Integration of Central European states into Western policy regimes presents a dilemma for the national governments. These states join new regimes because of a lack of alternatives following the collapse of East European regional institutions precisely to deal with the problems they share with their Eastern neighbours as a result of the breakdown of the Soviet system. A case of a problem which crosses national borders, and which calls for international co-operation is East-West migration. The issue is complex, ranging from short-term small-scale cross-border trade between Ukraine and Poland to trafficking of migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Western Europe across the former Soviet Union and Central Europe.(1) At the period of high unemployment and collapse of social security net, labour immigration is unpopular with the electorates of new East European democracies. At the same time, as the newly independent states can express their national identities and attempt to draw the frontiers of the community, calls are made for repatriation of ethnic compatriots, while barriers are set against the immigration of aliens of foreign descent.
The case of Hungary demonstrates
that Central European migration and asylum systems underwent a transformation,
which can be divided into three chronological periods: first, they were
guided primarily by the national interest, then by universal human rights,
and finally by regional security. As the authorities open their borders
in response to the population’s wish to travel abroad after years of regimentation
of this right, they must also accept an influx of foreigners. In
the beginning, little infrastructure exists to cope with the flow, and
its expansion comes at a cost, precisely at the time of the financial crisis
in Central Europe. Help is needed from the non-governmental sector,
and from the international community. As the political space opens
up, a debate arises as to who the desirable immigrants are. In the beginning,
nationalist calls for discrimination between the ethnic compatriots and
others prevail, accompanied by a general sentiment to make immigration
requirements stricter to alleviate what is perceived as a burden on the
economy. This period could be defined as one in which the ‘national
interest’ plays the most important role. The relevant actors are
Ministries of Interior and the political parties.
Wars and political repression in
neighbouring as well as more distant countries, however, exert immediate
pressure in the form of large refugee flows. As the Central Europeans
aspire to join the club of Western states, humanitarian concerns appear
on the local agenda, reinforced by local non-governmental organisations
(NGOs). Procedures for determination of who the genuine refugees
are, and who are economic migrants are required, and these necessitate
changes in the legislation, training of qualified staff, and expansion
of infrastructure, such as refugee reception centres. These can only
be achieved with the help of specialised international organisations, such
as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
The period could be regarded as ‘human-rights-driven’.
The ultimate solution is burden sharing with the neighbours. Western European states, however, have failed to produce a permanent burden-sharing procedure for distributing refugees. On the contrary, their increasingly harmonized policies center on restricting access to refugees with a number of procedures, such safe third countries, carrier liability and accelerated procedures for manifestly unfounded applications.(2) With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Union has incorporated the Schengen agreement, accompanied by a number of other border control measures, into the acquis communataire. As Central European states are in the process of harmonising their national legislation with the acquis, their policies are likely to extend the tightly-controlled border of “Fortress Europe” to their eastern frontiers. Since the East-West flow is not forecast to abate, as the sources of Eastern migration continue, the migrants will put the burden on the countries even less able to cope fiscally, such as Ukraine or Romania. This last period can be defined as one of “regional security”.
I chose Hungary as a case study
to illustrate this development for a number of reasons. Hungary was
the first country in the region, which was exposed to a series of migration
flows, of Romanians (1987-1989), East Germans (1989), Croats (1991-92),
Bosnians (1993-94), and thus was forced to become a trailblazer among socialist
states in developing a migration and asylum policy. The plight of
3.5 million ethnic Hungarians, living in the territories adjacent to Hungary,
has been an important political issue, raised by the political opposition,
and then picked up by the late Communist and first non-Communist government.
Finally, this relatively ethnically homogenous (with the exception of the
Roma population) and economically and politically stable country borders
on multiethnic states whose economies and systems of governance remain
shaky.
These initial conditions predispose
Hungary as a country of first asylum, first for the ethnic Hungarians,
then for victims of political repression or war, and finally for the migrants
in transit toward the West. Hungary’s institutional response is equally
unique: it was the first signatory to the 1951Geneva Convention on the
Status of Refugees, which hosted the first office of the High Commissioner
of the Refugees in Eastern Europe (15 October 1989). Then it accepted
much of the influx of Yugoslav refugees under a novel temporary protection
system.(3) Now it is in the first wave of EU expansion,
which will potentially make its borders the external frontiers of the Schengen
area. The latter move will have particularly disturbing consequences,
given the geographical location of Hungary, its lack of natural borders,
and long-standing social, cultural and economic ties with the neighboring
areas. In essence, Hungary’s lengthy process of institutional development
allows for conclusions, instructive for the states at a lower level of
institutionalisation of their migration and asylum systems, in the CIS
and the Balkans.
In this presentation, I shall outline the institutional development of the Hungarian migration policy in terms of the three periods by looking at the strategies and actors involved in the transition from one period to another. Such turning points were the signing of the Geneva Convention, and the drafting of the Asylum Law.
Hungary has changed over the past decade from a country, which was sending migrants to an area of transit or even destination. The administrative response to the new immigration has been ambiguous and inconsistent. This fact can be explained in the following terms: lack of previous experience, undeveloped infrastructure, social and political attitudes, and most importantly, by the pressures which three major factors exert on the Hungarian authorities in charge of migration: the direction and scope of migration, the example of Western European practice, and the activities of domestic non-governmental organisations.
1. For the overview
of the scope of East-West migration see: Ed. Frank Laczko, IOM and ICMPD
Migration in Central and Eastern Europe: 1999 Review, Vienna 1999.
2. Following
the meeting in London on 30 November—1 December 1992, ministers responsible
for immigration from the EU states have concluded a number of resolutions,
which allow the officials responsible for handling asylum applications
to turn down outright those applications which are “manifestly unfounded”.
An applicant may be turned away if she comes from a “safe country” or if
she has transited through a country where there is no risk of persecution.
An asylum-seeker might also be prevented from arriving in the EU altogether,
since the airline carrying an undocumented traveler can be fined for doing
so, and the very threat that this ‘carrier liability sanction’ would be
used against the airline is likely to persuade it to deny the asylum-seeker
the right to travel. These measures are reinforced by a list of countries
whose nationals are required visas to enter the countries which have acceded
to the Schengen Convention, which lists over 115 countries, mainly from
the East and the South. For more information, see the last section
of this article.
3. Temporary
protection offers the status comparable to that of a recognized refugee
for as long as the prolongation of hostilities in the country of origin
make the return dangerous. The status was discontinued for Bosnians
after the Dayton Agreement.