The paper focuses on the issue of transboundary drug-trafficking through Russia's post-Soviet borders, including such key features as geographical directions and spread of illicit drugs in regions of Russia and its neighbor post-Soviet states, organization and mechanisms of smuggling. Russian anti-narcotic policy's adequacy is estimated on the basis of the analysis of qualitative and quantitative information. This information includes statistical data for the period 1999-2005, expert assessments, and the results of event-analysis (of the cases of discovered attempts of drug smuggling) for the same period. The proposed recommendations are grounded both on research results and the corresponding foreign experience considered in the last part of the paper.
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Background

Illicit drug trade is one of the most dangerous and fast developing kind of transborder crime in the post-Soviet space. Its structures, stimulated by high profitability (1000% and more) of this illegal business, very often are able react to challenges faster than state agencies opposing them. After the collapse of the USSR Russia had to protect its new national borders the total length of which (11 000 km) as well of security issues related to them are comparable with similar characteristics of the EU and the US “problem borders” taken together. Considering the issue of drug-trafficking, Russia-Kazakhstan border is the most difficult direction as the main part of heroin, the most harmful hard drug by its harm for Russian society, is transported into Russia through it. The majority of, at least, 1,5 million Russian drug addicts depends just on this drug. Russia’s heroin market is considered to be the biggest in Europe.

Under these circumstances, Russia has to solve very difficult problem of developing its own model of anti-narcotic policy that should be even more effective than the similar experiences of other countries. However, nowadays there are no precise criteria for the adequate assessment of the issue because the needed information is dispersed through various state agencies. At the same time, the information available for public access is often evidently distorted. Independent expert estimations of the situation in the fields of illegal drug trade and national anti-narcotic policy are necessary condition for increasing of this policy's effectiveness.
Spatial Regularities of Transboundary Drug-Trafficking and Drug Consumption at its Routes

1.1. Main Routes of Trafficking through Russia’s Post-Soviet Borderlands

The problem of smuggling through Russia-Kazakhstan, Russia-Georgia, and Russia-Azerbaijan borders is connected to heroin production in Afghanistan and also (through Russia-Kazakhstan border) marijuana and hashish production in post-Soviet Central Asia. The traffic of marihuana from Ukraine and Transcaucasian states, of poppy straw from Ukraine, and of synthetic drugs from EU through Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Baltic states also have considerable impact on the Russian drug market.

The traffic of heroin and raw opium (for converting to heroin in Russia) from Afghanistan is the most dangerous. In the 1990s this country became one of the main drug producing hub and the absolute leader as a supplier of opiates. Now it produces almost 75-80% of their global volume [Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003].

There are several routes of opium trafficking from Afghanistan. On the way from this country the raw product converted to heroin in underground laboratories. The main ways of opiates trafficking are the Balkan route, passing through Iran (or to Pakistan to the port of Karachi and then by sea as a variant), Turkey, Balkan countries and when to Southern and Western Europe and the Northern route (or “the Silk way”) passing through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan and Russia, further - to Belarus, Ukraine or post-Soviet Baltic countries towards EU states. Various branches of the Northern route pass through Afghanistan-Turkmenistan border to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, in most cases entering after that the Russian territory [Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003]. Some of these branches, however, go roundabout it, turning to Turkey. There are also some "combined" ways: for example, Afghanistan – Iran - Azerbaijan or Armenia - Georgia – Russia.

For illegal drug suppliers each of two above-mentioned routes has both its advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of "the Balkan route" are in shorter distance between Afghanistan and EU countries and in close ties between ethnic mafia groups consisting of the citizens of Turkey, Iran, and EU states (so-called “Turkish” and “Kurdish” mafias). At the same time this route crosses more "risky" zones, such as Iran that is a world leader in seizures of opiates. "The Silk route" attracts drug smugglers by transparency of the most post-Soviet borders, possibilities to use clan and ethnic ties for criminal operations in these states, the biggest in Europe capacity of Russia's heroin market, and by the absence of serious competition to opiates from cocaine or synthetic drugs. However, the use of "the Northern route" for more solvent EU market is hampered with longer distance, more middlemen on the way, enough strict migration regime that EU established for the citizens of the CIS countries. That is why citizens of EU states themselves, especially of the countries recently joined the EU (Lithuania, Poland and others), played great part in drug-trafficking from the post-Soviet space westwards¹. Thus, the Northern route is

¹For example, Polish and Lithuanian citizens were among narco-courriers arrested in 2004 for an attempt to transport large lots of heroin to Germany by "the Northern route". [Bi-Annual Seizure
used more frequently for supplies of opiates to Russian and most post-Soviet countries' markets while to the EU states the most of heroin is transported mainly through the Balkan route.

Global state of the cannabis market differs from heroin one. Because of relative cheapness of cannabis (in the CIS it costs 0.3-0.4 dollars per gram [Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003]), more significant volume of this drug is smuggled though it increases a risk to be discovered. The favorable natural conditions for large-scaled cannabis planting (and wild vegetation) in wider geographic area of Central Asia also influences the conjuncture very much. The key cannabis trafficking routes are much shorter than in the case of opiates. Middle East and Central Asia don't influence the world situation, providing small share of supplies. But some regions of Russia's neighbor countries Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (especially the valley of the Chu (Shu) river) are large suppliers of cannabis narcotics to Russia. According the survey of the UNO, in 1998 in the Kazakhstani part of the valley 53 tons of hashish per 250 hectares were produced while in the Kyrgyzstani part 24 tons per 770 hectares [Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003]. It's no wonder that the main routes of cannabis trafficking come from the mentioned countries. In 2002 30 tons of hemp were seized in Russia, 17 – in Kazakhstan, 2,5 – in Kyrgyzstan, 1 – in Tajikistan, and 0,4 – in Uzbekistan [Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003].

Transportation of amphetamine-type stimulants and cocaine is carried out in the opposite direction – from Europe to Asia. The volume of these flows is much modest, but the problem shouldn't be underestimated. It is important to take into consideration, that the number of synthetic drug consumers in the world is inferior only to the number of cannabis drug users. A widespread stereotype associating the fight against drugs with seizures of heroin supplies, in some extent is favorable for expansion of synthetic supplied to Russia mainly from the outside.

The Russia-Kazakhstan border, which is the lengthiest continuous boundary in the world (more than 7500-kilometer long), has serious importance both for drug trafficking and fight against it. When smugglers cross it – they find themselves in another region and a price zone, one of the largest transit point on the way to EU, and at the same time, one of the most capacious drug market. According to Kazakhstan experts, 30% of imported narcotics is consumed in the country [Ashimbayev et. al. 2004: 6] while 70% is transported outside and most of them to Russia. The statistical information on seizures at the Kazakhstan-Russian border can be the evidence of the huge scale of narco-trafficking. For the period between 1997 and 2004, when the South-Eastern Regional Branch of Border Guard Service (responsible for the most of the Russia-Kazakhstan border except the territories of Astrakhan province and the Republic of Altai) has been existed, the servicemen of this branch seized more than 3.5 tons of heroin. In 2004 only they arrest 416 kg of drugs including 100 kg of heroin [Interfax-Ural 2004]. Unfortunately, border and customs services don't always have a common statistical information about all seizures.

It should be noted that by the middle of 2000s Kazakhstan also was some success. This success in the great extent was provided just by the struggle against smuggling. In 2004 1769 kg of illicit drugs were seized at Kazakhstan borders while
in 2003 – only 192,5 kg. At the same time, the percentage of overall increase in the volume of seizures in this country was significantly more modest – 11,7% (22690 kg in 2004 against 20316 kg in 2003). The overwhelming share of confiscations (21349 kg or 95%) was provided by cannabis drugs but the volume of seized heroin (457 kg) and raw opium (352 kg, that is 83% more than in 2003) was also significant [Ministry of the Internal Affairs, 2005].

Almost every province (with the exception to the Republic of Altai, where the border is in highlands and there are no regular communication) is an area where large-scale drug-trafficking takes place. The routes of delivery of opiates and cannabis drugs cross the border at the same checkpoints. Taking into account the drug-related statistical information analyzing below, the main flows of smuggling drugs achieve Moscow and St. Petersburg, resort regions of Northern Caucasus (especially Krasnodar krai), major cities of Volga and Ural regions (first of all, Samara and Yekaterinburg) and Western Siberia (Tiumen, Khanty-Mansiysk etc.).

Analyzing information about drug seizures at Russian-Kazakhstan border, the author can surmise that in the last few years the main transboundary drug-trafficking routes gradually has been shifting eastwards. According to official information, the Siberian Federal Area is ranking the first at heroin seizures in Russia (21% of the whole volume)2. This tendency can be explained both by the relative shortness of the “Eastern direction” and by higher purchasing capacity of gas-and-oil producing regions' population, in contrast to other Russian provinces. That is why this market is getting more and more attractive, taking into account continued rise of oil price.

Ways of "the Northern" and partly "the Balkan" routes pass through Russian borders with Transcaucasian states. These routes run from Central Asia and Iran through Azerbaijan and Georgia towards Russia or avoiding it to the illegal markets of EU countries.

The main ways of Transcaucasian drug-trafficking pass through the motorway "Baku - Rostov" (through Azerbaijan and the Republic of Dagestan), and also partly Ossetian area of Russian-Georgian border. For a long time Chechnya, not controlled by Russian power, had been a comfortable hug for a trafficking of drugs originated from Afghanistan. Drug trade at the Abkhazian area of Russia-Georgia border is less developed in comparison with other parts of this boundary. Nevertheless, the pot growing in Abkhazia and its smuggling to Krasnodar krai, is been considered to be a widespread illegal business in the area. From 1993 until May 1998 Russian border guards, responsible for this section, managed to seize more than 5 kg of drugs [Schiogoleva 1998] while in 2002 customs officers confiscated 10 kg of narcotic substances3. Different kinds of drugs, including marijuana, hashish, raw opium, and heroin, are also smuggled through the Daghestani area of Russia-Azerbaijan borderland. Within Russia narcotics are transported northwards and to "rich" resort areas of Krasnodar and Stravropol krais.

2 The information was obtained by Dr. Grigory Olekh from Siberian Federal District's Branch of the Federal Agency for the Control over Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. See: [Golunov et al. 2004: 21].

3 The information has been obtained from Southern Operations Customs (Rostov, Russia) by Dr. Nataliya Batischeva in August 2005.
Talking into account the volume of drug seizures, the "Caucasian route" is not, at least, the main channel of drug smuggling. In 2002 representatives of North Caucasian Branch of the Border Guard Service seized 60 kg narcotics [Rossiya - Regiony 2001] while in 2001 – only 6,7 kg⁴. It is important to note that from 2001 till 2004 at Abkhazian and Ossetian parts of the border Russian customs officers seized only marijuana and that the largest volume of drugs confiscated at Russia-Azerbaijan border was only 8,2 kg.⁵ However, the Caucasus is one of potentially dangerous directions from the considered point of view.

An important branch of the «northern route» of heroin trafficking to the EU countries passes through the Russia-Ukraine border westwards, while poppy straw, cannabis and synthetic drugs are smuggled in the opposite direction. For a long time a balance of such an exchange was «in favor» of Ukraine mainly at the expense of poppy straw. Thus until the end of 1990-s the Ukrainian border in this respect was often considered in Russia to be even more dangerous than the Kazakhstani one. Concerning the beginning of 2000-s it is difficult to determine certainly the main direction of transboundary smuggling in drugs: it seems that incoming and outcoming flows are compatible taking into account their quantitative and qualitative characteristics. According to estimation of Ukrainian sources the main drug-trafficking routes passing through the areas adjacent to Rostov, Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts in Russia [Kovalenko et al. 2001].

Important ways of trafficking in opiates to the EU countries (beginning with Lithuania and Poland and further westwards) and of synthetic drugs in the opposite direction also pass through Russia-Belarus border. The transparency of this boundary facilitates the task of traffickers and it is no wonder that just this way is the main branch of the «silk route» at the stage of smuggling from Russia towards the EU. At the same time Poland, along with the Netherlands, is the main supplier of synthetic drugs to Russia, and the main ways of this supply also pass through the Byelorussian territory. These transboundary routes use, at first, the main highways and railways passing through Bryahsk and Gomel, and also Smolensk and Mogilyov provinces.

The structure of drug-trafficking at the Baltic direction is similar to that can be observed at the Byelorussian routes: opiates and cannabis drugs are smuggled from Russia to Latvia and Estonia while synthetic drugs are brought from or through these countries to Russia. Two motorways and two railways connecting the Pskov province with Estonia, one motorway and one railway between the Leningrad province and the same country as well as exclave Kaliningrad province are used most actively in this case.

2.2. Border Provinces and Regions situating at Drug-Trafficking Routes as Narcotics

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⁵ Calculated by the information obtained from Southern Operations Customs (Rostov, Russia) by Dr. Nataliya Batischeva in August 2005.
Correct estimation of the scale or at least trends in the dissemination of illicit drugs in Russia is the necessary condition for adequate policy making. Unfortunately, at present this problem hardly can be considered solved. Such estimations are originated mainly from several state departments (Federal Agency for the Control over Drugs and Psychotropic Substances – Gosnarkokontrol, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Security Service, Federal Customs Service, Ministry of Health Care and Social Development) often been partial and not correlating with the information of the other departments. The independent expertise in the field yet is developed weakly as a lot of corresponding information is not accessible for public.

The problems concerning correct estimation of the considered issues can be illustrated by evident divergence in assessments of drug addicts' number in Russia. During a one-year period (since autumn 2004 until summer 2005) state officials from various departments «increased» this number from 2 (Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov, November 2004 [Igoshina 2004]) to 4 (the Minister of Interior Affairs Rashid Nurgaliev, December 2004 [Cry.ru 2004]) and 3-8 million (the Director of the Department for Interdepartmental Interaction in the Preventive Sphere of Gosnarkokontol Boris Tselinsky, June 2005 [NEWsr.com 2005]). In July 2005 the Ministry of Health Care and Social Development stated that there are 1,5 million drug addicts and 6 million people who have ever taken narcotics [Mironov 2005]. At the same time, mass-media and officials (including those from Gosnarkokontol) often used to manipulate by these figures: trying to present the situation as catastrophic and to persuade the society to take extraordinary measures, they focused the attention of public opinion on the number of 6 million. The situation at regional level is similar: estimating the number of drug addicts some officials use to multiply the number of registered drug addicts by four, others by ten.

In order to improve the adequacy of estimations concerning the role of various geographic routes in drug trade in Russia, the dynamics of drug addiction and drug-related crimes in border and transit regions should be analyzed. The considered data includes: 1) number and relative share (for 100000 inhabitants of a regarded province) of officially registered drug addicts at regional narcotic health centers; 2) annual increase in number of these citizens, 3) number and share (for 100000 inhabitants) of drug-related crimes for the period from 1999 till 2004. The mentioned information was obtained from The Russian State Statistic Commitee (Goskomstat) in November 2005.

It should be taken into account that the representativeness of such data is far from to be sufficient. The number of officially registered drug addicts in Russia is only a small part of their real amount and this part varies from a province to province in many cases depending on the effectiveness of local social policy. Many drug-related crimes haven't been registered at all while the great share of crimes being registered was committed by ordinary addicts. Therefore, in the light of this research this statistical information reflects only some manifestations of drug-related activity discovered and registered by law-enforcement bodies. Taking into account these considerations the author would like to focus his attention not so much on...
quantitative indicators and estimations as on a relative position of a province in comparison with other provinces according to the above-mentioned indicators. If tendencies, fixed by several indicators at the same time, coincide, the reliability of comparative conclusions is considered to be high enough.

In order to discover tendencies in development of drug addiction and drug-related criminality for the period from 1999 till 2004 top tens of regions, ranked by relative and absolute indicators, were distinguished. Emphasizing just ten (not more or less) regions is representational enough: it can be justified by the fact that the «first ten» of provinces provides more than 50% of figures concerning registered drug addicts and 35-45% of drug-related crimes in Russia\(^6\).

By the number of officially registered drug addicts the city of Moscow has been constantly ranking the first among other Russian provinces, with the only exception to Samara oblast in 2001 (in other years Samara ranked the second and the third). From 1999 till 2004 the “top ten” provinces constantly included also Altai, Krasnodar, and Primorsky krais; Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, and Tiumen oblasts. Among these provinces (and other regions, which have been among “leaders” in 1999-2004) three regions border Kazakhstan (Altai krai, Tiumen and Novosibirsk\(^7\) oblasts), one area (Krasnodar krai) - Georgia, two regions (Krasnodar krai and Rostov oblast) - Ukraine. The highest annual increase in the number of drug addicts was registered periodically in the city of Moscow (with the exception to 2001 when Moscow ranked the second after Krasnodar krai, and to 2004 when it was also left behind by Irkutsk oblast). The top ten provinces by the mentioned index very often included Krasnodar krai, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Rostov, Samara, and Tiumen oblasts. Among 15 regions belonged to the top ten for the mentioned period, 6 (Altai and Krasnodar krais, Novosibirsk, Rostov, Tiumen, and Cheliabinsk oblasts) were border provinces, four of them bordered Kazakhstan.

A relative share of drug addicts in province's entire population can influence on the level of social tensions, if the conditional admission that the number of registered drug addicts in various regions is proportionate to their real number would be accepted. According to the mentioned indicator, in 1999-2004 regions ranked the first were as follows: Tomsk oblast (1999), Tiumen oblast (2000), Samara oblast (2001, 2004), and Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug (2003). The top ten included 14 Russian regions, among which 4 bordered Kazakhstan (Astrakhan, Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Tiumen oblasts), 1 (Krasnodar krai) - Georgia and Ukraine. By the annual growth of of drug addicts' share among leaders were Tiumen oblast (1999), Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug (2000), Kemerovo oblast (2001), Primorsky krai (2002-2003), Irkutsk oblast (2004); Besides, the top ten frequently included Altai and Krasnodar krais, Samara and Novosibirsk oblasts. Twenty provinces were among leaders in some years, including 6 border regions (Altai and Krasnodar krais,  

\(^6\) Calculated by the author according the statistic information used.  
\(^7\) From the considered point of view border region means a province, through which great legal and illegal flows run. In this section the Samara oblast is not regarded as a border region, though it has 5 km border with Kazakhstan, because there are no communication ways in this part of the border. At the same time Samara oblast is one of the leaders in Russia by drug consumption and drug-related criminality.
Novosibirsk, Orenburg, Rostov, and Tiumen oblasts\(^8\) 4 of that bordered Kazakhstan.

By the number of drug-related crimes the city of Moscow ranked the first in 2000, 2002-2004, while Saint-Petersburg was the leader in 1999 and 2001. The top ten often included Novosibirsk, Rostov, Samara, Sverdlovsk and Tiumen oblasts. From 1999 until 2004 16 regions belonged to the top ten, among them 5 (Krasnodar krai, Novosibirsk, Rostov, Tiumen and Cheliabinsk oblasts) were border provinces including bordering Kazakhstan.

The share of drug-related crimes per 100 000 people during 1999-2004 was constantly the largest in Yevreyskaya Autonomous Oblast. The top ten frequently included also the city of Saint-Petersburg, Krasnodar and Primorsky krais, Astrakhan, Novosibirsk, Samara, Tiumen, and Tomsk oblasts, Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous Okrug. Eighteen provinces were in the top ten in 1999-2004, among them 7 boundary provinces (Krasnodar krai, Astrakhan, Novosibirsk, Kurgan, Omsk, Rostov, and Tiumen oblasts) 5 of which bordered Kazakhstan.

Taking into account absolute and relative indicators for the period from 1999 until 2004 considered in aggregate, the “top five”\(^9\) included Novosibirsk, Samara, and Tiumen oblasts, Krasnodar and Primorsky krais. only two of these provinces (Krasnodar Krai and Tiumen oblast) border to post-Soviet states. On the whole, in 2004 all of the considered according top tens taken together included 46 provinces, among which 9 bordered Kazakhstan (but only Tiumen oblast, Altai krai and Novosibirsk oblast were in these top tens frequently); 1 (Krasnodar krai) - Georgia, 2 - (Krasnodar krai and Rostov oblast) - Ukraine. It is significant that no one Russian province bordering Belarus and the Baltic states has ever belonged to the group of “leaders” in 1999-2004.

On the whole, the importance of borderland areas in the structure of drug consumption and drug-related criminality is not the same in various areas. The provinces adjoining Russian-Kazakhstan border have especially high rate of both corresponding indices (numbers and shares of drug addicts and drug-related crimes). As it was mentioned above the top ten by these two indicators in included Tyumen and Novosibirsk oblasts, more rarely Altai krai. The second and the third top tens constantly included 5-7 regions (especially Omsk, Orenburg, Saratov, and Chelyabinsk oblasts). Among regions adjacent to Caucasian and Ukrainian borders, Rostov oblast and Krasnodar krai in 2004 were among the leaders constantly (as a rule, were being in the first and the second «top tens»). Other regions have never been even in the «top twenty». According to any indicator, the provinces bordering on Belarus and the Baltic states have never been in the «top thirty» of regions by drug consumption or drug-related criminality.

So, the location near to a border through which most hard drugs are imported,

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\(^8\) The republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Tcherkessia are also do not considered to be border regions as these regions have no transboundary communications with Georgia and there are very little possibilities to arrange cross-border drug smuggling. However, during the period of 1999-2004 these North-Caucasian republics belonged to the top ten according to relative indicators.

\(^9\) In this case just five (not ten) regions are definitely distinguished by the aggregate of the mentioned indicators for the period from 1999 until 2004. Other regions can be distinguished only by separate indicators for shorter periods.
has a great influence on drug consumption and drug-related criminality. But the geographic location is less crucial factor than purchasing capacity and the presence of large groups of people having relatively high income but doubtful social prospects (for instance, in miner's cities). On the other hand, transit location of the territories, through which hard drugs are exported from the Russian Federation to the EU, have no serious impact in drug consumption in such border provinces.

Similar tendencies in the sphere of drug consumption are observed in the CIS countries bordering Russia. In Kazakhstan for the period of 2003-2004 Almaty and Karaganda oblasts (the latter is the main miner's region of the country) were the leaders both in narcotic consumption and drug-related criminality. Among Kazakhstani provinces bordering Russia, East Kazakhstan oblast ranked the third according to the number of drug-related crimes and the fifth according to the number of officially registered drug addicts. Pavlodar and Aktiubinsk oblasts ranked the same as East Kazakhstan province according to the relative share of drug addicts among the total regional population.10

In Ukraine the regions bordering Russia (among them were such miner's centers as Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts and the main resort zone of the country – the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea) ranked from the second to the forth by officially registered number of drug addicts being inferior only to the Dnipropetrovsk oblast [Region Online 2003], [Kilkist' hvorih 2004]. By to the relative share of drug addicts these regions ranked from the third to the fifth. It should be noted that the Kharkiv oblast, that is one of the largest regions at the Ukraine-Russia borderland, was not among the provinces top-ranked by the mentioned indices. In Belarus the evident leaders in drug consumption are the city of Minsk (1917 registered addicts in 2004), Gomel oblast bordering Russia (1454), and the Brest oblast bordering Poland (797). According to the corresponding relative indicator the regions' positions are the same. However, the other than the Gomel oblast regions bordering Russia, Vitebsk and Mogilyov oblasts, ranked the last seventh and eighth [Belorusskoye 2005], despite through Mogiliov oblast very important transboundary motorways and railways also pass.

Some provinces of Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Kazakhstan borderlands, being in the corresponding countries among the leaders by indices concerning drug-related criminality and drug consumption, adjoin each other. Conditionally such areas can be called «transboundary narco-regions». The first of them, situated along Russia-Kazakhstan border, includes Tiumen, Omsk, Novosibirsk oblasts, also Kemerovo and Khanty-Mansiysky autonomous okrug (the latter two provinces do not directly border Kazakhstan) in Russian Federation; while in the Republic of Kazakhstan - Pavlodar, and Eastern Kazakhstan oblasts as well as Karaganda oblast which does not border Russia. The second «transboundary narco-region» situating at Russia-Ukraine borderland includes Krasnodar krai and Rostov oblast at Russian side; Donetsk and Lugansk border oblasts, the Autonomous republic of Crimea and Dnipropetrovsk oblast not bordering Russia – at Ukrainian side.

The comparative analysis of indicators on drug consumption and drug-related criminality in border provinces of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan would be not

10 Calculated on the basis of: [Ministry of the Internal Affairs, 2005].
quite representative, taking into account different methods of calculation of drug addicts and national peculiarities of law enforcement practices. Conditionally omitting this circumstance, one can conclude that the above-mentioned provinces of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, according to quantity and shares of registered drug addicts in whole regional populations, can be compared with the top 30-40 provinces of the Russian Federation. For example, Dnipropetrovsk oblast would rank the 5th (by the «absolute» number) and the 11th (by the share in regional population) in the joint list including all Russia's regions and border provinces of Ukraine and Kazakhstan. According to the same two indicators other regions would have the following places in this list: Donetsk oblast – the 11th and 28th correspondingly; Karaganda oblast - 25th and 13th, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea -27th and 30th, Lugansk oblast- 28th and 37th, Eastern Kazakhstan oblast - 30th and 21th, Pavlodar oblast- 36th and 8th. By the rate of drug-related criminality Kazakhstani regions would rank significantly lower in similar rating (including all regions of the RF and above-mentioned oblasts of the RK): Eastern Kazakhstan oblast was being ranking the first by the number of officially registered «narco-crimes» among all border provinces of Kazakhstan, would be only 47th in the united list. Such a difference can be explained not only by the real state of affairs but also by different law enforcement practices in Russia (more strict) and in Kazakhstan in respect of small-scale infringers of anti-narcotic legislation.

The phenomenon of «transboundary narcoregions» can be explained by several factors. Among them are transit location of some borderland provinces on the way to the most «solvent» regional markets of neighbor countries: for example, Karaganda, Pavlodar, and Kostanay oblasts of Kazakhstan have such an importance in respect of Tyumen oblast of Russia. Another important factor is, on the contrary, a transit role of some «rich» regions as the location of intermediate wholesale markets from which illegal transboundary trade is made: such a role played by illicit wholesale hard drug markets of Krasnodar krai and Rostov oblast play for Eastern regions of Ukraine. The presence of depressive extractive industry with extremely harmful production in such border provinces as Pavlodar and Eastern Kazakhstan oblasts in Kazakhstan, Kemerovo oblast in Russia, Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts in Ukraine etc. also creates a fertile ground for concentration of narcotics supply both on such areas and around them. These all factors create serious prerequisites for involving neighbour regions in united system of narcotic consumption and criminal drug circulation. The problem needs more serious study within special research.

The analysis shows that border or transit location of a region is an important but not the decisive factor for dissemination and consumption of illicit drugs (especially hard) in provinces of the Russian Federation and neighbour CIS states. The most important factors in this case are the level of social-economic development (such as high purchasing capacity of large groups) and low social mobility. These aspects are not sufficiently taken into account in at making or planning the modern national anti-narcotic policy. The emphasis is made on strengthening national borders and forming «security belts» at the Russia-Kazakhstan borderland. But at borders, as it will be demonstrated later, only a very little volume of narcotics, with respect to the whole volume of
national illicit drug market, are seized while border regions don't play decisive role in the structure of narcotic consumption in Russia.

2. Organization of Smuggling Process

2.1. Criminal Structures Involved

Methods of smuggling and the structure of criminal groups involved. Crossing the border is the most risky stage of drug-trafficking. It makes smugglers to use a special tactics, modify strategy and techniques used. For the research on these organization forms both interviews with officials from Customs and Border Guard Services and the analysis of mass media materials were used.

The methods, most often used by smugglers discovered by law enforcement structures, can be divided into the following types: 1) masking drugs in large lots of transported vegetables and fruits (including inside these products), industrial goods and raw materials; 2) concealment inside human bodies (swallowing etc.); 3) concealment in baggage, under clothes and inside the shoes; 4) fitting up hiding places in cars, lorries and carriages of trains; 5) concealment in packed lots of products and industrial goods, including factory wrapping and built-in hiding places; 6) throwing down drugs before arrival to checkpoints; later accessories pick them up.

Masking cargo, criminals try to create favourable impression about couriers as representatives of “less suspicious” social group. Large lots of narcotics are often transported by women, children, pensioners (sometimes even veterans of the World War II), representatives of “European” ethnic groups (Russians in particular) and so on. Organizers of large-scale smuggling operations in the direction from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to Russia prefer to use Russian vehicles and drivers because the vehicles having Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani license plates, being on the Russian territory, can be stopped and inspected at almost every checkpoint of the road police11.

Several examples bring to an assumption that high status of couriers is also systematically used for masking illegal cargo. Probably the most remarkable case took place on 14 October of 2005 at the Russia-Kazakhstan border checkpoint «Sagarchin» during the examination of «Jeep» car having a diplomatic license plate. The driver of the car, an employee of Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tried to smuggle 380 kg of narcotics including 362 kg of heroin. In this case the combination of the above-mentioned methods of smuggling was used: drugs were transported in specially equipped steel tank under car's bottom and their presence was masked with the smells of onion and vinegar. [Narkotiki 2005: 2].

In many respects a method of drug transportation is determined by peculiarities of transborder drug dealing organization. Individualists, small groups, as well as major groupings controlling all stages of supply can be involved in smuggling. In the post-Soviet period one of the main trends of transboundary narcotraffic has become

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11 Information from the interview with deputy director of the Main Directorate for Fight against Smuggling of the Federal Customs Service Tatiana Beklemishcheva. She was interviewed by Yana Denissova in February of 2005.
the growth of the share of organized crime, branching groupings in comparison with individualists and small groups. They want to control not only smuggling, but even sales. Considerable part or even most of them specialize in several kinds of transboundary criminal activity, e.g. smuggling other goods. At the same time small criminal groups often, rallied by relative or ethnic links, still dominate in Eurasian drug trafficking. Large hierarchical cartels of monopolists, controlling all operations at drug market, haven't still appeared. The process of centralization is hampered by several factors including the presence of very broad lands for activity, necessity to survive in hostile environment (it is more easy discover centralized structures) and even by unwritten norms of criminal community. According to these norms drug-trafficking is a condemned occupation that restrains involvement of organized criminals into this process.

Supplying drugs in Russia, large groupings divide traffic into several stages at which different carriers are involved; in some cases these carriers act as second-hand dealers. With such a scheme drugs are delivered to fixed place and passed to a next courier who pays his or her partner money for a work done.

It is very difficult to discover such criminal networks and it reduces the effectiveness of the "force strategy" of struggle against narco-traffic. It is often admitted that in the most of situations only small-scale traffickers ("camels"/"verbliudy" in slang), dealers ("pushers"), and consumers are detained, such persons are also accused within the majority of criminal cases. Arrests of ordinary couriers do not pose serious damage to narco-business as it is not very difficult to hire new carriers. No wonder that tactical achievements of power structures cannot change the situation at the long-term outlook: organized criminality both in Russia and neighbor post-Soviet countries redesigns its strategy and tactics. Sometimes criminal groupings provide official structures by good indices for their reports exposing inveterate drug addicts to police or servicemen at border control.

Together with corrupted officials (see later) criminal groupings recruit as assistants representatives of some professions and occupations whose status or professional skills help smuggles to surpass control at the border. Among such professions are railwaymen and conductors of trains, passenger bus drivers, workers of enterprises producing wrappers etc. Many inhabitants of border areas are also recruited to participate in this criminal business perfectly orientating themselves at localities and been well-informed about the regimes of Border Guard and Customs Services’ work. According to estimations of some officials in Volgograd and Astrakhan regions in some border districts more than 80% of active local population works for smugglers. For a considerable part of local inhabitants of border areas illegal transboundary operations is almost the sole source of significant income while remunerations for assistance to smugglers can be many times as big as their ordinary salaries.

Effectiveness of drug trafficking often depends on corruption ties between drug dealers and state officials. Basis for corruption is created by chances to make a profit very fast rendering assistance to criminal operations. For instance, if official lets pass a large lot of narcotics he can become the owner of a flat or a car produced abroad immediately. There are also cadre problems: private soldiers of Border Service are
recruited from local citizens and they have a lot of informal connections with inhabitants of border area. Low salary of border stuff is also the problem. The fight against this evil is complicated with the problem of establishing criminal intent in officials' actions. State official must be just inattentive or not enough diligent at a certain moment. That is why his actions can be estimated as criminal negligence or administrative violation of law, not resulting in criminal responsibility.

Making shady transactions customs officers and border guards can be just not informed about characteristics of the cargo. Criminals try to penetrate into Border, Customs service and Ministry of Internal Affairs. State officials hold the opinion that smugglers very often know about operations prepared against them.

Though the interested parties make some efforts in order to fight corruption and conditions causing it (such as increase in financing of border guard and customs services, special operations of these agencies' security services, opening of new modern checkpoints, organization of helplines at them, improvement of information exchange with neighbor country's agencies), the question is still urgent. It seems that the main ways to improve the situation have been advance of officials' wages in the combination with personnel selection based on stricter criteria.

2.2. The Role of Ethnic Factor: Realities, Perceptions, and Phobias

According to a stereotype widespread both in power structures and public opinion, drug dealing is a field in that some ethnic groups, especially Tajiks, Gipsies, Azeris and Chechens, specialize. Unfortunately, officials are often have a friendly neutral, and even favorable, attitude towards mass media (including state and even departmental ones) equate these groups with narco-dealers. Such ideas contribute essentially to decrease in the level of tolerance in Russian society.

This situation requires thorough and impartial analysis of the importance that the ethnic factor has in illicit drug dealing. Unfortunately, having almost no access to the corresponding office files, the author often had to rely on interpretation of indirect statistic information and trustworthy expert estimations on structural organization of drug-trafficking process.

As it will be shown below, the law enforcement structures are able to discover even a paltry share of the hard drugs demand in Russia. Thus, it is rather doubtful if the corresponding seizure statistical data could be even partially adequate reflection of the structure of drug dealing. This information can mirror, on the one hand, more successful activity of police and security agencies against some criminal groups including the mono-ethnic groupings, and, on the other hand, greater latence of some drug-trafficking mechanisms in respect to other ones. The representatives of «visible» ethnic minorities from Central Asia attract evidently more attention during customs and other inspections. Hence, it seems to be very probable that the attempts of smuggling, made by representatives of such groups, are discovered much better than the similar attempts made by persons having «European appearance».

If the assumption, that the statistical data on drug-related seizures partially reflects the real structure of drug dealing, will be made, rather contradictory conclusions can be derived from this base. At first sight, the analysis of this
information allows to assert that Russian citizens (in majority ethnic Russians) rank first in this respect while Ukrainians ranking second whereas the citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan rank behind the top three. This correlation is regularly reflected in annual reports of Federal Customs Service [Tamozhnya 2004] and reports of other agencies.

Such a statistical information doesn't show, however, the importance of ethnic factor in trafficking of heroin that is the most dangerous hard drug. It should be also taking into account that a significant part of drug-related arrests is provided by small-scale retailers (including many consumers) and drug addicts themselves who were detained for the storage of too large dozes. Therefore, the analysis of the ethnic structure of all drug-related arrests doesn't give a clear notion about the composition of transboundary drug-trafficking criminal groups.

Despite its non-sufficient representativeness, the event analysis of Internet news informing about seizures at the Russia-Kazakhstan border gives some idea about the structure of drugs smuggling. According to the results obtained, in almost 60% of cases traffickers were citizens of Russia or Kazakhstan but in significant majority of these cases they tried to smuggle cannabis drugs. At the same time, almost all citizens of Tajikistan and Usbekistan, as well as the majority of Kyrgyzstan citizens, the facts of whose arrests were recorded during the event analysis, were detained for smuggling of opiates. Tajikistan ranked first by the citizenship of persons arrested for trafficking of heroin and raw opium, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan ranked second, third and fourth correspondingly. An attempt to analyse an ethnic structure of these arrests on the basis of this information can bring to a supposition that number of Russians and representatives of other «European» ethnic groups detained is compatible to the similar number of Tajiks and Uzbeks. Again, in this case the representatives of two corresponding countries attract much attention of border guard and customs structures as «potentially suspicious» persons.

The statistical information on drug-related crimes committed in Kazakhstan in 2004 can be also interpreted by different ways. The citizens of Kazakhstan committed 94,5 % of such crimes while the citizens of Russia - 2,5%, of Kyrgyzstan – 1,8%, of Uzbekistan – 1%, of Tajikistan - 0,3% only. But the structure of confiscations made by national law enforcement structures was partly similar: its 96% was consisted of cannabis drugs and only 4% (including 2% of heroin and 2% of raw opium) of opiates. Of course, this doesn't imply direct connection between the analyzed two groups of indices, but such a correlation makes unconvincing statistically based arguments of that the contribution of Central Asian ethnic minorities to trafficking of hard drugs is less than the similar contribution of Russian citizens and «European» ethnic groups.

12 The analysis was carried out by Sergey Golunov, Yana Denissova, and Liudmila Reshetnikova within research projects «Drug Trafficking as a Challenge for Russia-Kazakhstan Border Security» and «Transboundary Crime through Russia's Borders with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan: Social and Political Effects». These projects were co-ordinated by the Center of Regional and Transboundary Studies of Volgograd State University in 2004-2005 and supported by the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (American University, Washington, D.C., USA) and were headed by the author.
But the contrary assertion can be also easily called in serious question by the analysis on qualitative information on seizures of extremely large lots of heroin. At present time Border Guard and Customs services are able to discover approximately 1 ton per year while all law enforcement structures – roughly 4 tons. In the above-mentioned case happened in October 2005 an official of Russian Foreign Ministry attempted to smuggle 360 kg of heroin in a car having a diplomatic license plate. This volume is an annual equivalent to one third of drugs seized at all national borders, one tenth of drugs discovered by all Russian law enforcement structures taken together, and evidently larger share of narcotics confiscated from ethnic migrants. As Russian post-Soviet borders, not excluding the Russia-Kazakhstan boundary, is crossed by many millions of people, motor vehicles and thousands of trains, there is a probability that tens of extremely large lots of drugs are successfully smuggled by groupings having different ethnic composition. If this assumption is correct, mono-ethnic criminal groups can be just a top of an iceberg.

So, the statistical data on seizures does not allow to arrive at a definite conclusion about the role of Central Asian ethnic criminal groupings in smuggling of hard drugs to Russia. Therefore the organizational mechanisms of drug-trafficking will be examined with the same purpose.

As it was already mentioned before, the structure of drug dealing includes the following main stages: production – trafficking - wholesale markets – retail, dividing into numerous constituents. Both interrelated and independent criminal groupings of different scale operate at the each of these stages. A part of them is mono-ethnic while another one is inter-ethnic. The situation when different stages of drug-trafficking process are controlled by various groupings of both kinds is rather typical. Ironically, according to a stereotype which is widespread in Estonia, the issues of narcomania and drug dealing in this country are «Russian», taking into account that the majority of drug addicts lives in Ida-Virumaa district where the share of ethnic Russians is especially high. This example demonstrates that the attempt to represent drug dealing as a traditional occupation of some ethnic minorities can easily become a boomerang.

Taking into account the poly-segment structure of drug dealing which elements often compete with each other in the process of supply to illegal wholesale markets or to consumers, weakening of one kind of grouping should almost inevitably (due to superprofitability of the business) cause substituting weak units by more viable ones. It seems that introduction of visa regime for the citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan can have only short-term positive effect for Russian security though in the beginning this effect may appear to be significant. As the U.S. Experience showed, toughening of policy towards «remote» South American countries – producers of cocaine – caused reinforcement of drug cartels in the neighbor Mexico. Hence, a flexible and pluralistic structure of drug-trafficking can respond to similar toughening of Russian policy by a corresponding way making Kazakhstan the key intermediate center. The effectiveness of trafficking mechanism can be restored very quickly in this case while «ethnically Russian» drug mafia will take a good chance to get rid of some competitors and strengthen its lobbyist influence on Russian power structures. The
danger of such a scenario can be illustrated by the experience of Latin American countries where drug mafias consist mainly of representatives of the «ethnic majority». In some cases the raise of ethnophobic sentiments towards Central Asian migrants can actually work in favor of «native Russian» criminal communities, which, on the one hand, could divert public attention from their own activities and, on the other hand, to force their competitors from Russian illegal markets or bring them under control. Thus, the «selective struggle» against only one kind of criminal groupings can be in favor to the other kind that only would take advantage from the temporary decrease of supply.

The accusation of an ethnic group in drug dealing logically means that, at least, more than a half of this group participates in this process especially at the stages of wholesale delivery and/or retail. The estimated capacity of heroin market is about 150-300 tons a year while the supposed number of migrants from Tajikistan to Russia is 600-800 thousand per annum\(^\text{13}\). If a half of Tajik migrants would supply 100 tons of heroin to Russian illegal market, each of them should smuggle 250-300 gram as a minimum. It is difficult to suppose that such a concentrated accumulation of narcotics transported by large crowds, certainly regarded as «risk groups» by law enforcement structures, in the most of cases would remain undiscovered. Besides, event-analysis and other sources show that, at least, in 50% cases especially large lots of narcotics (more than 1 kg) were seized. It indirectly means that only evident minority Tajik migrants participate in drug-trafficking to Russia. The number of representatives of other «visible» ethnic minorities (Uzbeks, Azeris, Chechens, Gipsies), arrested for smuggling, is significantly smaller that provides no ground to associate any ethnic group with drug dealing.

Some schemes that, according to representatives of law enforcement structures, are used by organized criminal groupings, are also do not correspond the idea about their mono-ethnic character. In many cases the traffic supposedly is divided in several stages: at the end of each one the illicit cargo is loaded to another vehicle having a new driver who pays off with a previous courier [Golunov et. al.: 27-28]. In this case the Russia-Kazakhstan border is crossed by a vehicle having Kazakhstani, or (that is better) Russian license plate and driven by a citizen of Russia or Kazakhstan correspondingly; otherwise, such a vehicle will attract higher attention at almost every road police post. Flexibility of drug traffickers, who can be familiar with regulations of border regime and can change routes of smuggling being in danger, are often noted by officials of agencies dealing with the issue. But these features imply not only inter-ethnic character of a criminal organization but also that its brain is situated not in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan or Uzbekistan but in Kazakhstan or Russia itself. If one assumes that such organizations are headed by Tajiks or Central Asian migrants having Russian citizenship, the involvement of other ethnic groups diminishes essentially the share of Central Asians in smuggling process. Again, it provides no any sufficient reason to make entire ethnic groups responsible.

The statements of some experts from law enforcement agencies also bring to

\(^\text{13}\) Appraisal of the First Deputy of Russian Federal Migration Service I. Yunash from his statement at the meeting with journalists from CIS countries in September of 2004. See: [Tajikistan National Informational Agency, 2004].
another conclusion. According to these statements, in many Russian provinces (including the regions bordering with Kazakhstan) there is no criminal groupings specializing only in trading in opiates\(^{14}\). But this «many-sided specialization» assumes a capability to penetrate in different fields of activity that can be achieved easier than a composition of such groupings is multi-ethnic.

In many respects the ground for ethnic criminal groupings involved in drug-trafficking exists and grows due to marginal status of a large share of migrants. The Russian labor market needs seriously migrants from Central Asia, Caucasus, and other regions. During a long time these migrants have to pass through numerous and humiliating bureaucratic procedures often following by extortion. Many migrants are not able to meet all legal requirements that is very profitable to some groups of law enforcement officials that systematically use to their advantage such a situation and, at the same time, to stress their importance as a «shield against a rush of aliens». In these circumstances migrants often have to rally around influential people having much money and many important social ties, but just these people (including representatives of regional ethnic-cultural organizations’ leadership) are often involved in drug dealing and co-ordinate trafficking. It gives representatives of law enforcement agencies an additional cause to allege that some ethnic groups specializing in drug-trafficking. This argument, however, is based on not more correct premises than the previous ones.

Actually, the existing administrative system of migration control drives a large part of ethnic migrants into a corner and therefore indirectly contributes widening ethnic criminality's social basis, encouraging cohesion of marginal groups around centers of shady criminal activity. Reforming this administrative system with the aim to ease the adoption of migrants to social environment is a very important condition for diminishing of the importance of ethnic factor in drug-trafficking.

### 3. Ways of Problem Solving

Within the international experience there are three main ways of struggle with narco-traffic and its consequences: 1) restriction measures including strengthening of border and customs control; 2) demand reduction programs (social advertising, health protection, active policy towards the youth); 3) harm reduction (prevention of overdosage, AIDS, and other diseases directly or indirectly caused by narcomania; social protection of drug addicts etc.) that means control over consumption of drugs 3) limited legalization of some drugs.

Repressive policy is part and parcel of antinarcotic policy of all states. It includes system of strict punishment for drug dealing, strengthening of police, border and other state bodies, carrying out special operations, international cooperation between corresponding law-enforcement bodies. Due to such policy, drug dealers work illegally, that is why the price for narcotics is high and demand reduction. At the same time, international experience demonstrates that the most strict repressive

\(^{14}\) For example, this opinion was expressed by the Head of Orenburg province Branch of Gosnarkokontrol interviewed by the author on 30 September 2004.
policy can't solve the problem. On the other hand, drug threat is used as justification for power enlargement (sometimes to the prejudice of democratic freedoms) and increase of financing of security structures.

To all appearances just the first variant (restriction measures) with the stress on the necessity of “hard-edged struggle against drug-trafficking” has been chosen in Russia. The same and even more expressive mobilization vocabulary as in USA of 1980-s is been used much. Such a perception in some cases is combined with ideas in the manner of “conspiracy theory” according to which “narco-agression” against Russia is been skillfully organized by its enemies (USA or some clandestine forces). This kind of ideas represents an example of non-traditional threats’ interpretation in traditional terms, and it induces to search “traditional” adversary supposedly waging a war being behind the scenes. Within this approach the situation in Russia is been perceived as something unique, its systematic comparison with international experience is done rarely. This situation is a good illustration of the idea of “useful enemy”. The importance of the latter and the necessity of additional extraordinary measures for successful opposition to it are stressed in every way in order to obtain additional power and financial resources. According to Nils Cristie and Kellil Bruun, the “useful enemy” should have the following features:
- it is always dangerous, satanic, inhuman; at least, this is the case for its leaders;
- In order to bee able to assume responsibility in the fight against an enemy, one must feel secure. Criticism must wait until the fight is over.
- Good enemies always stay alive. Generals may hope for victories but not permanent peace. It may be advantageous in a war of limited losses to prolong it if possible and to avoid capitulation by the enemy.
- The perfect enemy is sufficiently defined so that it can be fought, but sufficiently ambitious so that it can be suspected behind every bush, should the need arise15.

Actually, the supporters of restriction measures in Russia (taking into account far more modest resources) to that was already used by USA in 1980-1990s. This strategy is apparently the most popular both in power structures and in public opinion. The complex of concrete measures includes strengthening of technical and organizational potential of force structures, development of informational databases, equipping of border checkpoints, establishment of new cynological centers etc. These activities requires essential increase of funding that sometimes is achieved on the expense of other important spheres (education, health protection, support of activities of children and the youth) that has direct or indirect importance for struggle against narcotism.

The important constituent of repressive policy is the system of criminal penalties for drug dealing. In the Russian Federation, like in many other countries of the world, criminal law stipulates enough strict punishment for possession of drugs without the purpose of trade – 3 years of imprisonment (or other sanctions – reformatory works, penalty at the rate of 40 thousand rubles and so on), for drug possession in especially great size (more than 50 minimum assumed doses, the list of which according to

different drugs is approved by Russian Government) - from 3 to 10 years of imprisonment (or the fine of 500,000 rubles and other sanctions); for illegal production and trade in narcotics – 20 years of imprisonment, the fine of 1 million rubles and so on. In this case the Russian legislation is, at least, not less strict, than the similar legislations of the USA and EU countries. Some experts from the Russian law enforcement bodies express their discontent mainly with the absence of laws, permitting to confiscate the property of large-scale drug dealers.

However, the weakest point is not the very legislation, but the law enforcement practice. Unlike the EU countries where the attitude towards drug addicts and small-scale drug dealers is liberal enough, in Russia the main target of repressive measures includes actually the mentioned two categories. This approach indirectly encourage cohesion between ordinary drug addicts and criminal communities thus strengthening narcomafia. Such an attitude, driving drug addicts into a corner, contributes to increase of mortality (dozens times as high as in the countries of the EU) and the spread of diseases distribution (AIDS, hepatitis) in this environment.

Taking into account these considerations, the widely discussed in Russia question on the size of narcotics doses, that can be possessed by addicts without the risk of criminal prosecution, seems to be less important than the problems related to law enforcement practice.

At the same time the Decree of the Russian government N 231 «On the Approval of Average One-Time Size Doses of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances for Purposes of Articles 228, 228(1) and 229 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation», adopted on 6 May 2004, was actively discussed in Russia. According to this resolution, drug consumers could possess less than 1 gramme heroin or 20 grammes marijuana without the risk of being prosecuted by criminal law. Authors of the resolution wanted to defend ordinary drug addicts from the arbitrariness of police while numerous critics asserted that this resolution gave freedom of action to retail drug dealers. Under the heavy pressure of opponents in February of 2006 the resolution was revised towards restriction: according to a new resolution the possession of 0,5 grammes of heroin or 6 grammes of marijuana was prosecuted by criminal law [Postanovleniye 2006]. The new standards are more similar international ones: even in the liberal Netherlands the possession of more than 0,5 g hard drugs or 5 g soft drugs is illegal [Verdurmen et al. s.a: 7]. However, as we mentioned before, practice of using legislation in the RF is more different from international standards than the very legislation. The practice has small scale dealers and drug addicts as the main object of repressions.

The increasing of support for “restriction policy” has brought some fruits that is been reflected in essential growth of statistical indices concerning numbers of arrests and volume of seized drugs. Trying to prove that increasing financial and other support could bring more serious results, the advocates of such a policy frequently refer to the experience of the USA that organize expensive operations ending by seizures of impressive volumes of cocaine and other illicit drugs. But the growth of statistical indices is been partially provided by arrests of ordinary consumers: in Russia the share of criminal cases against them in the total amount of drug-related trials of 2000 was about 60% [Kovalyov 2003: 14].
But the main weakness of the restriction policy held both in Russia and in many other countries (not excluding the USA) seem to be in that its effectiveness is often evidently low in comparison to the volumes of their financing that, even being sharply increased, rarely brings commensurable results in field of supply reduction. International experience shows that law enforcement agencies taken together as a rule are able to seize not more than 10% of supplied illicit drugs while only confiscation of 70% of this supply can undermine profitability of narco-business.

As it was already mentioned before, it is difficult to assess correctly the effectiveness of security and police structures' repressive measures because the significant part of related statistic information is closed for public access. This situation gives to the mentioned structures a wide range of possibilities to manipulate by figures stressing on favorable and concealing from unfavorable ones. Therefore, the necessary condition of improvement of the national anti-narcotic policy is independent monitoring. In the Netherlands such a monitoring, including the collection of statistic information, is carried out by an interdepartmental center on the base of results collected by independent experts. One time in a four years national surveys are held in order to estimate the level of drug consumption in the country.

But even having no results of such a monitoring and lack of open information, one can ascertain that the work of law enforcement structures is not enough effective. Basing on very moderate expert estimations assuming that an average Russian heroin addict, the total number of which is 1 million, consumes 0,5 g. daily, the demand for heroin in Russia is more than 180 tons annually. As it was already mentioned before, the South Eastern Branch of the Federal Border Guard Service seized only 3,5 tons of heroin (that means 500 kg per a year on average) during the entire period of its existence. In 2003 Federal Customs Service arrested 488 kg [Federal Customs Service 2004a], in 2004 – more than 680 kg of of this narcotic [Federal Customs Service 2004]. Hence, the total volume of heroin that is confiscated annually by Border Guard and Customs services is less than 1 % of Russian illegal market's demand. It is also evidently less than the volume of seizures in Tajikistan where in 2004 4794,1 kg. of heroin (it is a share equivalent to 2.6% of the mentioned demand – S.G.) was arrested [The Review of Central Asia 2005]. The total volume of heroin confiscated by all law enforcement agencies at Russian borders and inside the country in 2001-2003 did not exceed 1 ton annually. In 2004 it was 3,897 ton while in 2005 – more than. Additionally, 2058 kg. of raw opium (from which 10 times less of heroin can be produced) was seized in 2004 [Tendentsii 2005: 8, 19].

It means that all law enforcement agencies now are able to seize apparently not more that 2,5% of the volume demanded by Russian heroin market that is slightly less than the volume of heroin confiscating in Tajikistan. It raises serious doubts about the adequacy of current national anti-narcotic policy within which the main financial and organizational resources are concentrated in hands of police and militarized structures. By similar reasons the idea that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Tajikistan can have catastrophic consequences for national security that can be partially prevented only by the closure of the Russia-Kazakhstan border is also evidently not correct. Taking
into account that the largest part of illicit drugs is brought through this border via existing checkpoints, such a variant could be effective only if these points would be provided by modern expensive equipment, the number of border guards and customs officer would be increased essentially as well as their salaries. Such a system could be an excessive burden for Russian budget. But even this system smugglers would be able to use a wide range of geographic (use of routes passing through other borders) and tactic possibilities in order to surpass border control.

From this point of view Russia has much less possibilities for effective anti-narcotic policy with stress to restriction and repressions than the USA, Iran or even China have. The total length of Russian «problem» borders (with Kazakhstan, Transcaucasian states and with China too) is almost 1500 km while of Chinese «problem borders» (with Afghanistan, Butan, Vietnam, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Laos, Pakistan, and Tajikistan) – 11135 km (unlike in Russian case more than a half of these boundaries pass through sparsely populated areas having very small number of transport communication ways), of the U.S.' ones (with Mexico) – 3141 km, and of Iran (With Afganistan and Pakistan) – 1845 km (Land Boundaries 2005). The appellation to the American experience based on rigid repressive policy, being often used by Russian security structures, is therefore incorrect taking into account far more favorable geographic position of the USA as well as incommensurability of financial resources which two countries have for their anti-narcotic policies.

The concentration of the main efforts on Afghanistan, that is evidently the largest producer of heroin, also could not be considered as a panacea. Massive and synchronous annihilation of poppy crops can deprive a significant part of the country's population from the main source of income and, as a result, to cause armed conflicts that can spread beyond the limits of Afghanistan. Besides, the Afghanil illicit drug industry is able to adjust quickly to such measures which would make problematic the victory over it. As the experience of the USA has shown, very expensive governmental programs aiming eradication of drug industry in Colombia resulted neither in annihilation of illicit plantation nor in decreasing of cocaine flow northwards. In particular, the US' authorities in August 2004 had to admit the low effectiveness of very large-scaled and expensive plan «Colombia» at the cost of $ 3.3 billion per a year [Kamenskiy 2004].

It seems that now one of the main weaknesses of restrictive strategy is also in its reliance on security and police agencies, having excessive administrative staff machinery and numerous army of low-paid employees but poorly equipped for the purpose to fight drug-trafficking. In May 2004 the President Vladimir Putin admitted that in Russia about 40 000 personnel is directly involved in this field while in the USA the corresponding number is about 10 000 [Rodnaya gazeta 2004: 6]. In the same year it was also turned out that up to 80 percent of financial resources and staffs of some Border Guard Service’s regional branches were concentrated in their managing departments [Krasnaya zvezda 2004]. Such structures are very vulnerable against corruption: proposed bribes can be hundreds times as big as salaries.

As not only Russian but also U.S. experience shows, the intolerant repressive policy indirectly promotes strengthening ties between the huge army of drug addicts
and criminal communities, causes increasing death rates because of overdoses and infection diseases and worsening of inter-ethnic relations as both in Russia and in the USA and some other countries the repressive measures are often directed mainly towards representatives of ethnic minorities. Even such apparently positive consequence of restrictive policy as increase of retail prices for hard drugs can have unfavorable spin-off including jump in the rate of street crimes (as addicts need larger amounts of money) and of deaths caused by cheaper but low-quality narcotics.

The realistic role of border guard, customs, police, and other security structures within the national anti-narcotic policy is in the narrowing the circle of possibilities for drug-traffickers, especially for traffickers of hard drugs. The strengthening of customs control at the most risky directions (at the multilateral checkpoints in particular) probably could diminish the role of mono-ethnic criminal groups, augment the importance of intermediaries in drug-trafficking process, create additional risks for transportation of especially large lots of heroin and cause their splitting up. As a result, it can cause some increase in prices for hard drugs and also some decentralization of internal Russian illicit drug business diminishing its capabilities to lobby their interests by undercover means. The effective international cooperation between security structures, especially in fields of control over transboundary flows passing through multilateral checkpoints and complementary patrol of problem border areas can also create some obstacles for international criminal groupings. Under repressive and other pressure a part of such groupings could switch from trafficking in hard drugs to other illegal operations less risky for themselves and less harmful for the entire society by the damage: human trafficking, smuggling in consumer goods and raw materials and, at least, in cannabis drugs.

The success in achievement even of these modest aims depends on the effectiveness of cooperation between Russia, its neighbor states and other countries situating at the main trafficking routes. In each particular case both Russia and other mentioned states are interested in different extent to take efforts requiring significant financial expenses and mutual trust between the parties involved.

The cooperation between Russia and EU, as well as between Russia and Ukraine, can be based on the balance of interests in struggle against different kinds of illicit drug flows: of heroin – westwards and of synthetic drugs – towards Russia. The real cooperation between Russia and Georgia, partially – between Russia and Azerbaijan is hindered by political contradictions. For Russia is a serious stimulus to create a rigid barrier border as it really does now. The mutual cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan seems to be the most prospective. Although Kazakhstan is now mainly a transit country, its economic growth and increasing purchasing capacity of its population is fraught by that this state can attract itself far more volume of heroin and to turn into one of the most prospective market of hard drugs. Thus the possibility of joint and, in many respect, unified anti-narcotic policy, including the control over potentially dangerous flows within Kazakhstan and partial financing of such projects by Russia, seems to be real enough.

The main alternative for restrictive policy is demand reduction that includes health protection, youth policy, social advertising, and other measures. This way assumes active involvement of non-governmental structures: antinarcotic
foundations, sport clubs, religious organizations. The psychological ground for demand reduction is support of important social aims diverting young people from drugs or creating powerful stimuli to surpass drug addiction. The effectiveness of demand reduction measures can explain the success of national anti-narcotic policies in the countries having almost opposite conceptual approaches. In comparison with average European indicators, the number of people, abusing hard drugs, is relatively small in the Netherlands, carrying out the liberal policy of tolerance and especially small in Sweden, following one of the strictest policies in Europe directed towards «the society free of drugs»\(^{16}\). The success of these different strategies has been most likely provided by the powerful systems of social security including the support of the youth policy in both countries.

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of many officially supported antinarcotic programs in Russia is low. They frequently take a form of Soviet style agitation conducted by bureaucrats having no sufficient qualification in the field. This agitation often only provokes the interest towards drugs among teenagers. But even effective demand reduction measures are usually underfinanced. For example, in Orenburg oblast they were funded only by 12 percent for 2003 and by 6 percent for the first half of 2004 [Program 2002].

The new Federal Program “Complex Measures for Counteraction to Drug Abuse and their Illicit Circulation” adopted in September 2005 [Federal'naya Tselevaya programma 2005] can be regarded as some shift towards demand reduction. The Program has a very ambitious aim to diminish the number of drug addicts by 20 percent while the estimated volume of confiscated drugs to their illicit circulation should be increased only from 8,9 to 10,7 percent. The Program’s budget of $ 108,2 million in the ruble equivalent is to be distributed among Gosnarkokontrol (41 percent), Ministry of Health and Social Development (12 percent), Agency “Rospechat” (8 percent), Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Education (7 percent for each one), Federal Security Service, Ministry of Agriculture and Federal Sport, Physical Culture Agency (4 percent for each one), Customs Service (0,6 percent), and other agencies. It should be noted that since 2006 the greater share of funds allocated to Gosnarkokontrol will be spent for social advertising and other forms of propaganda, about $ 107,8 million of these funds is destined for direct distribution among NGO’s. As the Program aims “creation of the unified system of positive moral values determining the negative attitude towards illicit drug consumption”, it seems, however, that many of its actions can take the shape of centralized Soviet style agitation without serious effect.

But the main problem is that the budget is evidently too small to achieve targeted aims. At the same time, the financing of antinarcotic agencies in 2006, according to the national budget’s project, is 14 times (of these structures’ management alone - “only” 2,1 times) as big as the funds allocated for the Program for the same period. On the other hand, if the complex of mainly social measures aiming to diminish drug addiction by 20 percent has the four-year funding of $ 107,8 million, the need in state antinarcotics bodies, having the budget of $ 299,2 million for 2006 only [Prilozheniy 8 2005], is rather doubtful. Taking also into account the

\(^{16}\) См., например: European Legal Database on Drugs. Country Profile – Sweden.
huge share of expenses for the national security in 2006, the mentioned program cannot be regarded as a crucial turn from restriction towards demand reduction strategy.

The importance of harm reduction as a strategy of struggle against narcomania and drug-related crime in Russia is not only underestimated but also often perceived by officials and public opinion as indirect encouraging of consumption. Such a distorted perception (of course, for a healthy person a possibility to get gratuitous treatment is not a very powerful stimulus to fall sick) combined with a widespread contemptuous attitude towards addicts impedes to estimate advantages of this strategy that in the Netherlands is considered to be as important element of national drug control policy as demand reduction [Synthetic Drug Trafficking 2003: 74]. Social and medical support can make a part of the huge army of Russian drug addicts, rallying with organized crime by intolerant restrictive policy, loyal or, at least neutral in fight between the state and drug mafia. It is also important that harm reduction measures can essentially diminish the number of deaths because of overdoses and of infections by AIDS and hepatitis. No wonder that in the Netherlands this number is evidently less than a number of deaths caused by alcohol and tobacco consumption.

The option of legalization, concerning either all kinds of drugs or only soft ones, is not considered seriously in Russia. Moreover, people proposing to examine this option are often regarded as «lobbists of drug mafia» as well as the advocates of «harm reduction» measures: free dissemination of syringes and condoms, methadone support for heroin addicts etc. Meanwhile legalization has some economic ground in this case as removing a ban would cause decriminalization of narco-business and, as a result, decrease in its profitability. At the same time, narcotics would be easy for access for a very wide range of consumers, including young people, while a part of criminal groupings could redirect to other, also dangerous, activities such as traffic in arms.

While discussing the option of legalisation (first of all, for soft narcotics, especially marijuana) the Netherlands' experience is usually mentioned. In this state marijuana is legally sold in special places (so called coffee-shops) where some strict rules are observed. However, coffee-shops is not the main constituent of the Netherlands experience taking into account that all supplies to coffee-shops are formally banned, that they prohibited in 80% of the country's provinces and the idea of their very existence have many opponents. The main points of the national antinarcotic policy are actually in tolerance towards ordinary consumers and diversification of approaches towards soft and hard drugs. The aim of such policy is in separation of drug markets and indirect stimulation of criminal groups dealing in less dangerous drugs. Attitude towards large-scale dealers is far less liberal than to small-scale ones. In spite of the fact that the territory of the Netherlands is one of the main European drug trafficking hubs and large-scale producer of synthetic drugs (because of historical reasons and the presence of appropriate industrial infrastructure), the rate of drug consumption in the country is not more than average European indicators.

On the whole, the effectiveness of restriction measures undertaken by Russian
law enforcement and security agencies is paltry in comparison to the level of hard
drugs consumption. Taking into account the problems caused by geographical
position of the country and other factors, there are no serious grounds to believe
that such effectiveness will increase essentially. Within the national anti-narcotic
policy the main stress should be laid, therefore, on social measures, including
demand reduction and harm reduction programs.
The problems related to drug consumption and dealing challenge seriously Russian security being, at the same time, a very serious social problems among such issues as cardiovascular diseases, consequences of alcoholism and smoking, traffic accidents and so on. Though the number of drug addicts have been slowly increasing, the situation is still difficult because supply, especially of heroin, continues to rise. The effective counteraction to drug dealing and adequate estimation of the situation are hampered by that the source of this danger is external and the problem is transboundary. Thus the situation is perceived not rarely as an oncoming national catastrophe or as an «non-traditional aggression» of some external mysterious power. Incorrect estimations cause inadequate decisions, such as excessive rise in financing of security structures (able to seize only a very small share of hard drugs turnover within Russia) at the expense of health protection and social development systems. The situation needs careful research (including constant monitoring) of narcotics-related illicit activities and of measures undertaken to fight drug dealing.

As the analysis made in this research shows, the decisive factor of narcotics consumption (especially of hard drugs) in Russian provinces and regions of some neighbor states, is not the borderland or transit location of the territory, though it also must be taken into serious consideration. The main factors, however, include peculiarities of area's social-economic development such as, on the one hand, high average purchasing capacity of population, and, on the other hand, low social mobility of some groups which members can experience the feeling of having no prospect. Taking into account statistic information about narcotics consumption and drug-related crimes it seems that 50% or even most drug-related activities are concentrated in roughly 20 major Russian cities. Conditionally, one can assert about the existence of «transboundary narco-regions» at Russia's borders with Kazakhstan and Ukraine consisting of contiguous administrative-territory units of the mentioned countries. In this case high capacity of regional narco-markets and very often similar social conditions create the necessary prerequisites for functioning of well-organized transboundary narco-business structures.

These factors are not always taken into account when national anti-narcotic policy is made or planned. The main stress is laid on the fortifying borders making «security belts» along the most «problem» of them, especially along Russian-Kazakhstan border. However, even at this boundary only very small share of Russian hard drugs market's demand is been seized while borderland provinces have no decisive importance in all-Russian regional structure of drug consumption.

The structure of drug trafficking through Russia's borders has many forms and units. Post-Soviet narcomafia is not controlled by one or several centralised groups: drug dealing is carried out by individualists or groups of different level of organization. These groups are often made on the ethnic base. Groups, smuggling drugs along the Northern route consist of more kinds of ethnic criminal groups in comparison with ones smuggling along the Balkan route. The role of ethnic factor shouldn't be, however, overestimated: while the majority of arrests for drug-trafficking towards and within Russia probably related to ethnic migrants, one can
cogently prove that only a significant minority of Central Asian immigrants to Russia involved in smuggling. Additionally, such a role in smuggling of largest lots of hard drugs (tens or hundreds of kilograms), that maybe have the key importance in filling Russian illicit drug market, is known insufficiently.

In response for expansion of illicit drugs in Russia the main stress is laid on restriction and repressive measures that is supported by redistribution of the lion's share of funding for national anti-narcotic policy in favor of militarized structures. This redistribution doesn't lead to proportional results: it seems that all Russian security and police agencies, taking together, are able to seize not more than 2.5% of heroin brought to and circulating in Russian illegal markets. The largest lots of drugs are brought through existing checkpoints which yet couldn't be controlled effectively. The efficacious control other post-Soviet boundaries would mean not only barrierization of this space but also reequipment of checkpoints, high salaries for enlarged staff of border guards and customs officials. Taking into account the huge length of Russian borders, these measures could became excessive burden for Russian budget.

The Federal Program “Complex Measures for Counteraction to Drug Abuse and their Illicit Circulation” adopted in September 2005 can be considered as some shift towards demand reduction. This shift, however, has been reflected a little on the structure of funding for anti-narcotic policy. Moreover, within demand reduction the excessive stress is been laid upon agitational and advertising actions the professionalism of which ideas is questionable. Harm reduction officially attracts even less attention though it could essentially diminish a rate of drug addicts' mortality and weaken the ties between this group and criminal community.

Taking into account evidently low effectiveness of restriction measures, Russian anti-narcotic policy should be, at first, social, stressing on demand and harm reduction and taking into account the corresponding experience of EU and other countries. It should be carried out by competent people and coordinated by the Ministry of Health and Social Development. It is necessary to re-distribute proportion of funding from «power unit» of anti-narcotic policy (in which now the overwhelming share of resources is concentrated) to the social one and to establish transparent independent monitoring allowing to estimate the real state of affairs concerning the issue of narcomania. The role of restrictive policy, including border security, should be auxiliary and be based on real objectives such as creation of maximal obstacles to functioning of large-scale trafficking.

The highest priority in this case should be support for customs bodies, especially technical and organizational improvement of control at multilateral checkpoints through Russia-Kazakhstan border and struggle against corruption in Customs service. The key condition for effective law enforcement measures is also in very close cooperation between corresponding agencies of Russia and Kazakhstan. Within this cooperation joint and co-financed programs, that would complicate functioning of the main trafficking routes and illegal wholesale markets in Kazakhstan, should have the highest priority. Unification of standards and priorities within national anti-narcotic policies can contribute essentially to the effectiveness of joint measures. In geographic respect special attention also should be paid to
international cooperation within “transboundary narcoregions” at Russia-Kazakhstan and Russia-Ukraine borders: the agencies involved in realization of national anti-narcotic policies should have possibilities for effective joint work including the right to direct operative cooperation in fields of information exchange, organization of joint actions etc.

Instead of creating the «security belt» in Russia-Kazakhstan borderland it would be far more efficient to focus on pilot projects for roughly 10 regions and/or 20 major cities most of all infected by narcomania. Within such project the main stress should be laid on demand reduction (especially youth policy), harm reduction (in order to decrease the dependence of drug addicts on organized crime), undermining economic mechanisms of drug-related crime, experiments on structural reforms of law enforcement bodies and on law application practice.

Taking into account the geographic location of Russia and its modern social and economic problems, the realization of above mentioned measures won't be a panacea against drug dealing and consumption. Effects that can really be achieved are as follows: stabilization of heroin consumption rate, essential decrease in mortality rate among drug addicts, more social prospects for youngsters as a spin-off from demand reduction policy, reduction of ethnic factor importance in drug dealing and of negative casual consequences related to it, improvement of human rights observation in corresponding situations, and, at last, more effective re-distribution of budget funding directed to anti-narcotic programs.
**APPENDIX I. GEOGRAPHY OF NARCOTICS CONSUMPTION AND DRUG-RELATED CRIMES IN RUSSIAN REGIONS (1999-2004)**

**Symbolic Notations**
- Provinces distinguished by the greatest numbers of officially registered drug addicts
- Provinces distinguished by the greatest numbers of officially registered drug-related crimes
- Provinces distinguished by both absolute and relative indices of officially registered drug addicts and drug-related crimes

**Provinces marked by figures:**
1 – Altai krai; 2 – Irkutsk oblast; 3 – Kemerovo province; 4 – Khanty-Mansiysky Autonomous District; 5 – Krasnodar krai; 6 – the city of Moscow; 7 – Novosibirsk oblast; 8 – Primorsky krai; 9 – Rostov province; 10 – the city of St. Petersburg; 11 – Samara oblast; 12 – Sverdlovsk oblast; 13 – Tiumen oblast; 14 – Tomsk oblast.
Appendix 2. «Transboundary Narco-region in Russia-Kazakhstan Borderland»

Provinces marked by figures: a) of Russia: 1 – Altai krai, 2 – Kemerovo oblast, 3 – Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, 4 – Novosibirsk oblast, 5 – Omsk oblast, 6 – Tiumen oblast; b) of Kazakhstan: 7- East Kazakhstan oblast, 8 – Karaganda oblast, 9 – Pavlodar oblast.
### APPENDIX 4. «TOP TEN» RUSSIAN PROVINCES BY THE NUMBERS OF OFFICIALLY REGISTERED DRUG-ADDICTS AND DRUG-RELATED CRIMES IN 1999-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-addicts in Russia / Rank by the share of officially registered drug-addicts per 100 000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-related crimes / Rank by the share of officially registered drug-related crimes per 100 000 inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North and Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow province</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The city of Moscow</td>
<td>1/- 1/- 2/- 1/- 1/- 1/- 2/- 1/- 2/- 1/- 1/- 1/-</td>
<td>8/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The city of Saint-Petersburg</td>
<td>1/1 2/- 1/- 3/- 4/-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-West and Volga Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnodar Krai*</td>
<td>2/9 3/- 3/8 3/9 3/10 2/10 3/7 4/10 3/10 2/7 2/- 3/-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrakhan province</td>
<td>-/10 -/10 -/5 -/1 -/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov province</td>
<td>7/- 7/- 7/- 7/- 5/9 3/4 8/- 7/- 6/- 4/-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara province*</td>
<td>3/2 2/2 1/1 2/2 2/2 3/1 4/4 5/2 4/7 8/- 9/10 5/-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ural and Siberia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurgan Province</td>
<td></td>
<td>-/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sverdlovsk Province</td>
<td>6/- 6/- 7/- 7/- 9/- 6/- 6/- 6/- 10/- 9/-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiumen province*</td>
<td>4/4 4/5 4/4 4/6 4/7 4/7 7/10 8/- 5/10 4/10 3/7 2/5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanty-Mansiysky</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous district</td>
<td>n/a -/1 n/a -/1 -/1 -/3 -/10 -/5 -/3 -/2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamalo-Nenetsky Autonomous District</td>
<td>n/a -/10</td>
<td>-/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Tyva</td>
<td>-/6</td>
<td>-/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altai Krai</td>
<td>8/5 8/9 9/7 10/8 -/9 9/9</td>
<td>-3 -3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnoyarsk krai</td>
<td>10/- 10/- 9/- 10/- 7/-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taimyr</td>
<td>-/7</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The figures are calculated on the base of the information obtained by the author in State Statistic Agency of Russian Federation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-addicts in Russia/ Rank by the share of officially registered drug-addicts per 100,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-related crimes / Rank by the share of officially registered drug-related crimes per 100,000 inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irkutsk province</td>
<td>9/7</td>
<td>-/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemerovo province</td>
<td>5/3</td>
<td>5/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novosibirsk* province</td>
<td>10/9</td>
<td>9/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omsk Province</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomsk province</td>
<td>-/1</td>
<td>-/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Far East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primorsky krai*</td>
<td>-/8</td>
<td>-/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khabarovsky krai</td>
<td>-/5</td>
<td>-/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amur province</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Magadan province</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yevrei'skaya Autonomous oblast</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>

- The information concerning regions especially distinguished by both absolute and relative indices in 1999-2004 is marked by the bold font.
### APPENDIX 5. RUSSIAN BORDERLAND PROVINCES BY THE NUMBERS OF OFFICIALLY REGISTERED DRUG-ADDICTS AND DRUG-RELATED CRIMES IN 1999-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-addicts in Russia/ Rank by the share of officially registered drug-addicts per 100 000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-related crimes/ Rank by the share of officially registered drug-related crimes per 100 000 inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia-Norway and Russia-Finland borders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murmansk province</td>
<td>54/55 47/50 42/47 43/45 41/38 41/38 66/57 51/51 51/49 49/46 38/34 40/43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Karelia</td>
<td>65/61 68/65 69/68 70/70 70/69 72/72 40/26 42/36 73/67 74/76 66/50 66/65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borders with Baltic countries and Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leningrad province*</td>
<td>32/33 32/33 29/27 28/27 28/26 29/26 33/44 34/44 34/43 33/40 52/75 57/78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pskov province*</td>
<td>71/69 72/75 71/70 72/74 71/73 76/74 76/77 75/75 71/68 74/71 74/79</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliningrad province</td>
<td>34/21 37/27 36/26 37/29 37/29 37/31 35/28 35/26 29/8 34/13 32/14 31/13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia-Belarus border</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Smolensk province*</td>
<td>42/42 40/45 39/46 40/49 40/44 39/39 46/48 57/59 53/56 43/47 48/46 41/40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia-Ukraine border</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bryansk province*</td>
<td>57/67 65/78 67/75 67/79 65/78 63/78 42/54 47/68 49/64 44/58 41/52 38/46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kursk province</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgorod province</td>
<td>66/75 71/81 70/77 71/81 72/81 70/81 41/56 46/71 45/61 45/63 40/51 34/47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voronezh province</td>
<td>27/38 28/38 26/34 27/37 27/36 26/36 28/46 32/55 33/54 30/48 27/44 27/53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rostov province</td>
<td>7/13 7/18 8/18 7/16 7/16 7/16 5/9 3/5 8/32 7/31 6/30 4/24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transcaucasian borders**</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Ingushetia</td>
<td>74/57 76/73 74/68 74/71 74/70 73/67 79/53 77/52 77/55 77/56 78/80 78/66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Daghestan</td>
<td>30/36 31/40 31/38 32/40 32/49 31/49 31/49 30/48 36/62 35/54 35/63 43/61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia-Kazakhstan border***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrakhan province</td>
<td>29/12 30/20 30/16 31/12 29/11 30/11 37/36 26/7 27/3 25/4 34/28 36/28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volgograd province</td>
<td>28/43 29/43 28/43 30/48 31/51 32/51 16/24 14/19 15/20 11/15 22/33 21/34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov province</td>
<td>19/28 20/24 20/21 20/20 20/22 21/27 22/38 18/31 18/30 23/38 26/45 25/44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
<td>Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-addicts in Russia/ Rank by the share of officially registered drug-addicts per 100 000 inhabitants</td>
<td>Rank in Russia by the number of officially registered drug-related crimes / Rank by the share of officially registered drug-related crimes per 100 000 inhabitants</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg province</td>
<td>24/30</td>
<td>26/28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chelyabinsk province</td>
<td>14/26</td>
<td>15/25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurgan province</td>
<td>33/27</td>
<td>33/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiumen province</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>4/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omsk province</td>
<td>18/16</td>
<td>18/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novosibirsk province</td>
<td>10/9</td>
<td>10/10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Altai krai</td>
<td>8/5</td>
<td>9/9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Altai*</td>
<td>64/23</td>
<td>73/30</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Russia-Mongolia border</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Tyva</td>
<td>40/6</td>
<td>45/11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Buriatia</td>
<td>61/62</td>
<td>56/60</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Russia-China border</strong></td>
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<td>Chita province</td>
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<td>Amur province</td>
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<td>34/26</td>
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<td>Yevreiskaya Autonomous oblast</td>
<td>70/32</td>
<td>80/60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khabarovsk krai</td>
<td>21/11</td>
<td>24/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primorsky krai*</td>
<td>12/8</td>
<td>12/8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Provinces bordering to two or more states are included only in one group taking into account the length of a regional section of a border and importance of transboundary communication ways.
** The republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Verkhovazhskia are not included in this part of the list as these areas there have no transboundary communications with Georgia and there are very little possibilities to arrange cross-border drug smuggling. The Republic of Chechnya is not also including because of the absence of data available.
*** Samara oblast is not included in this section of the list (though it has 5 km border with Kazakhstan) because there are no communication ways in this part of the border.


Narkotiki ... pod diplomaticheskim prikrytiyem (Illicit Drugs ... under Diplomatic Screen). 2005. Granity Rossi, N 42, 8 December.


Postanovleniye Pravitel'stva Rossii'skoy Federatsii ot 7 fevralya 2006 g. N 76 „Ob utverzhdenii krupnogo i osobu krupnogo razmerov narkoticheskih veschestv i psihotropnyh veschestv dlya tseley statey 228, 228 (1) i 229 Ugodovogo Kodeksa Rossii'skoy Federatsii” (The Decree of the Government of Russian Federation “About the Approval of the Norm of Large and Particularly Large Amounts of Narcotic Substances and Psychotropic Substances for the Purposes of the Clauses 228, 228 (1) and 229 of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation”. 2006.


oborotom narkoticheskikh sredstv i psihotropnyh veschestv general-levtenantom Aleksandrom Mikhailovym] (Narco-Agression. It hasn't taken Such a Scale in any Country of the World as it has in Russia [interview with a Deputy Director of the Federal Service for the Control over Drug and Psychotropic Substances, lieutenant-general Aleksander Mikhailov]). 14 May: 6.


