international arena. Regional
Assemblies are much less involved in international affairs than executive
authorities. One of the few examples is the cooperation agreement between the
Kaliningrad regional Duma and the Schlezwig-Holstein land of Germany signed in
January 2000. It seems nonetheless that this underestimated form of interaction
is potentially very fruitful because the regional parliaments are closer than
regional governments to civil society institutions and have bigger democratic
potential.
Engaging
newly created federal districts into the web of international
cooperation is an uneasy task since they are not yet well established political
institutions (created in May 2000 by Presidential decree). Their future is
still ill defined. From Sergey Kirienko’s perspective, federal districts are
rather political instruments of the President than autonomous political
institutions[34]. Nikolay
Fiodorov, the president of Chuvashia, on the contrary, argues that the federal
districts will inevitably evolve into new subnational governments. Another
concept posits that there is in fact “double federalism” in Russia: one
comprises 89 subjects of the federation, while another is composed of seven
federal districts.
In
spite of this uncertainty, Presidential representatives have already undertaken
certain steps to obtain some international credentials. The most telling
example is Sergey Kirienko, the head of the Volga Federal District, who
established a network of connections with international institutions to foster
investments and credits. All presidential representatives – being members of
the Security Council of the Russian Federation – are heavily involved in
resolving a plethora of security-related issues like protecting external
borders, reviving military industries, undertaking counter-terrorist measures,
upgrading transportation and communication networks, etc.
The
impact of the federal districts on Russia’s external relations might be traced
in the following ways. First, it is hoped that presidential representatives
would have to make heads of the subjects of federation more law-obedient in a
whole spectrum of issues related to foreign economic relations. Secondly, since
the concept of the federal districts is aimed at concentration of resources,
the weakest subjects of the federation will be marginalized and will have to
leave the sphere of active international relations. Thirdly, there might be
more interdependency between the subjects of the federation constituting a
single federal district in a number of specific areas like transportation
networks, border security, migration policy, etc.
NGOs
NGOs
are among the most significant groups of institutions in those regions that are
developing their long-term international strategies. Marat Cheshkov explains
this in terms of primordial importance of ecological, human rights and
humanitarian conscience for Russia’s globalization drive[35].
There are some encouraging examples of effective Western assistance to
ecological NGOs in Russian provinces. Thus, in 1995 the Canadian Council of
Ministers of Environment and Canadian International Development Agency, along
with some Russian institutions, launched the Russia-Canada Project “Water
Resource Management in the Angara River Basin” which is referred to as one of
the most efficient in strengthening ecological security in the Irkutsk region[36].
NGOs
might be instrumental institutions in policy advocacy as well. Till now
international NGOs have not encouraged their Russian counterparts to engage in
the political process[37]. Foreign experts recognize that, “the bulk of
American assistance to Russia was earmarked for economic reform… Unfortunately, American aid programs
invested very limited resources in promoting support for these reforms in
society, from below”[38].
Yet there is growing understanding worldwide that assistance programs should
not remain of purely “technical” nature, they have to tackle political issues
more specifically that earlier. Civic organizations supported by the West might
become “important resources for alternative local politicians and tools for
creating more effective constituencies in the future”[39].
Among other helpful measures are promoting the media infiltration of the
regions, helping to institutionalize political parties, and encouraging more
rigorous international election observing[40].
The
paradox is that integration in the global network might alienate the NGOs from
the population at the same time[41].
The Western assistance strategy sometimes concentrates funds in the hands of a
small, centralized, hierarchical organizations pursuing its own survival over
original mission. Not rare are complains that resource centers hold a monopoly
on information and external assistance in the region, working with a small
number of organizational leaders but doing little to attract the population
into public activism[42].
Apart
from these technical issues, there are even more serious political limitations
for globalization of Russian NGOs. In the Rostov and Kaluga oblasts, and the
Far East, the Federal Security Service arrested Russian NGO activists for
violating the rule regulating circulation of classified information. In the
Kremlin many still believe that environmental agencies should be treated as
tools of foreign intelligence. This makes the work of ecological, human rights
and information-related NGOs risky and troublesome in many regions[43].
The
problem of finding the right balance between collaborating with NGOs and
official institutions outside Moscow is increasingly important. On the one
hand, undoubtedly the rise of civil society institutions is a prerequisite for
the steady integration of regional Russia into the global world. On the other
hand, the Western countries face the necessity of having levers to influence
regional administrations and even incite their ambitions as autonomous
international actors.
To
find a compromise between these two strategies, the Western institutions
officially declare that they are very much interested in close cooperation
between Russian official authorities and grass-roots NGOs. In pursuit of this
strategy Western foundations usually tend to integrate resources of regional or
municipal administrations and civil society institutions. For example, US
Eurasia foundation has sponsored several projects of this kind aimed at
stimulating citizens’ initiatives in the city of Obninsk[44]
and raising public participation of private business organizations in the
North-West regions of Russia[45].
In
many regions however NGOs are sharp opponents of regional or municipal
institutions, especially in such spheres as human rights protection, ecology,
media, public policy research. At the same time, not all regional grass-roots
organizations are automatically turned into nuclei of democracy – like the
Cossack units that widely operate in the Krasnodar, Stavropol and Altai
regions.
Ethnic and religious
institutions
Ethnic
and religious institutions are also an important set of actors linking Russia
to outside world. The ethnic republics of the Russian Federation were quick to
develop their international ties along ethnic lines, using a variety of
informal institutional channels. For example, the Republic of Kalmykia is
oriented towards reestablishing Buddhist practices. The Dalai Lama visited
Elista, the capital of Kalmykia, as early as 1991. Local Buddhists fostered
cooperation with Buddhist communities in Japan, Korea and Western Europe. The
revival of Islam was an essential element of domestic politics in the Republic
of Adygeia, whose leaders are engaged in close collaboration with Syria, Turkey
and Egypt[46]. The Komi
Republic has established “special relations” with Hungary, since both belong to
the Finno-Urgian culture[47].
Western
religious institutions are capable of having a certain impact in many regions,
especially east of the Urals. The research of Sergei Filatov and Liudmila
Vorontsova shows that “in the eastern regions, such as the Lower Volga, the
Urals and Siberia, Catholicism is developing...easily... Today practically all
the clergy are foreigners, mainly Poles”[48].
Another study demonstrates that the Lutheran “Church’s missionaries have
achieved success working among the Finnish-speaking peoples of the Volga Region
and the north-eastern European part of Russia who have never been Lutherans –
the Mordvinians, Udmurts, Mari and Komi”[49].
The Mormons are preparing to build their temple in Volgograd, to become the
second in Europe. Expansion of the foreign missionaries into Russia’s heartland
provokes harsh criticism by the Russian Orthodox church which appeals to the
federal government to roll back the influence of overseas religions.
Foreign
influences can be transmitted to the regions via ethnic communities. Thus, the
Kurd communities in the Krasnodar region organized public protests in the
aftermath of the arrest in Turkey of A. Odzhalan[50].
Owing to foreign reactions the Russian Federation has officially agreed to
facilitate the residential conditions of the Meskhetian Turks in the Krasnodar
region, including lifting fines for late registration, increasing social
assistance, etc.[51] The Kazakh
community in the Republic of Altai has raised the issue of its
institutionalization as “small ethnic group” with the rights of “indigenous
people”[52].
In
most cases foreign diasporas are closely integrated into the regional social
environment, like for instance the Korean communities in the Russian Far East[53].
Yet unfortunately the impact of ethnic communities on regional politics is not
always conducive to greater stability. For example, the division of spheres of
influence between Azeri and Afghani criminal communities in the city of Ryazan
have led to violent clashes[54].
Another
channel of outside influence is the ethnic diasporas abroad. For example,
ethnic Kalmykian residing in USA have helped to establish in Elista a branch of
an international agency to offer employment opportunities for local citizens
abroad[55].
In
Tatarstan there are two institutions encompassing ethnic Tatars living abroad –
the World Congress of Tatars and the Kurultai of Tatar People. Interestingly
enough their political orientations are very much different: the former are
considered supporters of President Mentimer Shaimiev, while the latter adhered
to more radical positions (Kurultai initiated the Latinization of the Tatar
written language, and raised the issue of applying for NATO membership)[56].
This is a good illustration of the existing linkage between globalization and
pluralization of regional political environments.
Economic Institutions
Economic
Institutions are also on the list. Major Russian transregional companies are both
regional and global actors. For instance, in London where the share-holders of
the “SIDANKO” Oil company – having wide-range interests in numerous Russian
regions – meet to take major financial and managerial decisions[57]
British Petroleum that together with “SIDANKO” and “Tiumen Oil Company” is a
share holder in an oil-extracting project in Irkutsk Oblast; London-based
“Trans World Group” that was instrumental in creating “Russia Alluminum”, a
holding company that now controls most of the country’s aluminum production,
above all in Krasnoyarsk Krai;[58]
the “Deutsche Bank” and “Clifford Chance”, that were contracted to appraise the
assets of “Norilsk nikel” company, one of the world’s leading metals producers[59],
on international markets.
Many
Russian regional companies are controlled by foreign share holders (Swiss
“Nestle”, for example, is a major share holder of the “Altai” factory in
Barnaul[60]).
Privatization of some industries – like the Krasnoyarsk mining plants – was
stipulated by agreement with the World Bank[61].
In
general, foreign institutions are motivated not only by making money but even
to a greater extent by fostering structural reforms of Russian corporate
actors. The EBRD had openly declared that among the purposes of its investments
in Russian industrial enterprises (basically regional ones) were restructuring
“natural monopolies” (basically in those sectors dealing with natural resources
like oil and gas) and the car-manufacturing industry. The EBRD also stated that
it will support only those Russian clients that adhere to high standards of
corporate management and practice honest business practices.
The
first role of transregional economic groups in the transition process at the
regional level is that they are able to bring to the regions much needed
foreign exchange. For example, the “Tiumen Oil Company” (TNK) operating in the
Ryazan region managed to get foreign credit which overstepped the entire
regional budget[62]. This
explains the deep involvement of major economic and financial groups into
regional life: in view of “Norilsk nikel” General Director Alexander Khloponin,
his company is not indifferent to the developmental strategies of these regions
where his company’s share in the regional budget is about 80%[63].
To
promote local export, new institutions are often created. This was the case of
the League of Defense Enterprises of Vladimir Oblast established to implement
investment projects and foster foreign sales[64].
The Small Business Developing Center in Novosibirsk funded by the Open Society
Institute, Budapest, has developed a strong reputation among both entrepreneurs
and officials that seek its expertise in small business legislation and
practice.
The
second role of trans-regional economic structures is trade liberalization. For
example, in October 2000 directors of four major regional metallurgic factories
signed an open Letter to Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov protesting against the
government’s decision to raise transportation tariffs for metallurgic products[65].
Thirdly,
economic institutions are already strong enough to globally protect their
rights in international business. For example, the “Avisma” company from the
Perm Oblast had sued its US investors in the state of New Jersey accusing them
of dishonest business practices[66].
The Bank “Tiumen’sky kredit” won the trial against the Portuguese company
“Estiverna comercio internationale investimentos LDA” which had to reimburse
its debt of US$400,000[67].
In the Sverdlovsk Oblast, the court decision obliged US-based “OBA enterprises
limited” company to compensate financial losses to the local VSPMO metallurgic
company[68]. These practices are a part of the global
business agenda.
It
would be false nonetheless to unconditionally treat Russia’s regional economic
actors as agents of globalization. In Karelia, according to a local expert, “it
is difficult to find a single enterprise which has a proper business plan
within the typical European standards”[69].
International investments do not represent always an instrument for influencing
Russian economic actors. It was noted that some economic institutions in the
regions took an uncooperative stance with regard to foreign investors: thus,
the Sakhalin Steamship Line laid false claims to the property of the joint
venture created together with “Tairiku Trading” company of Japan[70].
Media have reported that the administration of the “Azart” confectionery in
St.Petersburg is very resentful of foreign investments[71].
The main reason is that local producers are fearful of drastic restructuring of
uncompetitive marketing practices and outdated management as a direct result of
sharing powers with foreign investors, which provokes anti-globalization
sentiments.
Universities and Academia
Universities
and Academia possess their own resource base for becoming globally oriented
institutions. Firstly, many Universities are islands of free political
discourse and agents of liberal thinking. “Even in a republic where an
authoritarian situation flourishes, where in essence a regime of dictatorial
power has been established, we speak openly about those things that are
happening in the republic as well”, says Midhat Faroukshin from Tatarstan[72].
This makes Universities very important actors in Russian provinces. As Raymond
Struyk pointed out, their goals extend well beyond those of a conventional
educational institute; “these organizations often wish to become actively
involved in policy prescription and in program implementation and evaluation”[73].
Second,
Universities are gateways to the cyberworld. The Open Society Institute paid
for establishing 33 Internet centers in non-central Universities all across
Russia.
Third,
cooperation with foreign partners makes Russian provincial Universities more
independent – from Ministries and regional authorities – in financial terms
owing to grants and technical resources. From 1999 the Soros Foundations runs
“Megaproject” which lays the foundations for networking liaisons between
leading Moscow universities and their regional partners. In 2000 the Carnegie
Corporation of New York launched a similar program for establishing Centers for
Advanced Study & Education in several non-central universities to develop a
network of scholars beyond the main academic hubs of Moscow and St Petersburg[74].
Fourth,
many Russian Universities were capable of establishing joint degree programs
with their counterparts from the West. This is an important measure to prevent
brain drain and form a new generation of Russian regional leaders.
Fifth,
projecting and adapting foreign models and principles is important. Educational
marketing, creating Boards of Trustees, introduction of new specializations
(like ecological management, human resources development, organizational
behavior, public relations, and others), flexible tuition fee policies – all
this is part of the Universities’ strategy for survival and development.
All
these efforts are undoubtedly geared towards integration of Russian
Universities and think tanks into the international academic community. Raymond
Struyk reported that Russian public policy research institutions are the
largest in Eastern Europe and are growing the most in terms of staff size and
budgets[75].
However there are certain hurdles in this area.
First, the procedure of assessing and evaluating
existing programs is very formalized. It rarely goes public (one of rare
exceptions is the expertise of economic and business publication projects
financed by Eurasia Foundation Moscow office from 1996 till 1999).
Foreign donors
usually require figures, often at the expense of the content of the change.
Allen Kassof commented that “much of the American response to the new situation
had been of a technocratic nature, with a pragmatic ‘fix-it’ mentality that has
been applied in the past to Third-World countries”[76]. It is for example the practice of American sponsoring agencies to host
huge conferences with broad topics, which are aimed at either “studying the
democracy” or reporting about the progress, not at deepening expertise in
specific areas of science.
Second, sometimes, foreign institutions are eager to
demonstrate their dynamism and mobility, artificially inventing new forms of
cooperation. This leads to shifting priorities and frequent reorganization of
existing programs, which might be misleading and discouraging for grant
holders.
Third, foreign sponsors tend to rely too heavily on
Russian institutions in distributing funds and controlling projects
implementation. The practice shows that there is no guarantee that the
administrators of Russian institutions in charge of funds distribution operate
as impartial actors – corporate solidarity, clan structures within the academic
community and group collisions do matter. Usually, Western partners disregard
the negative role of University bureaucracy. It is common practice for example
that American grant-making institutions refrain from participation in selecting
exchange students from regional Universities to be sent to the USA.
Fourth, the creation of regional branches of
international institutions without clear functions and roles turns into wastage
of resources. This fact is well illustrated by regional Soros foundation
offices in several Russian cities.
Fifth, the practice of distributing funds
beyond formal grant competitions might create an impression of “special
relations” between certain grant-making institutions and its Russian recipient.
This practice could be based on pre-existing contacts or personal sympathies,
but by and large it has a negative impact on the image of Western institutions.
In
recent decades some institutions involving both Russian regional actors and
their Western partners were created. For example, the Baltic Sea Chambers of
Commerce Association was formed in 1992 to include chambers of commerce from St
Petersburg and Kaliningrad. The Council of Baltic Sea States is another
important institutional tool to foster development of infrastructure in
Russia’s North West[77].
There are some attempts to materialize the concept of “Euroregion Karelia”
based on already existing sub-regional programs of the EU, including the Cross-border
Cooperation Subprogram of TACIS and Interreg-Karelia.
There
is nonetheless some confusion regarding joint institutions involving Russia
(the federal government along with the regions) and the West. Some of them are
“vague” institutions, with an unclear “ultimate role”[78].
Experts frequently note that there is a big deal of duplication in numerous
institutions in charge of subnational cooperation, which diverts attention and
energy away from them. As Igor Leshukov figures out, “there are too many
institutional layers in the region – the CBSS, BEAC, Arctic Council and many
smaller constellations. They have divergent institutional agendas, functional
rational and driving forces. It is not easy to imagine how all these
desynchronized networks could work coherently”[79].
In his views, common institutions are ill equipped to meet Russia’s needs in
cross-border challenges, Kaliningrad development and structural reforms, etc.
Many questions still remain unsolved – which of the existing institutions will
become the center of gravity? Does the EU Commission not need a special unit
for the Northern Dimension initiative?
The
majority of Russian experts are certain that the Baltic institutional network
is unstable because the political centrality of NATO-related issues destroys
all endeavors to foster complex interdependency within the region. Another very
sensitive issue is divergent interpretations of sovereignty in Russia and its
Western neighbors: for example, the functions of the National Minorities
Commissioner of the CBSS might be treated as intervention in domestic affairs
by the Russian side[80].
A
closer look at the various institutions listed in this study showed that
globalization matters. International and global institutions promote three
types of domestic change in Russia: near-term policy (loans as incentives for
specific political actions); medium term (rapid, large-scale privatization to
empower special social and political groups), and long-term (attitudinal)
change[81].
What
are the implications for Western engagement in Russia? One of the basic
problems of international cooperation is to be seen in the fact that the West
lacks a clear strategy towards Russia and its regions. Many foreign donors seem
to have “more money than ideas”.[82]
Some experts claim that in many fields of technical assistance there is no
serious and comprehensive analysis of the work done by foreign institutions and
its effectiveness. No comprehensive account of failures was accomplished so
far, mainly because of the fear that such a report might provoke harsh
criticism in the West and question the basic political and ideological
assumptions of Western engagement.[83]
As there is no clear strategy, it comes to no surprise that there is also a
lack of coordination between Western grant-making agencies and centers. In the
opinion of Marten van Heuven, “intergovernmental organizations are poor cousins
to bilateral contacts in implementing engagement with Russia. The West will
continue to face the challenge of having to coordinate bilateral and
intergovernmental channels to fashion an effective pattern of engagement with
Russia... Without that, the array of presently available intergovernmental
venues will only aggravate the lack of clarity as to Western means and
objectives”[84].
Another
problem of Western engagement in regional Russia can be see in the tendency
that Western countries often treat certain Russian regions not as separate and
autonomous political entities but rather as parts in larger geopolitical
schemes. This is the case of Kaliningrad and is also true with regard to some
regions of the Northern Caucasus, which seem to be meaningful for the policies
of the Western powers only within the framework of broader strategic
considerations, such as “rolling back Russian influence”, oil and gas
transportation routes, etc.[85].
This makes Russian regions hostages of geopolitical ambitions of both, the
federal center on the one side, and major foreign governments on the other.
The
federal center can also pose an obstacle to international cooperation between
Western and regional institutions. The federal center tends to see in
cooperation between subjects of the federation and foreign partners as an
encroachment on its powers. President Putin stated that the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is the “absolute and unconditional coordinator” of Russian
foreign policy, including its diplomatic, economic and cultural aspects[86].
Alexander Avdeev, first deputy foreign minister of Russia, made similar
observations: “It is no secret that foreign partners, including international
organizations, sometimes take advantage of the differences of interests among
our own regions... We should exercise caution with regard to border cooperation
in order to preclude economic, demographic and cultural-religious expansion by
neighboring states to the Russian territory”[87].
Russian high ranking diplomats are reluctant to figure out why regions abuse
their autonomy in the international arena and tend to become trouble makers for
international affairs communities (both domestic and foreign); they just
ascertain this fact and repeatedly speak out in favor of restoring the
workability of the central government.
There
is some logic in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ claims that regional elites
lack full comprehension of the fact that regions are parts of the whole; hence
undermining the interests of the whole is detrimental for the parts as well.
There are also some arguments for stating that full-scale liberalization of
foreign economic relations of the regions might lead to the collapse of Russian
industry and provoke social unrest. There is some justification as well for
saying that participation of the regions in various international organizations
should not turn into the ultimate goal. The problem is, however, to keep the
right balance between opening the country to the world and protecting its
interests. As all other states involved in globalization, the Russian state
still has come to a better understanding of how to counter the global challenge
by creating a healthy balance between international and local conditions and,
at the same time, avoid the isolation of the country from global processes.
[1] Vladimir Gelman assumes that a group of influential persons meeting together informally to bargain about distributing resources and/or property rights might be classified as an institution. Cf. Gelman, Vladimir. “Transformatsiya i rezhimy. Neopredelionnost’ i eio posledstviya (Transformation and Regimes. Uncertainty and Its Sequences).” In Rossia Regionov: Trasnformatsia politicheskikh rezhimov (Russia of Regions: Transformation of Political Regimes). Moscow and Berlin: Ves’ Mir and Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2000, p. 24.
[2] Ikenberry, John. “Why Export Democracy.” Washington Quarterly, Spring 1999, p. 62.
[3] North, D. “Institutsional’nie izmeneniya: ramki analiza (Institutional Changes: Framework for Analysis).” Voprosy ekonomiki, no. 3, 1997.
[4] Gel’man, Transformatsiya i rezhimy, p. 59.
[5] See for these regions: Gel’man, V., S. Ryzhenkov and M. Bri, eds. Rossiya regionov: transformatsiya politicheskikh rezhimov (Russia of regions: transformation of political regimes). Moscow and Berlin: Ves’ Mir and Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 1999.
[6] Gel’man, Transformatsiya i rezhimy, p. 57.
[7] Shlapentokh, Vladimir. “Will Russia Pass the Democratic Test in 2000.” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1999, p. 65.
[8] Zubarevich, Natalia. „Rol’ ekonomicheskogo razvitiya v formirovanii regional’nykh elit (The Role of Economic Development in Formation of Regional Elites).” In Transformatsiya regional’nykh elit v sravnitel’noi perspektive (Transformation of Regional Elites in Comparative Perspective). Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999. p. 137.
[9] Regina Smyth. Supporting Democratic Institutions Rather than “Democrats” in Russia. Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series. Memo No. 139, April 2000. P.2.
[10] Russian Regional Investor. Week’s edition of the EWI Russian Regional Report. December 8, 1999. Vol.1, No.46.
[11] Lapina, Natalia. Regionalnye elity Rossii (Regional Elites of Russia), Moscow: INION RAN, Center for Scientific and Information Studies of Global and Regional Problems, 1997, pp.14-15.
[12] http://www.osi.ru/VAD/Publish100.nsf/pages/chub
[13] See the information provided by the Foreign Investment Promotion Center (under the Ministry of Economy of the Russian Federation) on “Problems of Attraction of Foreign Investment in the Economy of Region” at http://www.fipc.ru/fipc/regions/problem.html.
[14] Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 September 2000, p. 4.
[15] See Abramov, Vladimir. “Politicheskogo zatishiya ne ozhidaetsa (There Will Be No Political Lull),” (http://www.mpsf.org/pub/kpvoonl/Regioni/Abramov.htm). And: “Pochemu v Rossii ne rabotaiut svobodnie ekonomicheskie zony (Why Free Economic Zones Fail to Work in Russia),” (http://www.ptpu.ru/issues/3_00/5_3_00.htm).
[16] Sinelnik, Yurii. “Dver’ v Evropu (The Door to Europe).” Izvestiya, 31 August 2000.
[17] Barzilov, Sergei. “Gubernatorskaya vlast’ kak institut i subiekt regional’nogo politicheskogo prostranstva (Governors’ Authority as Institute and Subject of Regional Political Space).” In Region kak subiekt politiki i obshestvennykh otnosheniy (Region as the Subject of Politics and Social Relationship). Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 2000, pp. 137-138.
[18] Sergey Barzilov. Osobennosti razvitiya politiko-ideologicheskikh protsessov v rossiiskoi provintsii (Peculiarities of Political and Ideological Processes in Russian Provinces). Saratov and Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1997, pp.17-19.
[19] See for a different type of regional leader the comment by Robert Orttung in: Popson, Nancy. “Anatomy of a Dinosaur: Russia’s New Regional Elite.” NEWS/Meeting Report http://wwics.si.edu/WHATSNEW/NEWS/isham.htm).
[20] http://www.fipc.ru/fipc/vestnik/glavy/jan_feb/Eight.html
[21] http://www.regions.ru/news/288657.html
[22] Mirolevich, Valery. “Umriom, no ostanemsiya bednymi (‘We’d Better Die But Stay Poor’).” Novie Izvestiya, 1 July 2000.
[23] Zhdakaev, Sergei. “Bednyi lizing (Poor Leasing).” Izvestiya, 5 September 2000.
[24] Magomedov, Arbakhan. Misteria regionalizma (Mystery of Regionalism). Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 2000, p. 132.
[25] Lapina, N. and Chirikova, A. Regionalnye elity RF: modeli povedeniya i politicheskie orentatsii (Regional Elites of the RF: Models of behavior and political orientation). Moscow: INION RAN, 1999, pp. 85-91.
[26] Reut, Oleg. Republic of Karelia: A Double Asymmetry or North-Eastern Dimensionalism. Working Paper, no. 13. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2000, p. 15.
[27] Wellmann, Christian and Hanne-Margret Birckenbach. “Civil Society in Kaliningrad oblast.” Baltiiskie issledovaniya, no. 1 (2000), p. 86.
[28] Magomedov, Arbakhan. “Kharakter politicheskogo sopernichestva lokal’nykh elit v Krasnodarskom krae (The Character of Political Rivalry Between Local Elites in Krasnodar krai: Mobilizing Constitutional, Economic and Geopolitical Resources).” Konstitutsionnoe pravo: vostochnoevropeiskoe obozrenie, vol. 27, no. 2 (1999), p. 97.
[29] Rossiya, 27 October 2000, p. 8.
[30] http://www.regions.ru/news/292687.html
[31] http://www.regions.ru/news/295114.html
[32] Zinovsky, Valery. “Baltiyskaya kosa nashla na kamen’ (Baltic Spit in Trouble).” Izvestiya, 25 October 2000, p. 3.
[33] Itogi, October 31, 2000. P.21.
[34] Kalashnikova, Marina. “My ne yavliaemsiya samostoyatel’nymy igrokami (We Are Not Self-Ruled Players).” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 October 2000, p. 1 and 8.
[35] Cheshkov, Marat. “Global’niy kontekst postsovetskoi Rossii (Global Context of Post-Soviet Russia).” Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999, pp. 79-80.
[36] Russia-Canada Cooperative Environmental Decision-Making Project. The Irkutsk Component. Materials of the 5th scientific workshop “Organization of water resource management and water object pollution prevention in the Angara River Basin”. Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 2000.
[37] Sarah E.Mendelson. Strategies for US Democracy Assistance to Russia After Market Failure. Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series. Memo No. 47. November 1998. P.3.
[38] Michael McFaul. Why and How the US Should Aid Russia. Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series. Memo No. 46. Stanford University, November 1998. P.3.
[39] Regina Smyth. The Role of US Democracy Assistance: Helping Build Parties from the Bottom Up. Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series. Memo No. 140. Harvard University, April 2000. P.3.
[40] Henry E. Hale. Op.cit. P.5.
[41] Valerie Sperling. Foreign Funding of Social Movements in Russia. Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series. Memo No.26. January 1998. P.1.
[42] Jennifer Richter. Promoting Activism or Professionalism in Russia’s Civil Society? Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series. Memo No. 51. November 1998. P.2.
[43] Badkhen, Anna. “When Is a Spy Really a Spy?” St. Petersburg Times, 27 October 2000, p. 2.
[44] http://www.eurasia.msk.ru/news/press_releases/PR150600.htm
[45] http://www.eurasia.msk.ru/programs/programs_list/nw_russia.htm
[46] Bourdeaux, Michael. “Religion Revives in all its Variety: Russia’s Regions Today.” Religion, State & Society, vol.28, no.1 (2000), pp. 16-20.
[47] http://www.regions.ru/news/297560.html
[48] Filatov, Sergei and Liudmila Vorontsova. “Catholic and Anti-Catholic Traditions in Russia.” Religion, State & Society, vol.28, no.1 (2000), p. 80.
[49] Filatov, Sergei. “Protestantism in Postsoviet Russia: An Unacknowledged Triumph.” Religion, State & Society, vol.28, no.1 (2000), p. 99.
[50] Tishkov, V.A. & E.I. Fillipova. Mezhetnicheskie otnosheniya i konflikty v postsovetskikh stranakh (Inter-ethnic Relations and Conflicts in Post-Soviet Countries). Annual Report. Moscow: Institute for Ethnology & Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, p. 148.
[51] Ibid., p. 154.
[52] Ibid., p. 183.
[53] http://ww.regions.ru/news/297302.html
[54] Izvestiya, 5 September 2000, p. 6.
[55] Ibid., p. 73.
[56] Zaznaev, Oleg. “Dinamika politicheskogo protsessa v Respublike Tatarstan (Dynamics of Political Process in the Republic of Tatarstan).” Konstitutsionnoe pravo: vostochnoevropeiskoe obozrenie, vol. 22, no. 1 (1998), p. 81-82.
[57] Tutushkin, Alexander. “Kirill Koriukin. Kreditory otpustili SIDANKO (Creditors Let SIDANKO Go).” Vedomosti, 4 October 2000.
[58] Cullison, Alan. “Murder Probe Targets Shareholder in Russian Smelter.” Wall Street Journal, 5 October 2000, p. 2.
[59] Jack, Andrew. “Norilsk dilution prompts enquiry.” Financial Times, 4 October 2000.
[60] Barabanov, Oleg. “Altaisky krai: pravovoe i obshestvenno-politicheskoe razvitie (Altai region: legal and socio-political development).” Konstitutsionnoe pravo: vostochnoevropeiskoe obozrenie, vol. 27, no. 2 (1999), p. 79.
[61] Krasnikov, Viktor. “Krasnoyarskie khroniki (Krasnoyarsk Chronicle).” Konstitutsionnoe pravo: vostochnoevropeiskoe obozrenie, vol. 28, no. 3 (1999), p. 201.
[62] Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 October 2000, p. 2.
[63] Romanova, Olga. “My uvodim “Nornikel” ot politicheskikh riskov (We Are Taking “Nornikel” away from Political Risks).” Vedomosti, 4 October 2000, p. A5.
[64] http://www.milparade.com/ru/36/03_02.htm
[65] Maximov, Vladislav. “Porvat’ telegrammu MPS (To Tear off the Telegram of the Ministry of Transportation).” Vedomosti, 4 October 2000, p. B2.
[66] http://www.fipc.ru/fipc/vestnik/glavy/June_July_august/Sixth.html
[67] http://www.regions.ru/news/295134.html
[68] http://www.regions.ru/news/257345.html
[69] Reut, Republic of Karelia, pp.19-20.
[70] Izvestiya, 31 August 2000, p. 1.
[71] Sokolova, Natalia. “Peterburgskie konditery v osade (St.Petersburg Confectionery in a Siege).” Vol. 145, no. 42 (25-31 October 2000) at http:www.chaspik.spb.ru.
[72] Kishkovsky, Sophia. “A Bright Future for Russian Higher Education.” Carnegie Reporter, Summer 2000, p. 4.
[73] Struyk, Raymond. Reconstructive Critics. Think Tanks in Post-Soviet Block Democracies. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1999, p. 77.
[74] “The Challenge: Academic Freedom in the Former Soviet Union.” Carnegie Reporter, Summer 2000, pp. 13-14.
[75] Struyk, Reconstructive Critics, p. 89.
[76] Kassof, Allen H. “Scholarly Exchanges and the Collapse of Communism.” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, vol. 22, No. 3 (1995), p. 274.
[77] Erler, Gernot. „Nemetsko-Rossiiskoe partniorstvo (German-Russian Partnership).” Paper presented at the VI World Congress of Eastern European Studies, Tampere, 2 August 2000, p. 6.
[78] Presentation by Hanna Ojainen: “The Northern Dimension: an Assessment and Future Development. Conference proceedings.” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2000, p. 23.
[79] Presentation by Igor Leshukov: “The Northern Dimension: an Assessment and Future Development. Conference proceedings.” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2000, p. 40.
[80] Suslov, Dmitry. “Region Baltiyskogo moria kak faktor evropeisko bezopasnosti (Baltic Sea Region as a Factor of European Security).” Baltiiskie issledovaniya, no. 1 (2000), pp. 22-26.
[81] Jeffrey Checkel. Rethinking the Role of International Institutions in Post-Soviet States. Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series. Memo No. 135. April 2000. P.1-2.
[82] Holmes, Steven. “Can Foreign Aid Foster the Development of the State of Law?” Eastern European Constitutional Review (http://www.mpsf.org/pub/kpvoonl/Etazi/Holms.htm).
[83] Legal reform is a telling case in point. Referring to Steven Holmes, “thus far, foreign legal advice to Russia has not done that country much good... The assistance community has failed to come to grips with the obstacles inhibiting the rule of law in Russia... Ironically, assistance programs have been undermining trust building. Typically, donor aid has the effect of peeling elites away from serving society by pressuring them to act in the interests of the donor in order to secure future funds.” See Dresen, Joseph. “Expert Calls for New Approach to Funding Russian Legal Reform.” Washington Quarterly, 1999 (http://wwics.si.edu).
[84] Van Heuven, Marten H.A. Engaging Russia: Can International Organizations Help? The Atlantic Council of the United States. Occasional Paper, March 2000, p. 9.
[85] See: Kaplan, Robert D. “Why Russia Risks All in Dagestan.” The New York Times, 17 August 1999, p. A19; Stern, David. “Caucasus trio ask NATO intervention.” The Washington Times, 10 July 1999, p. A6.
[86] http://www.lenta.ru/russia/2000/03/24/sovbez/_Printed.htm
[87] Avdeev, A. “International Economic Relations of the Russian Regions.” International Affairs, Moscow, no. 2 (2000).