DRUG-TRAFFICKING AS A CHALLENGE FOR RUSSIA'S SECURITY AND BORDER POLICIES

Policy Paper

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The paper focuses on the issue of transboundary drug-trafficking through Russia's post-Soviet borders, including such key features as geographical directions and spread of illicit drugs in regions of Russia and its neighbor post-Soviet states, organization and mechanisms of smuggling. Russian anti-narcotic policy's adequacy is estimated on the basis of the analysis of qualitative and quantitative information. This information includes statistical data for the period 1999-2005, expert assessments, and the results of event-analysis (of the cases of discovered attempts of drug smuggling) for the same period. The proposed recommendations are grounded both on research results and the corresponding foreign experience considered in the last part of the paper.
**Background**

Illicit drug trade is one of the most dangerous and fast developing kind of transborder crime in the post-Soviet space. Its structures, stimulated by high profitability (1000% and more) of this illegal business, very often are able react to challenges faster than state agencies opposing them. After the collapse of the USSR Russia had to protect its new national borders the total length of which (11 000 km) as well of security issues related to them are comparable with similar characteristics of the EU and the US “problem borders” taken together. Considering the issue of drug-trafficking, the Russia-Kazakhstan border is the most difficult direction as the main part of heroin, the most harmful hard drug by its harm for Russian society, is transported into Russia through it. The majority of, at least, 1,5 million Russian drug addicts depends just on this drug. Russia's heroin market is considered to be the biggest in Europe.

Under these circumstances, Russia has to solve very difficult problem of developing its own model of anti-narcotic policy that should be even more effective than the similar experiences of other countries. However, nowadays there are no precise criteria for the adequate assessment of the issue because the needed information is dispersed through various state agencies. At the same time, the information available for public access is often evidently distorted. Independent expert estimations of the situation in the fields of illegal drug trade and national anti-narcotic policy are necessary condition for increasing of this policy's effectiveness.
The geography of drug smuggling through post-Soviet borders of the Russian Federation

Main drug smuggling routes. The problem of smuggling through Russia-Kazakhstan, Russia-Georgia, and Russia-Azerbaijan borders is connected to heroin production in Afghanistan and also (through Russia-Kazakhstan border) marijuana and hashish production in post-Soviet Central Asia. The traffic of marijuana from Ukraine and Transcaucasian states, of poppy straw from Ukraine, and of synthetic drugs from EU through Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Baltic states also have considerable impact on the Russian drug market.

The traffic of heroin and raw opium (for converting to heroin in Russia) from Afghanistan is the most dangerous. In the 1990s this country became one of the main drug producing hub and the absolute leader as a supplier of opiates. Now it produces almost 75-80% of their global volume [Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003].

There are several routes of opium trafficking. On the way from Afghanistan (in this country and outside it) it is converted to heroin in underground laboratories. The main ways of opiates trafficking are the Balkan route, passing through Iran (or to Pakistan to the port of Karachi and then by sea as a variant), Turkey, Balkan countries and when to Southern and Western Europe and the Northern route (or “the Silk way”) passing through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan part of Fergana Valley) to Kazakhstan and Russia, further - to Belarus, Ukraine or Northern Russian provinces towards EU countries. Various branches of the Northern route pass through Afghanistan-Turkmenistan border to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, in most cases entering after that the Russian territory [Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003]. Some of these branches, however, go roundabout it, turning to Turkey. There are also some "combined" ways: for example, Afghanistan – Iran - Azerbaijan or Armenia - Georgia – Russia.

For illegal drug suppliers each of two above-mentioned routes has both its advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of "the Balkan route" are shorter distance between Afghanistan and EU countries and close ties between ethnic mafia groups consisting of the citizens of Turkey, Iran, and EU states. At the same time this route crosses more "risky" zones, such as Iran that is a world leader in seizures of opiates. "The Silk route" attracts drug smugglers by transparency of the most post-Soviet borders, possibilities to use clan and ethnic ties for criminal operations in these states, the biggest in Europe capacity of Russia's heroin market, and by absence of serious competition to opiates from cocaine or synthetic drugs. However, the use of "the Northern route" for more solvent EU market is hampered with longer distance, more middlemen on the way, enough strict migration regime that EU established for the citizens of the CIS countries. That is why citizens of EU states themselves, especially of the countries (Lithuania, Poland and others) recently joined the EU, played great part in drug-trafficking from the post-Soviet space westwards1. Thus,

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1 For example, Polish and Lithuanian citizens were among narco-couriers arrested in 2004 for an attempt to transport large lots of heroin to Germany by "the Northern route". [Bi-Annual Seizure Report 2004, 346].
the Northern route is used more frequently for supplies of opiates to Russian and most post-Soviet countries' markets while to the EU states the most of heroin is transported mainly through the Balkan route.

Global state of the cannabis market differs from the heroin one. Because of relative cheapness of cannabis (in the CIS it costs 0.3-0.4 dollars per gram [Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003]), more significant volume of this drug is smuggled though it increases a risk to be discovered. The favorable natural conditions for large-scaled cannabis planting (and wild vegetation) in wider geographic area of Central Asia also influences the conjuncture very much. The key cannabis trafficking routes are much shorter than in the case of opiates. Central Asia doesn't influence seriously the global conjuncture, but some regions of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (especially the valley of the Chu (Shu) river) are large suppliers of cannabis drugs to Russia.

Transportation of amphetamine-type stimulants and cocaine is carried out in the opposite direction – from Europe to Asia. The volume of these flows is much modest, but the problem shouldn't be underestimated. It is important to take into consideration, that the number of synthetic drug consumers in the world is inferior only to the number of cannabis drug users. A widespread stereotype associating the fight against drugs with seizures of heroin supplies, in some extent is favorable for expansion of synthetic supplied to Russia mainly from the outside.

The Russia-Kazakhstan border, which is the lengthiest continuous boundary in the world (more than 7500-kilometer long), has serious importance both for drug trafficking and fight against it. When smugglers cross it – they find themselves in another region and a price zone, one of the largest transit point on the way to EU, and at the same time, one of the most capacious drug market. According to Kazakhstan experts, 30% of imported narcotics is consumed in the country [Ashimbayev et. al. 2004: 6] while 70% is transported outside and most of them to Russia. The statistical information on seizures at the Kazakhstan-Russian border can be the evidence of the huge scale of narco-trafficking. For the period between 1997 and 2004, when the South-Eastern Regional Branch of Border Guard Service (responsible for the most of the Russia-Kazakhstan border except the territories of Astrakhan province and the Republic of Altai) has been existed, the servicemen of this branch seized more than 3.5 tons of heroin. In 2004 only they arrest 416 kg of drugs including 100 kg of heroin [Interfax-Ural 2004]. Unfortunately, border and customs services don't always have a common statistical information about all seizures.

Almost every province bordering Kazakhstan (with the exception to the Republic of Altai, where the borderland is mountainous and there is no stable transboundary communication) is an area where large-scale drug-trafficking takes place. The routes of delivery of opiates and cannabis drugs cross the border at the same checkpoints. Taking into account the drug-related statistical information analyzing below, the main flows of smuggling drugs achieve Moscow and St. Petersburg, resort regions of Northern Caucasus (especially Krasnodar krai), major cities of Volga and Ural regions (first of all, Samara and Yekaterinburg) and Western Siberia (Tiumen, Khanty-Mansiysk etc.).

Analyzing information about drug seizures at Russian-Kazakhstan border, the author can surmise that in the last few years the main transboundary drug-trafficking
routes gradually has been shifting eastwards. According to official information, the Siberian Federal Area is ranking the first at heroin seizures in Russia (21% of the whole volume). This tendency can be explained both by the relative shortness of the “Eastern direction” and by higher purchasing capacity of gas-and-oil producing regions' population, in contrast to other Russian provinces. That is why this market is getting more and more attractive, taking into account continued rise of oil price.

Ways of "the Northern" and partly "the Balkan" routes pass through Russian borders with Transcaucasian states. These routes run from Central Asia and Iran through Azerbaijan and Georgia towards Russia or the illegal markets of EU countries. Within Russia narcotics are transported northwards and to "rich" resort areas of Krasnodar and Stravropol krais.

The main ways of Transcaucasian drug-trafficking pass through the motorway "Baku - Rostov" (through Azerbaijan and the Republic of Dagestan), and also partly Ossetian area of Russian-Georgian border. For a long time Chechnya, not controlled by Russian power, had been a comfortable hug for a trafficking of drugs originated from Afghanistan. Drug trade at the Abkhazian area of Russia-Georgia border is less developed in comparison with other parts of this boundary. Nevertheless, the pot growing in Abkhazia and its smuggling to Krasnodar krai, is been considered to be a widespread illegal business in the area. From 1993 until May 1998 Russian border guards, responsible for this section, managed to seize more than 5 kg of drugs [Schiogoleva 1998] while in 2002 customs officers confiscated 10 kg of narcotic substances.

Talking into account the volume of drug seizures, the "Caucasian route" is not, at least, the main channel of drug smuggling. In 2002 representatives of North Caucasian Branch of the Border Guard Service seized 60 kg narcotics [Rossiya - Regiony 2001] while in 2001 – only 6,7 kg. It is important to note that from 2001 till 2004 at Abkhazian and Ossetian parts of the border Russian customs officers seized only marijuana and that the largest volume of drugs confiscated at Russia-Azerbaijan border was only 8,2 kg. However, the Caucasus is one of potentially dangerous directions from the considered point of view.

The routes running through the western post-Soviet borders of Russia (its boundaries with Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, and Baltic states) in the most of cases are used for trafficking of opiates towards the EU. At the same time synthetic and cannabis drugs and poppy straw are trafficking towards Russia. As regards the Russia-Ukraine border, the main smuggling routes, according to Ukrainian sources,

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2 The information was obtained by Dr. Grigory Olekh from Siberian Federal District's Branch of the Federal Agency for the Control over Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. See: [Golunov et al. 2004: 21].
3 The information has been obtained from Southern Operations Customs (Rostov, Russia) by Dr. Nataliya Batischeva in August 2005.
5 Calculated by the information obtained from Southern Operations Customs (Rostov, Russia) by Dr. Nataliya Batischeva in August 2005.
go through boundary sections adjacent to Rostov, Belgorod and Briansk oblasts [Kovalenko et al. 2001]. Through the Russia-Byelorussia border main drug-trafficking routes pass along transborder motorways and railways of Briansk, Gomel, Smolensk, and Mogilyov oblasts. In the Baltic area smugglers use actively two motorways and two railways, connecting Pskov oblast and Latvia, a motorway and a railway connecting Leningrad oblast and Estonia, and exclave Kaliningrad oblast.

It should be noted that among Russia's western post-Soviet boundaries its Ukrainian border is distinguished by the most intensive exchange of countering flows of illicit drugs. For a long time, the balance of such exchange was in favor of Ukraine because of poppy straws' supplies to Russia, but since 2000 incoming and outgoing flows can be considered comparable taking into account their quantitative and qualitative characteristics.

**Regional geography of the dissemination of illicit drugs.** Correct estimation of the scale or at least trends in the dissemination of illicit drugs in Russia is the necessary condition for adequate policy making. Unfortunately, at present this problem hardly can be considered solved. Such estimations are originated mainly from several state departments (Federal Agency for the Control over Drugs and Psychotropic Substances – Gosnarkokontrol, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Security Service, Federal Customs Service, Ministry of Health Care and Social Development) often been partial and not correlating with the information of the other departments. The independent expertise in the field yet is developed weakly as a lot of corresponding information is not accessible for public.

The problems concerning correct estimation of the considered issues can be illustrated by evident divergence in assessments of drug addicts' number in Russia. During a one-year period (since autumn 2004 until summer 2005) state officials from various departments «increased» this number from 2 (Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov, November 2004 [Igoshina 2004]) to 4 (the Minister of Interior Affairs Rashid Nurgaliev, December 2004 [Cry.ru 2004]) and 3-8 million (the Director of the Department for Interdepartmental Interaction in the Preventive Sphere of Gosnarkokontol Boris Tselinsky, June 2005 [NEWsr.com 2005]). In July 2005 the Ministry of Health Care and Social Development stated that there are 1,5 million drug addicts and 6 million people who have ever taken narcotics [Mironov 2005]. At the same time, mass-media and officials (including those from Gosnarkokontrol) often used to manipulate by these figures: trying to present the situation as catastrophic and to persuade the society to take extraordinary measures, they focused the attention of public opinion on the number of 6 million. The situation at regional level is similar: estimating the number of drug addicts some officials use to multiply the number of registered drug addicts by four, others by ten.

In order to improve the adequacy of estimations concerning the role of various geographic routes in drug trade in Russia, the dynamics of drug addiction and drug-related crimes in border and transit regions should be analyzed. The considered data includes: 1) number and relative share (for 100000 inhabitants of a regarded province) of officially registered drug addicts at regional narcotic health centers; 2) annual increase in number of these citizens, 3) number and share (for 100000
inhabitants) of drug-related crimes for the period from 1999 till 2004. The mentioned information was obtained from The Russian State Statistic Commitee (Goskomstat) in November 2005.

It should be taken into account that the representativeness of such data is far from to be sufficient. The number of officially registered drug addicts in Russia is only a small part of their real amount and this part varies from a province to province in many cases depending on the effectiveness of local social policy. Many drug-related crimes haven't been registered at all while the great share of crimes being registered was committed by ordinary addicts. Therefore, in the light of this research this statistical information reflects only some manifestations of drug-related activity discovered and registered by law-enforcement bodies. Taking into account these considerations the author would like to focus his attention not so much on quantitative indicators and estimations as on a relative position of a province in comparison with other provinces according to the above-mentioned indicators. If tendencies, fixed by several indicators at the same time, coincide, the reliability of comparative conclusions is considered to be enough high.

In order to discover tendencies in development of drug addiction and drug-related criminality for the period from 1999 till 2004 top tens of regions, ranked by relative and absolute indicators, were distinguished. Emphasizing just ten (not more or less) regions is representational enough: it can be justified by the fact that the «first ten» of provinces provides more than 50% of figures concerning registered drug addicts and 35-45% of drug-related crimes in Russia.

By the number of officially registered drug addicts the city of Moscow has been constantly ranking the first among other Russian provinces, with the only exception to Samara oblast in 2001 (in other years Samara ranked the second and the third). From 1999 till 2004 the “top ten” provinces constantly included also Altai, Krasnodar, and Primorsky krais; Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, and Tiumen oblasts. Among these provinces (and other regions, which have been among “leaders” in 1999-2004) three regions border Kazakhstan (Altai krai, Tiumen and Novosibirsk oblasts), one area (Krasnodar krai) - Georgia, two regions (Krasnodar krai and Rostov oblast) - Ukraine. The highest annual increase in the number of drug addicts was registered periodically in the city of Moscow (with the exception to 2001 when Moscow ranked the second after Krasnodar krai, and to 2004 when it was also left behind by Irkutsk oblast). The top ten provinces by the mentioned index very often included Krasnodar krai, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Rostov, Samara, and Tiumen oblasts. Among 15 regions belonged to the top ten for the mentioned period, 6 (Altai and Krasnodar krais, Novosibirsk, Rostov, Tiumen, and Cheliabinsk oblasts) were border provinces, four of them bordered Kazakhstan.

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6 From the considered point of view border region means a province, through which great legal and illegal flows run. In this section the Samara oblast is not regarded as a border region, though it has 5 km border with Kazakhstan, because there are no communication ways in this part of the border. At the same time Samara oblast is one of the leaders in Russia by drug consumption and drug-related criminality.
drug addicts in various regions is proportionate to their real number would be accepted. According to the mentioned indicator, in 1999-2004 regions ranked the first were as follows: Tomsk oblast (1999), Tiumen oblast (2000), Samara oblast (2001, 2004), and Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug (2003). The top ten included 14 Russian regions, among which 4 bordered Kazakhstan (Astrakhan, Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Tiumen oblasts), 1 (Krasnodar krai) - Georgia and Ukraine. By the annual growth of of drug addicts' share among leaders were Tiumen oblast (1999), Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug (2000), Kemerovo oblast (2001), Primorsky krai (2002-2003), Irkutsk oblast (2004); Besides, the top ten frequently included Altai and Krasnodar krais, Samara and Novosibirsk oblasts. Twenty provinces were among leaders in some years, including 6 border regions (Altai and Krasnodar krais, Novosibirsk, Orenburg, Rostov, and Tiumen oblasts)4 of that border Kazakhstan.

By the number of drug related crimes the city of Moscow ranked the first in 2000, 2002-2004, while Saint-Petersburg was the leader in 1999 and 2001. The top ten often included Novosibirsk, Rostov, Samara, Sverdlovsk and Tiumen oblasts. From 1999 until 2004 16 regions belonged to the top ten, among them 5 (Krasnodar krai, Novosibirsk, Rostov, Tiumen and Cheliabinsk oblasts) were border provinces including bordering Kazakhstan.

The share of drug-related crimes per 10 000 people was the largest in Saint-Petersburg (1999), Samara (2000), Astrakhan (2001) oblasts, Primorsky krai (2002-2003), Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug (2004). The top ten frequently included Krasnodar and Primorsky krais, Novosibirsk, Samara, Tiumen, and Tomsk oblasts. Seventeen provinces were in the top ten in 1999-2004, among them 7 boundary provinces (Krasnodar krai, Astrakhan, Novosibirsk, Kurgan, Omsk, Rostov, and Tiumen oblasts) 5 of which bordered Kazakhstan.

Taking into account absolute and relative indicators for the period from 1999 until 2004 considered in aggregate, the “top five”8 included Novosibirsk, Samara, and Tiumen oblasts, Krasnodar and Primorsky krais. only two of these provinces (Krasnodar Krai and Tiumen oblast) border to post-Soviet states. On the whole, in 2004 all of the considered according top tens taken together included 46 provinces, among which 9 bordered Kazakhstan (but only Tiumen oblast, Altai krai and Novosibirsk oblast were in these top tens frequently); 1 (Krasnodar krai) - Georgia, 2 - (Krasnodar krai and Rostov oblast) - Ukraine. It is significant that no one Russian province bordering Belarus and the Baltic states has ever belonged to the group of “leaders” in 1999-2004.

Similar tendencies in the sphere of drug consumption are observed in the CIS countries bordering Russia. In Kazakhstan for the period of 2003-2004 Almaty and Karaganda oblasts (the latter is the main miner's region of the country) were the

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7 The republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayev-Tcherkessia are also do not considered to be border regions as these areas there are no transboundary communications with Georgia and there are very little possibilities to arrange cross-border drug smuggling. However, during the period of 1999-2004 these North-Caucasian republics belonged to the top ten according to relative indicators.

8 In this case just five (not ten) regions are definitely distinguished by the aggregate of the mentioned indicators for the period from 1999 until 2004. Other regions can be distinguished only by separate indicators for shorter periods.
leaders in narcotic consumption and drug-related criminality. Among Kazakhstani provinces bordering Russia, East Kazakhstan oblast ranked the third according to the number of drug-related crimes and the fifth according to the number of officially registered drug addicts. Pavlodar and Aktiubinsk oblasts ranked the same as East Kazakhstan province according to the relative share of drug addicts among the total regional population. In Ukraine the regions bordering Russia (among them were such miner's centers as Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts and the main resort zone of the country – the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea) ranked from the second to the forth by officially registered number of drug addicts being inferior only to the Dnipropetrovsk oblast [Region Online 2003]. By to the relative share of drug addicts these regions ranked from the third to the fifth. It should be noted that the Kharkiv oblast, that is one of the largest regions at the Ukraine-Russia borderland, was not among the provinces top-ranked by the mentioned indices. In Belarus the evident leaders in drug consumption are the city of Minsk (1917 registered addicts in 2004), Gomel oblast bordering Russia (1454), and the Brest oblast bordering Poland (797). Regions' positions don't change According to the corresponding relative indicator the regions' positions are the same. However, the other than the Gomel oblast regions bordering Russia, Vitebsk and Mogilyov oblasts, ranked the last seventh and eighth [Belorusskoye 2005], despite through Mogiliov oblast very important transboundary motorways and railways also pass.

The analysis shows that border or transit location of a region is an important but not the decisive factor for dissemination and consumption of illicit drugs (especially hard) in provinces of the Russian Federation and neighbour CIS states. The most important factors in this case are the level of social-economic development (such as high purchasing capacity of large groups) and low social mobility. These aspects are not sufficiently taken into account in at making or planning the modern national anti-narcotic policy. The emphasis is made on strengthening national borders and forming «security belts» at the Russia-Kazakhstan borderland. But at borders, as it will be demonstrated later, only a very little volume of narcotics, with respect to the whole volume of national illicit drug market, are seized while border regions don't play decisive role in the structure of narcotic consumption in Russia.

Organization of smuggling process

Methods of smuggling and the structure of criminal groups involved. Crossing the border is the most risky stage of drug-trafficking. It makes smugglers to use a special tactics, modify strategy and techniques used.

The methods, most often used by smugglers discovered by law enforcement structures, can be divided into the following types: 1) masking drugs in large lots of transported vegetables and fruits (including inside these products), industrial goods and raw materials; 2) concealment inside human bodies (swallowing etc.); 3) concealment in baggage, under clothes and inside the shoes; 4) fitting up hiding places in cars, lorries and carriages of trains; 5) concealment in packed lots of
products and industrial goods, including factory wrapping and built-in hiding places; 6) throwing down drugs before arrival to checkpoints; later accessories pick them up.

Masking cargo, criminals try to create favorable impression about couriers as representatives of “less suspicious” social group. Large lots of narcotics are often transported by women, children, pensioners (sometimes even veterans of the Great Patriotic War), representatives of "European” ethnic groups (Russians in particular) and so on. Organizers of large-scale smuggling operations in the direction from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to Russia prefer to use Russian vehicles and drivers because the vehicles having Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani license plates, being on the Russian territory, can be stopped and inspected at almost every checkpoint of the road police10.

Several examples bring to an assumption that high status of couriers is also systematically used for masking illegal cargo. Probably the most remarkable case took place on 14 October of 2005 at the Russia-Kazakhstan border checkpoint «Sagarchin» during the examination of «Jeep» car having a diplomatic license plate. The driver of the car, an employee of Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tried to smuggle 380 kg of narcotics including 362 kg of heroin. In this case the combination of the above-mentioned methods of smuggling was used: drugs were transported in specially equipped steel tank under car's bottom and their presence was masked with the smell of onion and vinegar. [Narkotiki 2005: 2].

In many respects a method of drug transportation is determined by peculiarities of transborder drug dealing organization. Individualists, small groups, as well as major groupings controlling all stages of supply, can be involved in smuggling. In the post-Soviet period one of the main trends of transboundary narco-trafficking has become the growth of the share of organized crime, branching groupings in comparison with individualists and small groups. They want to control not only smuggling, but even sales. Considerable part or even most of them specialize in several kinds of transboundary criminal activity, e.g. smuggling other goods. At the same time small criminal groups, often rallied by relative or ethnic links, still dominate in Eurasian drug trafficking. Large hierarchical cartels of monopolists, controlling all operations at drug market, haven't still appeared in the area. The process of centralization is hampered by several factors including broadness of the field for their activities, necessity to survive in hostile environment (it is more easy discover centralized structures) and even by unwritten norms of criminal community. According to these norms drug-trafficking is a condemned occupation that restrains involvement of organized criminals into this process.

Supplying drugs to Russia, large groupings divide traffic into several stages at which different carriers are involved; in some cases these carriers act as second-hand dealers. With such a scheme drugs are delivered to a fixed place and passed to a next courier who pays his or her partner money for a work done.

It is very difficult to discover such criminal networks and it reduces the effectiveness of the "force strategy" of struggle against narco-trafficking. It is often

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10 Information from the interview with Mrs. Tatiana Beklemisheva, a Deputy Director of the Main Directorate for the Fight against Smuggling of the Federal Customs Service. She was interviewed by Yana Denissova in February of 2005.
admitted that in the most of situations only small-scale traffickers ("camels"/"verbliudy" in slang), dealers ("pushers"), and consumers are detained, such persons are also accused within the majority of criminal cases. Arrests of ordinary couriers do not pose serious damage to narco-business as it is not very difficult to hire new carriers. No wonder that tactical achievements of power structures cannot change the situation at the long-term outlook: organized criminality both in Russia and neighbor post-Soviet countries redesigns its strategy and tactics. Sometimes criminal groupings provide official structures by good indices for their reports exposing inveterate drug addicts to police or servicemen at border control.

Criminal groupings use to recruit as assistants representatives of some professions and occupations whose status or professional skills help smugglers to surpass control at the border. Among such professions are railwaymen and conductors of trains, passenger bus drivers, workers of enterprises producing wrappers etc. Many inhabitants of border areas are also recruited to participate in this criminal business perfectly orientating themselves at localities and been well-informed about the regimes of Border Guard and Customs Services’ work. For a considerable part of local inhabitants of border areas illegal transboundary operations is almost the sole source of significant income.

The success of drug-trafficking operations often depends on corruption ties between drug dealers and state officials. Criminals try to penetrate into Border and Customs services, Gosnarkokontrol and some structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Some officials are sure that smugglers very often know in advance the details of operations prepared against them.

The ground for corruption in the structures countering transboundary drug-trafficking is very serious. Firstly, such officials have relatively small salaries while corruption ties mean for them possibilities to make a very quick and often huge profit. For instance, an officer letting pass a large lot of narcotics has a chance to become immediately an owner of an apartment or a very good car. Secondly, Customs and especially Border Guard services have serious cadre problems: for example, local structures of the Border Service are recruited from inhabitants of border localities who have a too many informal connections with their countrymen. The fight against corruption is often very complicated with the problem of establishing criminal intent in such officials’ actions: for the success of a criminal operation a state official in many cases have to be just inattentive or not enough diligent at a certain moment. That is why his or her actions can be estimated as negligence or administrative violation of law, not resulting in criminal responsibility. At least, a corrupted official may be just not informed about the kind of the smuggled cargo.

**The importance of ethnic factor.** According to a stereotype widespread both in power structures and public opinion, drug dealing is a field in which some ethnic groups, especially Tajiks, Gipsies, Azeris, and Chechens, specialize. Unfortunately, officials often have a friendly neutral, and even favorable, attitude towards mass media (including state and even departmental ones) equating these groups with narco-dealers. Such ideas essentially contribute to decrease in the level of tolerance in
Russian society.

This situation requires thorough and impartial analysis of the importance that the ethnic factor has in illicit drug dealing. Unfortunately, having almost no access to the corresponding office files, the author often had to rely on interpretation of indirect statistic information and trustworthy expert estimations on structural organization of drug-trafficking process.

As it will be shown below, the law enforcement structures are able to discover even a paltry share of the hard drugs demand in Russia. Thus, it is rather doubtful if the corresponding seizure statistical data could be even partially adequate reflection of the structure of drug dealing. This information can mirror, on the one hand, more successful activity of police and security agencies against some criminal groups including the mono-ethnic groupings, and, on the other hand, greater latency of some drug-trafficking mechanisms in respect to other ones. The representatives of «visible» ethnic minorities from Central Asia attract evidently more attention during customs and other inspections. Hence, it seems to be very probable that the attempts of smuggling, made by representatives of such groups, are discovered much better than the similar attempts made by persons having «European appearance».

If the assumption, that the statistical data on drug-related seizures partially reflects the real structure of drug dealing, will be made, rather contradictory conclusions can be derived from this base. At first sight, the analysis of this information allows to assert that Russian citizens (in majority ethnic Russians) rank first in this respect while Ukrainians rank second, whereas the citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan rank behind the top three. This correlation is regularly reflected in annual reports of Federal Customs Service [Tamozhnya 2004] and reports of other agencies.

Such statistical information doesn't show, however, the importance of ethnic factor in trafficking of heroin that is the most dangerous hard drug. It should be also taking into account that a significant part of drug-related arrests is provided by small-scale retailers (including many consumers) and drug addicts themselves who were detained for the storage of too large dozes. Therefore, the analysis of the ethnic structure of all drug-related arrests doesn't give a clear notion about the composition of transboundary drug-trafficking criminal groups.

Despite its unsufficient representativeness, the event analysis of Internet news informing about seizures at the Russia-Kazakhstan border gives some idea about the structure of drugs smuggling. According to the results obtained, in almost 60% of cases traffickers were citizens of Russia or Kazakhstan but in evident majority of these cases they tried to smuggle cannabis drugs. At the same time, almost all smugglers from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (as well as the majority of Kyrgyzstani

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11 The analysis was carried out by Sergey Golunov, Yana Denissova, and Liudmila Reshetnikova within research projects «Drug Trafficking as a Challenge for Russia-Kazakhstan Border Security» and «Transboundary Crime through Russia's Borders with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan: Social and Political Effects». These projects were co-ordinated by the Center of Regional and Transboundary Studies of Volgograd State University in 2004-2005 and supported by the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (American University, Washington, D.C., USA) and were headed by the author.
smugglers), the facts of whose arrests were recorded during the event analysis, were
detained for trafficking of opiates. Tajikistan ranked first by the citizenship of
persons arrested for trafficking of heroin and raw opium, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan ranked second, third and fourth correspondingly. An attempt to analyse
an ethnic structure of these arrests on the basis of this information can bring to a
supposition that number of Russians and representatives of other «European» ethnic
groups detained is compatible to the similar number of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other
«ethnic Central Asians».

The statistical information on drug-related crimes committed in Kazakhstan in
2004 can be also interpreted by different ways. The citizens of Kazakhstan committed
94.5% of such crimes while the citizens of Russia - 2.5%, of Kyrgyzstan – 1.8%, of
Uzbekistan – 1%, of Tajikistan - 0.3% only. But the structure of confiscations made
by national law enforcement structures was partly similar: its 96% was consisted of
cannabis drugs and only 4% (including 2% of heroin and 2% of raw opium) of
opiates. Of course, this doesn't imply direct connection between the analyzed two
groups of indices, but such a correlation makes unconvincing statistically based
arguments of that the contribution of Central Asian ethnic minorities to trafficking of
hard drugs is less than the similar contribution of Russian citizens and «European»
ethnic groups.

But the contrary assertion can be also easily called in serious question by the
analysis on qualitative information on seizures of extremely large lots of heroin. At
present time Border Guard and Customs services are able to discover approximately
1 ton per year while all law enforcement structures – roughly 4 tons. In the above-
mentioned case happened in October 2005 an official of Russian Foreign Ministry
attempted to smuggle 360 kg of heroin in a car having a diplomatic license plate. This
volume is an annual equivalent to one third of drugs seized at all national borders,
one tenth of drugs discovered by all Russian law enforcement structures taken
together, and evidently larger share of narcotics confiscated from ethnic migrants. As
Russian post-Soviet borders, including the Russia-Kazakhstan boundary, are crossed
by many millions of people, motor vehicles and thousands of trains, there is a
probability that tens of extremely large lots of drugs are successfully smuggled by
groupings having different ethnic composition. If this assumption is correct, mono-
ethnic criminal groups can be just a top of an iceberg.

So, the statistical data on seizures does not allow arriving at a definite
conclusion about the role of Central Asian ethnic criminal groupings in smuggling of
hard drugs to Russia. Therefore the organizational mechanisms of drug-trafficking
will be examined with the same purpose.

As it was already mentioned before, the structure of drug dealing includes the
following main stages: production – trafficking - wholesale markets – retail, dividing
into numerous constituents. Both interrelated and independent criminal groupings of
different scale operate at the each of these stages. A part of them is mono-ethnic
while another one is inter-ethnic. The situation when different stages of drug-
trafficking process are controlled by various groupings of both kinds is rather typical.
Ironically, according to a stereotype which is widespread in Estonia, the issues of
narcomania and drug dealing in this country are «Russian», taking into account that
the majority of drug addicts lives in Ida-Virumaa district where the share of ethnic Russians is especially high. This example demonstrates that the attempt to represent drug dealing as a traditional occupation of some ethnic minorities can easily become a boomerang.

Taking into account the poly-segment structure of drug dealing which elements often compete with each other in the process of supply to illegal wholesale markets or to consumers, weakening of one kind of grouping should almost inevitably (due to superprofitability of the business) cause substituting weak units by more viable ones. It seems that introduction of visa regime for the citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan can have only short-term positive effect for Russian security though in the beginning this effect may appear to be significant. As the U.S. Experience showed, toughening of policy towards «remote» South American countries – producers of cocaine – caused reinforcement of drug cartels in the neighbor Mexico. Hence, a flexible and pluralistic structure of drug-trafficking can respond to similar toughening of Russian policy by the corresponding way making Kazakhstan the key intermediate center. The effectiveness of trafficking mechanism can be restored very quickly in this case while «ethnically Russian» drug mafia will take a good chance to get rid of some competitors and strengthen its lobbyist influence on Russian power structures.

The accusation of an ethnic group in drug dealing logically means that, at least, more than a half of this group participates in this process especially at the stages of wholesale delivery and/or retail. The estimated capacity of heroin market is about 150-300 tons a year while the supposed number of migrants from Tajikistan to Russia is 600-800 thousand per annum\(^\text{12}\). If a half of Tajik migrants would supply 100 tons of heroin to Russian illegal market, each of them should smuggle 250-300 gram as a minimum. It is difficult to suppose that such a concentrated accumulation of narcotics transported by large crowds, certainly regarded as «risk groups» by law enforcement structures, in the most of cases would remain undiscovered. It indirectly means that only evident minority Tajik migrants participate in drug-trafficking to Russia. The number of representatives of other «visible» ethnic minorities (Uzbeks, Azeris, Chechens, Gypsies), arrested for smuggling, is significantly smaller that provides no ground to associate any ethnic group with drug dealing.

Some schemes which, according to representatives of law enforcement structures, are used by organized criminal groupings, are also do not correspond the idea about their mono-ethnic character. In many cases the traffic supposedly is divided in several stages: at the end of each one the illicit cargo is loaded to another vehicle having a new driver who pays off with a previous courier [Golunov et. al.: 27-28]. In this case the Russia-Kazakhstan border is crossed by a vehicle having Kazakhstani, or (that is better) Russian license plate and driven by a citizen of Russia or Kazakhstan correspondingly; otherwise, such a vehicle will attract higher attention at almost every road police post. Flexibility of drug traffickers, who can be familiar with regulations of border regime and can change routes of smuggling being in

\(^{12}\text{Appraisal of the First Deputy of Russian Federal Migration Service I. Yunash from his statement at the meeting with journalists from CIS countries in September of 2004. See: [Tajikistan National Informational Agency, 2004].}
danger, are often noted by officials of agencies dealing with the issue. But these features imply not only inter-ethnic character of a criminal organization but also that its brain is situated not in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan or Uzbekistan but in Kazakhstan or Russia itself. If one assumes that such organizations are headed by Tajiks or Central Asian migrants having Russian citizenship, the involvement of other ethnic groups diminishes essentially the share of Central Asians in smuggling process. Again, it provides no any sufficient reason to make entire ethnic groups responsible.

The statements of some experts from law enforcement agencies also bring to another conclusion. According to these statements, in many Russian provinces (including the regions bordering with Kazakhstan) there are no criminal groupings specializing only in trading in opiates. But this «many-sided specialization» assumes a capability to penetrate in different fields of activity that can be achieved easier than a composition of such groupings is multi-ethnic.

In many respects the ground for ethnic criminal groupings involved in drug-trafficking exists and grows due to marginal status of many migrants coming to Russia. During a long time they have to pass through numerous and humiliating bureaucratic procedures often following by extortion. Many migrants are not able to meet all legal requirements and that situation is very profitable for some groups of law enforcement officials who systematically take advantage of it, at the same time, to stress their importance as a «shield against the rush of aliens». In these circumstances migrants often have to rally around influential people having much money and many important social ties, but just these people (including representatives of regional ethno-cultural organizations' leadership) are often involved in drug dealing and co-ordinate trafficking. It gives representatives of law enforcement agencies an additional cause to allege that some ethnic groups specializing in drug-trafficking. This argument, however, is based on not more correct premises than the previous ones.

**Ways of problem solving**

Within the international experience there are three main ways of struggle with narco-trafficking and its consequences: 1) restriction measures including strengthening of border and customs control; 2) demand reduction programs (social advertising, health protection, active policy towards the youth); 3) harm reduction (prevention of overdosage, AIDS, and other diseases directly or indirectly caused by narcomania; social protection of drug addicts etc.) that means control over consumption of drugs 3) limited legalization of some drugs.

To all appearances just the first variant (restriction measures) with the stress on the necessity of “hard-edged struggle against drug-trafficking” has been chosen in Russia. This strategy is apparently the most popular both in power structures and in public opinion. The complex of concrete measures includes strengthening of technical and organizational potential of force structures, development of informational databases, equipping of border checkpoints, establishment of new...
cynological centers etc. These activities require essential increase of funding that
times is achieved at the expense of other important spheres (education, health
protection, support of activities of children and the youth) that has direct or indirect
importance for struggle against narcomania.

The increasing of support for “restriction policy” has brought some fruits that is been
reflected in essential growth of statistical indices concerning numbers of arrests
and volume of seized drugs. Trying to prove that increasing financial and other
support could bring more serious results, the advocates of such a policy frequently
refer to the experience of the USA that organizes expensive operations ending by
seizures of impressive volumes of cocaine and other illicit drugs.

However, the effectiveness of restriction policies both in Russia and in many
other countries (not excluding the USA) is often evidently low comparing to the
volumes of their financing that, even being sharply increased, rarely brings
commmensurable results in field of supply reduction. International experience shows
that law enforcement agencies taken together as a rule are able to seize not more than
10% of supplied illicit drugs while only confiscation of 70% of this supply can
undermine profitability of narco-business.

Approximate evaluation aiming to appraise the effectiveness of Russian law
enforcement agencies efforts bring to even less optimistic conclusion. Basing on
very moderate expert estimations assuming that an average Russian heroin addict,
the total number of which is 1 million, consumes 0,5 g. daily, the demand for heroin
in Russia is more than 180 tons annually. As it was already mentioned before, the
South Eastern Branch of the Federal Border Guard Service seized only 3,5 tons of
heroin (that means 500 kg per a year on average) during the entire period of its
existence. In 2003 Federal Customs Service arrested 488 kg [Federal Customs
Service 2004a], in 2004 – more than 680 kg of this narcotic [Federal Customs
Service 2004]. Hence, the total volume of heroin that is confiscated annually by
Border Guard and Customs services is less than 1 % of Russian illegal market's
demand. It is also evidently less than the volume of seizures in Tajikistan where in
2004 4794,1 kg of heroin (it is a share equivalent to 2.6% of the mentioned demand –
S.G.) was arrested [The Review of Central Asia 2005]. The total volume of heroin
confiscated by all law enforcement agencies at Russian borders and inside the
country in 2001-2003 did not exceed 1 ton annually. In 2004 it was 3,897 ton while
in 2005 – more than. Additionally, 2058 kg of raw opium (from which 10 times less
of heroin can be produced) was seized in 2004 [Trends 2005: 8, 19].

It means that all law enforcement agencies now are able to seize apparently
not more that 2,5% of the volume demanded by Russian heroin market that is
slightly less than the volume of heroin confiscating in Tajikistan. It raises
serious doubts about the adequacy of current national anti-narcotic policy
within which the main financial and organizational resources are concentrated
in hands of police and militarized structures. By similar reasons the idea that
the withdrawal of Russian troops from Tajikistan can have catastrophic
consequences for national security that can be partially prevented only by the
closure of the Russia-Kazakhstan border is also evidently not correct (see also
the section «7 myths»).
It seems that now one of the main weaknesses of restrictive strategy is also in its reliance on security and police agencies, having excessive administrative staff machinery and numerous armies of low-paid employees but poorly equipped for the purpose to fight drug-trafficking. In May 2004 the President Vladimir Putin admitted that in Russia about 40 000 personnel is directly involved in this field while in the USA the corresponding number is about 10 000 [Rodnaya gazeta 2004: 6]. In the same year it was also turned out that up to 80 percent of financial resources and staffs of some Border Guard Service’s regional branches were concentrated in their managing departments [Krasnaya zvezda 2004]. Such structures are very vulnerable against corruption: proposed bribes can be hundreds times as big as salaries.

As not only Russian but also U.S. experience shows, the intolerant repressive policy indirectly promotes strengthening ties between the huge army of drug addicts and criminal communities, causes increasing death rates because of overdoses and infection diseases and worsening of inter-ethnic relations as both in Russia and in the USA and some other countries the repressive measures are often directed mainly towards representatives of ethnic minorities. Even such apparently positive consequence of restrictive policy as increase of retail prices for hard drugs can have unfavorable spin-off including jump in the rate of street crimes (as addicts need larger amounts of money) and of deaths caused by cheaper but low-quality narcotics.

The main alternative for restrictive policy is demand reduction that includes health protection, youth policy, social advertising, and other measures. This way assumes active involvement of non-governmental structures: anti-narcotic foundations, sport clubs, religious organizations. The psychological ground for demand reduction is support of important social aims diverting young people from drugs or creating powerful stimuli to surpass drug addiction.

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of many officially supported anti-narcotic programs is low. They frequently take a form of Soviet style agitation conducted by bureaucrats having no sufficient qualification in the field. This agitation often only provokes the interest towards drugs among teenagers. But even effective demand reduction measures are usually underfinanced. For example, in Orenburg oblast they were funded only by 12 percent for 2003 and by 6 percent for the first half of 2004.

The new Federal Program “Complex Measures for Counteraction to Drug Abuse and their Illicit Circulation” adopted in September 2005 [Federal'naya Tselevaya programma 2005] can be regarded as some shift towards demand reduction. The Program has a very ambitious aim to diminish the number of drug addicts by 20 percent while the estimated volume of confiscated drugs to their illicit circulation should be increased only from 8,9 to 10,7 percent. The Program’s budget of $ 108,2 million in the ruble equivalent is to be distributed among Gosnarkokontrol (41 percent), Ministry of Health and Social Development (12 percent), Agency “Rospechat” (8 percent), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Education (7 percent for each one), Federal Security Service, Ministry of Agriculture and Federal Sport, Physical Culture Agency (4 percent for each one), Customs Service (0,6 percent), and other agencies. It should be noted that since 2006 the greater share of funds allocated to Gosnarkokontrol will be spent for social advertising and other forms of propaganda, about $ 107,8 million of these funds is destined for direct
distribution among NGO’s. As the Program aims “creation of the unified system of positive moral values determining the negative attitude towards illicit drug consumption”, it seems, however, that many of its actions can take the shape of centralized Soviet style agitation without serious effect.

But the main problem is that the budget is evidently too small to achieve targeted aims. At the same time, the financing of anti-narcotic agencies in 2006, according to the national budget’s project, is 14 times (of these structures’ management alone - “only” 2.1 times) as big as the funds allocated for the Program for the same period. On the other hand, if the complex of mainly social measures aiming to diminish drug addiction by 20 percent has the four-year funding of $107.8 million, the need in state antinarcotics bodies, having the budget of $299.2 million for 2006 only [Prilozheniye 8 2005], is rather doubtful. Taking also into account the huge share of expenses for the national security in 2006, the mentioned program cannot be regarded as a crucial turn from restriction towards demand reduction strategy.

The importance of harm reduction as a strategy of struggle against narcomania and drug-related crime in Russia is not only underestimated but also often perceived by officials and public opinion as indirect encouraging of consumption. Such a distorted perception (of course, for a healthy person a possibility to get gratuitous treatment is not a very powerful stimulus to fall sick), combined with a widespread contemptuous attitude towards addicts, impedes to estimate advantages of this strategy that in the Netherlands is considered to be as important element of national drug control policy as demand reduction [Synthetic Drug Trafficking 2003: 74]. Social and medical support can make a part of the huge army of Russian drug addicts, rallying with organized crime by intolerant restrictive policy, loyal or, at least, neutral in fight between the state and drug mafia. It is also important that harm reduction measures can essentially diminish the number of deaths because of overdoses and of infections by AIDS and hepatitis. No wonder that in the Netherlands this number is evidently less than a number of deaths caused by alcohol and tobacco consumption.

On the whole, the effectiveness of restriction measures undertaken by Russian law enforcement and security agencies is paltry in comparison to the level of hard drugs consumption. Taking into account the problems caused by geographical position of the country and other factors, there are no serious grounds to believe that such effectiveness will increase essentially. Within the national anti-narcotic policy the main stress should be laid, therefore, on social measures, including demand reduction and harm reduction programs.
7 myths

Myth 1. Narcomania is spreading throughout Russia like epidemics. Therefore, the country verges to catastrophe. In order to stop it extreme measures, realized by police and militarized structures having extraordinary powers, are required.

By the estimations of UNO experts, in the last years the level of hard drugs consumption has been stabilized (2005 World Drug Report: 59). The damage caused by narcomania is inadmissibly great for Russia but it is commensurable with the similar detriment of alcoholism or tobacco smoking. Therefore these problems should not have evidently different priorities at the national level. Additionally, exaggerated estimations on the scale of narcomania in Russia indirectly call in question if the corresponding law enforcement and security agencies have now and will have in future any real efficiency in the considered field. If we agree that the number of drug addicts in Russia is about 6 million (the maximal figure provided by high-ranking officials) the majority of which (2/3 or even more) addicted to heroin, it means that approximately only 0,2% of all-Russian circulation is seized at national borders and only 0,6% by all law enforcement structures taken together.

Myth 2. The level of drug consumption is the highest in regions and cities situated near «problem» borders or at trafficking routes.

Actually, the level of consumption is the highest in regions and major cities where purchasing capacity is especially great while/or social mobility is often low. The latter feeds the sense of hopelessness among broad groups of population (e.g. miners). It seems that approximately 20 major cities, where about 50% or more of drug-related activities is concentrated, can be found.

Myth 3. To defeat drug-trafficking Russia should close its borders with the Asian countries of the CIS.

If we assume that the number of heroin addicts in Russia is about 1 million, today border guards and customs officials are able to seize only 0,5-1% per year of the whole demand of Russian illegal market. Increasing of the heroin addicts' number makes this share even less favorable for the mentioned structures while the decreasing diminishes the importance of transboundary drug-trafficking issue for Russian national security. It should be taken into account that, even according to estimations of these services' officials, the largest share of drugs are brought to Russia through existing checkpoints the majority of which yet actually is controlled not far better than the space between them. The effective control other post-Soviet boundaries would mean not only barrierization of this space but also re-equipment of checkpoints, high salaries for enlarged staff of border guards and customs officials. Taking into account the huge length of Russian borders, these measures could became excessive burden for Russian budget. Any «softer» decision for the problem will hardly allow increasing essentially the share of seized hard drugs.


Only evident minority of Central Asian migrants, including Tajiks, are involved in supply of illicit drugs to Russian market. The number of these migrants is
not sufficient to satisfy the demand of this market providing heroin by average lots less than 0,15 kg for each migrant without exception (the less number of migrants involved the more drugs should be re-distributed among the rest of them), but so high concentration of heroin in such migration flows, certainly considering as «risk groups» by border guards and customs officials, would hardly remain undiscovered. Besides, even several successfully smuggled great lots of heroin (cases when 250-360 kg of heroin were attempted to be smuggled are already known) can outweigh annual volume of all confiscations from Central Asian migrants. It is known that the traffic of such lots is organized by representatives of different nationalities and ethnic groups. As for cannabis drugs, the statistical information on seizures cogently shows that ethnic minorities do not have a crucial importance in trafficking.

**Myth 5. A typical drug addict is a natural ally of drug mafia.**

Well-considered social policy, including harm reduction programs can reduce noticeably the dependence of addicts from illegal supplies as well as incentives to earn money by criminal ways.

**Myth 6. Russia should use, at first, the experience of countries (USA, Iran, China etc.) that rely on rigid restriction measures.**

The most of these countries have far less lengthy (e.g. Iran – in 7 times, USA – almost in 4 times) «problem» borders. It's no wonder that the restrictive policies of such countries are and will be certainly far more effective than Russian one though no country is able to stop increase of supply and consumption by restriction measures.

**Myth 7. Police and militarized structures should be at the head of struggle against narcomania in Russian Federation.**

According to moderate expert estimations the number of heroin addicts in Russia is roughly 1 million and in this case all mentioned structures taking together are able to seize slightly more of 2% heroin demanded by Russian illicit market. Increasing of the heroin addicts' number makes this share less favorable for law enforcement agencies while decreasing raises the doubt about the statement that counteraction to heroin traffic from Afghanistan through Central Asia requires extraordinary measures in field of national security. Taking into account these considerations, the mentioned structures have no sufficient ground to claim to leadership in national anti-narcotic policy.

Apart from this, it should be also taken into account that rigid restriction policy not combined with well-considered social (migration, youth policy, medical etc.) measures can cause worsening of inter-ethnic relations, periodical jumps in the rate of street crime, spread of AIDS and infectious hepatitis even beyond the environment of addicts, increasing of death rate because of overdosages, rallying between drug addicts and some other socially marginal groups (e.g. ethnic migrants) on the one hand and criminal communities – on the other hand.

**Recommendations**

*a* For Executive Power (Government, President Administration etc.) on the whole:**
1) Taking into account evidently low effectiveness of restriction measures, Russian anti-narcotic policy should be, at first, social, stressing on demand and harm reduction and taking into account the corresponding experience of EU and other countries. It should be carried out by competent people and coordinated by the Ministry of Health and Social Development. It is necessary to re-distribute proportion of funding from «power unit» of anti-narcotic policy (in which now the overwhelming share of resources is concentrated) to the social one and to establish transparent independent monitoring allowing to estimate, at last, the real state of affairs concerning the issue of narcomania.

2) The role of restrictive policy, including border security, should be auxiliary and be based on real objectives such as creation of maximal obstacles to functioning of large-scale trafficking.

3) Functions of the State Agency for the Control over Drugs and Psychotropic Substances should be focused not on “everything related to the issue of illicit drugs” on strategic planning, coordination of governmental bodies' activities and supervision over these activities in order to increase this effectiveness and fight drug-related corruption.

4) Instead of creating the «security belt» in Russia-Kazakhstan borderland it would be far more efficient to focus on pilot projects for roughly 10 regions and/or 20 major cities most of all infected by narcomania. Within such project the main stress should be laid on demand reduction (especially youth policy), harm reduction (in order to decrease the dependence of drug addicts on organized crime), undermining economic mechanisms of drug-related crime, experiments on structural reforms of law enforcement bodies and on law application practice.

5) Within the «supply reduction unit» of national anti-narcotic policy the highest priority should be support for customs bodies.

6) The key condition for effective law enforcement measures is in very close cooperation between corresponding agencies of Russia and Kazakhstan. Within this cooperation joint and co-financed programs, that would complicate functioning of the main trafficking routes and illegal wholesale markets in Kazakhstan, should have the highest priority. Unification of standards and priorities within national anti-narcotic policies can contribute essentially to the effectiveness of joint measures.

b) For Customs and Border Guard Services

1) The highest priority should be support for technical and organizational improvement of control at multilateral checkpoints through Russia-Kazakhstan border and struggle against corruption in Customs service. As a first step, these checkpoints should get modern equipment for scanning of cargo and thorough inspection of people (especially of the citizens of third countries) crossing this border.

2) Transboundary passenger trains from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are inspected badly; so the idea to construct 3-4 railway stations at Russia-Kazakhstan border or Kazakhstan's southern boundaries, where all passengers would be
obliged to pass strict control and change trains, can be considered. This action could create serious obstacles for small and middle-scale trafficking groups and reduce a criminal constituent of Central Asian migration.

3) Wage rise together with toughening of personnel selection and service requirements are the main directions of struggle against corruption.

c) For law enforcement structures

Taking into account the Dutch experience, the idea to differentiate criminal responsibility for dissemination of hard and soft drugs deserves serious consideration. Perhaps, this idea can be tested within law application practice at the local level. Such measures and other indirect means of regulation should stimulate organized criminal groupings to redirect themselves from traffic of heroin and other hard drugs to other activities less risky for them and less dangerous for society.

d) For Federal Migration Agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

In order to diminish the role of ethnic factor in drug-related transboundary organized crime: a) strict border control should be combined with benevolent attitude to law-abiding migrants that assumes preventing their marginalization: easing registration process, help in job placement etc.); b) introduction of all-national database on «undesirable migrants».

Symbolic Notations
- Regions distinguished by the greatest numbers of officially registered drug addicts
- Regions distinguished by the greatest numbers of officially registered drug-related crimes
- Regions distinguished by both absolute and relative indices of officially registered drug addicts and drug-related crimes

Regions marked by figures:
1 – Altai krai; 2 – Irkutsk province, 3 – Kemerovo province, 4 – Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous District, 5 – Krasnodar krai, 6 – the city of Moscow, 7 – Novosibirsk province, 8 – Primorsky krai, 9 – Rostov province, 10 – the city of St. Petersburg, 11 – Samara province, 12 – Sverdlovsk province, 13 – Tiumen province, 14 – Tomsk province.
APPENDIX 2. «TOP TEN» RUSSIAN PROVINCES BY THE NUMBERS OF OFFICIALLY REGISTERED DRUG-ADDICTS AND DRUG-RELATED CRIMES IN 1999-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-addicts in Russia / Rank by the share of officially registered drug-addicts per 100 000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-related crimes / Rank by the share of officially registered drug-related crimes per 100 000 inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North and Center</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow province</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The city of Moscow</td>
<td>1/- 1/- 2/- 1/- 1/- 2/- 1/- 2/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/-</td>
<td>8/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The city of Saint-Petersburg</td>
<td>1/- 1/- 2/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 1/-</td>
<td>1/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South-West and Volga Area</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnodar Krai*</td>
<td>2/9  3/-  3/8  3/9  3/10  2/10  3/7  4/10  3/10  2/7  2/- 3/-</td>
<td>8/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavropol Krai</td>
<td>-/10</td>
<td>-/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrakhan province</td>
<td>-/10</td>
<td>-/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov province</td>
<td>7/-  7/-  7/-  7/-  7/-  5/8  3/3  8/-  7/-  6/- 4/-</td>
<td>8/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara province*</td>
<td>3/2  2/2  1/1  2/2  2/2  3/1  4/3  5/1  4/6  8/- 9/9 5/-</td>
<td>7/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ural and Siberia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurgan Province</td>
<td>-/9</td>
<td>-/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sverdlovsk Province</td>
<td>6/-  6/-  7/-  7/-  9/-  6/-  6/-  6/-  10/- 9/-</td>
<td>6/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous district</td>
<td>n/a  -/1  n/a  -/1  -/1  -/3  -/9  -/4  -/2  -/1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamalo-Nenetsky Autonomous District</td>
<td>n/a  -/10</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Tyva</td>
<td>-/6</td>
<td>-/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altai Krai</td>
<td>8/5  8/9  9/7  10/8  -/9  9/9</td>
<td>8/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnoyarsk krai</td>
<td>10/-</td>
<td>9/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taimyr Autonomous</td>
<td>-/7</td>
<td>-/2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Provinces | Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-addicts in Russia/ Rank by the share of officially registered drug-addicts per 100 000 inhabitants | Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-related crimes / Rank by the share of officially registered drug-related crimes per 100 000 inhabitants |
---|---|---|
District | | | | | | | | | | | |
Irkutsk province | 9/7 | -/6 | 6/5 | 6/7 | 6/6 | 7/6 | | | | | 10/- |
Kemerovo province | 5/3 | 5/4 | 5/3 | 5/4 | 5/6 | 10/- | 10/- | 10/- | 8/- | | |
Novosibirsk* province | 10/9 | 9/10 | 8/8 | 9/9 | 8/8 | 8/8 | 8/5 | 7/- | 5/2 | 6/7 | 7/8 | 6/10 |
Omsk Province | | | | | | | | -/9 | -/9 | | |
Tomsk province | -/1 | -/3 | -/2 | -/3 | -/3 | -/3 | -/6 | -/7 | -/10 | -/5 | | |
Far East | | | | | | | | | | | |
Primorsky krai* | -/8 | -/8 | 10/6 | -/5 | 10/5 | 10/4 | 9/3 | -/6 | 9/3 | 5/1 | 5/1 | 9/6 |
Khabarovsk krai | | | | | | | -/4 | -/4 | -/5 | -/2 | -/4 | -/7 |
Amur province | | | | | | | -/10 | | -/5 | -/6 | -/5 | | |
Magadan province | | | | | | | | | | | -/8 |

* The information concerning regions especially distinguished by both absolute and relative indices in 1999-2004 is marked by the bold font.
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