

**Assessing Best Practices in Devolution**

# **Efforts to Improve Sanitation Services**

## **Lodhran District**

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# I Introduction

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This assessment of the best practice<sup>1</sup> in improving sanitation in Lodhran district, builds upon a preliminary identification process, which was initiated and subsequently reviewed by CIDA-DSP to select specific best practices for undertaking further analysis. This more detailed study of selected best practices<sup>2</sup> was meant to lend sharper focus to the actual methods, outputs, and underlying challenges behind the approaches being widely recognized (by government, NGO and international development agencies) as being best practices in devolution in Pakistan. Instead of relying on secondary sources, the following documentation is based on primary field research that sought views of a range of concerned stakeholders, and the views of these respondents are in turn supplemented by observations of ground realities emerging from the implantation of a specific best practice in devolution.

## i Stakeholders

The views of the following stakeholders were sought to enable the process of assessment:

- i *Institutional Perspective*: The institutional stakeholders of this study are the relevant tiers of the local governments
- ii *Perspective of Practitioners*: These views are being obtained to contrast and compare opinions of current service delivery providers and of their predecessors
- iii *Perspectives of Target Audience*: Feedback from the actual users/clients of service delivery mechanisms being reformed under the devolutionary framework, as well as the intended beneficiaries who are not yet availing the service, are obtained and cross referenced to shed light on the actual and potential impact of a selected best practice.

## ii Approach to the Study

Information obtained concerning the following best practice has relied on discussions with all of the above mentioned stakeholders. Given the variance in what can actually constitute a best practice however, led to use of a flexible and interactive approach in posing queries to the concerned stakeholders, so that different types of relevant information specific to a particular best practice could be obtained. Methodologically, this required use of open-ended queries, which were posed keeping in mind the individual

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<sup>1</sup> 'Best practices' are being defined as innovative but workable solutions being implemented in the context of Local Government Ordinance 2001, which bolster local governance processes and outcomes, and contribute to bringing about sustainable improvements in service delivery.

<sup>2</sup> The best practices identified for further assessment by CIDA-DSP included the effort to improve water sanitation in Lodhran district, the health care management initiative in Rahimyar Khan district, the formation of CCBs in Sadiqabad district, and innovations being undertaken by the Tehsil Municipal Administrations in Jaranwala and Sadiqabad.

stakeholders. The contentions emerging from these discussions were then cross-checked with views of other stakeholders. This multilayered approach enabled a deeper probe concerning the actual meaning of the experiences emerging from the selected best practices, so as to identify and corroborate their intended consequences, to highlight unexpected outcomes if any, and to assess their potential for replication.

A reference to the existing knowledgebase obtained from relevant secondary sources has also been used wherever necessary to help contextualize the consolidated findings of this particular study.



## II Improving Sanitation in Lodhran district



The state of sanitation remains dismal across large parts of Pakistan. Inadequate sanitation also contaminates drinking water supplies and is directly linked to the high infant mortality rate in the country and the recurrent prevalence of disease amongst the populous poor households in cities and towns across the country. The World Bank estimates that less than 10% of the rural population of Pakistan has been provided with sanitation facilities. A majority of neighborhoods in the country have no underground sewers. Lack of access to latrines compels people to defecate out in the open.

It was to provide poor people access to basic sanitation facilities that the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was initiated in 1980 in Karachi and it subsequently won a lot of praise for its innovative approach. Subsequently the OPP approach has been replicated in many cities and towns including: Karachi, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Lodhran, Uch, Multan, Jaranwala and Peshawar.



The Lodhran Pilot Project in particular has endured the test of time and has been highlighted in the context of this particular study of 'best practices in devolution' for its ongoing collaboration with the local government structure put in place by the LGO 2001. The OPP approaches have been adapted to suit local situations in Lodhran district. While in the case of the OPP, interaction with the municipal corporation started in later stages of the project, the municipal committee (now the TMA) has been an active partner of LPP right from the project's beginning. Moreover, the LPP approach is not confined to low income communities but it deals with the whole city as a unit and moreover LPP has secured donor support to provide low cost sanitation to rural areas as well.

### i The 'Component Sharing' Approach To Sanitation

Both the OPP and the LPP stress the need for a component sharing approach towards provision of sanitation which entails separating the internal component (e.g. lane sewers that are provided and funded by the community groups), from the external component (e.g. trunk sewers, which should be provided by government). This approach implies that a community group must finance and develop its own internal component of the infrastructure, with no cost sharing or subsidy. Critics question why groups in poor areas should pay the full cost for sections of public infrastructure such as lane sewers. Perhaps it is due to this critique that many government and donor organizations prefer a cost sharing between government/donors and community groups, often based on agreed percentage contributions. But component sharing for local sewers is a more

sustainable approach particularly if residents in a lane are sufficiently motivated to improve their local environment and incur all the associated costs. The component sharing approach does require more effort by the community and the organization advocating this approach since it needs to persuade concerned residents not only to share the cost but to be involved in the actual implementation and supervision of the sewerage system being put in place within their community. Yet the component sharing approach has a number of distinct advantages over cost sharing in the long run. The communities can develop a clear sense of ownership and empowerment by taking full responsibility for their own lane sewers or other local infrastructure.



The component sharing approach generally allows community groups to proceed with their component of the project, with much less bureaucratic interference or delays caused by government agencies. The proponents of the cost sharing approach to sanitation (OPP and LPP) argue that substantial savings are made by lane committees engaging local contractors or artisans to do the construction, thus eliminating the additional costs of government managed schemes that include over-designed schemes, large contractor profits, fixed government schedules of rates and pay-offs to officials who grant approvals.

## **ii Brief History of LPP**

It was on the initiative of a local industrialist and then advisor to the Chief Minister of the Punjab (Jahangir Khan Tareen) that OPP agreed to replicate its component sharing model for low cost sanitation model in Lodhran in 1999. A senior social mobiliser from OPP was sent to Lodhran to talk to people from communities and government. The Lodhran Pilot Project (LPP) was established as an NGO to upgrade the town's infrastructure and to serve as a training ground and demonstration area for the province's bureaucracy. Initially LPP started off with mapping out the settlement, its existing infrastructure and problems, using hired surveyors. The city's municipal engineer, his staff, local councilors and the social organizer chosen from Lodhran were all brought to OPP for orientation. A project office was also opened, run jointly by the municipality (now the TMA) and LPP, where a municipal engineer (now the Assistant Tehsil Officer - Infrastructure) was appointed technical advisor to the communities and LPP's social organizer, were provided offices.

Using the OPP approach of division of responsibilities using the component sharing approach, and with the supplemental coordination with the TMA, LPP began its work in Lodhran. After undertaking some desilting and sewerage construction work within Lodhran city, Lodhran's municipal engineer (now honorary director, LPP) tried implementing the LPP approach in a nearby village and achieved the results successfully. Thereafter LPP launched an outreach program in partnership with NRSP in Juggowala. The NRSP experience further bolstered LPP's resolve to expand its work in rural communities. NRSP provided support to LPP through the CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) to fund the external component of the required sanitation system. NRSP's community organization mechanism is well defined, and it planned to use its Community Organizations to mobilize communities for taking care of the internal component of the sewerage schemes. In Lahori, a village in Lodhran, NRSP accepted funds deposited by one person, on the express understanding that the community would pay him back gradually but tensions developed within these people, which required a lot of extra input by NRSP and the LPP to salvage the scheme. Still some scattered houses refused to pay and had to be subsidized by rest of community. Since NRSP was trying to secure cost rather than component sharing commitments, the LPP decided to work in its individual capacity. The Chairman of LPP stepped in at this stage to provide funds for constructing the external component of 16 villages based sewerage schemes. LPP has completed work in 18 sanitation schemes thus far and is now planning to undertake work in another 100 locations within the next three years under a World Bank funded project (see tables 1a&c in Annex 2).

### **iii Distinctive Features of the LPP Approach**

The LPP model is a demand responsive approach. It encourages participatory planning and total community involvement not only in the construction but also the operation and maintenance of low cost underground sewerage systems. The LPP designates direct responsibility of the community to provide for sanitary latrines and lane sewers. The LPP approach focuses on provision of technical advice and support to community groups in maintaining the sewerage infrastructure once the work on it has been completed. To facilitate coordination within the community, LPP insists that Village Sanitation Committees (VSCs) be formed, which are supposed to not only motivate and solicit funds for the internal component but subsequently help manage the sewerage system once it has been completed. For poor people who cannot afford to contribute funds, are given the option by the VSC to provide labor towards construction of the sewerage system instead. The LPP insists that community involvement is necessary for the sustainability of its approach.

The external component of the sewerage system is considered LPP's responsibility (through activation of donor or TMA funds) and it includes construction of the main sewers, disposal works and treatment plants. Yet acquiring the land where the external component of the sewerage system is based also requires community involvement. While community members can donate land for construction of the disposal site, more often that not, the required piece of land has to be purchased. The sewerage water being filtered and treated through the external component is subsequently used to water nearby fields. The person whose fields use this water to supplement water ordinarily purchased from tube well owners, are asked to pay for the fuel required to work the

disposal pump, whereby minimizing the need for external involvement in maintaining the sewerage system.



LPP gets feedback through from communities by maintaining contact with them even after the sanitation work has been completed. The LPP now often responds to requests for assistance by community groups, following successful implementation of nearby community sanitation schemes.

#### **iv LPP's work in Lodhran**

The old sewerage system in Lodhran was built in the 1960s, and it had expanded in an unplanned manner, due to which it could only cater to less than 30% of the town's needs. It was amidst this situation that the LPP began its work in Lodhran. Surveys conducted by LPP in 1999 showed that the city had a total of 1,419 lanes (including big and small), of which only 450 had a complete sewerage system. In other words, on average only 24 lanes acquired functioning sewerage systems in each of the years (1980 -1999) when the city depended entirely on local and provincial government resources.

Since 1999, however, when the LPP started working here, a change has come to Lodhran and caused the pace of development work in the sanitation sector to have redoubled and its quality to have improved significantly.

Besides having undertaken construction of sewerage systems on a self-help basis, the LPP has also cooperated with the TMA for desilting the sewerage system of the city. People are also beginning to assume responsibility for minor repair work like pipe leakage and blockages and reducing their dependency on external help. LPP has also assisted the TMA deal with the perpetual problem of missing manhole covers, which kept being displaced or falling into the sewerage lines. Standard manhole covers are held in place by ring frames made from galvanized iron, which were repeatedly being stolen by miscreants to make money. In view of this problem, LPP suggested that the size of manhole covers be increased, so they would not require a frame and fit easily onto the standard manholes constructed by the TMA, without the need for a frame. This simpler manhole cover costs Rs. 500 instead of Rs. 1,700 being spent by the TMA before and thus when the TMO was given this option in 2002, he ordered 100 manhole covers based on the LPP design, now there are 500 such manhole covers being used within the tehsil.



A field visit was made to Pipliwala, a village in which LPP completed a sanitation scheme two and a half years ago. It had taken the LPP a while to motivate this community to opt for the component sharing approach, but when a local councilor committed to utilize UC development funds to undertake brick soling of the streets once the sewerage pipes had been laid, the community resolve was catalyzed and work finally began. The external unit in this particular area is located on a depressed piece of land which made it feasible for the LPP to build overflow pipes (see picture), which can be activated in case there is a blockage in the main disposal line (the entire sewerage system is also based on an angular design in which gravity helps move the waste water). The VSC members in Pipliwala hire sanitation workers from the TMA to clean the sludge or people do it themselves. A plumber also comes and fixes mechanical problems and operates the pump for Rs. 800 per month at Pipliwala. There was a direct spillover effect of Pipliwala in Nai Basti, another village in UC Lodhran, which also became interested in improving its long ignored sanitation situation. In Nai Basti, it was the TMA which agreed to give a grant to fund the external component and a contractor was hired to build the external component, while LPP motivated the community to pool its resources for the internal component.

The Naib Nazim in Lodhran tehsil identified outsourced contractors as the only resource for undertaking sanitation work commissioned by the TMA. Yet CCB resources could also be pooled in this regard, provided that LPP can create a niche for them to demonstrate their capacity in this regard. To provide greater incentive to communities, it was suggested that the provincial government should create a special fund whereby individual TMAs could expeditiously channel funds for brick soling in areas which had taken the initiative to construct underground sewerage systems on a self-help basis, as this would become a powerful incentive for people to try and participate more actively to improve the existing sanitation conditions.



#### v LPP's work in Dunyapur Tehsil

The sewerage system in Dunyapur was constructed twenty years ago but the sewerage lines were not being cleaned regularly and had been badly silted. When LPP established its field office in Dunyapur in 2002 (located within the TMA building), its interaction with the TMA resulted in three distinct efforts to improve this situation. The TMA contacted LPP and a Terms of Partnership<sup>3</sup> (TOP) was signed between them for a desilting campaign, whereby the LPP first initiated a survey to map the existing the sewerage system. Thereafter, it agreed to initiate desilting using 6 TMA allocated sweepers supervised by an LPP sub-engineer.

Based on the visible success of this desilting campaign, the Dunyapur TMA signed 2 other TOPs with LPP concerning



solid waste management and environmental protection. Under the solid waste management plan, the TMA began collecting 30 rupees from two lanes of Mohalla Qureshiwala in the city. The amount of money collected from this community of 439 people was used to reimburse sanitary workers given the duty to collecting the waste from these lanes and depositing it at a dumping site. LPP provided the motivation for the solid waste management campaign and agreed to monitor the TMA sanitary workers. It also agreed to provide waste bins and a wheelbarrow needed to take the solid waste to the dumping site. In conjunction with the solid waste management initiative was on a plan to convert human waste at the dumping site into fertilizer and to use this fertilizer to grow plants around Dunyapur, but this plan never materialized. Within a period of three months the

<sup>3</sup> An agreement signed by the LPP, the Tehsil Nazim and TMO

community willingness to donate money for solid waste collection dissipated and since that time the scheme has not been replicated elsewhere in the tehsil.

The third TOP was signed to undertake a plantation campaign. Again the Dunyapur community was mobilized and this time Rs. 1,20,000 were raised through contributions by local residents and businesses. Subsequently, 100 street plant guards were purchased and the TMA agreed to provide a water tanker to water these plants. Although half the saplings planted around Dunyapur have died, the TMA does plan to replant more trees in the street plant guards, which are still in place.

In retrospect of this experience, the LPP feels that the TMA was following a cost sharing instead of a component sharing approach. Instead of focusing on involving the community to donate funds for waste collection or donating plant guards, the TMA should have sought their participation in collecting the neighborhood waste themselves in the former case, or made them responsible for looking after the plants in the latter instance. The present Project Coordinator for LPP was the TMO in Dunyapur Tehsil at the time when the LPP signed the TOP with the TMA. In his opinion, motivation to undertake such schemes needs to be inculcated within the TMA itself. After his own departure, there was no one in the TMA to actively maintain liaison with the LPP and thus their TOPs did not materialize as planned. This lack of current interaction needs to be addressed given that the LPP is planning to undertake construction of 33 sewerage schemes in the tehsil in the next three years (albeit through donor funding), and this work should provide the LPP the pretext to reactivate its contact with the TMA.

#### **vi LPP's work in Kehror Pacca Tehsil**

Like the other two tehsils, the TMA in Kehror Pacca also signed a TOP with LPP for a desilting campaign. It has also collaborated with LPP on putting in place the external component of sewerage systems constructed in the tehsil. The TMA has also designated a sub-engineer under the TO (Infrastructure) to liaise with the LPP. However, the rapport created between the TMA and the LPP was disrupted when the LPP field office in-charge had an accident and died.

The new LPP Field Office In-charge had not yet been able to connect with the TMA like his predecessor. The relevant sub-engineer in the TMA complained that there was no in-built structure within the existing TOP to ensure coordination between the LPP and the TMA. The TMA officials complained that given the increasingly hectic commitments of the LPP, it was increasingly difficult to maintain rapport with them. The TMO reiterated similar objections and said that he had no contact with the LPP since several months despite having requested LPP to provide a model t-chamber to display in his own office.

During an ensuing discussion, the LPP In-charge mentioned to the tehsil nazim the option to put in place redesigned manhole



covers being used in Lodhran tehsil, and the nazim expressed some interest in acquiring them from LPP. But the tehsil nazim of Kehrorpucca was evidently not happy with LPP for involving union council nazameen in its projects, and kept reiterating that unlike the TMA, union councils have no sub-engineers and cannot give accurate advice or support to the LPP. The LPP however considers the involvement of councilors vital in mobilizing communities and in some instances for providing development related funds from the district level to improve the sanitation situation in their local communities.

### **vii Outreach program**

Several interested NGOs have contacted LPP to help implement low cost sanitation schemes in their communities. In coordination with the Strengthening Partnership Organization and the trust for Voluntary Organizations, and with LPP motivation and supervision (including appointment of LPP sub-engineer on the pay role of local NGOs), construction of underground sewerage systems in several locations in Khanewal, Faisalabad and Multan districts. LPP has provided interested NGOs technical assistance including survey, mapping, estimation and design of the external component.

Even though the LPP has itself secured funding to expand its program substantially, it considers itself a mature enough organization to perpetuate the low cost approach towards sanitation to other interested organizations, much in the way that the OPP helped establish the LPP itself.

### **viii LPP and JSDF**

The World Bank administered Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) has awarded LPP a US \$ 1.1 million grant to help replicate the LPP model in 100 villages across the three tehsils of Lodhran district. At an average estimated cost of be US \$ 50/household, the JSDF grant requires communities to contribute US \$500,000 for the internal component, while the external costs will be met through the grant funds. The estimated number of beneficiaries of this three year project is 20,000 households, comprising of 160,000 persons.

In addition, the JSDF project plans to train 150 Associate Engineers in the participatory sanitation model. Also 400 local government functionaries including nazims, councilors and technical staff within local governments are to be oriented in the participatory sanitation model. LPP model of participatory development is also going to be shared with technical colleges. Therefore, in addition to providing basic services to poor and vulnerable communities, the JSDF project wants to help reform public policy towards institutionalization of participatory development and to help reform the design of donor funded projects through demonstration of an innovative model to provide rural sanitation through partnership with communities and local NGO's. In the specific context of devolution, JSDF aims to galvanize CCBs for sanitation in rural areas. LPP feels that its VSC can be converted into CCBs provided some procedural guidelines.

### **ix Concluding Assessment**

It has not been easy for the LPP to mobilize communities despite its inextricable linkage with the TMA. Besides having to convince people to pay for and to manage a service typically considered a state responsibility, LPP has also become a target of local

politicians who view the LPP's activities as an unnecessary intrusion within their designated constituencies. There are several cases where local politicians have opposed the idea of people paying for access to sanitation services and tried to beguile them with elusive promises, only for these communities to approach LPP when political promises failed to materialize. Conversely, some politicians have facilitated the LPP's work by mobilizing communities and also providing their own funds to undertake soling of streets once the sanitation work has been completed.

The LPP model itself claims to provide a 'total sanitation' solution yet it does not concern itself much with the sewerage effluent used for irrigation. The LPP needs to focus on the public health implications and the environmental implications of effluent. WHO Guidelines for Safe Use of Waste Water and excreta in agriculture (stressing the ratio in which it should be mixed with normal water, depending on the nature of crops for example) could be used by LPP and its social mobilizers or a new cadre could be trained in this regard to ensure that communities are in fact following the guidelines for safe use of affluent. The Asian Development Bank has provided the LPP with a new design for a more effective disposal pond, which could increase the treatment capacity of the affluent before it is discharged into irrigation fields. LPP could also work on providing low cost toilets and stress upon the safe disposal of sludge (when manholes and disposal works are cleaned). Other departments could also help the LPP in this regard, the TMA could impress upon the district health department to ask LHWs to speak about sanitation and health or safe removal of sludge.

LPP cannot ensure 100% sanitation coverage. The poorest people of a neighborhood are encouraged to provide labour if they cannot share the cost of the internal component of the sewerage system. Usually however, other people often share the cost of these poor households, and poor people also tend not to provide labor if they are too poor to link up to the sewerage network. There are however many people who have adopted the LPP sewerage scheme in phases and many people prefer to build their own t-chambers and sewerage connections after the sewerage lines in their neighborhood lanes have been laid.

A World Bank study<sup>4</sup> undertaken last year had pointed out that the LPP's approach neglects women in community management of water and sanitation services. This is no longer the case, since the LPP has now begun trying to involve women. It has initiated contact with a lady councilor to form a female VSC to launch a sanitation scheme. LPP would also encourage female participation in existing VSCs, which are still comprised entirely of males.

It must also be kept in mind that the LPP model is best for tightly packed settlements ranging in size from 50 to 400 households and therefore it may not be very suitable to scattered locations. Moreover, there are still people within the communities in which the LPP was worked, who have not participated in the LPP sanitation scheme. For example, an old widow in Pipliwala, whose son is a drug addict and she has no money to pay for a connection and can not avail the sewerage facility and the only benefit for household is to live in a cleaner street. LPP first focuses on construction of sewerage lines within neighborhood lanes, which enables people to get household connections to these underground lanes at a later stage if they do not have toilet facilities or cannot

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<sup>4</sup> Scaling Up Rural Sanitation in South Asia, World Bank, 2004

simultaneously afford paying for the neighborhood sewerage lines as well as the t-chamber and sewer connection required to connect their house to the sewerage lines within their neighborhood.

According to the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey in 2002, only 41% of rural households have toilets, so LPP could certainly improve the situation by working on the design of a low cost toilet facility within households, linked to its sewerage system. Yet LPP primarily stresses that people should first concentrate on building the internal and external sewerage infrastructure as they always have the option of connecting to it at a later stage. For those who have toilets, or been able to purchase the t-chamber to be connected to the sewerage lines, are very protective about their maintenance since they are the once most able to use the sanitation facilities. While LPP certainly provides a low cost solution to sanitation, there are other solutions available like pit-latrines. In comparison to pit latrines, LPP provides a relatively higher level of services in the form of underground sewerage. Yet there is a price attached to this. The LPP estimates that communities pay 30 to 35 percent of the cost but these figures ignore the cost of the t-chamber and sewer connection, which makes the proportion of the community cost higher particularly if no one in the community is willing to donate the land for the disposal unit and this land has to be purchased by the community (see table 1b in Annex 2).

A looming question for the LPP in retrospect of its experience with the NRSP and in view of its coming expansion under the JSDF project is whether its component sharing will be diluted further or will the LPP be able to retain its sense of identity and focus on addressing the above concerns. Perhaps the greater resources to be provided by JSDF will enable the LPP to be more introspective. LPP remains adamant to keep working with the TMAs (on desilting campaigns for example) in order to retain its hard won identity as a specialized institution offering low cost and participatory sanitation solutions. For now, it may be best for the LPP to concentrate its energies within the Lodhran district and to keep up its vigilance against the dissipation of its personal identity by focusing more on how to best mediate between local communities, the government and donor organizations interested in making the provision of a basic amenity more accessible.

### III Concluding Remarks

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Several kinds of agreements and contracts between local governments and non state providers are becoming evident under devolution. There are also varying degrees of difficulty in getting the balance of roles and authority right for the sake of improving the quality and enhancing the access to basic development needs of the average Pakistani citizen. It is difficult to say whether the 'private sector' should best work with and through the government or should it be encouraged to offer parallel systems of service delivery. Some of the various strands of public-private partnership becoming evident under the devolution plan are also struggling with such question. For example, in Rahimyar Khan, collaboration has taken place between an NGO and the district government for health management, yet the NGO in question also works like the government in many ways and this is the reason why it has gained the trust and credibility of taking over government BHUs. Yet the PRSP's attempt to follow government procedures in terms of procuring medicines for example has constrained its ability to improve the quality of medicines. In Lodhran, the TMAs have placed a dual responsibility on their own staff, which allows for greater collaboration but also causes a bit of strain within the TMA. In Jaranwala, there is much more aggressive outsourcing, although NGOs are being involved in some instances as well, such as with regards to waste management.

The above case study has attempted to articulate some of the real life stresses, innovations and opportunities becoming evident from the devolution of power in a specific context. A further attempt has been made to include the viewpoint of different stakeholders, including not only the various implementers but also the intended beneficiaries. It seems that the access and quality of services is improving thus far, which is the basic reason for the mentioned initiative emerging from the devolutionary process to be labeled as a 'best practice'.

Yet there is need for giving more attention on the removal of emerging inconsistencies and the hurdles confronting attempts to improve social service delivery. The issue of sustainability is paramount given that local government officials themselves express doubts about the future of their innovations. This assessment of a specific best practice has thus been an attempt to not only highlight innovative processes but also to identify particular impediments pertaining to sustainability and outreach. Wherever possible an attempt has been made to suggest how given impediments have been, or could have been overcome, in the attempt to draw lessons for the replication of this success in other parts of the country.

## Annexure 1

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### List of People Interviewed

#### Lodhran

1. Nazim, Dunyapur tehsil
2. Nazim, Kehror Pacca tehsil
3. Naib Nazim, Lodhran tehsil
4. Honorary Director, LPP & AEO (I&S), Lodhran Tehil
5. Sub-engineers, (I & S), Dunyapur and Kehror Pacca tehsils
6. Former (TMO, Dunyapur tehsil)
7. Honorary Director, LPP
8. Finance and Administration Manager, LPP
9. Lady Councilor
10. VSC members and other LPP beneficiaries



## Annex 2

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**Table 1a: Rural Sanitation Projects – Progress until 15<sup>th</sup> February, 2005**

Serial No.	Project Location	Social Status		
		No. of Households	Population	No. of Streets
<b>Lodhran</b>				
1	Piplywala	243	1700	22
2	Nai Basti	62	439	14
3	Basti Barati Wala	50	350	10
4	Bubbywala	32	320	5
5	Nai Basti Qureshiwala	100	722	5
<b>Dunyapur</b>				
6	Chak 319/WB	42	1585	3
7	Chak 227/WB	80	560	14
8	Basti Sheikhain	50	560	12
9	339/WB	152	1064	25
10	Mouza Bhana	88	616	38
<b>Kehror Pacca</b>				
11	Mushi Wala	30	210	7
12	Gahi Mummar	222	1420	30
13	Muhammad Wala	32	320	5
14	Sohailabad	50	350	12
15	Faizabad	115	826	27
<b>Mailsi, Vehari</b>				
16	Kot Malikpur	171	1200	11
17	Chak 205/WB	165	1205	11
18	Chahumban Wala	39	273	9

**Table 1b: Project Costs**

<b>Table 1b: Project Costs</b>														
<b>Project Location</b>			<b>Internal Development (Community)</b>					<b>External Component (LPP)</b>						
<b>Lodhran</b>	<b>Length</b>	<b>Manholes</b>	<b>Primary Lines</b>	<b>Land Cost</b>	<b>Total Cost</b>	<b>Cost/ House</b>	<b>% of Total Cost</b>	<b>Length</b>	<b>Manhole</b>	<b>Main Line</b>	<b>Disposal</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>% of Total Cost</b>	<b>Cost/ Household</b>
	<b>(Rtf)</b>		<b>In Rs.</b>	<b>In Rs.</b>	<b>In Rs.</b>							<b>Cost in rupees</b>		<b>Rs.</b>
Piplywala	3671	76	122950	60000	182950	505	31	3000	60	212309	185812	398121	69	1638
Nai Basti	2094	47	86005	40000	126005	1387	41	994	17	53963	124400	178363	59	2877
Basti Barati Wala	1400	32	60000	30000	90000	1200	35	800	16	47500	122500	170000	65	3400
Bubbywala	1350	27	48100	40000	88100	1503	27	1142	22	68090	167465	235555	73	7361
Nai Basti Qureshwala	1016	21	45300	40000	85300	2059	28	850	17	63730	157000	220730	72	2207
<b>Dunyapur</b>														
Chak 319/WB	1286	26	57266	-	57266	1363	31	-	-	116316	116316	116316	69	2769
Chak 227/WB	3426	70	96000	60000	156000	1200	34	2034	36	185227	298678	298678	66	3733
Basti Sheikhain	1510	30	57386	30000	87386	1148	32	944	18	127400	187724	187724	68	3754
339/WB	4230	91	201368	50000	251368	1325	25	5840	87	210000	746398	746398	75	4910
Mouza Bhana	2328	50	95424	50000	145424	1085	28	1345	31	209860	373314	373314	72	4242
<b>Kehroor Pacca</b>														
Mushi Wala	1058	25	36073	50000	86073	1202	33	1630	37	99388	77785	177173	67	5906
Gahi Mummar	6640	137	250000	70000	320000	1126	42	3146	60	263000	187000	450000	58	2027
Muhammad Wala	1300	28	60015	40000	100015	1765	28	1200	24	82249	169465	251714	72	7866
Sohalabad	1750	35	79928	30000	109928	1599	31	1050	21	78428	169465	247893	69	4958
Faizabad	3800	80	172000	50000	222000	1496	29	4550	96	327162	233605	572767	71	4980
<b>Mailsi, Vehari</b>														
Kot Malikpur	3790	77	185573	50000	235573	1084	37	1800	36	194362	196985	391347	63	2289
Chak 205/WB	5010	101	230960	50000	280960	1400	30	4328	87	455695	210000	665695	70	4034
Chahumban Wala	816	18	37042	35000	72042	950	27	974	31	58822	136502	203324	73	5213

**Table 1c: Project Accomplishments until February 15<sup>th</sup>, 2005**

Serial No.	Project Location	Total Project Accomplishment			Completion Status
		Length	No. of Manholes	Total Cost	%
	<b>Lodhran</b>	<b>(Rtf)</b>		<b>(Rs.)</b>	
1	Piplywala	6671	136	581071	100
2	Nai Basti	3088	64	304368	100
3	Basti Barati Wala	2200	48	260000	100
4	Bubbywala	2492	49	323655	100
5	Nai Basti Qureshiwala	1866	31	306030	100
	<b>Dunyapur</b>				
6	Chak 319/WB	1286	42	173582	100
7	Chak 227/WB	5460	106	454678	100
8	Basti Sheikhain	2454	48	275110	100
9	339/WB	-	178	997767	96
10	Mouza Bhana	3673	81	518738	20
	<b>Kehror Pacca</b>				
11	Mushi Wala	2688	62	263246	100
12	Gahi Mummar	9786	197	770000	100
13	Muhammad Wala	2500	52	351729	100
14	Sohailabad	2800	56	357821	70
15	Faizabad	8350	176	794767	38
	<b>Mailsi, Vehari</b>				
16	Kot Malikpur	5590	113	626920	100
17	Chak 205/WB	9338	188	946655	100
18	Chahumban Wala	1790	49	275366	55